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PART ONE : THE MODEL 
-I- 
I: MHODOLOGICAL nURODUCTION 
The first prerequisite of any single body of research must be to 
establish clearly the rationale and orientation of that research* This 
process involves two related though quite distinct tasks: first the 
identification of the substantive field of study, and second the estab- 
lishment, of the methodological foundation and the prescription of the 
means and goals of analysis, These two tasks constitute the theme and 
Primary aim of this introduction. 
The first task is relatively simple and brief. 
- 
The last two 
decades have witnessed an increasing assumption of major civilian political 
offices by domestic military forces in many new nation state systems* The 
phenomenon of widespread total intervention by the militaryp long established 
in Latii; Americag has become manifest in the Middle East, South Asiat and 
finally Africa. It is the generic area of the total assumption and re- 
tention of major civilian political organs and offices by the militaryv 
i. e. intervention and performanceq. which provides our substantive frame 
of references' It is the apparent propensity for widespread military 
coups and governments in now nation state systemaq and the obvious import 
of such a significant change of regime or governmentq which constitutes 
the substantive rationale for the investigation of this problem. 
Although the iaentification of the generic substantive area is 
relatively easy-to establish, the second task is considerably more complex. 
The basic methodological premise is that the type of questions formulated 
about any given, research areaq the manner of satisfying. these questionst 
and therefore the type of-answers received are closely related to metho- 
dological considerations. In other words, the substantive formulation 
and payoff are intimately tied to problems of methodology. Hence the 
necessity of formulating explicity the methodological framework and 
rationale of this particular study. In order to establish our Own 
ý2- 
methodological framework and to appreciate the rationale for the adoption 
of such a ftameworkt it is necessary initially to examine briefly the 
existing literature on military intervention and performance. 
Critique'of C-ur-ient Studies 
Given that the many studies on intervention could be organized 
according to a number of criteriag the most useful would appear to be 
methodological. The existing studies- may be divided into individualizing 
and synthesizing studies. 
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The individual or particular studies are characteiiZed by the 
examination of a particular phenomenon,, usually a coup or a series of 
coupog-or occasionally of a particular feature of the military such*as 
organization or'ideology. 
3 The geographic focus falls mainly on one 
particular systemt though occasionally on a region, In approach they 
range from the anecaotalt to the descriptive-chronolOgicalt to the 
aescriptive-explanatory. 4 
The major limitation of these studies, quite apart'from their narrow 
frubstantive focus, is that none ittemptsp either prior to or as a conse- 
quence of researehp to'produce a related set of concepts which may, be use- 
ful in guiding research and in calibrating the results"of research. 
Invariably the stimulus for research and the rationale for data collection 
have relied more on chronological description than on an explicit'attempt 
to provide generalized categories of examination and explanatory unifor- 
mities. As a consequence we are left with the difficulties of providing 
a satisfaotory understanding of a diffuse, ftagmentary and unconneoted set 
of resul-Cs. Le historical materialt the individual studies are rich# 
though often uneven; but as a source of stimulating explanatory general- 
imationeg, they are not veryaseful. 
It is the perception of the somewhat confused nature 0. f the individual 
studies that has provided the stimulus'for the synthesizing - studies. The 
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primary motivation of these latter studies is to afford a generalized or 
synthesized concept around which the various cases of-military-interven- 
tion may be ordered. Since these studies are considerably fewer-Ahan 
the individual type, and since they are of greater relevance to our own 
studyq we may note briefly some difficulties pertinent to eaohý. --- -- 
Thus Janowitsp after a simple classification of-types of societyp 
focuses only on the internal dimensions of the military as factors favour- 
ing interventiong and further he makes no attempt to relate-the five 
dimensions of internal military organization to the broader'societal 
forces preciptating intervention and conditioning the development Of- 
these dimensions within the military itsglf. 
5 In the last-analysisq 
Janovitz provides a statiog albeit interestingg comparative scale divorced 
somewhat from any explanatory frame, of reference. The analysis based on 
professionalizationg as suggested by Huntington# can amount only to a 
partial explanation. 
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In the first placetýa. number, of highly profes-, - 
sionalized armies have become engaged in-civilian politicat while, a number 
of low professional armies have shown no such proclivity;. and secondlyt 
professionalization may even legitimately precipitate interventiong as 
for example-when a government demand violates the professional code of 
the army. A second very different and very interesting approach provided 
by Huntington has been in. terms of mobilizationt institutionalization and 
praetorianism (the product of certain degrees and relations between mobil- 
ization and inatitutionalization7). The major problems, with this aplýroach 
are that all three concepts are, rather catch-all in nature and difficult 
to measure empiricallyq further certainly the. evidence concerning the 
relation of mobilization to stability is ambiguoupg-and finally the main. 
concepts are incapable of precise differentiation.,, Thus for example it, 
is impossible to explain the differential incidence of military coups 4 
West Africa in terms of these concepts. A fourth approach has been that 
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of Finer 
8a This too has a number of difficulties. Firstly, to relate 
increased propensity for military intervention to weak attachment to 
civilian institutions is to offer a rather shallow explanations further 
it is'impossible to account for the-differential incidence of coups in 
situations of similar oulturesq and finally since neither the determinants 
not the relations between the three main components (i. e. dispositions 
opportunity and culture) are not establishedg--Piner's explanation must 
be seen to represent a flow chart rather than a theory. The final approach 
is that which has used correlation and'regression analysis in the attempt 
to identify precipitant conditions of coups9. Although this approach 
marks a direction in which research must move,, it is subject at present 
to three major difficulties. First the scales are xdthor, primitive and 
limited, Thus economists would point out that gross indicators such a's 
G. N. P* levels tell us very 3-ittleg or again political scientists would 
point out that one party v two party v multi-PartY indicators equally tell 
us very littleg or again the scales usually cover only readily identifi- 
able socio-economic indicators. Second, the current indicators are 
rather superficial., Thus a relationship between a low G. N. P. and a coup 
does not tell us the form of that relationship or indeed what factors 
govern low G. N. P. s. Thirdq much correlation analysis tends to be static 
in that it fails to examine the time dimension (though there is no reason 
why the necessary adaptation cannot be made)*, 
We may now integrate both types of study to examine the main defects 
which have characterized the field as a whole. ýThree such defects may 
be noted. In the first plaeot empirical data is random and further there 
are certain gross substantive lacunae. Thus analysts have chosen var7ing 
sets of variables for examination, which have vitiated the possibiUtY', fOr 
comparative examination. In addition whole substantive areas have been 
ignored, of which perhaps the most striking example has been the neglect 
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of the general syndrome of military-political'-Perf6rmancO and the'complex 
of problems surrounding the military transfer of power and withdrawal from 
politics. 
In the second place the vast sabjeot area of military intervention 
and performance has remained highly confasedg and there have been no 
attempts to order or structure the field, The bewildering-array of 
military intervention and'performance can be easily documented. Tbus 
some coups are led by military factions, others by civil-inilitary alli- 
anoes; some coups are initiated by well-trained, well-equippedo profes- 
sional armies and others by less well organized forces; some coups 
involve a high degree of conflict and violenceg while others take place 
at civilian invitation; 'some coups occur in societies with high G. N*Pos 
and with complex civilian political instit-dtioneg others in societies of 
a much less complex nature; some coups are explicit and easily7identified, 
others more indirect; some coups preceed military governments of long 
durationg others of short; some military governments initiate massive 
reform-programmes, others only limited or repressive measures. Such a 
list could be extended but would serve little purpose. The main point 
is clearly evident. Even at a relatively simple levelf the unqualified 
statement and identification of a, military coup or government can involve 
such a host of complex variationst whicht if unspecifiedg leave us-with 
such an over-generalized subject area as to defy any meaningful analysis. 
Finallyt desp: Ue the increasingly rich and extensive body- of empirical 
findings on the subject of military interventiong this information h" 
remained discrete and unconaected. Few explanatory concepts have been 
advanced and-few attempts have been made to integrate the empirioal 
findings into explanatory generalizations. 
10 
Given these three main limitations of the research on militarY inter- 
vention and performance, the next logical task must be to inquire into the 
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reasons'for these limitations, The reasons will be seen to be primarily 
of a methodological nature. 
In the first placeg the research area of military intervention and 
performance is a comparatively new area of investigation* The Primary 
reason for this is that the widespread occurence of domestic military 
coups is a recent phenomenon. (Thus most independent systems in the 
Middle East and South Asia either became independent or began nation state 
development some time after 19469 whereas most African systems followed 
the same pattern only from 1960. ) Given the contemporaneity of the 
majority of coups, it is unaerstandable that the initial stages of inves- 
tigation. should be concerned both to compile information and outline the 
boundaries of the problem. 
Secondly, a considerable degree of normative judgement surrounds 
military coups and governments. The usual evaluation is negative and is 
made from two very different standpoints. The one sees military coups 
as representing 
i breakdowns or deviations from some non-defined, idealized 
civilian democracy; while the other sees the military as the repressive 
aft of the state, Occasionally a more positive evaluation is made by 
those"who see the military as harbingers of law and oraer (and a bastion 
against communism). All these evaluations lead analysts to focus on some 
issues to the neglect of others and to see all military coups and govern- 
ments as part of a singleg uniform ffyndrome, and none helps us to confront 
the empirical-question of the conditionsunderlying coups and the patterns 
of military governmental performance. 
A third problem lies in the confused or non-explicit general con- 
ceptual, and methodological foundation of research. In generalp the normal 
approaoh has been founded on three relatively simple givens: that it is 
noxi-problem. or a matter of oommon. sense as to what constitutes the Militaryt 
a coup and a new na - tion state system. prom this point the method has been 
to focus on a particular coup and suggest a number of seemingly pertinent 
determinants. Howeverv if interest lies in the production of explanatory 
generalizations, a necessary preliminary task must be to clearly identify 
the activities or processes under study. In all non unitary or simple 
problem areas (which military intervention is clearly not)t this task 
involves some kind of typological or taxonomic exercise. Without an 
initial ordering or classifying of variations within the area of militarY 
intervention and performance so as to identify and isolate behavioural 
similarities and differencesq it becomes impossible to execute explanatory 
analysis. An important corc%3-1=y to this is that if the aim of the inves- 
tigation is to provide empirical explanationsq then the variables of the 
typological organization must be cast in heuristic terms and not in simple 
descriptive terms. (As for example in the case of the three simple givens 
above. ) 
A final problem relates to the failure to produce any comprehensive 
conceptual framework. The absence of any criteria for a systematic in- 
olusion or exclusion of key variables has had two main consequences. 
Firstj the absence of a comon guide for research has led to the'randomized 
collection of empirical data* Second# the absence of a general framework 
means there is no mechanism by which empirical observations and findings 
of research may be comparatively assessed and calibrated, It is the 
failure in this areap which is responsible for the fragmentary and uncon- 
nected findings of most studies, 
Meth-nodolo; dcal Framework 
Given these criticisms of the existing body of studies on militarY 
intervention and performancep it is now possible to outline the nature and 
rationale of this particular study, The primary aim is to establish the 
first stages of an empirical theory of military intervention and perfor- 
mance in new nation state systems, An empirical theory may be defined 
as an interrelated body of empirical propositions or generalizations 
(ioso 
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empi: rically validated, propositions) having reference to, a particular area 
of behaviour - in this case military intervention and performance. The 
main aims of empirical. theory formation are: first, to order and struo- 
ture an otherwise complex area of behaviour; seeondq to identify and 
isolate uniformities and common_patterns, of behaviour within this area; 
and third to identify the conditions underlying such patterns and their 
interactions in terms of interrelated explanatory generalizations. 
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With reference to an empirical theory of military intervention and 
performancep,, these aims may be translated as: firstj an attempt to 
classify and order the varying manners of military, take-over of civilian 
power and the varying, forms of military governmental performance contin- 
gent on such take7Over; seoondlyt to identify common patterns and 
uniformities with respect to such take-over or political performance; and 
thirdv to provide explanations or isolate the conditions accounting for 
such patterns, ioe, the conditions precipitating and governing both the 
various forms of military coup and the subsequent form of military political 
performance. 
The primary reason for attempting to formulate a synthesizing 
empirical theory is that such a theory may most adequately satisfy the 
complex of problems and limitations affecting the present general field 
of study of military intervention and performancet and thereby may hope- 
fully make a, useful contribution to that field. 
Howeverg, given that our particular approachp i. e. a synthesized 
empirical-theory of military intervention and performances has been deter- 
mined by a consideration of some of the basic methodological limitations 
of the current body of study in this areal it follows that our approach 
must be founded on and conditioned. by certain methodological prerequisites- 
These prerequisites are a function of two sets of faotorst first the basic 
assumptions and orientations of empirical theorizingy and second ths naturs 
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and scope of the substantive problem of military intervention and perfor- 
mance itself. Five such prerequisites may be identified. 
In the first placeg since the area of military intervention is both 
vast and complex,, the theory must be capable of organizing and structuring 
this area and of formulating the boundaries and definition of the'problem. 
Furthermorep since the empirical theory involves explanationg the form of 
boundary definition must be in heuristic terms. YSecond, the theory mast 
be capable of identifying the major areas of inquiry, of providing the 
conceptual means for analysis, and of integrating the subsequent body of 
empirical research. Thirdlyq the theory must be suffioiently-general to 
distingaish and account for the differences between military and non 
military governmentsp but also it must be sufficiently flexible and precise 
to differentiate between military coups and governments. Fourthly, it 
must be capable on account of the problem of taking account not only of 
factors pertinent to the military but also of the general political system 
of which it is a part. Pinallyt to the extent that the problem is of 
both comparative and historical dimensions, it follows that the theory 
must be composed of concepts and variables derived in terms of processual 
activity and independent of stractural parameters. 
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Given these prerequisitest the next logical step must be to posit- 
13 the method of theory constructiong and the basic units of this theory* 
The particular method, of theory construction will be a two stage one in- 
volving firstly the establishment of a conceptual framiwork or models and 
I 
secondly detailed empirical research based on this model. Speoificallyt 
the model will serve as the basis for empirical research in that it will 
define the boundaries of the problemt point out the areas for investiga- 
tion, and provide the means for integrating the product of research. In, 
itself the conceptual framework or model does not provide a theOrY 
(although 
it'is possible to deduce theoretical propositions from a conceptua-1 model)* 
An empirical theory can only be said to be constructed once empirical 
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evidence and'generalizations are collected and related in, terms of the 
conceptual framework. The advantages of this method of theory building 
are that'it can establish areas and vaxiables of investigation and pat- 
terns of interrelation'among these variables prior to researchq it can 
afford the means for abstraction from particular cases, and finally it 
can afford a modicum of deductive reasoning. The particular basic units 
of the conceptual framework are system and function, These two concep- 
tual units are especially suited to our problem in that they are inae- 
pendent of any phenomenal structure, they focus on process and activityp 
they'provide the means for abstractiong and they are ideal both for 
historical and compaxative analysis. 
Given that we axe interested in formulating an'empirical theory of 
military intervention and'performancep ana given that we have aclequately 
outlined the goals and aims of such an--analysist the final problem of this 
introduction must be to'posit the main qualifications of this approach. 
In the first placep middle range empirical theory does not provide 
the sole or comprehensive approach to the study and analysis Of human 
behaviour. Three limitations are noteworthy, Different forms of 
approach to a problem are'suitable at different stages of the develop-ý 
ment of knowledge with respect to that problem. Further different forms 
of approach provide different payoffs. Pinallyq since the constraints 
of empirical theorizing force a certain focusq empirical'theoryg far 
% 
from being'comprehensive,, 'must consciously neglect certain problems (given 
our focusq one obvious area which will be neglected is the aotual'technical 
process of'the coup). In the second placeg we must reiterate a point made 
above that our partioular approach to empirical theory building represents 
only one of several possible approaches. *, (Weealess to say we have sAoptea 
this particular Onq-. '. Sindtýýit promises the greatest return at the present 
time. ) Thircllyg our particular application of sy, 3tgm ana funotiorl aoes 
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not represent the only conceptual tools to confront the, problem of 
military intervention and performance. , 
In this respect two qualifi-" 
cations are in order. On the one hand, it is quite conceivable that 
other concepts or conceptual frameworks may be utilized, which would 
overlap with our own conceptualization in proportion t the comprehensive- 
ness of our formulation. On the other hand, our application consciously 
provides only a certain range or variance of explanation. Thus in 
focusing on the social system, 
_our 
framework deliberately avoids that 
complex of issues pertaining to the psychological ciipersonality systemt 
(i. e. our framework is inter-personal and not intra-personal) and that 
complex of issues pertaining to the general ecological system. Fourthlyq 
it is inconceivable that our theory vill provide all the generalizations 
having reference to military intervention and perfoxuanoe. Such a task 
is obviously beyond the scope of a single work* 
It is claimedo however, 
that our study will provide a number of-interesting findings and general- 
izations and that the conceptual framework is applicable to any case of 
military intervention and performance (within our definitional boundaries). 
Finally, it will be appreciated that we are not presenting an enduring 
scheme or theory. The development of empirical theoryq irrespective of the 
Aegree of sophistication or scope of any one theory# represents a constant 
movement between on the one hand abstraction (in the form of concept for- 
mationt testing different variables, collecting variables into patterns) 
and empirical research and data collection on the other. The two pro- 
cesses are mutually reciprocating and inevitably interlocked. Thus given 
a body of discrete empirical datat we attempt to order or classify it. into 
empirical variables and generalizationsg which are reapplied to eml*ical 
research and analysis, and either are retained as satisfactory (i, e* can 
explain a particular phenomenon), or are rejectedt or are refined. Which,, 
ever particular method is temporarily adoptedq the process indicates the 
constant movement between data and abstraction. It follows in the case 
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of our own theoryq assuming it is not rejected outrightt that future 
research will attempt to produce more empirical datat to refine some 
of the concepts and variablesp and even to reject and replace others* 
In short we are not positing an immutable theory. 
It will be realized that we are very far from providing a theory 
of military intervention and performance to end all theories of military 
intervention and performancep and even further from providing a compre- 
hensive explanation of all aspects of all coups and a prediction of 
future ones. Rather given the more modest general aims of empirical 
theory formation and the utility of such an approachp and given the current 
stage of development of the discipline of research on military intervention 
and performancev it is hoped that our approach will make a significant 
contribution to an understanding of this area. The final payoff and 
justification for our thesis may be easily and simply assessed in terms 
of whether our analysis has helped to order and explain and thereby to 
facilitate comprehension of one small yet interesting and important area 
of social life. 
11 
PART ONE : THE MODEL 
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FOOTNOTES I: METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION 
1. The subject frame of reference is rather vaguely definedq and as 
such would seem to correspond to a criticismg which will shortly 
be levelled at existing studies. Howeverl the subject area will be 
considerably refined later. It is necessary at the present simply 
to note the generic area. 
2. The distinction between the two categories is not of course always 
easily drawn with the result that there are a nýmber of transitional 
studies. These studies are either of a broad focus but employ 
essentially descriptive techniques, or examine only selected issues. 
Examples are W. F. Gutteridgeg Military Institutions and Power in New 
States, Pall Mall, 1965; or H. Daalder, Role of the Military in 
Emerging Countries, Mouton, 1962. 
3. The individualizing studies far outnumber the synthesizing ones, and 
are too numerous to list. They appear as anthologies, e. g. W. C. 
McWilliams, ed., Garrisons and Government, Chandler, 1967, or J. J. 
Johnson, ed., The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countriesl 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1962, or H. Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes, 
Sage, 1968; or as single works with either a regional focus, e. g. 
G. M. Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East, Speller, 
1965, or J. J. Johnson, Military and Society in Latin America, Stanford 
Univ. Press, 1964, or a single system focus, e. g. G. S. Harris, "Role 
of the Military in the Turkish Republic", M. E. J., 1965- 
4. Compare for example: M. Howard, Soldiers and Government, 4re, 1957, 
with E. Lieuwen, Generals v Presidents, Pall Mall, 1964, with G. 
Germani and K. Silvertj "Military Intervention in Latin America", 
Eur. J. Sociol., 1961. 
5. M. Janowitz, Military in the Political Development of New lationsi 
Chicago Univ. Press, 1964. 
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6, S. P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard Univ. Press, 1962. 
7. S. P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing_Societies, Yale Univ. 
Press, 1968, and an interesting application A. Perlmutter, "The 
Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army, " Comp-Pol-9 1969. 
8. S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback, Pall Mall, 1962. 
9. See for example, R. D. Putnam, "Towards Explaining Military Intervention 
in Latin America", World Pol., 1967. 
10. Given the negative criticisms, it is important to realize their 
positive empirical contributions, which are twofold. Firstj the studies 
have afforded a considerable amount of empirical data (which it is 
impossible to summarize. ) Second, they have called attention to 
areas of interest in the form of the documentation of the range of 
military political behaviour (e. g. puppet military regimes, military 
as counterbalance, military as restorers of the status quo, military 
as caretakers, military as innovators etc. ), and in the form of 
empirical correlates (such as socio-economic indicators, military 
variables, and international variables. ) 
11. Theory formation is not of course the only activity within the area of 
empirical political analysis. This type of analysis may be restricted 
to classification or data collection, but invariably works towards 
theory formation. For statements on the assumptions and goals of 
empirical political analysis and on the position of empirical theories 
within this field, see A. Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry, Chandler, 1964; 
J. IZimon, *Basic Research Methods in Social Sciences, Random House, 1969; 
H. Blalock, ed., Methodology in Social Science Research, McGraw, 1968; 
J. Galtung, Theory and Method of Social Research, Allen and Unwins 1967; 
D. P. Forcese and S. Richer, ed., Stages of Social Research, Prentice- 
Hall, 1970; C. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, Free Presst 1965. 
12. Examples of the early writings on the comparative method are R. C. 
Macridis, The Comparative Study of Politics, Random House, 1955; H- 
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Eckstein, "Perspectives on Comparative Politics: Past and Present", 
in H. Eckstein and Apter, ed., Comparative Politicsj Free Press, 1963; 
G. A. Almond, "A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics", in G. A. 
Almond and Coleman, ed., The Politics of Developing Areas, Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1960. The brunt of more recent work has been to point out 
that there is no such thing as the independent comparative 'method', 
but that it is an integral part of the scientific paradigml, and also 
to point out that problem definition can only be made in terms of 
process parameters and that spatial-temporal parameters only have the 
status of residual identifiers. See R. T. Holt and Turner, "The Methodol- 
ogy of Comparative Research", in ibid., ed., The Methodology of 
Comparative Research', Free Press, 1970; but in particular A. Przeworskil 
and Teune, The Logic of Comparative Social Inquiry, J. Wiley, 1970- 
13- There are of course several methods of theory construction. For a 
discussion see A. L. Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories, Harcourt 
and Brace, 1968; H. Blalock, Theory Construction, Prentice-Hall, 1969; 
A. Kaplan, op. cit. 
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THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM 
One of the main products of the first chapter was the establishment 
of the general methodological orientation of this inquiry in the form- of 
an attempt to produce an empirical theory of military intervention and 
performance in new nations state systems, Furthermore, the procedure'to 
be adopted in constructing such a theory was by means'of the development- 
of a formal modelg and the subsequent application of, this model in empiri- 
cal research. - The following chapters of Part One will beýconcerned in 
the main to elaborate this conceptual framework. - 
The subject of this chapter will be the first and most important 
stage in the development of this conceptual framework. More specificallyt 
this will involve the constraotion of a conoeptual model of the nation'- 
state social system. As the core of the total conceptual-frameworkg this 
model 4ill also be the primary foundation for this research. The-model of 
the nation state system will be constructed in two, main stages. The first 
involves an identification of the abstract analytic model; the second 
involves the establishment of the empirical analytic moaei as an elabora- 
tion and application of the abstract analytic one* 
The Abstract Analytic Conceptual Model 
The methodological introduction was of import not only in establishing 
the goals'and general format, of the research (in terms of an empirical 
theory constructed by means of a formal conceptual framework) but also in 
dictating a number of prerequisitesývhich any such research must take into 
account. These prerequisites were derived from a consideration both of 
the substantive scope of the research (i. e. a complex area of macro behaviour 
having wide comparative and historical reference)9 and the methodological 
orientation of the research (i. e. the obligation to identify patterns and 
uniformities of behaviour within the substantive frame of referencep and'to 
Provide explanations of these). These substantive and methoiological 
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prerequisites impose a number of constraints on the nature of the com- 
position and structure of the conceptual framework* 
The logical consequences of these prerequisites for the development 
of, the conceptual framework may be summarized in the need'to evolve a con- 
ceptual, framework derived inýterms of procesmial activity independent of 
phenominal structure and capable of heuristic application and development* 
The basic concepts9 which most adequately satisfy the requirements for a 
macro conceptual framework of comparative viability focusing on proceset 
are system and function, Both concepts have been the focus, of intense 
debate in which we do not intend to become involved. Rather we shall pro- 
ceed directly to define how we intend to-designate system and functionel 
System and funotion represent paradigms for analysiso and have been 
applied in a wide diversity of manners (this is particularly true of funo- 
tionalism). For our purpose a weak interpretation of function-(in which 
it is virtually synonymous with role) is subjugated into our master para- 
digm of systems. --A systems model simply describes a collection or pattern- 
ing of any group of elements, variables or relations which can be so '- 
aggregated as to form a mutually interdependent whole. Analytically the 
concept of a system as a set of interacting elements may be identified in 
a wide variety of different spheres, such as social# biologioall or' 
mechanicalg and at a variety of different levels within these-spheres (for 
examplet intra- or inter-personal levels in the social system). Our focus 
is the social system at the. inter-personal level as a collection ofAMI 
relational'interaction constituting an identifiable and interdependent 
whole. 
The next problem must be to identify why and to what extent any group 
of interactions may be said to constitute a system. ,A social system may 
be said to exist when any collection of human interaction so coheres as to 
fOXM an interdependent whole oriented to sejf-majutenance. ý' ObviOuslY no 
18 
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absolute or specific end purpose for self maintenance can be identifiedp 
but this problem necessitates a solution in terms of the identification 
of exigent processes independent of any phenomenal social system organiza- 
tion and common to all self-sustaining social systems. 'This may be' 
accomplished through a modified form of teleological reasoningg namelyý 
functionalism. 
To the extent that social systems represent enduring patterns or 
collections of interaction oriented toward self-maintenance, it follows 
that interaction within the social system is functional-to the extent, that 
it serves either the survival or the adjustment or the-maintenance of the 
system. This demands that we identify the ends, or activites that funo- 
tional behaviour plays in serving the existence or maintenance of the 
system. In short, we need to posit the major functional activities which 
are seen to support every social system and thereby to, be maafested in 
every social system, 
5001al systems may be resolved into a number of functional subsystems 
)4 
which are defined and identifiable in terms of functional activity" There 
are four functional subsystems: the political# theýeoonomiot the cultural 
and. the social. It is the first which is of primary importance for, us. 
The major activites peculiar to the political-subsystem are goal, -attainment 
and conflict regulation. These two major functions may be resolved into 
the following activites: decision-makingg institutionalization;,,. support ý 
mobilization and monitoring. Decision-making relates to the determination 
of goalst rules and offices; institutionalization, relates to the formation 
of consensuag rules and the legitimation, of the modus operandi, of the 
Political system and of its main structures. and goals; support maintenance 
relates to the stimulation and aggregation of support; for the-main goals 
and structures; and monitoring relates to, the capacity of-the political 
system to maintain itself and implement its goalep- which, aotivities beoome, 
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tied to administrative and supervisory duties and the development. of 
authority* 
The political systemt hovever, represents but one part of the matrix 
of relations forming the -total social system. In this respect, it both 
influences and is influenced by the other'subsystems. Its influence Ues 
in i1s own output# i. e. the definition of major collective goals to be im- 
plemented, their order of priorityp the allocation of sanotionsp and so 
one In turn it is influenced by its continuous dependence on the inflow 
of resourcesq services and supports needed to sustain its own outputs* 
These resources are drawn from the economic subsystem responsible for 
labour# manpower, material and monetary resources; the cultural subsystem 
which contains the basis of support for the regime, identification with 
symbols and so on; the social subsystem rejects social stratification and 
organisation and provides necessary support for different policies. 
At this stage a number of important deductions may be drawn. Firstt 
in form4 terms any collection or patterning of human relational interaction 
constituting some form of self-sustaining whole may be skid to form a social 
system. Secondq any social system may be seen to manifest a number of 
activities which may be resolved into four main functional categories. 
Third, the four functional areas of interaction of any social system are 
highly interdependent and mutually reinforcing. Finally,, the various 
activities of the functional spheres represent the permanent enduring social 
processes of any social system, 
This conceptualization of the social system in terms of system ana 
a 
function represents the initial outline of the conceptual apparatus. 
However, it is clearly evident that some considerable elaboration is 
necessary before this framework can be of empirical value. The first 
stage in such an elaboration can be made at the formal abstract level; the 
second and more important elaboration will be made in the following section* 
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The first elaboration hinges on the necessary requirement that the 
conceptualization of the social system be capable of identifying various 
types of social system. In this respectq social systems may be differen- 
tiated in two main fashions: abstractly and phenomenally. ' From the 
abstract standpoint social systems may vary in terms of the differential 
salience of various subsystems. Thus in some social systems the political 
subsystem may predominate, whereas in others, the economic or cultural ones 
may do so. F=ther, social systems may vary in terms of the degree of 
differentiation both between and within the various functional embsystems. 
Tbus in social systems with a high degree of social division of labour and 
role differentiation, the various subsystems will be more clearly demar- 
cated. Finallyt social systems may vary in terms ofAhe'size and their 
degree of comprehensivenessq i. e. in terms of the scope of interaction. 
From the phenomenal standpointv social systems may be differentiated in 
terms of, the empirical referrents of the various functional activities. 
Although the same functional processes and activities may be found in all 
social systemej the empirical nature or referrent of these universal pro- 
cesses will vary. Thus social systems may differ for example in the sub- 
stance of the different collective goals sought by the political'system or 
in the means of conflict regulation; or in the types of economic inputs 
such as tribal barter, feudal land. taxes or progressive income tax or 
corporation tax; or in the various forms of cultural legitimation such as 
heredittry principlesq natural lawq divine right or principles of popular 
representation and responsibility; orlinally in different social organi- 
zations such as rates of mobilityq types of family organization or forms of 
stratification. 
Given these analytic and phenomenal criteria of differentiationg 
several further deductions may be added to these outlined above. First-9 
a wide variety of phenomenal social systems may be seen to exist. Second, 
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the abstract functional exigencies may be represented in a wide variety 
of empirical forms* Thirdq since any social system manifests a high 
degree of interrelation among its various functional componentsq it follows 
that different types of social system uphold and are uphold by particular 
empirical manifestations of the basic functional processes. Finallyt all 
phenomenal types of social system develop and function undar specific 
social conditions and therefore the continuity of any social system is '- 
related to such specific conditions. 
The Empirical Analytic Model 
Thus far ve have elaborated the abstract analytic conceptual frame- - 
work in terms of a systems-function model. Am it was pointed out abovet 
the abstract model of a social system is not immediately amenable to empiri- 
oal research. Rovevert it was further argued that the adaptation'of the 
systems-function model for empirical research could be achieved through a 
two-stage elaboration. The first stage of this elaboration has already 
been accomplished through the specification of the formal mechanisms whereby 
social systems may be differentiated. It is the capacity for the differen- 
tiation of various types of social system which provides the means whereby 
it is possible to achieve the second stage of the elaborationg namely the 
translation of the formil abstract conceptual framework of the systems- 
function model into the empirical conceptual model. This will be accom- 
plished by translating the abstract social systems model into an empirical 
2 social systems model of the nation state social system. 
Howeverg before we proceed to establish this model of the nation 
state, it is useful to make a small digression to examine briefly existing 
approaqhes to the study of the nation state. in generalp two main appi6aches 
may be isolatea: the traaitional and the moaern. 
In considering the traditional approach, it is necessary to note that 
the nation state encompýsses two distinct conceptsp which have had different 
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intellectual histories. The state became central to western political 
discourse following the consolidation and centralization of power in several 
European countries under despotic monarchs (approximately from the 16th 
century onwards), and the introduction of concept of sovereignty. On the 
other hand, the concept of nation has been used at least from the time of 
the Middle Ages when it was defined in terms of a group of people which 
had some factor in common (i. e. were born in the same axea or had the same 
occupationg eto. ). The French Revolution partially destroyed this usage 
and gave rise to two different meakings of the nationp which were integrated 
over a century later. The political dimension to the concept of the nation 
spawned by the French Revolution was a mass element. The second and legal 
dimension was that of the nation-as a sove3dga independent state. ItIwas 
natural that with the rise of popular government and the establishment of 
stronger central authority after the French Revolution# the concepts of the 
state and the two strands of the nation should merge. The marked variations 
in the individual traditional approaehes may be subsumed along three main 
dimensions. The first and, most obvious is the historical, which was of 
import in conditioning the stage of development of the concepts. 
3 The 
second relates to the emphasis given, to political obligation and the grounds 
on which such obligation was, based. 
4 The third relates to the emphasis 
given to the historical description, of the rise of the nation state and 
5 the different variables posited for this rise. 
However, the variety of approaches within the traditional complex 
have been subject to a, number of limitations. In the first placeg the 
two concepts of state and nation were rarely integrated (a problem which 
has clear historical linkage). Secondly$ both concepts have engendered a 
high degree of emotive response, which has generally limited analysis. 
Thirdlyq the conceptual definitions were Very loose. This is particularly 
true of the concept of nation, which was employed much as we would use either 
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group identification or culture* 
6 
Finally, the use of empirical dataýwas 
random and haphazard# and evidently subject to severe limitations in 
availability. 
The modern approach has a strong germinal connection with the tradi- 
tional one in that it retains the notions of state authority and self- 
determinacy. It differs firstly in that it sees the nation state speci- 
fically as a single phenomenon of 19th century western development* 
Secondly, the modern approach has abandoned the emotive, philosophical or 
descriptive approach to focus on the empirical analysis of the dynamic 
processes of nation stateenergence and development. Further it is founded 
on empirical quantification and definition. Finally, it views the nation 
state as a cluster of variables which manifest varying degrees of intensity 
7 
or development. 
The discussion of the traditional and modern approaches is useful in 
that it illustrates the intellectual history of the two, concepts of state 
and nationg and points up the germinal strands which have persisted and 
developed through that history. 
. 
The modern approach is particularly use- 
ful not only in that it provides a wealth of empirical data and a number of 
interesting empirical variables vhich have been used to define the nation 
stateg but also in that it has fased the nation and the state into a maoro 
form of social organization# which has developed initially in the West over 
the last century and later diffused throughout the world. 
It is now possible to return to the main disoussion and to resume the 
elaboration of our conceptual. framework, It was pointed out in the intro- 
duction to this sectioný. that the second stage in. this elaboration was to be 
the construction of an empirical model of the nation state, This may be 
achieved by constructing an empirical analytic model of the nation state- 
derived from and mirroring the abstract, systems-function model. Thus the 
nation state is taken as a specific, concretep macro, type of social System 
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which could be juxtaposed to other macro phenomenal social systems such as 
feu. dalism. 9 bureaucratic empires or'despotic monarchies. The precise nature 
of this concrete social *systemt viz. the nation state, may be identified in 
terms of particular empirical referents of the abstract functional processes. 
It is these empirical referents of the abstract functional processes which 
define and support the nation state social system. In sum, our empirical 
conceptual model is a social systems model of the nation state defined in 
terms of certain empirioal-referents of the abstract functional processes* 
I, " In constructing an empirical'analytic model of the nation state 
derived from the abstract systems-function modelp two stages are involved. 
The first involves the identification of the boundaries of the systemt which 
in part corresponds to the'identification of some of the traditional notions 
of the state; the'second'stage involves the identification of the empirical 
referents of the'major abstract ftmotional processes which define and 
support the nation"state as the current major macro form of societal Organi- 
zation. 
The boundaies of the: system are defined initially in terms of the 
demarcation of 'pa; tterns'of interdependence and intercommmioation of 
politicalq economiop I social and cultural goodsq services and values among 
the c- onstituent units of the system. The major faetor differentiating the 
boundaries of the nation state system from other types of social system 
(which are similarly identified and defined in terms of intensities of inter- 
action and intercommunication)'-is the exclusive nature of the authority 
structure within the'system, "i. e. -the manifestation of sovereign authority. 
(Thus familiest-churchesl'Trade Unions, . corporationag etc. 9 may be identi- 
fied as systems but none has a'"m'ono'poly of auithority over its members, nor 
does it-represent the highest- I manifestation of authority over its members*) 
Thus the existence or boundaries of a nation'state system are initially 
recogmizable in terms of a-6ollection'of political, economicq social and 
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cultural interaction and intercommunication within which there is an, 
exclusive authority structure. Invariably in the case of. the nation 
state the boundaries are formally defined in legal-territorial terms. 
Within the framework of the sovereign. authoritative demarcation of 
patterns of interaction, the nation ý state ý is uniquely differentiated from 
other social systems (some of whichýmay possess the above properties) in 
terms of the empirical referents of the major functional adtivities. It 
is necessary therefore to identify the empirical manifestations of these 
processes which define and constitute the nation state* 
Theýmain functional activities of the economic subsystem are identi- 
fiable in the high degree of development of specializationt ýhe emergence 
and consolidation of industrial productiont-and the, ýdevelopment of a com- 
plex market and distributive system. The most important process involves 
the change-over from largely subsistence (and in some cases also a high 
luxury commodity production) to-factory productiong involving a high degree 
of machine production. ý Agriculture itself becomes more specialized and 
intensive either verticallyýthrough*improved techniquesp and experiments- 
tiont or horizontally through the reclaiming of new landsp a process often 
based on the application-of new industrial techniques. Howevert, the'major 
change lies in the appearance, -of industrial factory productiong which it- 
self is founded on and further, reciprocates capital and machine-intensive 
as opposed to labour-intensive production, the large-scale employment of 
investment for productive returns, the development of secondary and 
especially of tertiaryýemployment. 'The development of a complex market 
and distributive system entails a much higher exchange of both goods and 
services, a more mobile'and complex labour forcep the development of a 
monetary economyt and the responsivenessýof production to pressures of 
supply and demand. The major economic repercussions of the emergence of 
these particular economic functional, activities ýaret a massive rise of 
G. N. P. p the development of a high_degree of division of labourg a large 
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working foroet the freeing of a large part of the population from. purely 
subsistence activity,, the commercialization of agriculture, the emergence 
of monetary techniques and a developed market system, the development of 
technology and the increasing application of technical knowledgel and 
finally the diversification of general economic activity. 
The major functional referents of the cultural system axe manifest 
in terms of the development of rationality and scientific thought, In 
definitional termsq rationality implies that a logical or empirical bond 
may be established between any two elements. A thought or action may be 
said to be rational-to the extent that such bonds may be said to exist* 
As such two main types of rationality may be distinguished: substantive 
and formal. Thus the ideology of divine right of monarchs may have been 
said to be substantively rational in the sense that it served as a useful 
myth which consolidated and supported the rule of a certain class of peoplet 
and was therefore rational in assisting the perpetuation of such rule. In 
formal criteria the myth of divine rights is obviously untenable since no 
logical or empirical bond can be established showing either the existence 
of a god or a god-given prerogative for a particulax hereditary group to 
rule. and dominate others. It follows that all societies manifest some 
degree of rationality to the extent that they possess moral codes and legiti- 
mating ideologies which serve as rules and norms of conduct whereby behavioural 
expectation patterns may be established. The same, howevert need not hold 
true for formal rationality. 
The, cultural subsystem of the nation state is characterized by two 
major developments in rationality which, differentiate it from other types 
of social system. These developments involve certain changes in substan- 
tive rationalityt and secondly an increased manifestation of formal rationality. 
The changes in the former, relate to the extension in the range of persons 
within a system to whom normative and behavioural codes are applicablet and 
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the increasing impartiality and levelling in this process* The change 
in the latter relates to the divorce of normative codes from magict customt 
religion and their reliance on mechanical taboool unchanging and unchange- 
able rules external to society, to appeals to the quality of -behavioural 
acts in themselves or the attempt to employ formalized concepts of rational- 
ity by setting the frame of reference within, the total frame of human 
behaviour and not relying on external laws9 advice or sanction. The 
apotheosis of these changes lies in the, development of secular law. Howeverg 
the major impact of formal rationality has been in the emergence of science 
and technology. Science represents a method of inquiry identifiable in 
terms of a particular complex of rules, whereby Ihe empirical investigation 
of the nature and organization of man's knvironment may be ýaccomplished. 
The object of such scientific investigation is to-isolate patterns of uni- 
formities of interaction of elements within, this, enviroment and to provide 
explanations of these patterns. , 
The major offshoot of science is the de- 
velopment of technology, which, is the application of scientific laws and 
theories to the control of man's. -environment. The nation state ischarac- 
terised by the continuous expansion of science and technology, The major 
repercussions within the cultural sphere, of the _dual revolution 
of ration- 
ality and science are several. -,, - In the first, place there develops a changed 
perspective on time, which_is-, no longer seen as cyclical# nor is human 
existence within time seen as a preordained, phenomenon but rather as a con- 
stant process from the past intothe future.,. Secondlyq there is a changed 
perspective on nature whichis now viewed as a universe or collection of 
phenomena amenable both to being, ordered -in identifiable patterns and to 
being controlled and monitored by human activity- -. Finallyl there exists 
a changed perspective on, the relation of man to_man in society which is the 
consequence both of the development of sciene'e. 
-and 
of the major changes in 
substantive rationality* 
The social subsystem is characterized by the manifestation of certain 
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forms of societal organization and stratification* The most salient 
characteristics are a high degree of role and structural differentiationt 
social mobilizationg increased mobility (whether in prestige, occupational 
or geographical terms), and the greater salience of achievement oriented 
norms and organizations. 
The definitional characteristics of the political subsyAem maybe 
examined more precisely in terms of the empirical referents of the four 
main functional activities. The political function of decision making 
may be Akiided into two considerations: the method and the scope of 
decision making. The former becomes tied to some kind of legislative 
aotivityq to the emergence of some kind of central executivet 'and to the' 
development of a complex administrative structure. The latter becomes, 
tied to the maximization of the maýor political and economio'goalti, ' to the 
production and distribution of political and economic goods , to the means 
of conflict regulation, to the regulation of external, contaotg to the choice 
of occupants of political roles and so on. The institutionalization funo- 
tion refers to the attempts to increase the survival capacity of the poli- 
tical system through the- development of a body of rules governing , orientation 
and modes of political action and theereation of consensus on such a body# 
the development of legitimate channels -for the circulation of political 
incumbents-, offices and regimest and the development of institutional auton- 
omy for major political organizations. '-These activities involve the 
development of a constitution, *- rule's of successiont voting and electoral 
mechanismsý specification of the spheres of competence of various organiza- 
tionst the development of a juridicial" apparatus. Support mobilization, 
the third major political function, - i's'or-iented not only toward small 
groupsp cliques or organizations but', to the popula I celas a whole, The 
mobilization of support is'manifest'ed in 'such activities ai rationalization 
of policies and goals to the populace - "in'the-use of mass media and in public 
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opinion. Howeverg the major feature of support mobilization lies in the 
development of political parties. Factions or cliques are tobe found in 
most social systemsp but the emergence of a largeýase political, party 
oriented to the recruitment and production of leaders, to the-winning of 
popular support for various policies, to the articulation and aggregation 
of a wide variety of representative views and -opinions. is a feature unique 
to the nation state. The monitoring function, involves the development of 
the central authority structure, capable -of regulating and combining the 
major demands made upon it and of executing its own-policies and decisions. 
This involves the creation and development of administrative activity ., 
related to large central complex organizations (such as the civil bureau- 
cracyg police and military forces) based on centralizationt standardization 
and achievement rules of recruitment, and promotion; - the attempt to create 
and legitimate central authority resources; the mobilization of various 
national symbols; and the creation of functionally specific associations 
such as local government bodiesp commissions and central specialized policy 
bodies. 
The nation state may, be identified and is defined, as a gross type of 
social system which is supported. by and which manifests certain empirical 
referents of the abstract functional processes. - It is the manifestation 
of these empirical functional 
I 
activ#iýs within an interactive system : which 
constitutes the nation state.,,, Thusq in this manner the abstract analytic 
systems-funotion model has been translated into an empirical analytic 
model of the nation state. 
Before any possible problems 
, 
raised 
'by -this 
conceptualization of the 
nation state are consideredg a further. prelimintary elaboration of the con- 
ceptual framework is necessary., The outline of Ahe abstract systems 
model contained not,, only an elucidation'of a complex. of functional 
_activities 
but also an indication of, the systemic interaction among these functions, 
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The next section will seek to illustrate the interrelations among the 
major- ftpirical functional activities in the nation state. 
Interrelations among the Punctional Activities of the Nation State 
It is important to note that we are not concerned with the identifi- 
cation of any pattern of the emergence of the major functions* We are 
still engaged in elaborating our basic definitional model and as such are 
interested in outlining only a number of necessary logical or empirical 
connections between the major functional activities. These interrelations 
may be considered under two headings: the interrelations between the 
economict cultural and social subsystemst and the interrelations between 
the politicalq economic and cultural subsystems. In examining prim ily' 
the interrelations between the varying subsystems, we may also note inter- 
relations between functional processes within subsystems. 
The single most striking factor of economic activity in the nation 
state has been the development of manufacturing and industrial production. 
Manufacturing and industrial production may be used-to refer to the change- 
over from agricultural to factory production (as ýsueh the processing of 
agricultural or raw materials can involve significant developments of manu- 
facturing and industrial aotivity). These spheres of-reoiprocal repercus- 
sion of the development of manufacturing or industrial'production may be 
noted. The most immediate concerns the development of capital intensive 
production, of laxge-scale i investment and the longer'time lag for the 
returns on this investmentv and of secondary and -teAtiary production. A 
second and less direct sphere of repercussion has-been manifested in the 
emergence of a high degree of. the division of labour, and role and structural 
differentiation 9 the development of complex market'systems, and of a high 
degree of interdependence and'communication. These factors have a high 
degree of reciprocating-influence. The developed market systems are a 
direct product of the development of seoondaxy and tertiary' industries 9 which 
themselves demand more complex distributive and indeed collective systems 
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both to afford the materials and skills for the development of these sectors 
and to distribute the produot of those seotors. ' The development of a high 
degree of division -of labour bears a similar relation to the development 
of industrialization. ' In turn the new division of labour and the new in- 
creased ma et system demand impoved comnnini cations p, which in turn are made 
possible by technological improvements of industrial development. The not 
result of these three features, i. e. the division of labour, increased 
markets and communication systems, have the effect of inducing a higher 
degree of interdependence and intercommini cation. This involves agreater 
degree of exchange of goods and services,, greater communication among the 
various parts of the'system and increased mutual dependence of the various 
units within the system. -, All these'factors have the effect of enhancing 
the intensity'of interaction and-, interdependence within the - systemt and 
thereby of differentiating more clearly one system (as a pattern of inter- 
action) from'another. 
A third sphere of reciprocal- repercussion relates to the development 
of urbanization. ', Urbanization has existed independently of industrial 
production, but never toýthe same level as found in industrial society. 
Thus urbanization can onlyidevelop when., there is sufficient agricultural 
surplus to support an urban populaceg and where that populace has its own 
means of production from which-it'may purchase such surplus. FVrthermoret 
urbanization requires at leastýsome development in, the market systemt 
division of labour, and - communi cation, system, and'also some investment or 
capital exchange production, .:. Thusq not-only'does urbanization contain 
many of the features necessary: for, --industrialization, - but, industrialization 
in turn demands a, large-and-regulax working force-which urban communities 
are beat able to provide*'ý: - In short;, industrialization both necessitates 
and fosters urbanization* 
We may'now examine-some of--the*'necessary, logical and empirical 
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connections between the cultural and economic subsystems* It will be 
recalled that the major characteristic features of the cultural system in 
the nation state were firstly -the change in the nature of substantive ... 
rationality,, and secondly the use of formal rationalityq especially in the 
development of science and technology. With respect to the former, it has 
been well established that certain substantive value complexes -facilitate , 
the emergence of industrialization, In. general termsg a. value, complex is 
required which -places high in its hierareby, the importance of material over 
other worldly pursuits, such factors as savings or thrift and discipline 
which are conducive to investment, formation and complex organizati. Ong the 
commitment to regular and organized labourp and finally some favourable 
evaluation of industrialization. This. value complex,: which. in the West,,, _ 
was provided by the Reformation and Enlightenmentl is. most effectivelwhen 
it can provide a generalized legitimation of industrializationg and a more 
specific legitimation for the. essential internal, processes of industrializa- 
tion. The second major influence of the cultural-, on the economic subsystem 
liex in the development of formal rationality, and, especially., in the develop- 
ment of science and technology. The essence. of,. 
Iseience 
is, the untiring, 
drive to provide explanatory empirical laws governing the natural world of 
man's environment. The most generalized repercussions of science have been 
of a substantive form. In this respeotp. science-has, fostered a world viww 
based on the belief in the eapability of man, to., control and harness the 
tone of nature. To the extent, the industrialization is partiallyfounded 
on this belief as vell as providing the, credibility for the. beli, ef 9a direct 
connection betveen the cultural and economic , subsystems -'jay established. 
More specificallyr the investigation and experimentation 9 so central to the 
scientific methodt have led to conscious to imp3ýove, the. capabilities 
and range of choice open to man through, the continuous inventions of machinesp 
toolog methods of pover generatinn, mqdesof.,, transpoýt and communication and 
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so on. Technologyq as the applied branch of sciencet coupled with 
industrial and manufacturing skills has become the continuously expanding 
motivating force and input into the economic subsystem. Finallyq formal 
0 
rational techniques have been used to improve,, industrial, techniques of 
productionp distribution and marketing. 
In turn the economic subsystem has influenced the cultural. Firstlyq 
economic and industrial expertise have improved, man's control over his en- 
vironment and thereby have supported a specific form of substantive ration- 
ality and enabled the explanation of man in society to move away from 
external sanctions and controls by, taboos or gods or god-given laws. 
Furtherp industrialization has provided massive iftrovements in transporta- 
tion and communication which have enabled the diffusion of new world views* 
Finally, economic development under -the 
stimulus.. of industrialization has 
provided the necessary surplus capital to finance, educational programmes 
and increased government expenditure on welfare and juridical programmes* 
Such developments have enhanced the ideology of, universalization in the 
evaluation of behavioural. acts (i. e. that behaviour be,, Judged. in and of 
itself and that the same normative standards, be, applied -, 
to all incumbents 
of the social system), and the mechanism by which such universalization 
mmy be established. 
In continuing the examination of the patterns of intevaction. among 
the economict cultural and social subsystemsq it, io now pertinent to examine 
the interaction between the. economic. and social subsystems., 
, 
The major 
economic functional activities of the nation state demand a permanent and 
expanding labour force with an increasing degree of adaptability, and, mobility. 
The labour force must be permanent to permit stable patterns of production 
to develop and to allow for the necessary acquisition-of industrial skills 
and discipline (it follows that the lower the level of industrialization the 
less the need for a permanent or skilled working force). The labour force 
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must be adaptable as industrialization represents'a continuous growth of 
complexity and differentiation. Thus the labour force hasIto be both 
villing and capablev in te=s of educational and skill levelsp, to adapt 
to more complex and demanding tasks, This becomes particularly impor- 
tant as industrial production diversifies and secondary and tertiary 
manufacture outstrip primary production. - Finallyp the labour force must 
be mobile both occupationally and geographically. The-ramifications of 
such demands have been several. In'the firsVplace there has been'a"' 
marked increase in role and structural differentiation. "''For examp, e" 
a basic social organizationp such as Ihe family, has been stripped of many 
of its functions, such as educationp job trainingt job placementq etc* 
Generally, a nuclear or modified extended, family emerges'as-the modal-size 
of familial organization. A second major social ramig-ication has been 
the emergence of a new group of people dependent, for their livelihoods on 
activities other than subsistence agriculture. -, As economic growth advances 
through diversification and secondary and tertiary productiong that group 
of people outside agriculture has come to 'occupy a-wide diversity of 
occupational groups and statuses. A final ramification has been in 
changing stratification and mobility patterns, - , The continuous rapid and 
complex growth of economic production has made simple and enduring patterns 
of stratification Qn anomaly. Although stratification or status gradationsp 
in terms of differential financial or prestigious rewards have far from dis- 
appearedq they are more loosely drawn. Similarly mobility becomes 
increasingly, though far from solelyp dependent on achievement criteria 
and skill levels, and more a function of individual as opposed to-group 
movement. 
However, if the demands of certain - economic changes and . processes 
have induced certain changes within the'social subsystemg- the contributions 
of the social subsytem, have been just as -important in adapting'to those 
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demands. Thus, for exampleg increased social specializationg division of 
V-0 
labour and mobility are just avipljortant in giving momentum Leertain economic 
changes#, as vice versa. Economic growth levels cannot be maintained in , 
the'face of non-response by the social system* 
i", , Finallyq it is possible to examine the functional interrelation 
between the cultural and social subsystems. More so than in other patterns 
of interaction, the forms of interaction axe of a reciprocal rather than a 
0- ausal-nature, The major effects of the change in substantive rationality 
and the development of formal rationality have been in conditioning the 
quality and quantity of social stratification and organization. 
Qualitatively the universalization implicit in the change of substantive 
rationality has meant a greater dtandardization and levelling in -the applica- 
tion of codes of conduct. This has entailed forexample, greater, emphasis 
on'equalization in the application of societal, rules as in the standardiza- 
tion and sovereignty of secular law,! or the greater emphasis on achievement 
orientation. Quantitatively the changes in stratification relate to the 
availability of channels of mobility, - The substantive and formal rational 
elements of the cultural subsystem do not tolerate stratification or 
mobility based on such grounds, as tradition, ý hereditary rights or natural 
rights. This does not imply-that the'-'oultural, values., of the nation state 
run counter to stratification, ý which they manifestly "do not t but that the 
grounds on-which stratification*Iis based" do- changet i. e. become founded to 
a greater degree on occupation or'skill. -', In sump'the major effects of the 
cultural system have been inchanging the grounds for stratification and 
mobility through greater emphasis on achievementq educationt occupation'and 
ikillp in standardizing norms of -behaviour through the universalization of 
substantive rationalityq and', in'ý increasing the volume of, change and mobility. 
The social subsystems major ý contribution, to the development * of the ý cultural 
system has been in pro#i'ding"-'the necessary degree'of structural differentia- 
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tion to afford the requisite number of groups capable of stimulating and 
sustaining the particular cultural values. 
The second major heading relates to the ezamination of the functional 
inte=elations between the political and economic and cultural subsYstems- 
We may examine initially the relationship between the economic and political 
subsystems. 
The first major repercussion of the economic subsystem relates to 
the development of the high degree of functional interchange and inter- ' 
dependence. The division of labour and the specialization of productionp 
the growth of market interchange and the development of transport and 
communication systems have all served to increase the extent and intensity 
of interaction. The primary effects of this change have been twofold. -- 
In the first place, the increased intensity of interaction facilitates 
the process of boundary demarcation. By definition any system is demar- 
cated from others in terms of interactiong and -it follows therefore that 
the higher the rate and the greiter the intensity of interactiong-the greater 
the ease of boundary formation. (Invariably boundary formation is formal- 
ized by the establishment of territorial limits. ) ý- In the second placeq. 
the clarity of boundaries and the high, degree of intercommini cation and 
interdependence provide the basis on which stable and persisting patterns 
of behaviour and expectations may be established. Such patterns mean that 
I 
behaviour Uecomes more predictable and complementarity of interests may 
develop. The major payoff of such - developments'is in the greater ease, of 
national authority formation. 
The second major repercussions of, the economic on the political sub- 
system has been the increased load it has placed on the fatter. , This 
increased load is of two main forms. The first is the more direct and 
is a product of the increased scope and complexity of economic productiong 
which have led to a number of regulative and protective demands to be made 
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on, the political subsystem. The second is more indirect and relates to 
C. ov%%e-Cj%)Qr%C-e 
an increased load as a cons Mqneee of certain economic - changes. The 
phenomenon of import in this respeot is that of -, mass ýmobilization. . -, :- 
Although economic changes are not the sole caase of mobilizationq the 
changes precipitated by the processes of manufacturing and industrial 
productiont increased markets and improved communications ý have been of. 
paramount importance. The main consequence-has been manifested in, the 
tide of rising expectations in the form of demands ýmade -upon'the -political , 
system for educational facilitiesp welfare - services, regulative-, and inte- 
grative services and so on. 
The final major contribution'of the economic subsystem has been to 
provide the political one with greater, and, more constant resources than 
those available in any other form of , social: system organization., The' 
surplus educational and financial capital of the. eeonomie proceýses within 
the nation state has provided the necessary support to finance ý both- the', ý 
major bureaucratic structures of the political system'and also Many of the,: 
political system's main policies* 
The contributions of the political: to the economic system to aigreat 
extent mirror the inputs of the economic'to the political ý system* -- The 
major-effects are, firstlyp the general monitoringýand control fumation8i 
andt secondlyp specific promotional policies. With reference to the. former, 
in order that a complex, highly -differentiated- and -interdependent economy 
may develop, it is necessary thatý a: number-of basioý. political conditions 
prevail* Thus there mast existýa relatively, well, defined area, within 
which economic growth may freely ý take place 9, and, further-, there must, be 
some co=on authority structure within that area providing'not only internal 
law-and order and therefore security of production,. and,, trade buValso, for a 
legal network to monitor economic -transactions. ; The. more speoific, promo- 
tional effects include either the, provision. of, goods andýservioerj which, the.:, 
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economy itself is unable to provide, or regulative, and control functions* 
The former includes such features as transportational or communication 
sy6temsp which the economic system may be unable to provide on account of 
either the large capital sums involved or the need for' standardization. 
Perhaps the more important promotional role is in the regulative and con- 
, trol function. The most obvious manifestation of this is the protection 
of internal trade against foreign competition through the erection of 
tariff barriers. A further index of the control function of the political 
system is the centralization of currency and control of currency circulation 
and exhange. Without this complex controlp the economic system would soon 
collapse. Centralized direction by the political system is maintained 
through direct ownership, fiscal controls (such as bank ratest levels and 
types of taxesq tax incentives and so on) -and a foreign exchange budget* 
We may now consider the functional interchange between the cultural 
and political systems. The two major repercussions'of the cultural system 
may be considered in terms'of differentiationg i. e. -the change to rationality 
of action in terms of the action itself 9 and universalization. The former 
has meant a change in the cultural legitimation'of politics which can no 
longer rest on divine rights or natural, law'but is much more closely related 
to the actual pay off from the'lolity in terms ý of the demands made upon it 
and the success with which it meets these demands. - ' Thus 'the political 
system is obliged to rationalize its various policies 'in terms'of the 
perceived consequences of such pclioies. '- The latter, i. e, univeisalizationg 
has meant that the cultural legitimation of politics", largely in , terms of 
rationalization of policies and successful payoff 9, must be made to a *much 
larger group of people involving the majority of -adults within aI By I stem. 
Political culture in the nation state as the internalization of authority 
and Processes relating to that 'authority become's widesiredd throughout the 
populace. This means that not' only must the-polity iatio'nallie its policies 
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to the whole populace, but that it must take regard -of the demands of the 
total populace in trying to affect a suitable payoff coefficient between 
success in satisfaction of major political goals and demands for these 
goald'. ; -. The political system has responded to the changb in quantity and 
quality of political culture by devising institutionalized means whereby 
the changes in culture may be accommodated. This has involved'the develop- 
ment of relatively open legislative mechanism as a means for accomplishing- 
decision making for collective political goals; the development of mass 
political parties as a means for recruitment of political personnelg channels 
for the mobilization of demands and interests and as means for the subsequent 
rationalization of political action; the development of formalized rules 
for the transfer and acquisition of powerg and finally a formalized code of 
rules governing general norms of behaviour. 
The interrelations between the political and social subsystems tend 
to be of a more indirect natureq being expressed either through the economic 
or cultural subsystems. : Nonethelesst two important and interesting inter- 
relations may be noted, The first pertains to the c6nnection''between social 
stratification and the nature of political support. The emergence of mass 
popular participation in the political subsystem both is influenced by and 
influences certain changes in social stratification. On the one hand, 
for example, a more mobile population demands increased access to mass 
popular participation, some'degree'of control oVer 'political leaders and 
the reference and rationalizatioý'to the total populace. On the other 
hand the changing nature of-politi, , cal support (especially the extension of 
political participation) can pr , ovide the mechanism whereby changes in social 
stratification can be effected, which in turn can have consequences for the 
organization and composition of ý the political 'subsystem itself The 
primary consequence of the extýnsio'n Of 'political" participation is'to, in- 
hibit large-scale,, enduring inequalities in social stratification* The 
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second important interrelation pertains to the responsibility assumed by 
the political subsystem for a wide range of policy decision-making areas 
which have direct relevance to the structure and organization of the social 
subsystem. On account of demands from the socialq economic and cultural 
subsystem,, the political subsystem comes to assume either control or at 
least some direction for a number of policy decision making areasp such as 
education, healthq welfare, housing and population control 
(especially with 
reference to immigration). The consequences of such control or direction 
for the organization of the social system (and in turn for its response to 
the political subsystem) are both direct and obvious, 
In conclusion, a number of main points may be summa ized. The 
nation state social system is seen as the major macro form of societal 
organizationt which has diffused globally. The nation state is defined in 
terms of a number of interrelated politicalq eoonomict social and cultural 
processesq which have begun to interact and cohere over the last century. 
The focus on the nation state does not preclude examination of interactions 
between nation state systems or examination of those global forces to which 
all nation state systems are subject. 
8 To the extent that such forces are 
relevantl they are examined indirectly as they axe filtered and monitored 
by the nation state. (For example, a strong economic influence through 
external corporations would be represented as a structural weakness in the 
economy. ) Further the nation state is not seen as the final or idealized 
unit of macro societal organization but simply as the current most prevalent 
typd of macro societal organization. (Indeed examination of the interaction 
between the major politicalt economict social and cultural processes reveals 
a number of major contradictions which must ultimately terminate and trans- 
form the current form of nation state organization. ) R=ther, the state 
and nation become redundant as individual concepts so that the appellation 
the nation state refers simply to a particular type of social system. The 
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state and the nation as single concepts have been rejected on account of 
their tortuous confusing history and because they are difficult to, operate 
empirically and have had little heuristic pay-off. Finally, our model of 
the nation state system defined in terms of a number of empirically identi- 
fiable processes (which as will be shown later can have several possible 
permutations) will be seen as satisfying all prerequisites of comparative 
analysis outlined in the first chapter, 
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FOOTNOTES 2: THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEK 
1. The primary reasons for side-stepping the discussion of systems and 
function are that the debate is too vast to do justice to in a short 
space and that the debate has been conducted fully elsewhere. On 
systems, see W. Buckley, edp Moderft Systems Research for the 
Behavioural Soientistq Aldine, 1968; F. Ko Berrieng General and Social 
Systems, Rutgers Univ. Press, 1968; W. Backleyt Sociology and Modern 
Systems Theoryl Prentice-Hallg 1967; D. Eastong A Pramework of 
Political Analvsis,, Prentice-Hall, 1965- On functionalismp see., 
Ct Elýmpel, "The Logic of Functional Analysis"t in L. - Grosst - ea, 
§Mosium on Sociological Theor-vv Harper & Row, -1959; 14. Lanclaut 
"On the Uses of Functional Analysis in American - Political, Soienoe"l 
Soo. Res, 1969; A. J, Gregorg "Political Science, ana the, Uees of, 
Yanctional Analysis". A. P. S. R. 9 1967; R, Parsons,, "A Paraaigm for- 
the Analysis of Social Systems ana- Change"t in N. J. Demerath &. ý 
Peterson, eal System. Change., -and 
Confliett . Free Presst 1967; E. Nagelt 
"A Formalization of Funotionalism",. in. ibid. 
2* For a similar type of activity though with ref erenoe to" a very different 
type of social systemq see So No Eisenstadtt The Political Systems of 
Empireg, Pree Pressq 1963- Works such as K. Deutsohq The Nerves of 
Governmentl Free Pressq 19639 or-W. Mitchellt The American Poliby, 
Free Press, 1962,,, make a more detailed: analysis o. f different types of 
Political system organization. 
Thus the particular chronological date would dictate -the referrent of 
the nation or state: the degree to which these concepts had"been, 
merged. For two books which highlight this pointo, see C. J, H, "Ifayest 
The Evolution of Modern Nationalism, - MoMillant 1961, and L. L. Synder, 
The New-Nationalismg Cornell Univ. - Press. 1968. 
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5. 
6o 
7. 
8. 
For example, the basis of obligation varied markedly between such 
writers as Meineeket Cassirer, Fichtep Hobbesq Locke or Millis. 
Most writings on the state, if not of a philosophical or polemical 
nature, were historical descriptions. However, it is important to 
distinguish earlier writings which took an orgakic evolutionary 
approach (see 0. Hintzeq "The State in Historical Perspective", in 
It. Bendix, edq State and Societyq Little Brownp 1968)p from the 
more modern historians, who generally focus on post French Revolution 
organisations (see for example,, H. Kohn, The Idea of Nationalismt 
Collier, 1967; E. Kedourie, Nationalism, t Hutchinsont 1966; R. Emersont 
From Empire to Nationt Harvard Univ. Press, 1962). 
In this context, it is still common to find defiArtions of the nation 
in terms of a group of people who think they constitute a nation* 
For definitional and analytic purposes such a conceptualization is 
highly confusing as it raises a host of problems as to the identifi- 
cation of such units and as to the dimensions along which such iden- 
tification can take placeq e. g. religiousg, ethniev economicl regional. 
We suggest that given the presenoe of'interaution (by virtue of a 
system) . the degree of interaction and identification is all empirical 
and not a definitional problem. 
The outstanding work in this axea, is K. Deutscht Nationalism and 
Social Co-m-unication, M. I. T. Press, 1966. 
This includes on the one hand the whole field of "International 
Relations" which sees "states" as the main actorsq and on the other 
hand a new area of inquiry which moves in a very different direction 
to #he traditional '"International Relations" approachg namely Global 
Systems, which focus on gloval resources, patterns of economio trade 
flowp population, arms control, environmental decay# etc* 
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DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATION STATE SYSTEM 
The model of the nation state system outlined in the previous chapter 
has two-major limitations. ', In the first place, the method of differen- 
tiating phenomenal nation state systems -has not been outlined; and second 
the model cannot as yet take account of change. The primary aim of this 
chapter is to satisfy these two limitations and to extend and elaborate the 
existing model by introducing a dynamic dimension, This will be accomplished 
through the analysis. of development and political instability in the nation 
state system. 
Conceptual Prerequisites-for an Analysis of Development 
Before we outline' our own conceptualization of developmentq modern- 
ization and instability, it is useful to survey briefly the existing die- 
oussion. 
The majority of the discussions of development and modernization# 
which are now legion, has. taken'these two concepts as synonymous and 
z attempted to define%them, in. terms', of a number of variables. Occasionally 
either development or modernization is taken singly to be defined similarly 
in terms of a number of'variablesp and then the other concept is seen as 
the process whereby-such a condition is achieved. Thus we may speak either 
of aevelopment-as the-proýsss leading to'modernizationg or modernization as 
the process leading to, development. 'Usually some variant of the western 
advanced industrial nation'state is, taken as the modern or developed form 
of societal, organization which - is contrasted against. its obverse# namely 
the traditional, or,, underdeveloped organization. The developmental or 
modernizing process involves the movement from the underdeveloped or tradi- 
2 tional to the developed or, modern society. 
Al- Although the majbrity of-discussions of development or modernization 
may be summ ized in this manner-9, it. is important to notep within this 
general configuzationt four dimensions along which the numerous definitions 
may vary,. The fir 
, 
st and, most-obvious"relates to the referents of 
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developmentt i. e, the criteria or variables which are seen to define 
development. Thus the number of definitional variables ranges from a 
single component (Deutech)q to two (Binder)q to four (Eisenstadtq Pyet 
Parsons)t to five (Emerson), to eight (Ward and Rustow)* More importantly, 
the criteria are variously defined in terms of legal constitutional elements 
(Wilson,, 1h=gess), levels of economic development (Lipsett Rastow)t demo- 
cracyp Pluralism and competitiveness (Almondt Lerner, Colemanp Verba)t 
Psychological or leadership elements-(Shilet Pyet Spengler)v mobilizationt 
urbanizationt literacy (Deutsehq Gutwright)t participation (Almondt'Weiner)y 
or structural differentiation (Eisenstadt, Riggs). 3 The second dimension 
relates to the alternative conceptualizations of political, development as 
a dependent variable, i. e. as the product of a number of other societal 
changes such as industrializationt urbanization or mobilizationt or as an 
independent variable. The third-dimension relates tothe alternative'oon- 
ceptualization of development as an open-ended phenomenong i. e. as open - 
proceest or as a state of affairs, i. e. end produoto Finallyt the developed 
society is invariably juxtaposed# though not always'explicityt to the 
underdeveloped one. In other words# an evolutionary scale is seen'to 
4 underlie development. The'representationa of this progression are some- 
times in the form of a dichotomy, or a continuat or a 3-stage model (of the 
traditional-transitional-modern format)q or even as a double diohoto#05 
It is now pertinent to consider some of the criticisms of this-body 
of literature on development. It will be appreciated that any collective 
body of criticisms must be selectively applied - some conceptualizations, of 
development are considerably more sophisticated than others. Seven major 
criticisms may be noted. 
In the first placet the traditional-modern progression is invaria'bly 
based on an overly simple image of traditional society. There io, no one 
such traditional societyp but rather a wide ranget which may have very - 
different rep/ercussions on development. 
6 
Secondlyt the concepts Of 
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industrializationt development and modernization have been used synony- 
mously with all change being reduced to one of these concepts*7 Thirdlyp 
developipent is frequently concei%ed as a state of affairs rather than as a 
process* This of course precludes any change beyond the particular state 
of affairs defined an development. Fourthlyq development is usually 
defined in parochial terms. It is thus impossible to speak of a developed 
tribal authority, city state, or bureaucratic empire. All systems which 
are not modern are presumably underdeveloped - this would include 5th 
century Athenst 3rd century Rome, Han and Vang Empires in China and so 
on. 
8 Further, the choice of variablesp employed to definetdovelopmentt 
has usually been very arbitraryv and no attempt has been made to defend 
any particular selection. Sixthlyq there have been few provisions for 
reversals. Development is seen as a continuous process moving inevitably 
to somepostulated end. Thus almost anything that happens# whether it be 
coups# revolutionst religious or ethnic warag becomes part of the process 
of modernization or development. Finallyt the discussion of development 
has frequently engendered a strong normative and ethnocentric element. 
This is manifested in the assumption that the typical conditions of modernity 
pertain to the socis, 19 political or economic characteristics of western 
liberal democracyt which is thorefore established as the idealized norm 
against which underdeveloped deviation may be measured. 
10 
In sumq the main criticisms that may be levelled against development 
are that the concept is confused and vaguel that itJo over generalizedp that 
it is too statiog that it is based on the notion of unilinear convergencof 
and that it is normatively oriented. 
Given these criticisms and given the requirements of comparativO 
analysisp it is possible to outline the necessary prerequisites for a more 
adequate discussion of development. 
11 These prerequisites may be ordered 
under two main headings: prerequisites of conceptual meaning and of conceptual 
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technicalities, The latter refers to the technical prerequisites of 
concept formation which must be satisfied if the concept of development 
is to be viable in a comparative and explanatory frame of reference. The 
former refers more to semantio prerequisites. 
With reference to conceptual technicalitiesq several technical , 
improvements to the concept of development are necessary if the criticisms# 
outlined aboveg are to be avoided. In the first pladet it is necessary 
to differentiate quite clearly a number of the different elements conSti- 
tuting development (especially the political and economic dimensions but 
also the social and cultural). Secondlyq development must be defined in 
an open-ended manner. Change must not be viewed as inevitably directioned 
or evolving towards a certain end; rather development must focus on pro- 
cese rather than a state of affairs. Thirdly, development must be 
globally defined and not restricted geographically. This means that the 
variables constituting development must be defined in terms of process and 
not in terms of any particular structural manifestation of such process* 
Fourthlyq development must be open-ended in respect to the direction of 
process and must not start from asy ideological bias* Finallyp develop- 
ment must be tied to some form of social system organization# as develop- 
ment obviously begs the question of development of what. 
With reference to conceptual meaningg three major different meanings 
may be distinguished. It is the failure to differentiate these several 
meanings which is responsible for a considerable amaunt of the confusion 
surrounding the discussion of development. In the first placet develoPý 
ment can refer to some form of vertical movement or elaboration along a 
single dimension. Thus we may speak of the development of the PhYsiOal 
body in terms of growth in height as movement along an inch or meter scale 
or growth in weight as movement along a pounds or kilogram scale. A 
second meaking of development can be identified in which development 
connotes horizontal movement. In this sense movement doea not represent 
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vertical growth along a single dimension but rather growth in 
that 
additional dimensions or facets are incorporatedo i, e, some qualitative 
change is involved. Thus physical development in this meaning does not 
relate to ever-present dimensions such as height, but rather to the de- 
velopment of additional physical features, as for example in the process 
of adolescence. We may refer to this type of growth or elaboration as 
horizontal development. The third meaning of developmentt though still 
related to the above two meaninsq does differ rather markedly. In a third 
usagep developed refers to a statement on the maturity or performance of 
the dimension or object under consideration. In this respedt we may 
speak of a dimension or object as being developed to the extent that it 
manifests a satisfactory level of performance. 
It is now possible to undertake an alternative discussion of 
development 'Which combines and satisfies both categories of prerequisites. 
The conceptual technical prerequisites may be satisfied by placing the 
analysis of development within the conceptual framework of the nation 
statep which it will be recalled is constructed in comparative and heuris- 
tic terms. The conceptual meaning prerequisites may be satisfied by 
retaining the three distinct meanings of development and by identifying 
the nature and format of each of these three meanings within the frame of 
reference of the nation state. 
12 
The first meaning of development may be identified in terms of 
vertical movement along the various diziensional indices of the nation 
state. Thus given the range of politicall eoonomiop sooial and altural 
variables which were used to define the nation otateg we can speak of 
vertical nation state development in terms of movement or expansion along 
these dimensions (for example in the extension of Political Partie't or 
of popular partioipationt or of industrial and manufacturing productionp 
or of social and geographical mobilityp or of educationg or of juridical 
rules of law). The second meaning of development may be seen, in the 
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horizontal expansion of the indices of nation state organization. Thus 
horizontal development may be pointed to in the case where a macro social 
system begins to manifest one of the major functional indices of the 
nation stite, which previously it had not matifested. The third meaning 
of development relates to the capacity of the total social system to 
persist and maintain self-sustaining growth. In the context of the 
nation state, it is possible to speak of a developed nation state in 
terms of ite capacity tocope with the demands made upon itp i. e. to maintain 
satisfactorily its major functional processes. 
13 
Before we evaluate this cone eptual i zati on of developmentp it is 
necessary to elucidate the three main meanings. The section below will 
examine the first two dimensions, i. e. vertical and horizontal development. 
The following section will make a slight digression to introduce the dis- 
cussion of modernization. The subsequent section will then return to 
the main line of examinatinn to discuss the third meaning of developmentp 
which in turn will provide the threshold for the analysis of political 
instability in the nation state. 
Vertical and Horizontal Development In the Nation State 
Sinoe the vortical and horizontal conoeptualizations of development 
are closely interrelated in that they both represent movement along the 
dimensions defining the nation state, it is possible to examine them under 
rULOC 
the same nebrie. Development, as the process of motiong does not in it- 
self denote any intention of speed or intensity, but it does by the very 
implication of movement entail some conception of direction. This direc- 
tion can only be provided by the incorporation of the discussion of devel- 
opment into any phenomenal form of social system orgakization. In the 
present discussiong this will be achieved by the analysis of development 
within the framework of the nation state. 
In this context nation state development may be assessed in terms of 
both the number of nation state indicee manifested by any one sooial system 
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(horizontal development) and the extent or intensity of these indices 
(vertical development). The indices of nation state development are of 
course derived from the major politicalg economiog social and cultural 
processes, which define and support the nation state. 
The major political indicators are: the -existence of a broad based 
legislaturep the responsibility of-the legislature to the populace and of 
higher organs to the legislature, the emergence of, a specialized executive 
body and especially of centralized specialized agencies surrounding such 
an executive (such as planning and banking agencies), the development of 
a national authority structure and functionally specific organizations to 
maintain, parts-of this structure (such as police foroes)q participation 
through electoral-mechanisms by the majority of the populationg the de- 
velopment of, mass political partiesg-the national societal orientation 
of the'government in such. manifestations as welfare-expenditureq speci- 
fication of, minimum wageol, increased percentage of the budget of G., N. P. q 
the development of central controls and direction (such as fiscal or 
legal controls), and the-development of large-scale bureaucratizationo 
centralization and the rationalization of codes of rulese The major-, 
economic inidees are: the movement from subsistence existenceg the devel- 
opment of industrial, and manufacturing produationt the development of 
secondary and tertiary productionp the emergence of an internal commercial 
, market exchange systemt the consolidation of a complex monetary exchavge 
systemt the development of urbanizationt the large-scale development of 
communication, -transportationt and mass media mechanisms, The major 
cultural and social indicators include the emergence of rational-legal 
juridical structuresq-the universal application of secular, rational- 
legal codes, the development of universal educationt the increasing devel- 
opment and application of technologyq geographic and occupational mobility 
and-the establishment of stratification in occupational or acWevement termsy 
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and the emergence of the modified extended family* 
It is possible to examine horizontal nation state development in 
terms of the progressive manifestation of the. above indices by any macro 
social system. It is possible to examine vertical development in terms 
of intensity or progression along each of the main indices. The inten- 
sity of the major political indices may be assessed: in the existence of 
a popular legislature as opposed to a collection of clan eldersq noblesp 
or in the existence of formalized means whereby the legislature is res- 
ponsible to its base through elections, rationalizationg formal rules and 
officesq or in the formalization of the central executive body and the 
number and degree of specialization of central agencies, or in the size 
and differentiation of authority maintenance bodiest or in the degree of 
development of mass political parties (which may be assessed in terms of 
the percentage of the population they attempt to recruit)v or in the popu- 
lar orientation of the goverment which may be assessed in terms of pro- 
gressive income tax# percentage of the budget of GNPq the extent of wel- 
fare expenditurep or-in the scale of central or bureaucratic control which 
may be measured in terms of the percentage employed by the governmentt the 
diversification of the bureaucracy, the range of state penal controlsq the 
range of fiscal controls and so on. The intensity of the economic indi- 
cators can for the most part be assessed even more precisely. Thus it 
is possible to measure per capita income and productiong , the percentage 
of GNP from industrial and manufacturing productiong the percentage employed 
in secondary and tertiary production, the degree of internal market trade 
and interchanget the formalization and centralization of control of the 
monetary system, the percentage of the population living in urban communitiest 
the level of pommunication and transportational developmentp and the levels 
of literacy. The intensity of the cultural and social indicators may be 
assessed by the salience of the secular rational-legal codest by the 
Percentage of the Population governed by universal codest by the levels 
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of educationg by the salience of technology (as measured by the general 
cultural adaptability to scientific innovation and more precisely by the 
number of specialized technical bodies and the percentage of the working 
population employed in research), by the degree of geographic and Occupa- 
tional mobilityq and by the salience of the modified extended family. 
14 
It is quite easy to set precise cut-off points for each of the 
dimensionsv and thereby to give a clear definition of the nation state. 
It would even be possible to carry out a multidimensional correlation and 
regression analysis of the various indices and their-intensities*15 HOW. 
evert desirable this latter exercise would beg it would scarcely be profit- 
able for our immediate pupose. The latter exercise would simply be too 
vastv whereas the former would set limits of out-off points which were 
too rigid. 
16 Furthermore, the more salient problem for our research 
inquiry is not to expend the greater resources on refining for measurement 
purposes a model of the nation state (involving weighting of dimensionst 
etc. ), but rather to use the dimensional indices of the nation state a 
little less precisely and to concentrate the analysis on more complex and 
elaborate identification and classification. We can therefore employ a 
much more simple schematic representation of the number and intensity of 
the indices of the nation state, in which we shall introduce the concept 
of the threshold nation state. 
A 
Diagram 1: 
Intensity of 
Indices 
Number of Indices 
F- 
Q 
lb 
fi 
Schematic Representation of Number and Intensity of Indices 
of Nation State 
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If we plot the two dimensions of nation state development against 
each otherg two major out-off lines may be established EF and 
GH- The 
cut-off line EF is set on the basis that any social system must manifest 
a majority of the characteristics or dimensions of the nation state if 
it 
is to be termed a form of nation state organization. The cut-off line GH 
is defined in terms of the miniM13M intensity in which the nation state 
dimensions may be recognized as clearly developing into a nation state 
manifestation and which are sufficient to maintain the activities of the 
other dimensions forming the nation state. The heavily shaded area 
n *icates forms of nation state organizationt the more lightly shaded areas 
indicate threshold nation states* 
17 
Given this discussion of vertical and horizontal development in the 
nation state, it is possible to make a number of observations and elabor- 
ations on the basic conceptual model of the nation state outlined in 
Chapter Two. In the first place, it is quite clear that any particular 
phenomenal nation state does not suddenly appear in totot but does in fact 
develop from other types of social organization. In this respeetp the 
analytic model does not represent any single nation state but it does 
isolate the major processes and dimensions which define and support the 
nation ptate. In this man-ner, the analytic model points up the major 
dimensions along which any social system transforming into a nation state 
must develop (though not of course the particular sequence or rate which 
are empirical problems). Secondly, it is possible to take account of 
movement up or down or even contrattion of the major indices of the nation 
state by any particular threshold nation state or any particular nation 
state. Thirdly, it is possible to differentiate various nation states 
in terms of the differential development of the various subsystems or 
activities within these subsystems. Given the minimum interrelation 
between the politicalg economic, social and cultural variablest it is 
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possible to identify varying interesting patterns and constellations of 
the major, variaýles. -Thus one interesting research problem which 
immediately demands attention'is that of trying to isolate different 
constellations of political, economic, ', social'ýnd'cultural variables 
(both 
in terms of the phenomenal form'of the 'variables'and their intensity)t and 
to isolate the factors which account for these different patterns. 
18 it 
is the capacity to point out the major'lines of nation state developmentt 
to-permit account to be taken of movement along these dimensions and to 
isolate different constellations of dimensions and thereby'to differentiate 
nation sit , ites both comparatively and over time which introduces the first 
major mechanism by, which the analytic conceptual framework can be elab- 
orated to take account of change. 
19 The fourth observation that 11 may be 
made i8"that'the'discussion of development is not normatively boundq and 
is constrained only by the framework of the nation state. This means 
first thatit-is possible to speak of development on alternative forms of 
M"'r'o social " systems assuming that the major processes and dimensions 
defining such systems have been isolated; second that there is no reason 
to suppose that the nation 'state is the final form of social organization 
(h1ance in the future it will be possible to speak of alternative forms of 
development); and third that within the framework of the nation state 
there is no speoification as to the idealized pattern of development or 
structuring of the major politicalq economict social or cultural processest 
nor of the phenomenal form that these processes may take, Finallyt it 
will be noted that the boundaries of the nation state as encompassed by 
the threshold nation state are relatively loosely drawn. Two main reasons 
account'for this. On the one handq the process of nation state develop- 
ment may take many different forms; and on the other handt since the 
nation state represents a complex macro form of social systems, it would 
be anomalous to establish too rigid cut-off points. 
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Modernization 
Before turning to examine the third meaning of development 
(and 
thereafter instability)q it is necessary to make a small but related 
elaboration to the general-discussion by introducing the concept of modern- 
(The primary reason for the brevity of the discussion is that izationG 
20 
we shall rely strongly on a previous exposition) . The introduction Of 
modernization at this point is relevant on two accounts: firstv modern- 
ization has frequently been used synonymously with developmentg and we wish 
to make a differentiation; -secondly, we shall employ modernization within 
the context of nation state developmentg as defined above* 
One of the major, lacunas thus far has been the neglect of the external 
contextýof interaction between social'systems, Although all social sys- 
tems are by definition self-maintaining bodies of-interaction and can-be 
differentiated from each other in terms of such intensity of interaction 
among their component units, all social systems axe influenced to varying 
degrees by 6ther social systems in an external sphere of interaction. ý In 
the case of the nation statep this area of interaction is of course the 
international arena. The external sphere of interaction between nation 
state social systems may be discussed on two levels. 
The first is the more specific and involves direct interactibn between 
individual nation states or groups of nation states or even such inter- 
p, otion through an international organization. In this context interac- 
tion takes the form of outputs from the functional subsystems of any one 
nation state which then become inputs into any other nation state social 
system. Por example external economic interaction may take the form Of 
tradingg exchange of services, external investmentq aidt or direct exploita- 
tion; or again political interaction may range from simple patterns of 
interactiong such as exchange of dipbmats or conferencest to direct attempts 
to influence the process of goal formation in another political systeml as 
for example through direct intervention or manipulation, Important as 
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such individual patterns of interaction may bet given that their existence 
has been notedv they need detain us no longer at the moment. 
21 
,, 
The second and more general level of discussion of the external 
sphere of interaction between nation states involves the discussion of 
moddrnization., Modernity represents the projection and aggregation of 
a, number of the major ideas, aspirations. and processes of the dominant 
form of social. system organization onto the external sphere of interaction. 
As such modernization in the context of the global emergence of the nation 
state-represents, a kind, of world culturet consisting of aetiviths and 
aspirations derived from the nation state organization which become pro- 
Jected beyond individual nation states into an international osmosis. 
22 
Modernization then represents the dual processes of perception and evalua- 
tion-by individual social systems of elements constituting. this interna- 
tional osmosis of ideasg aspirations and activitiesp and the subsequent 
attempts toAncorporate or-internalize such desired features by these 
social-systems into their own social organization, In the terms of Nettl 
and-. Robertson modernization is, the process of reductionýof atimic status 
whereby less well placed-nation states attempt to m6ve toward equivalence 
with better placed ones. 
knumber of interesting observations may be made with reference to 
this-conceptualization of modernization. In the first placeg to the extent 
that international culture -can only be derived from the units constituting 
the, internationalýsystem as a wholeg it follows that modernization at the 
present-time must-represent many of the ideasp aspirations and processes 
(and reactions to these) abstracted from the nation state. 
23 In shortt 
modernization. 
-is 
identifiable in terms of extrapolations from the process 
of nation state development (and transformation). Furthermoret as such 
modernization has-proved a magnetic force since the nation state as a type 
of social system has been diffused virtually throughout the globe. 
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Although there have been stagnations or even temporary reversalsi there' 
have been no large-scale rejections or reversals of the major values and 
processes, of modernization. Thirdlyq modernization represents a relati- 
vistic phenomenon which is constantly changing and developing in response 
to the politicalt economic, social and cultural changes in values and 
processes within the nation-state. Since modernization is constantlY 
changing and relativistic (in that perception and selection of "things' 
valued" in the international market may vary)q it follows that there is 
no ultimate climax or final stage of modernization. Fourthly, moderni- 
zation does not represent a single closed aspirational cluster which all 
nation states must blandly followq but rather a generalized cluster of 
open-ended values (such as economic developmentp welfaie-expenditureq 
literacy, participation) which individual nation states can take over to 
varying degrees and develop in different forms. One corollary that must 
be. notedq however, is the strong Zimitation element involved in the drive 
of less well placed nation states to achieve equivalende with better placed 
ones, -- A fourth observation concerns the relationship between moderniza- 
tion-and certain economic and technological developments within the nation 
statep especially those relating to communication and transportational 
developments. Recent advances in communication systems have broken down 
virtually all insulated areasq and thereby made possible the diffusion of 
tor, %Aqvtv%r_e information on a world'scale. ' The interesting eeneetiqneee of this is 
that although change is essentially a domestic processq increasingly the 
stimulus for change has come-about through a response to internationia 
24 forces. 
The relation between-vertical and horizontal nation state development 
and modernization is evident. Howevert to the extent that a large gap 
exists between less well placed nation states and their modernization 
aspirations, there must be important repercussions for their degree of 
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development in terms of performance, i. e. the third meaning of development. 
It is to the discussion of this dimension of development and political 
instability that we may now turn. 
Development and Performance in the Nation State 
The third meaning or dimension of developmentt i. e. development as 
a measure of the performance of a social systemq must be clearly differen- 
tiated from vertical and horizontal development. The developedq or stableg 
condition is defined in terms of capacity and capability. It is defined 
in terms of the capacity to persistq that is to continuously and success- 
fully absorb the demands made upon itq i. e. to maintain self-sustained 
growth. Thus it is possible to point to a developed nation state or 
bureaucratic empire or tribal system to the extent that such a system can 
continuously absorb and satisfy the demands made upon it. It followst 
of course, that the substantive demands made upon such systems will vary 
markedly, but nonetheless each may be developed to the extent 
that it can 
satisfactorily cope with the demands made upon it. The developed condi- 
tion or stability is a function of the resolution of the two forces of 
the demands made upon the system and the capacity of-the system to respond 
to such demands. It follows that ceteris paribus the greater the per- 
sistence of a system over time, the greater the degree of development or 
stability, 
Given this definition of development two general elaborations may 
be introduced. In the first place, the analysis of development or 
stability need not be limited to the discussion of the total system but 
may be applied to any specific sVbsystem. Thus political4developmentp 
in which we shall be primarily interested, may be defined as the Capacity 
of the political system to cope with the demands made upon it* The 
second elaboration concerns the different levels at which we may con- 
ceptualize the political system. Given that we wish to operationalize 
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the capacity of the political system to cope with demands made upon itt 
it becomes evident that we must refine the gross conception of the 
political system. Thus it is useful to identify three different levels 
at which change and dability may be discussed within the political systeM. 
25 
The most comprehensive level relates to community, which refers to the 
gross substantive nature and organization of the major political, econo- 
miev social and cultural processes within a social system. An example 
of community change would be the establishment of the nation state as the 
basic form of social organization; it follows therefore that change in 
the political system at the community level would involve in this instance 
the establishment of political structures consonant with nation state 
organization. The second level relates to regime, which applies to a 
particulax patterning of the major political functions and structures 
within the context of community, Thus political regime change within the 
nation state would involve change in the different methods of structuring 
the political system but without affecting the gross nature or existeno6 
of the nation state social system itself. The third levelq the most 
specific and explicitq relates to intra-regime changeq which includes the 
organization of rulest offices and incumbents. Three observations may 
bie made with reference to these levels. 
are not discrete but axe interrelated. 
Firstly, these three levels 
Secondly, we may speak of change 
and development at any of these three levelst e. g, change in incumbents 
or offices may take place irrespective of any change at regime level. 
Finally, change may be sudden, as in community changes following Soviet 
or ChineseRevolutions, or more, prolonged, for example in nation state 
development in Britain. 
Although this conceptualization of development is not as yet very 
sophisticated and quite obviously demands a number of operational elab- 
orations# it is easy nonetheless to identify a number of its considerable 
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advantages. In the first place, it is quite clearly viable comparatively 
and can easily be applied to different social systems. Secondlyq it is 
relativistic in the sense that development is only discussed in the frame 
of reference of the demands and capabilities of any particular so(lial 
system. Thusq it is possible to find developed nation statesp or 
developed bunnueratie empires, and also developed nation states at 
26 
different levels of vertical and horizontal nation state development. 
This leads to a third advantageq namely that this discussion of develop- 
ment is clearly not normatively biased. A further advantage is that it 
is open-ended and involves no final developed state (indeed would imply 
that such a state is impossible), nor any specification on the ideal 
condition. Finally this conceptualization of development is both dynamic 
and heuristic to the extent that it demands a direct focus on change (re- 
cognizing change as a constant) and on the forces stimulatingg executing 
or even forestalling such change. 
Given the germinal utility of this conceptualization of development 
(as assessed by its satisfaction of the conceptual prerequisites outlined 
above), the process of extending the discussion may be undetaken by intro- 
ducing the analysis of political instability. The elaboration and opera- 
tionalization of the basic discussion, which this analysis of political 
instability will achieveg may be effected by a concentration on the 
functions of the political system and by the positioning of the analysis 
of instability in the context of the nation state. 
Political Instability 
The analysis of political instability represents one of the major 
syntheses in the development of the conceptual framev=ko"ana as Such 
will provide one of the main keystones of. the study, It is in the analysis 
of political instability that we may integrate the discussions of the 
formal conceptual frameworkq the application of this formal abstract 
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framwwork in the construction of a model of the nation statep and the 
major dimensions of development. 
27 
The conceptualization of instability follows logiaJ. 1y from the 
analysis of development above. Instability is defined in terms of 
incapability or incapacity for persistence and functions i. e. the in- 
ability to cope with demands. Instability is a breakdown in the pro- 
cess of social system function and existence. Political instability 
isq. therefore, the incapacity of the political subsystem to abso: rbt and 
satisfy continuously the demands made upon it, i. e. the incapacity for 
sustained growth. 
The incapacity of the political system to cope with demanas may be 
expressed more precisely in terms of the failure of the political system 
to satisfy its major functions, Since the abstract conceptual framework 
identified four major political functionsq it follows that four main 
types 
Of Political instability may be identified. These are: dedisional break- 
downt institutionalization failure; support failure and monitoring failure. 
Parthermoreq since the formal abstract functions have been translated into 
empirical referents in the process of the identification of the nation 
state, it is possible to identify the empirical forms and indices of 
political instability in the nation state. 
Decisional failure implies a breakdown in the deoision-making 
capabilities of the political system and an atrophy in the determination 
of its goals, rules and offices. It has proved convenient to categorize 
the decision-making process under two headings: method and scope. The 
former implies dislocations and discontinuities in the decision-making 
orgazks and is manifested in such indices as failure of government forma- 
tion and maintenanceg failure of coalition formation, conflict between 
major decision-making bodies and factionalization of parties. Any of 
these dislocations means that the decision-making channels are non-PrOduOtivO 
and incapable of function satisfaction. : Breakdown in decision-making 
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8 cope is manifested in the inability of the polity to act with reference to 
the major goals of nation state developmentv due either to inanticipation of 
such goals or conflict over goal achievement. The institutionalization of 
the political system entails processes designed to legitimize, regularize 
and clarify the major procedures of the political system, such as the pro- 
vision of a constitutiont of a body of rules governing political action, the 
development of electoral procedures and rules governing such prooedurest the 
provision of regularized means for the appointment and rotation of political 
officest and the delineation of the spheres of competence of the major insti- 
*Utions. Institutionalization failure is manifested therefore in the atrophy 
of such processes, i. e. the failure to establish a constitution, the failure 
to develop consensus on the mode of orJaitation to political interactiont the 
failure to develop successful electoral proceduresp the failure to develop 
accepted channels for recruitment to political office and for the transfer 
of power, the development of corruption and patronagep and the failure to 
establish the autonomous sphere of competence of major institutions, Support 
failure may be of two basic kinds: withdrawal or insufficience. The former 
implies simply the retraction of support and may be manifested in a range of 
indices, such as decline of electoral support, refusal to abide by the deci- 
sions of the polity, or opposition to the polity. Insuffieiency is of two 
basic kinds. The first typifies a too narrowly restricted locus of support, 
i. ee support drawn from an insufficient percentage of the population. The 
xecond is more generalized and relates to the incapacity to mobilize suffi- 
cient support. This may be observed in the foaure to develop political 
partiest in the assification of partiesq or in the closing or failure to 
develop adequate channels for the expression of political support. Monitoring 
failure is represented by a breakdown in the authority and monitoring capacity 
of the polity. It is manifested in the failure of the polity to establish 
its authority and the machinery necessary to implement its policies and 
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decisions, in the decline of. governmenta-I authority and the increased use 
of power and force to achieve its goalso in the rise in domestic violenceg 
in the, incapacity of the polity to collate demandsq and in the incapacity 
of. the, polity to satisfy demands. 
28 
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Not only is it possible to identify different types of instabilityt 
but also to givesome assessment to the degree or intensity of instability. 
This may be achieved, by employing three different measures. The first 
relates to the level at which-instability may be expressedo namely intra- 
regime or community. It is quite evident that the higher the level bf in- 
ability to cope with demands, the more serious the consequence for the 
political, syptem. In the second placev it is possible to note the number 
of functional impairments9 i. e. the range of indices of instability, 
Finally, since all the indices. have been defined in empirically operational 
terms, it is possible to give some assessment of the development of each 
index. 29 Thus-it is possible'to speak of the ranget intensity and level 
of political instability and thereby to make gross assessments in terms of 
30 
minor dislocation to stagnation to paralysis. 
_Having -indicated 
the main types of instability and the manner of 
assessment of such, instability, a small elaboration on the focus on politi- 
cal instability is necessary before the discussion is further elaborated* 
In the. first placeg the focus on political instability does not exclude 
analysis of other processes within the social system. Although as'political 
scientists we may be oriented more toward the study of political phenomenag_ 
this in noway precludes examination_of other phenomena. Indeed such an 
examination is necessitated-, by the nature of the interrelated major processes 
outlined by systems analysis. We are interested, therefore, in other func- 
tions and processes derived from the other subsystems to the extent that they 
impinge on the political subsystem. Thus a consideration of economico 
cultural. and social, processes will not be undertaken whenever such processes 
have no immediate relevance for the politidal system. In shortv the 
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necessary infringment of non-political processes on the political system 
is the criteria of inclusion for the analysis of these processes. 
The 
second elaboration that must be made relates to external systemic inter- 
action. - Again the same criteria for inclusion may be employed. 
The 
external influences will be examined to the extent that they impinge 
directly on the political system or more indirectly via one of the other 
sub-systemsq such as the economic. We are not interested'in such forms 
as external influence as direct take-over or conquest. 'as this is not an 
indication of instability within any one system. Direct intervention can 
obviously lead to the breakdown of a systemt but this is of a different 
form from the cases of internal breakdown, Thus we are interested pri- 
marily in domestic-political instability but wemay taket and indeed axe 
obligedýto taket into account external factors to the extent that they in- 
fluence political stability or instability withinAny specific system 
through the structure and organization ofAhat system. The third elabora- 
tion. ib'. Jto emphasize that instability is not necessarily synonymous with 
the collapse of regimes, A collapse of a regime (assuming no external 
intervention) may involve the interaction between two variables: on the 
one hand the condition of instabilityv and on the other a substitution by 
another regime. The availability of an alternative regime is not a 
variable which should, form part of an instability syndrome. In sump 
instability may lead to a continuing situation of stagnation or paralysis 
with no regime changeq or it may lead to a condition in which, the incumbent 
regime undergoes transformation, or it may lead to a condition in which the 
incumbent regime is supplanted. . 
ItAs now pertinent to return to the-main line of discussion to con- 
sider, the penultimate development in the analysis of politioal instabilitYs 
Given the capacity to identify and assess the four main types of Political 
inBtability,, the next-logical task must relate to the attempt to account 
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for and explain these types of instability. The process of isolating +, he 
conditions underlying instability involves two levels of analysis* The 
first andiore I general level may be examined immediately; -' the'second 
more specific levelp which takes off from the first, will be examined 
below in the final part of this section. 
The more general level of accounting for instability is essentially 
an analytic and deductive task. Instability is attributable to dissYn- 
chronizitions and dislocations in the major patterns of interaction within 
the social system. To the extent that any social system is composed of a 
body of activities and processes among which there is an exigent minimum 
of'interaction, it follows that dissynchronizations or dislocations in 
such interaction must lead to instabilityt i. e. must lead to some functional 
breakdown. Given that the major politica. 19 economieg social and cultural 
forces defining and constituting the nation state have been outlined, it 
follows'that instability in the nation state may be attributable to dis- 
synchronizations in these functional processes. 
Two main types of dio6ynchronization may beidentifiedo The first 
relates to dissynchronizations between the political subsystem and any 
or all other three functional subsystems; the second relates to dissyn- 
chionizations within the political elibsystem between the major functional 
processes. Ea ch type may be of two different forms. The first dissyn- 
chronization is that caused by imbalance due to confliefor irreconciliabilitY 
between major functional proces. ses; the second is caused by imbalance due 
to the failure of a particular function to develop (vertically) sufficiently. 
We may illustrate both main types of instability', ýith examples from the 
nation state. With reference to the first type; the political system 
may be incapable of providing sufficient central direction for the economy; 
or the economy may not be able to provide the necessary budgetary resources 
for the polity to achieve some of its main'goals; or the form of social 
- 66 - 
stratification may inhibit-certain political developments such as the 
growth of mass political parties; or again certain elements in the 
cultural sphere may inhibit the. orientation to economic development 
which in turn will have ramifications for the political system. With 
reference to the second type-of dissynchronization: the administrative 
structure may be insufficiently developed-to implement the decisions of 
the polity; or the political parties may not be developed beyond the 
clique stage and thereby out of tune with certain other political develop- 
ments; or again the major political groups may be unable to develop 
medhanisms of political intercourse. These examples could be multiplied 
many times. In each case the argument is similar. To the extent that 
the major activities within the nation state demand a minimum input from 
other major processes, it follows that whenever such minimum input is 
lacking the, processes cease to be mutually reinforcing and a contradiction 
or dissynchronization develops. 
It is now possible. to make several important observations with 
respect to this discussion of instability. In the first placeg there 
are varying intensities of exigency of interrelation among the major func- 
tional processes; some of the major processes are linked only indirectlyt 
whereas others demand much closer interaction and interdependence. It 
follows that ceteris paribus-the intensity of instability will vary directly 
with the degree of necessary relationship between the processes. Secondlyp 
given that nation*states at different levels of development (vertical and 
horizontal) will manifest different patterns of interaction# it follows 
that nation states at different levels of development may manifest varying 
patterns of intensity among the major processes. It follows from the 
first observation above that such varying intensities can lead to STeater 
instability intensities. In other wordsl patterns and intensities of 
instability axe related to varying patterns of interrelation between the 
major functional variables found at different levels of development, 
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The third observation relates to the identification of necessary 
patterns of interaction. Such patterns may be identified in three main 
ways: on- the basis of logical deductions from the conceptual modeIg or 
as a consequence of empirical observation over a sufficiently large number 
of cases, or post hoc when instability is apparent and therefore indicates 
some pattern of dislocation*' However, several factors complicate the 
identification of these patterns. First therAs a wide range of perma- 
tations of the basic functions. Second# the major processes of the 
nation state can assume a wide range of phenomenal forms which have dif 
ferent conseqqendes for instability. Thirdlyl given the problem of equiva- 
lencei different processes may assume differential salience in different 
societies. Fourth, since the nation state is in a constant process of 
changet'it is sometimes difficult to anticipate new patterns of interaction. 
Furthermore, this task is complicated by two additional factors. On the 
one handq nation states emerge and develop from a variety of non-nation 
state organizations which can have different repercussions for the patterns 
of nation state development. On the other handq the international environ- 
ment is constantly changing which in turn means different effects may be 
felt by social systems developing as nation states at varying times* 
Fifthly, the political system itself can execute a certain range of policies 
to controlfdissynchronizations. Howeverv given a number of inevitable 
6 
nualificationso which these problems must raise, it is possible to point 
out a number of counteracting measures. Firstly, despite the range of 
permutations of nation state processes (or more strictly the levels of 
development of nation state-processes), there does exist-'a minimum degree 
of coherence among such processes, and further there exists a limit to the 
phenomenal manifestation of-processes in the natbn state* SecondlYt what- 
ever range does existv may be simplified by typology formation. purthert 
the problems of equivalence can be controlled for by the types of concepts 
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and measures we use and by comparative investigation over time. Fourthlys 
constant change only inhibits long term predictions when change is assuming 
novel formsq and demands that dynamic analysis be pursued. Finallyq the 
problem raised by the capacity of the political system to anticipate or 
control dislocations can be countered by pointing out that the various 
roles the political system may play is one of the main variables of which 
we would take account in any probability or explanatory statement on in- 
stabilityp and that furthermore the policy capacity range of the political 
system is limited. In sum the problemsq pointed to aboveg do not hin4er 
in any way the capacity to explain political instability but only provide 
limitations either on the capacity to predict instability or on the pre- 
cision of any such statements. Where it is possible to identify logical 
dissynchronizations or dissynchronizations which empirical investigation 
have documented several timesq it is possible to formulate probability 
statements on political instability, the various forms it may take, and on 
the range of policy decisions which may be made to alleviate it- Where 
predictive capabilities are more delimitedt explanatory analysis (in the 
form of identifying dissynchronizations) can be made on a post hoc basis. 
Both the method of accounting for instability (at the more general 
level) and some of the related problems, which this engender% have been 
considered, The discussion of our conceptualization of political instability 
may now be concluded by synthesizing the various elaborations in illus-, 
trating the method of construction of an empirical theory of political 
instability in the nation state-. (and in the process of developing the' sec- 
ond stage in the process of accounting for instability as referred to above). 
To recall the initial methodological discussiont an empirical theory 
was defined as an interrelated body of empirical generalizations governing 
the substantive frame of reference of that theory. one of the primary 
methods whereby such a theory may be constructed is through the initial 
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establishment of a conceptual model, The purposes of such a model are: 
firstly to identify the problem; secondly to outline and provide the 
conceptual means of procedure; thirdly, to provide an explanatory: --mechan- 
ism of analysis; and fourthly, to integrate the findings of empirical 
research. Our analysis thus far has quite evidently not provided an 
emIkical theory of political instability, but it has achieved the first 
major part of the process in that a conceptual model, drawn in empirically 
identifiable terms and satisfying the above requisites, has been construc- 
ted. The building of an empirical theory is contingent in the main on 
the application of this model to empirical research. 
The process of ýtheory building in this application involves a number 
of stages. The first problem is to take a single or group of social 
systems, which may be identified as nation statesl and to identify their 
levels of development (vertical and'horizontal) and to document the nature 
of the clustering and constellati'on' of the main processes. The second 
problem is to identify theýnature of political instability in terms the 
indices defining the four main types. Our analysis has indicated not 
only the means whereby instability may be identifiedg but also the means 
by which some assessment of the intensity of Such instability may be made. 
The third problem is that of providing an explanation of the manifestation 
of instability -a problem which involves two stages, The first stage 
relates to the identification of the dislocations and the dissynchroniza- 
tions'in the major functional processes and has already been examined 
above. "' The second stage involves the identification of the specific 
concrete factors which haveý'precipitated the dislocation, and has not as 
yet been examined. Given that it is possible to identify certain dislO- 
cations or dissynchronizationog the problem here is to isolate those cOn- 
ditions or, variables which'underlie and govern such dislocations. This 
stage is necessary on two accounts. Firstly two political systems may 
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be manifesting functional breakdown which may be attributable to the same 
basic dislocation# yet the specific factors accounting for such disloca- 
tions may vary. Secondlyj and partially related to the d)ove observationg 
such an elaboration increases idiographic flexibility and payoff. For 
examplep a breakdown may be attributable to conflict between the bureau- 
cracy and goverment which in turn may be attl1butable to a variety of 
possible canses such as conflict due to resistance on the part of the 
bureaucracy to politicization or to different recruitment and training 
patterns; or again a monitoring breakdown may be ascribable in the first 
place to a breakdown in the main national authority structure which in 
turn may be atti-ibutable to such a range of factors as domestic riotsp 
factional strife (of religioust ethnict linguistiop regional. basis, etc. )t 
secession demands9 external aggressiong emergence of an internal revolu- 
tionary party, excessive abnormal loads such as massive refugee movements, 
or even natural disasters. In shortp the'first stage of explanations is 
the one by which we axe able to synthesize a wide number of discrete cases 
in terms of abstract comparative concepts; whereas the second stage permits 
account to be taken of individual nuances and the possibly unique constel- 
lation of factors which account for the more abstracted dissynchronizations. 
The fourth and final problem is that of integrating the product of research. 
This takes the form of building up a body of empirical generalizations 
relating the three elem6nts of the conditions which underlie instabilityt 
the various forms of instability, and the nature of the nation states in 
which such instability is manifested. 
In sum, the four purposes of the conceptual moJel enable us to 
definep produce, explain and integrate a body of findings governing POliti- 
cal instability in the nation state. Thus, it'is through the application 
of this 
-model 
to the investigation of a wide range of specific concrete 
cases of political instability that it is possible to begin to build a body 
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of empirical generalizations and thereby to construct an empirical theory 
of political instability in the nation state. 
The Problems of Late Nation State Development 
The purpose of the final section of this chapter is to examine those 
problems Of late nation state -development which engender an increased pro- 
pensity to*instability in social'systems experiencing later nation state 
development. 31 The method'q that may be adoptedy is to take the major 
functional processes-found in the nation statep and to isolate the problems 
affecting the development of these processes which axe derived from the 
changed internal or external context of nation state development. Thus 
the object is to isolate a cluster of general factors derived from the 
changing I environment of nation state development which pose greater strains 
on new nation states, and thereby increase their propensity for instability, 
After examining two generalized factors pertaining to the totality of the 
nation statep we shall'focus primarily on economic and political variables. 
Three preliminary observations are in order. -Firstly, although the 
I 
parameters of the study have not yet'been establishedp the term new nations 
states, (to be seen as synonymous with late nation state development) has 
already been used to refer to that complex of social systems which have 
begun the major processes of development within the last three or four de- 
cades and as such are clea: rly differentiated from advanced industrial nation 
stateal which began the process of development in the main in the 19th 
century. Secondlyg the subject matter of this section goes beyond the 
strict elaboration of-the conceptual framework in that it'take's in to'some 
degree the empirical application of this framework. Nonethelesso this 
r' 
-. discussion is introduced at this point because-it is closely related to 
the discussion of nation state development and instability (and indeed*repre- 
sents a primary and obvious empirical extension of this study)q and because 
it is of a very general nature and as such may provide-a useful background 
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to the more specific work of Part 2. ThirdlYt although a, number'of general- 
ized economic and political problems will be isolatedq these problems do 
have differential import for different emerging nation states-* Howevert 
despite the unquestioned variation, such problems are sufficiently general 
and'sufficiently important to merit examination. 
The tito generalized factors, derived from the-total structure of the 
nation stateg are the degree of interrelation between the major process de- 
fining the nation state and the rate of absorption of change by the'nation 
state. These two factors may be examined before the more specific economic 
and political problems, 
A major characteristic of the nation state is the development of a 
high degree of interrelation and interdependence in the main patterns of 
interaction. The development of such a high degree of interdependence is 
a consequence of two major classes of factors,. '- those-faotors conditioning 
higher rates of interaction (primarily the processes of differentiation and 
mobilization)v and-those factors conditioning the reintegration of new forms 
of interaction. All the major functional subsystems in the nation state 
serve to increase mobilization and differentiation*32' The economic sub- 
system9fosters such changes in the development of the division of labourg 
in the diversification of economic productiont in the freeing of a vast 
number of people from subsistence agriculturet and in'such technological 
developments, which facilitate increased communication'and the diffusion of 
information. The cultural and social subsystems foster such changes in 
the increased structural differentiation of many basic institutions (etch 
ex education and the family), in increased mobility and in the process of 
cultural universalization. The political subsystem fosters such changes 
in increased political participation and in the extension of the role Of 
the polity (i. e. in distributing economic and Political goodsp in collec- 
tion taxes, in stimulating certain areas of developmentf etc. ), In turn 
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the major subsystems have undergone certain changes to accommodate new 
patterns of mobilization and differentiation* Thus economic reintegra- 
tion takes-place in the development of large and complex market systems 
manifesting a high rate of interchange of goods and servicesq in the de- 
velopment of large-scale produotionýunits, and in the more pervasive and 
efficient communication systems. Political reintegration takes place in 
the development of political parties to encompass larger numbers of people$ 
in the development of complex agencies such as civil servicev welfare or 
employment agencies to monitor and control the complexity of demandst and 
in the employment. of-certain forms of policy (especially fiscal policies) 
to supervise-and control the balance of interdependence. Cultural and 
social subsystem changes include universalization of education and the 
standardization of juridicial rules of conduct. In sum, the nation state 
demands a high degreeýof functional interactionr-and interdependence. It 
follows that any factors which inhibit such patterns of interaction and 
interdependence must threaten the stability of the system. The-importance 
both of the patterns of interaction and their breakdown will become evident 
in considering some of the political and economic strains on new nations. 
The second generalized factor that may be noted is the high rate of 
change in the nation state. Change is of course a constant in all social 
systems. - Howeverg the rate of change in the nation state is unique. The 
continuously high level of change in the nation state is a function Of two 
major forces: On the one handq the cumulative progression of economic and 
technological-growth and the maryramifications of such growth throughout 
the system; and on the other hand the inclusion of ever-wider numbers of 
people in more intense patterns of interaction, The scale and--intensitY 
of changeq engendered by the development of the major processes and; 
activities, mean that the nation state mast continuously absorb-ana adaPt 
to a high level of change if it is to survive* Again. the-relevance of 
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this'factor will become evident in considering the political and economic 
strains. -- 
It is now possible to examine the greater economic and political 
problems, derived'from the changing internal and external context of 
nation state development, which confront new nations. The majorýeconomiO 
problems centre around the changed nature of the international economic, 
maxket and the obligation of new nations to trade on this market, 
33 It 
is important in this context to point out that-although periods of economic 
growth-have been experienced throughout world history (though for the most 
part such economic growth has been the unplanned consequence of, 'factors 
such as isolated-inventions, conquests or favourable harvests), it is only 
in-the last'century and a half that'any social system has experienced sus- 
tained economic-growth. Not only do new nation states begin the process 
of economic development in an environment where several nation states have 
manifested continuous growth rates for decades reýulting in massive produc- 
tive CaPabilitiesv but also on account of the demands., of the economic pro- 
cesses of the nation state they axe obliged to trade-and survive on this 
international market. 
One initial and obvious problem is that new nation states are faced 
with a more forced provess of economic growth. In the emergence of early 
nathn states economic developmentq in the form of industrializationg caused 
considerable dislocations, but it was a largely 13pontaneous process preoi- 
pitated by the coincidence of a number of politicalp economic, social and 
cultural forces. In many new nation states the stimulus for economic 
development is externally derivedq and to this extent they may lack a suit- 
able internal political, economict social and cultural organization in 
which economic growth may take place (even adding the important qualification 
that such a suitable organization need not be a precise parallel of that 
found in early nation state developmentý34 To this extento economic devel- 
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opment becomes a forced process and is likely to encounter a host of 
general social obstacles. 
Not only is the process of economic development a forced one in that 
stimulation is externally derived rather than proAuded by a coincidence of 
appropriate internal conditions, but also the very process of stimulation 
has frequently involved a complex of debilitating effects. Thus the pro- 
cess of stimulation was in many cases the product of external economic 
exploitation and domination by economically more developed nation statesp 
which may or may not have been formalized through the structure of 
colonialism. 35 The earlier nation states undergoing the process of 
economic development quickly realized the benefits to be gained from ex- 
Ploiting external underdeveloped markets both in selling their own products 
C(Sn%QqQQV%Ce% 
and in extracting cheap raw materials. The oonseuqnee" for these social 
sYstems which experienced direct economic exploitation are several. In 
the first place, a subsistence (and frequently an economic system advanced 
beyond subsistence) was shattered to become attuned to the economic demands 
of the more powerful country. This took the form of channelling the pro- 
ductive drives of the exploited countries into those areas deemed profit- 
36 able by the exploiting country. Secondlyq many of the profits accruing 
to the process of economic explitation of the poor areas were not reinvested 
in these areas but repatriated to the exploiting nation. Thirdly, so 
strong were the economic lines of trade and exploitationg that many newly 
independent nation states have been unable to break from these ties. 
Furthermore many new nations were tied to the currency of the exploiting 
powerg with the result that any fluctuation in the fortune of such a cur- 
rency in the colonizing economy wo, uld be felt by the colonized. Finallyp 
although it could be claimed that by economic exploitation the stimulus 
for economic development was transmittedg the economic development so 
stimulated was very much stunted. Already it has been noted that the form 
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of exploitation was directed to the interests of the colonizing powerg but 
perhaps more importantly such production was very much truncated. Thus 
the only pa=t of production to be executed in the colonized economy was 
the extraction of the raw materialq whether agricultural or mineral. The 
more important and profitable processing andAaanufacturing stages of Pro- 
duction were carried on in the more developed economic systems. Thus not 
only did more profits accrue to the colonizing country but also the secon- 
dary ramifications (of job employment, marketing further subsidiaxy pro-' 
duction) could be enjoyed by these countries. 
These factors lead to another problem area, namely the balance of 
the international market and the terms of trade on this mazrket. 
37 Although 
the new nations have well over half the worldjs populationg they produce 
only a small percentage of the world's income (about 106 in Asia and Africa 
and 204 in Latin America). Agricultural'production is in fact declining 
in the new nations (which is important when it is recalled that 60% of 
their population is employed in, agriculture)v though extractive industries 
are increasing output. However, the major'imbalance'is that industrial 
and manufacturing production is almost a complete monopoly of the advanced 
industrial nation states. Howeverg not only do the economically advanced 
nation states dominate the international market by virtue of their indus- 
trial Powerp but also the terms of trade are adversely weighted for the 
non-industrial new nations. Thus the per unit value of agricultural or 
raw material production is either stagnant or deelintng, whereas that of 
industrial goods is increasing. Given that the marginal utility of 
industrial goods is greater than that of agricultural or raw material 
products, such atrend would seem inevitable. Thus on the basis of current 
trading patterns and the terms of such patterns, the gap between the rich 
and the poor is increasing, 
A hxrther major problem is that of the demonstration effect. The 
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demonstration effect relates quite simplp to the projection of certain 
processes and demands by one group of social systems and their imitation 
or internalization by another. As such the demonstration effect relates 
very closely to the modernization process. Several general factors may 
be noted concerning the demonstration effect. In the first placet it has 
ramifications beyond simply the economic sphere (for examplep it was of 
major importance in stimulating nationalist movements)q although for the 
moment we shall concentrate on the economic ramifications. Secondlyp the 
very process of nation state development has increased the degree and im- 
Pact of the demonstration effect through such factors as improved communi- 
cation and transport systemsq and the extension of literacy and education. 
Finally, as nation state development has progressed in some social systemsp 
the'potential range of phenomena constituting the demonstration effect has 
been manifested in the rising tide of expectations, The more generalized 
effect of increasing per capita income may be divided into the demands for 
consumer goods and for public and welfare servicese With reference to the 
former, as an industrial economy expandso it is increasingly able to pro- 
duce consumer goods (as can be clearly seen in the development of the 
advanced industrial countries). However, consumer investment on any sigý 
nificant scale is very unwise in an economy at a low stage of development. 
With reference to the latter, public and welfare expenditure raises a num- 
bet of problems. Thus it assumes that surplus capital exists which can be 
harnassed for such investment; secondly public and welfaxe expenditure 
beyond the minimum needed for basic growth is very expensive; further the 
returns on such investment tend to be dther indirect or long-term; and 
finally such investment if not haxnassed to an economic development Pro- 
gra. mme can easily increase demands. In the case of early nation state 
development, such demands were mobilized only after industrialization and 
economic development were well established. Thus early nation state did 
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not have to meet consumer and welfare demands which would have encouraged 
capital flow from more fundamental investments. Howeverg the demonstra- 
tion effect has placed such demands on new nations at an eaxlier stage of 
development and thereby increased the strain on already limited capital 
supplies. Purthermore the demonstration effect is likely to ensure that 
many of the social costs incurred in the first stages of industrialization 
in early nation state development are not incurred in new nations* Thus 
the capital formationg essential for economic growthq could be supplied in 
the earlier cases of growth largely at the expense of the working classt 
which was obliged to suffer poor housingg low wages, long hours and fre- 
quent economic crises. It was not until industrialization and capital 
formation was well established that the working class began to organize 
itself. However, the demonstration effect makes this method of capital 
formation in new nations impossible. 
A further problem pertinent to the external economic, environment is 
that this environment is now considerably less flexible. The global 
emergence of social systems with clearly-defined territorial limits means 
that there are much greater restrictions on the movement of populationg 
capital or labour. Thus no new nation can experience the expansion of 
frontiers or economic resources in the gross manner of the'united Statesq 
nor can they plunder and exploit economic resources as did the major calonial 
powers, So again one of the major means of capital formation which could 
be employed by early nation state development is denied to later develop- 
ment. 
The economic strains mentioned above derive in the main from the 
changed external envirormentg as a consequence of nation state development. 
The major problem posed by the changing internal context of nation state 
deyelopment relates to the changing role of capital and technology, In 
a subsistence economy9 investment plays a minimal role and whatever surplus 
e 
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may be produced is normally channelled into luxury commodities. Sustained 
economic growth requires at least increased efficiency and the expansion 
of existing factors of production (i. e. through increasing the quantity of 
landq labour or capital or through the invention of land-9 labour-9 capital- 
saving deviced)9 but more likely requires some diversification involving 
qualitative changes with reference to capital formation and investment and 
the development and application of technology. It is only through capital 
formation and the related deployment of technology that continuous economic 
growth may be sustained. The new nations state encounter a number of 
interesting problems and differences which demarcate them from early nation 
state development. In the first place, in early nation state development 
it was private investment khich played the early dynamic role. In new 
nations partly bedause the process of economic development is more forced 
and partly because of different cultural values, an entrepreneurial group 
is missing. (Ii will be noted in this context that it is not the private 
aspect which is important but the existence of an entrepreneurial innova- 
tive group. ) Secondlyq in the early development public investment only 
became vital at a later stage in order both to control the maxket and to 
develop facilities which the private sphere was unwilling or incapable of 
doing. New nationsl because they are obliged to compete on the inter- 
national ma kett are compelled to develop the public role much earlier, 
Yet it is in this area in which massive investment levels axe demanded 
and on which returns are very long-term. 
38 
t-Thirdly as economic growth 
has proceded the absolute levels of investment and the length of time over 
which payoffs on these investments can be realized have increasea. 
39 
This proves particularly problematic of course for these countries which 
experience acute capital shortages* Finallyq it must be noted that the 
development and application of technology provides the major economic 
input into advanced industrial economies. Yet technological development 
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goes hand in hand with high investment rates and industrialization. Thus 
many new nations lack the necessary conditions under which a technological 
revolution may take place*40 
It is now pertinent to examine the major generalized political prob- 
lems for new nation states. Exactly the same format may be used as in 
the attempt to isolate economic strainst i. e. of examining the changed 
internal and external context of nation state development. 
The first problem relates to the expanded role of the political sys- 
tem. In the first stages of early nation state developmentq the political 
system, though far from ineffective, was not very extensive* However, in 
the-process of nation state developmentt the political system has come to 
assume a much more dynamic and responsible role. Thus it has come to assume 
some responsibility for stimulation and regulation of economic activityp 
for the provision of numerousýpublic and welfare servicesq for the regu- 
lation of numerous social problems (such as crime, housingp immigration). 
Furthermoret to *he extent that patterns of interaction have become more 
complex and,, subject to more rapid change, it follows that many of the 
basic monitoring tasks also have become more-complex and extensive. 
Whereas the-political systems in early nation state development experienced 
a more gradual extension of demands for goods and servicesq late nation 
state development had demanded a more dynamic and extensive political 
system much earlier. The basic problem which new nations face in this 
context is that many of the resources needed to support such an extended 
role are lacking (such as financial resourcesp educational skills, suffi- 
cient time to adapt to the new demands). 
A second problem relates to the extension of participation. Againg 
early nation state developmentmanifested a gradual extension of partici- 
pation. The demonstration effect has resulted in the sudden and extensive 
exPansion of participation in many new nations, and in so doing has created 
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a number of problems. In the first placep there is no reason to. suppose 
that the wide range of demands encouraged by participation expansion must 
of necessity be aggregated into any coherent public choice or wby indivi- 
dual preferences should be synthesized into any collective preference. 
Secondly, to the extent that broad participation patterns axe new and un- 
institutionalizedt such participation tends to mobilize localized demands 
which may prove impossible to integrate centrally* Finally, a sudden 
paxticipation extension placed an enormous burden on poltical parties 
which must attempt to regulate and aggregate new participation rates. 
The organization, financial and general aggregative burdens of this task 
were unknown in early nation state development where mass political parties 
were either a gradual extension of clique parties or emerged to satisfy a 
particular constellation of group demands. 
A further problem relates to the identification of the authority 
strueture. Again early nation state development proceded usually on the 
basis of a clearly identified territorial unit with some form of centralized 
monitoring process. It will be recalled that the nation state manifests 
a high degree of interrelation among the functional processes and to that 
extent demands a high degree of interaction and interdependence in the 
formulation and execution of major collective goals and the distribution 
of political goods. In this context many new nations face severe diffi- 
culties on two accounts* On the one hand, national patterns of inter- 
action may be tenuous on account of such factors as arbitrary boundariesp 
or deliberate colonial policies to foster separatismv or discrete areas 
of interaction with no common patterns of economic or political interde- 
pendence. 41 On the other hands even where collective patterne of inter- 
action are more pronounced the political system frequently lacks the 
resources necessary to sustain the extended monitoring functions. 
In sum, a complex of internal and external political and economic 
Changes in the structure and context of nation state development place a 
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range of problems and strains on late nation state development, which 
were not encountered in early development, To the extent that all these 
factors indicate greater demands on the satisfaction of the major functional 
activities, they may be said to encourage instability. It is against this 
background of generalized pressures to instability, that the development 
of any single nation state must be examined. 
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FOOTNOTES 3: DEVELOP14INT AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN THE NATION STATE SYSTEM 
1. Another usage of development, which will be ignored as it lacks any 
analytic utility, is that of development as a generalized synonym 
for change. Thus it is common to find indiscriminate references to 
the political development of Ghana or Uganda or Brazil etc., when 
in fact reference is being made to political change in those countries. 
2. Although the majority of discussions of development and modernization 
follow this format, it is important to note some more recent critical 
discussions, to which reference will be made later. Such discussions 
include: M. R. Doornbas, "Political Developkent: the Search for Criteria", 
Development and Change, 1969; S. P. Huntington, Political Order in 
Changing Societies, Yale Univ. Press, 1968; J. P. Nettl and Robertson, 
"Industrialization, Modernization, and Development", Brit. J. Sociol-I 
1966; K. de Schweinitz, "Growth, Development, and Political Moderniz- 
ation'll World Pol., 1970; C. Hah and Schneider, 11 A Critique of Current 
Studies of Political Development and Modernization", Soc. Res., 1968; 
and S. P. Huntington, "The Change to Change: Modernization, Development, 
and Politics", Comp. Pol., 1971. 
For some of the referentsl see the two summary articles by Packenham 
and Pye, written five to six years ago. These articles are concerned 
primarily to summarize the multiplicity of definitions, which were 
I manifest at that time. R. A. Packenham, "Approaches to the Study of 
Political Development", World Pol. , 1965; L. Pye, "The Concept of 
Political Development", Annals, 1965- 
Although development is not a new concept, it has become especiallY 
salient in political vocabulary in the. last 15 years as a direct 
stimulus of the rise of a large number of newly independent systems. 
Until this recent expansion of studies on development, the major 
approaches to this discussion had been those of the evolutionists 
and Marx. These writers saw development as the unfolding of society 
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according to some identifiable pattern, whether it be status-contract, 
community-association, or capitalism-communism- Although recent 
studies differ from these discussions in not providing large-scale 
'theories' of history, they place nonetheless strong reliance on 
an evolutionary dimension. See A. A. IIazrui, "From Social Darwinism to 
Current Theories of Modernizationýtq World Pol., 1968. 
For the use of the transitional stage, see as but one illustration: 
F. W. Riggs, Administration in Developing Countries, Houghton Mifflin, 
1964; as an illustration of the double dichotomy see D. E. Apter, 
Politics of Modernization, Chicago Univ. Press, 1965- 
Thus within the context of Africa, anthropologists have pointed to 
a wide diversity of so-ýcalled traditional structures. Compare for 
example the Ashanýi with the Hausa-Fulani with the Ibos with the 
Buganda with some of the more nomadic or pastoral tribes. Or again 
such organizations could be contrasted with the structure of the 
Ottoman Empire, or the caste system of India, or the Bureaucratic 
system of China, or the latifundista system of Latin America. 
This point is made by Nettl and Robertson, op. cito 
This point is made by Huntington, op. cit. 
It is true that all concept formation is arbitrary to a degree, but 
to a degree only. Variables and concepts can be evaluated along a 
number of dimensions, such as clarity, economy, explanatory payoff. 
The majority of discussions of development are characterized by 
the failure to justify on any grounds the selection of a range of 
variables from a larger possible array. 
10. This is revealed firstly in the blatant use of indices taken from 
Western liberal-democracies, and secondly in the preoccupation of 
many analysts in accounting for the failure of1democraticIforms, i. e. 
the two or multi party system with Iliberal-civill rights, in man-, y 
new nation states. The 'gap' analysts list obstacles to dysfun#ioning 
while 'requisite' analysts specify the prerequisites and attributes 
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of 'democratic' society derived from the indices of the West, (such 
as high per capita income which is seen as a safeguard for democracy. 
11. The prerequisites for comparative analysis were outlined in Chapter 1. 
12. The importance of putting the analysis, of development within the 
context of the nation state should be emphasized. In this manner, 
it is possible to solve the basic problems of development of what 
and also the problem of the justification of variables. Furthermore, 
it follows that to the extent that the nation state as a form of 
social system otganization will be or even is being superpede4 
then the discussion of development would have to be extended to cope 
with the new form of emerging system. 
13- This is the basic meaning of development as used by Huntington, op. cit., 
or S. N. Eisenstadt, Modernization: Protest or Change, Prentice-Hall, 
1966. However, our development of this particular conceptualization 
will vary markedly from that of either Huntington or Eisehstadt. 
14. It will be recalled that because we have not weighted the variables, 
it is impossible to say that one nation state is more developed 
than an other (vertically or horizontally) unless it is more 
developed along all the indices. Howeverl this is of little import 
as this task is non-interesting. The factors of import are that we 
are able to make comparisons and identify different clusters of 
variables. 
15. Some work has been done in this area. See D. Lerner, The Passing of 
Traditional Society, Free Pressl 1958; or R. J. Rummelq "The DimensionilitY 
of Nations Project", in R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan, ed., Comparing 
Nations, Yale Univ. Press, 1966 or "Some Empirical Findings on 
Nations and their Behaviour". World Pol., 1969. 
16. Thus given the number of variables being used to define the nation 
state, the possible range of permutations among these variables and 
the size of the unit being considered, it would be anomalous to 
establish over ptecise cit-off points. This is not to imply that we 
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are opposed to more precise quantification of the major dimensions, 
but rather given the complexity of the nation state, we prefer to 
use a broader cut-off region by employing thethreshold nation state. 
17. Examples of relatively highly developed antion states are the U. S. A., 
U. S. S. R., and most of Western Europe. Examples of low level nation 
states are most of the independent African systems. Examples of 
threshold nation states are Ethiopia, pre-coup Libya, or Thailand. 
Examples of non-nation states are Nepalt Kuwait, or Muscat. 
18. In general terms, new nation states in Africa represent greater 
political over economic developments than in cases of earlier nation 
state development. Latin America represents in general an interesting 
variant on the modal line of late nation state development in that 
economic development is more advanced than political development. 
Slightly different examples of the same general process may be 
provided by the Republics of S. Africa and Rhodesia, which would both 
be classified as threshold nation state systems* 
19. These observations coumter some of the limitations noted at the end 
of Chapter 2 and in the introduction to this Chapter. 
20. J. P. Np-ttl and Robertson, International Systems and the Modernization 
of Societies, Faber and Faber, 1968. 
21. Some of the problems raised by generalized interaction in the 
international sphere will be raised in the final section of this 
Chapter, i. e. 'Pvoblems of Late Nation State Development'. 
22. In this context the work of Pye is interesting. See L. W. Pye, PersonaliýZ 
Politics and Nation Building, Yale Univ. Preps, 1962; dnd Aspec 
of Political Development, Little Brown, 1966. 
23. It follows of course that to the extent that the nation state. does 
not constitute any finite organization, the modernization complex 
may well contain elements gener#ed by the nation state indicating 
its transformation. 
24- A number of writers have pointed to the importance of communication 
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patterns in the general analysis of politics, -see K. Deutschl op. cit.; 
and L. W. Pyej ed. 9 Communications and Political Development, 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1963. 
25- These are taken from D. Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Lifel 
wiley, 1967. 
26. For example if Tanzania were compared with Britain, the latter would 
show more vertical development, but in terms of development as 
performance it could be claimed that at the present time Tanzania 
is developed. Furthermore, vertically developed nation states may 
well manifest a greater degree of instability than less well developed 
(vertically) nation states. 
27. In general the analysis of instability has been rather neglected in 
political science. The most common approach in the context of 
development studies is to take the Western liberal democratic 
systems as the constellation of dimensions from which any variation, 
such as a one party state or a military coup, may be seen as an 
index of instability. Some more inýeresting work has been done by 
Eisenstadt, op. cit., Huntington, op. cit., and C. Johnson, Revolutionar 
Changes Univ. of London Press, 1968. 
28. Most discussions of instability, which are not clearly normatively 
hide-bound, are restricted to attempts to provide indices of 
monitoring breakdown, e. g. in terms of domestic riots, deaths, etc. 
29. The major problem is that of equivalence. Thus in somesocial systems 
at different periods in time and at different stages of development, 
various activities and processes may assume differential salience. 
Thus an index of instability found at similar levels in two systems 
maý have differential repercussion for performance. This problem 
can be countered to some degree by making comprehensive anaysis of 
each system over time. Further it may be pointed out that given the 
exigencies of nation state development only a certain range of 
variance may be tolerated. 
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30. It will be appreciated that this analysis of instability has the 
same advantages as were outlined above for the conceptualization 
of development. It is comparatively viable, it is relativistic, and 
it has no normative bias. Instability can be identified in any 
political system without incorporating any evaluative element. 
31. Some of the most interesting work, which has been done in this area, 
has been done by economists. See especially K. de Schweinitz, 
Industrialization and Democracy, Free Press, 1964, and "Growth, 
Development, and Political Modernization", World Pol., 1970; see also 
D. A. Rustow, A World of Nations, Brookings Inst#. 9 1967. 
32. In this context, it is important to point out that in the process 
of general structural differentiation we may include compressed 
structural differentiation, c. f. Nettl and Robertson, op. cit. 
33. For general background, see C. P. Kindleberger, International Economics, 
Irwin, 1965; B. Higgins, Economic Development', Constableg 1959; 
W. Krause, Economic Development$ Wadsworth, 1960; C. P. Kindleberger, 
Power and Money, Basic Books, 1970; J. Bhagwatil ed., International 
Trade, Penguin, 1969; D. Sears and Joy, ed., Development in a Divided 
World, Penguin, 1971. 
34. It could be argued that in Japan for example the stimulus for 
economic development was externally derived* However, this would be 
a gross oversimplification for already by the time of the external 
stimulus there had been a major agricultural revolution, and even 
response to the external stimulus was a consequence of certain 
internal changes. 
35. It must bepointed out that the process of economic exploitation is 
not terminated. Although direct exploitation through colonialism ýas 
ceased in most areas of the world and although new nation states 
make some gains from external exploitation, the economic domination 
of the advanced industrial nation states makes exploitation easy. W 
Further it must be pointed out that the means of exploitation, 
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increasingly improved by advancing technology and the growth of 
corporations are-currently considerably greater than in the time of 
colonial empires. The economic domination and exploitation strand of 
the neo-colonial thesis is unquestionable. The problems centre around 
the degree of such exploitation, the leverage of such economic 
contuol for political control, and the degree of conspiracy and 
cooperation imputed to the advanced industrial nation states. 
36. Frequently this involved the development of a single line of prod- 
uction. The consequence of this was that many newly independent 
nation states were left with a non-diversified economy and with a 
product which was subject to marked fluctuations in the international 
market. 
37. These problems have been pointed out for some time. See for example 
S. Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth, Yale Univ. Press, 1966; or more 
recently P. Jaleeq Pillage of the Third Wobld, Monthly Review Press, 
1968, and P. Jalee, The Third World in World Economy, Monthly Review 
Press, 1969; or C. P. Kindleberger, op. cit. 
38. In this context it should be noted that new nation states cannot 
afford to go through the same stages of economic growth as did the 
earlier nation states, by virtue of the fact that early methods of 
production (demanding lower investments) cannot compete with later 
methods in terms of productive returns. 
39. See the ever growing literature on corporations, and in particular 
J. K. Galbraith, The New Industrial State, Penguin, 1968; and A. 
Shonfield, Modern Capitalism, Oxford Univ. Press, 1966. 
40. It could be pointed out that new nation states have two main 
advantages over earlier nation state economic development. These are 
first that aid may be provided, and second that in imitating 
technological developments new nation states are saved the expense 
of research and failure. However, it must be realized that aid is 
negligible (approximately 0.5,036 GNP of the more advanced industrial 
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countries, and even such aid is frquently tied both economically 
and politically); and that the imitation of advanced technology is 
of little value when sufficient resources are not available to 
finance such technological developments. (For a discussion of the 
later factor see D. L. Spencer. Technology Gap in Perspective, Spartan, 
1970. )_ 
41. The best example of arbitrary boundary demarcation is probably to 
be found in Africa as a consequence of the Treaty of Berlin, when 
most of Africa was divided by a number of European powers to suit 
the strategic interests of those powers. The problem surrounding 
arbitrary boundary definition is that many groups with no common 
patterns of interaction are incorporated into a single formal unit 
with certain minimum obligatory patterns of interaction. This has 
generally led to the mobilization of local interests and in some 
cases to a high degree of conflict. 
a 
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THE MLITARY IN THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTEM 
The aim of this final chapter in the elaboration of the conceptual 
framework is to introduce the analysis of the military in the nation state. 
The introduction of the discussion of the military has been delayed to 
this stage because the military represents but one part of the larger 
social system. The military is that organization whose primary function 
is the maintenance, through its monopoly of the means of forceq of the 
external (and to a lesser degree internal) integrity of the system of 
which it is a part. As such different phenomenal forms of social system 
will generate differing types of military organization, The master con- 
cept in the discussion of the military in the nation state will be pro- 
fessionalization. However, in isolation, this concept is inadequate in 
taking stock of the various forms of military organization, hence it has 
been necessary to introduce a'second though subsidiary conceptq namely 
politicization. The concepts of professionalization and politicization 
may initially be considered individuallyp after which their interrelation 
may be established through the construction of a typology of professionalizea- 
politicized military organizatiom 
The National Professional Milit , arv Organization 
The major suomaXYVoncept which has been employed in recent research 
to cover the "modern' military is that of professionalization. As such 
military professionaliZation represents only on .e dimension of the broad 
process of professionalizationg which has had repercussions for several 
2 major occupational groupings in the nation state. Profe9sionalizationt 
in the military contexti does not represent a single specific type of 
military organization but'rather a basic form of military organizationt 
within which several'permutations-may be found. It is evident that any 
singular definition of professionýaifzation would both confuscate the com- 
Parative variability-of different forms of military organizationg and 
Provide little heuristic'-payoff. Thus we shall define the professional 
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military organization in terms of five dimensions, which may be manifested 
to varying degrees in different military organizations and thereby may 
constitute different patterns of clusterings of professionalization. 
3 
A military organization represents that body of persons constituted 
for the. maintenance of external defense and security of the social systam 
of which it is a part, and to which end it has a monopoly of the physical 
means of violence. A national professional military organization is 
that military organization which manifests- the following five dimensions: 
the development of a specialized body of knowledge, the development of 
institutional autonomy, the development of corporatenessq the development 
of internalized control and internal affective neutralityt and the develop- 
ment of a professional ethic and external affective neutrality. 
The first criterion of professionalization relates to the development 
of a high degree of generalized and systematic knowledge and skills based 
on a complex of technical andintellectual advancements, The knowledge 
and skills involve such factors as, -the mechanical and 
technical development 
of weapons and ballisticsq the increasing complexity of logistics and ad- 
ministration,, and the sophistication of tactics and strategyl Such a 
development of an expert body of knowledge must precipitate and encompass 
the emergence of formalized means for the education in and training of such 
skills. Parthermorep these educational and ok training patterns must be 
accompanied by methods of validating the levels and means of training. 
The primary manifestation of the development of triining has been in the 
emergence of militaxy. academies, and compulsory and satisfactory attendance 
at these academies by would-be. officers. This first dimension of pro- 
fessionalization may be assessed in terms of the levels of technical know- 
ledge manifested by individual axmies (i. e. sophistication and complexity 
Of weapons systemsq logistiesp tactics, administrationg eto. )q and in terms 
Of the type of training (i. e*, number of academiesq percentage officer corps 
graduating from such academiesq duration and level of trainingg etc. )* 
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The second dimension relates to the development of institutional 
autonomy. As an occupational organization becomes a professiong-it-is 
necessary that it develops a high degree of autonomy within its own sphere 
of activity or competence. Thus the military must develop a significant 
degree of autonomy with respect to the management of its own functional 
sphere of activityg i. e. external defense and security. Furthermorep 
this autonomy must be accompanied by formalt institutional means validating 
it. This dimension is manifested and may be examined in terms of a number 
of indices: the existence of formal legal documents (such as constitutionsg 
codes of rules) or organizations (such as Ministries of Defense or High 
Commands) which specify the nature of the profession and i1s. sphere of com- 
petence; the non-infringement of this sphere of competence by other organ- 
izations; the development of formalized employment tenure and payment in 
terms of contracts and salaries; and the development of a complex of factors 
which differentiate that-organization from others and which define the 
legitimacy of anyone within that organization (eg. Uniformt Symbols, 
functionally specific requirements for entry and promotion). 
The third dimension is-corporateness. Corporateness is a function 
of two processes: on the one hand# the development of differentiation of 
the particular organization-from others, and on the other hand the develop- 
ment of internal processes of unityP involving especially egalitarian pat- 
terns of interaction. In the military, context,, external demarcation is 
fostered by the structural differentiation precipitated by the increasing 
development of skill levels-and-technical knowledge (and enhanced by the 
security aspect of-the military's monopoly) and complemented by a host of 
internal factors such as-iiniformso symbols, confined living patternsq 
acceptance of and dedication to a common purpose (i. e. national defense) 
and incorporation in an, extensive network, with well-establishedipatterns 
Of communication. COrporateness may, -be assessed interms of consciousness 
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of differentiation on the part of incumbents of the organizationt in terms 
of loyalty to the organizationg and in te=s of the levels and intensity 
of conflict and cleavage within the organization. 
The fourth dimension involves the development of internal controls 
and internal affective neutrality. The development of internal controls 
involves two processes. The less formal involves the socialization and 
internalization of values and norms of donduct and interaction which is 
achieved through the lengthy training periodq the process of confined 
living and so on. The more formal involves-an elaborate system of ranko 
oleqxly identifiable and specified rules, of behaviour based on rankg an 
extensive body of formalized rules and regulationst and formalized mecha- 
nism possessing a range of sanctions-which may implement such rules (i. e. 
sanctions such as Mes, confinement# loss of rankg expulsion from the 
military and in some cases formal prison sentences involving even death 
penaltiesq which are implemented through an elaborate internal juridioial 
system). The development of internal affective neutrality relates firstly 
to the institutionalization of the, achievement norm as the basis for recruit- 
ment and promotiong and secondly to the universalization of the application 
of the rules and sanctions to the patterns of interaction. 
The final dimension relates toýthe development of a professional 
social ethic and of affective external neutrality. It is evident that 
the increasing development, of a -branch of technical knowledge and skill 
proMdes those possessing such knowledge with powerful tools for the control 
of nature or society. In. the, case of the military's monopoly of the means 
of violence, the degree of potential control, is self-evident. The final 
diiension of professionalization, requires, that this body of knowledge be 
applied beyond organization interests. 1 , Thus the-orientation of the appli- 
cation of this knowledge must-, be. beyond personalg group or organizational 
interests to the total social-system of which the military is a paxto It 
is the social-responsibility which distinguishes the professional man from 
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other experts. External affeetive neutrality means simply the impartial 
external orientation of the professiong"i, &e. its orientation toward societal 
as opposed to more particularistic. goals. In the context of the nation 
statev this involves the application of the military's body of knowledge 
to the direction by the polity except where the polity specifically absolves 
any such directional responsibility (as for example during a war or crisis 
situation). 
As in the case of the nation state it is possible to identify different 
leirels of vertical developmentcC each main dimension, and horizontal develop- 
ment in terms of expansion over* the five dimensions, and changes (both up 
and down) in movement along these dimensions'over time, This conceptual- 
ization of professionalization in terms of indices which can be measured 
quite easily empirically has a number of important' advantages. In the 
first place, it is quite clear thatýprofessional military organizations do 
not suddenly appear but emerge over - 'time and frequently from other forms of 
military organization. The'several"dimensions which we have elucidated 
enable us to take account of"paths 6f development in the emergence (or 
decline) of a professional army. ý%`Secondlyq it is - possible to differentiate 
various professional armies in terms of their levels of development of the 
major indices. Thusg"any two professional, military organizations may 
manifest different skill'and technical expertise levels and differing com- 
plexities of weapons systems; '- , or''varying degrees Of structural demarcation 
and autonomy; or differing degreesýof dohesion, and'conflict, ' and so on. 
Given that a wide -rang'ýe`of permutations of, ýrofessional military 
forces may be identifieds it is'possibleg"'nonethelessp to identify the 
minimum criteria which define"a nation I al p- rofessional' rýilitary. For a 
military organization to be designated national'p'rofes I sionalt the'military 
must manifest firstly-technical, and skill I ievel s '" sýffi dent", to'd emand ex- 
tensive training through"an academy-sys-tem; " sec , ondlyq- the military must 
constitute a singleg unified and cohesive body with well-establi shed 
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patterns of interaction; fourthlyq the military must institutionalize the 
achievement norm as the criteria for reenuitment and promotiong and estab- 
lish a formalized body of rules governing recruitmenti, promotion and means 
of interaction and a functionally specific internal body to apply such 
norms universally and impose sanctions on any deviation; finallyq the 
activities and energies, derived from the primary function of the singlep 
cohesive military body, must be oriented to direction by the national 
popular authurity structure. 
Military Politicization 
In contrast to the case of professionalization, there is very little 
publication on politicization. Politicization is the process involving 
either the inculcation of values and attitudes or the expression of action 
towards the polity based oh such values and attitudesq which lie outside 
the political frame of reference dictated by the functional sphere of com- 
petence of any organization. To the extent that the major functional 
occupation of the military in the nation state has been the provision of 
national security, any inculcation of values or political activity which 
lies outside the sphere dictated by national security requirements represents 
politicization. 
4 
Politicization is of two very different types: induced and overt. 
Overt puliticization represents the deliVerate or overt drive by the polity 
to inculcate extra-military political values into the armed forads. Induced 
politicization has the same end result as overt# i. e. the acquisition of an 
enlarged sphere of political reference, but differs in the process of the 
acquisition of the political values. Th'ust as opposed. Ao-being deliberately 
imposed by the polity# they are 'acquired or induced more spontaneously 
through the general process of interaction between the military and the 
Polity* Each type of politicization may be examined in greater details 
The overt inculcation of extra-military political values and attitudes 
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by the polity must be clearly differentiation from the simple infusion of 
political values. To some degree all polities attempt to infuse various 
values of patriotism or national loyalty in varying degree. (In this 
respect Israel represents A more explicit case than Britain. ) However, 
this type of inculcation of political values differs radically from politi- 
cization in that it concerns only political values related to national 
security and which are therefore consonant with the role of the military; 
politicization involves the inculcation of values on a much broader front. 
Although the conditions precipitating overt politicization need not detain 
us, it is interesting to note that overt politicization is primarily the 
product of the existence, of that type of system in which only one party 
is seen as legitimate, and in which the functions of the party extend 
beyond simple support mobilization and the recruitment of leaders to be- 
come synonymous with the national authority structure. 
Overt politicization is manifested in several manners. Firstj 
recruitments and promotions may be made in terms of party affiliation. 
Thus the achievement norm of professionalization either becomes eroded or 
supplemented by party loyalty as the dimension for the evaluation of per- 
sonnel. Secondlyq the party can attempt to recruit members by distributing 
party cards among the military and thereby to build a corps of loyalty. 
Thirdly, the polity may delegate government posts to top military leaders# 
thereby involving the army in the general policy making process. Fourthlyq 
the Party may utilize political commissars both to encourage the military 
personnel to become party members but also to propagate and supervise* 
Finallys the polity can engage in political education and indoctrination 
through spýcial ideological schools. In generalg these last two factors 
indicate a higher degree of politicization. 
Indeed politicization is a more spontaneous phenomenon, and may be 
the product of four main classes of factors. In the first instancel the 
incidence of a high degree of instability in the civilian polity may lead 
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to an increased reliance on the military in the form of declarations of 
martial law, the use of military communication systemsp the employment of 
military personnel in top administrative postsq etc. This expansion of the 
role of the military into the civilian polity in turn stimulates an expan- 
sion of politicization in that the military is obliged to make major policy 
decisions and cooperate with major civilian political groups in issue areas 
beyond its own sphere of competence. The second condition relates to the 
situation in which civilian political cleavages and conflicts are projedted 
into the military so that the military organization encompasses rival poli- 
tical groups. In this context the military's assimilation process breaks 
down and the military includes rival political groups. The third condition 
relates to the situation in which attempts are made to induce military 
personnel to join or explicitly support certain civilian political groupst 
or to distribute promotions and rewards in the military on the basis of 
political patronage. 
5 The fourth condition is that produced by a period 
of military rule which may stimulate politicization by virtue of the fact 
that militaxy personnel are obliged to-, -make and debate major policy deci- 
sions which lie outside their sphere of competence. 
Militarv Professionalization and Politicization: A Typology 
Given the five dimensions of professionalization# it is possible to 
differentiate various military organizations in terms of movement along 
these dimensions. For example, using the first dimension, i. e. the level 
of expertise, it is possible to differentiate those military organizations 
possessing more complex weapon systemsp e. g. nuclear ballistic missilesp 
from those with less complex ones. Howeverp given that we are interested 
Primarily in the military ýn its political sphere of referencep an additional 
Political dimension must be included, which in ouZ case is that of politiciz- 
ation. Using the two concepts of professionalizatiOn and politicizationg 
it is possible to produce the following typology. 
II 
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Type Politicization 
Non-Politicized 
Induced Politicization. 
Overt Politicization 
Týrpe Professionalization 
Diagram 2: 
_Typology 
Pro fessionalized-Politicized Milita: rv organizations 
'Using professionalization as the major concept, we may examine the 
varying combinations. The non-politicizedg professional military is self- 
explanatory and may be illustrated by the present British army. The non- 
politicized, non-professional, seems an unlikely combination. 
Induced politicization can lead to three forms of military organizationg 
one of which is professional and the other two non-professional. The parti- 
cular ramification of induced politicization for professionalization is con- 
tingent primarily on the source, of the politicization. The first and 
third ciasses of factors noted aboveý(when the third condition is resisted) 
may lead to a generalized politicizationt which usually takes the form of 
a heightened political awareness9 which-has no debilitating consequences 
for professionalization. In thecase of military partisan and civilian 
sectional politicizationg some erosion of professionalization is involved. 
Military partisan politicization can'be precipitated by the first condition, 
but is more commonly the product of the fourth. Military partisan politi- 
cization involves the adoption' of an -independent autonomous inculcation of 
valuest attitudes and politica. 1 activity-on'the part of the military in 
which the political evaluation' involves a considerable degree, of projection 
of military values. -Civilian- sectional politicizatiOn is usually preci- 
pitated by the second condiion'9^ but'also the third (when it is not resisted 
by the military). Ci4ilian'sectional politicization involves heightened 
Political awareness and activity in which there isýa dominant identification 
with a sectional civilian groupt such as a, party, a iegionalt a class or an 
Professional Non-Professional 
- 100 - 
ethnic group. The. latter two cases of politicization involve differentia- 
tion from the professionalization syndrome in the erosion of low level of 
development of affective neutrality both concerning internal controls and 
external. responsibility. Political promotions and recruitmerIs tend to 
erode the development of neutral achievement internal norms while the 
increased political sensitivity of the army inhibits neutral impartial 
external interaction. Furthermore, it may be noted that the latter two 
types of politicization can easily generalize to induce low levels of de- 
velopment of the other dimensions of professionalization. This is partiou- 
laxly true of civilian sectional politicizationt which usually involves 
rival groups within the militaryý and thereby leads to an erosion of cor- 
porateness 
,, 
which in turn can, have repercussions for skill and efficiency 
levels. 
Overt politicization is manifested in such armies as those of the 
Soviet Uniong China and to a much less degree Algeria. It is not of 
necessity antithetical to the development of, professionalization but usually 
leads to a low level of development of institutional* autonomy. , 
Howeverl it 
may be noted by way of qualification that all major professions in the 
I 
nation state are never completely autonomous in that they are subject to 
government inspection, or tied to the government through salariest or have 
6 
government defined spheresof autonomy. Overt politicization can lead 
to an erosion of professionalization in the, situation in which the focus 
of politicization is transferred to a sectional civilian group. This may 
take place either when there -is a 
division within the civilian polity and 
the militaxy identifies with one sectiong or in thelcase where overt poli- 
ticization has been executid. --by's, small sectional civilian, group. 
In this 
instance there is an erosion of, internal and external affective. neutrality. 
In conclusion, three,, points, may be emphasized, Pirst, military 
organizations may be differentiated along, two dimensionsv i. e. development 
of the five indices of professionaliztion and development and type of 
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politicization. Secondq professionalization and politicization are not 
necessarily antithetical. Third, professionalization is the master con- 
cept with politicization providing a secondary elaboration of a political 
format along the professional/non-professional dimension. 
Professionaliz; ktion and the Nation State System 
p 
Having defined a basic form of military organizationt i. e. the 
national professional military, it is now necessary to examine its re- 
lation to the analytic model of the nation state. In this context, the 
main proposition to be substantiated is that the development of the nation 
state has precipitated the development of a particular kind of military 
organizationt namely the national professional military organization. 
The relation between the professional military and the nation state will 
be examined by relating the growth of professionalization to the develop- 
ment of the major indices of the n; ktibn-ptate. The establishment of the 
relationship between the indices of the nation state and the professional 
military organization is of importance both from the point of view of 
extending the basic conceptual framework and of including the discussion 
and analysis of the military as an integral part of the franeworkq and also 
from the point of view of clarifying and elaborating the definitional con- 
ceptualization of the national professional military. 
At a general levelo it has frequently been pointed out that the 
emergence of professionalization, is a recent phenomenon. None of the 
ancient societies possessed" professions 9 as defined above. A frequent 
date-line manifesting the appearance of professionalization, has been taken 
as the first time that the world "profession" appeared in the Oxford dio- 
tionaryv sometime in the 17th century. Although it is plausiblý to argue 
that medecine and law were manifesting some characteristics of profession- 
alism, it was not until the'19th century that the development of profession- 
alization became consolidated. It is quite'cleax'that historically 
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professionalization bears a close relation to the emergence of the nation 
statev and indeed has come to represent one of the'major occupational 
innovations associated with the nation state., This relationship can be 
examined more precisely by taking the. major spheres of functional activity 
of the nation state #i*e* the cultural and . social t economic ,- political and 
also externalv and examining the manner in which the indices of the pfo- 
fessional military have been conditions -by these spheres. 
The major processes of the social subsystem have probably had the - 
least direct effect on the changing patterns of military organizationt but 
axe nonetheless important. The main social changes have been associatea 
with social differentiation and the changing forms of mobilization and 
mobility. The primary factor of importance has been the changing nature 
of stratification. The increased mobilizationt greater mobility and ohang- 
ing foundation of stratificition have had marked repercussions on recruit- 
ment patterns to the military. The major consequences have been in 
emphasizing achievement criteria for entry and also in Iroadening the base 
7 of recruitment. This contrasts markedly with medieval armies in which 
only knights were permitted to fight 9 and _aloo armies, ý of 
the 14th-I Gth 
centuries in which the officer corps -was the monopoly of the nobility. 
Under the stimulus of the changing basis of social - stratification p many 
of the requirements of aristocratic- entry and. the practices of officer 
purchase were limited or aboliahad. in the 19th. century. Thus the changes 
in recruitment fostered by changing patterns of., social stratification in 
the nation state have relevance for, the fourth dimension of professionaliz- 
ation. 
The major cultural influences, on, -the rise of - professionalization 
have 
been threefold. In the first, placep-the Renaissance brought to a01000 
the monopoly of the church over _education 9 so, 
that education became, increas- 
ingly diversified and divorced from purely theological concerns. Related 
to this change was the emorgence of secularization which began to pervade 
f 
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all areas of social life, The major cultural product of secularization 
was the development and consolidation of formal rationality. 
Finallyp 
these developments were to some extent mirrored in and reflected -by the 
development of sciencet as a method of intellectual inquiryq and technologyt 
as the application of these rules to the solution of practical problems. 
The'direct consequence of these cultural changes was to pro-jide the where- 
withall. and legitimation for the collection of a body of technical skills. 
'Until the period of the continuous and systematic application of science 
and technology to the study of war, war had demanded only a modicum of 
intellectual and organization skills* However, the developmýnts fostered 
by technological change began to demand higher skill levels and increased 
trainingg which ultimately led to the establishment of the first military 
academies. (The major change-over in military education occured at the 
close of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries and lead to the 
establishment of a large number of academies in Britain, France and Prussia. 
) 
Thus cultural influences on educational changes were directly responsible 
for'the establishment of military academies and of the first major dimen- 
sion of professionalization. A more indirect and generalized conseqqence 
of the above cultural changes was in stimulating the rationalizition and 
universalizition process, which in turn was to play an important role in 
prompting the emergence of the professional ethic and affective neutrality* 
The major economic influences on the emergence of prof essionalization 
have been industrialization and -he growth of the division of labour. 
Technological and economic innovations hav'e persistintly throughout historY 
altered the nature of war and of the I armies'engaged in these wars* Iloweverp 
until the time of industrializationo such innovations had been sporadic. 
Industrialization was of import firstly in introducing more manufactured 
weapons and secondly in bringing stanaaxdization and economies of scale. 
This meant that increasing numbers of men'could be employed to carry armst 
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frequently at a reduction in cost. (The Napoleonic Wars mark the first 
major period of industrial production of weaponryq which has now escalated 
to the production of nuclear ballistic missile systems. 
) Furthermore, 
increased sophistication of weaponry systems has meant that their control 
and management has demanded increased educktional and skill levelso 
8 
Closely related to the development of industrialization has been'a second 
major economic process# i. e. the development of the division of labour. 
The primary consequence of this development has been the emergence of the 
military as an increasingly specialized occupational structure. Such 
developments as the navy and airforcep the intelligence systems, the com- 
munication and medical corpsq the various axmoured units, the increasing 
complex logistical systems, the tactical systemsq all testify to the 
occupational diversification which has taken place within the military. 
The development of the division of labour has had a number of repercussions 
for professionalization. Firstlyq the military has been consolidated as 
a large and permanent organization; secondlyp occupational specialization 
has led to the emergence of a complexp large-scalep hierarchical administra- 
tive and managerial systemp necessary to coordinate the many specialised 
branches; thirdly, the military has become clearly 'demarcated and differ- 
entiated from other occupational structures; finallyq increased specializ- 
ation which has led to increased educational and technical expertise has 
demanded both longer training periods and military aeademiesq and also some 
degree of internal autonomy. In sumt the technical developments of 
industrialization and the administrative and managerial developments of 
the division of labour have had ramifications for every dimension of pro- 
fessionalization. 
The major political influences on the emergence of professionaliz&tion 
may be subsumed under the development of a national authority structuree 
One of the cardinal features of the nation state has been the development 
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of a complex and pervasive authority structureq both as a stimulus and 
response to increasingly complex patterns of general. interaction. The 
major points of interest concerning this authority structure for the analysis 
of professionalization are that the authority structure has taken the form 
of a unifiedg centralized structure, and that the primary locus for the 
legitimation of this structure lies -in'popular ý public bodies. The develop- 
ment of the nation state authority, organization has several repercussions 
for military professionalization. In the first place, it has afforded a 
single central authority focus with clearly demarcated limits, usually de- 
fined-in territorial terms. Secondly, this central authority is based on 
popular rationalization. The major-consequence of a single popular 
authority structure within clearly,, defined territorial boundaries is that 
a focus for the development lof social responsibility for the military is 
provided. Thus a clear central authority body emerged to which the alle- 
giance of the military could Us pledged and on behalf of, which the technical 
skills of the military could be-applied. To the'extent that this authority 
structure encompasses popular legitimation, thenthere. emerges a fOCUl point 
around which the social responsibilityv or the'exter'nal iLffective neutralityg 
of the military may develop. A'further influence'of the d6ntralized autho- 
rity structure is in providing the. -meang whereby military development may 
be monitored. Thus the polity of the'ý nation ý state provides the main econ- 
omic resources for the military budget (including both armaments and 
training facilities) and can: supervise the level'- and type of training, 
In this context9 the polity both supplements Ahe economic', system in pro- 
viding the basic economic backing for the'militaryg "and' exceeds it in, that 
it can control and monitor the, deployment of such resourcesý 
The final area of influence relates. to ý the'international' arena, The 
progressive differentiation and demarcation" of 'various nation state systems 
has two main repercussions. '', In the. first 'pl"eg'-the crystallization of 
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the security confrontation has encouraged the development of nation state 
forces. Secondlyq the increasing facilitation, of international exchange 
encourages the process of osmosis in the demonstration and imitation of 
various militaxy developments. As professionalization has emerged in one 
nation state and immediately manifested itself as-a, more efficient form of 
military organization, it has been adopted quickly by others. 
In sum, the politicalq economic, social and culture forces which 
define and constitute the nation, state have conditioned the development of 
a particulax form of military organizationg namely the national- professional 
military. Furthermore, the international network has served to generate 
and demonstrate this form of military globally* 
Problems in the Development of Professionalization 
This section represents. the third elaboration andý extension of the 
initial conceptualization of the five dimensions of professionalization. 
The first took the form of the introduction -of the, variable of politiciz- 
ation to identify three main types of. professionalization; the second was 
concerned to establish the relationship, between the development of the nation 
state and the emergence. of -the. professional military. organization. This 
section attempts to qualify and extend the discussion of professionalization 
by noting some of the major issuesl problems and. limitations of profession- 
alization which have relevance for civil-military, relations. Such an 
examination may be undertaken by investigating each of the five dimensions. 
With reference to the, first dimension of , professionalizationg two main 
comments are pertinent. In the first placep the military is unique in that 
its technical expertise relates to. ýthe monopoly of the means of violencet 
and as such the military must remain an object of acute sensitivity-for 
the polity. 
9 Secondly, the pontinuing advancement, of the level of teohni- 
cal expertise of weapons systems has undermined to some degree the autonomy 
of the professional military. .. 
This may be illustrated on two accountse 
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Firstly, much of the research and development of advanced weapons system 
is caxried on by civilian agencies and organizationsq and furthermore much 
of the long-term military planning is executed by civilians. ' Secondly, 
to the extent that the military represents a complex large-scale organiz- 
ation structureq many of the managerial and even some of the technical 
10 
roles are transferable between military and civil institutions. 
Three factors are of significance cormrning autonomy. Firstly, 
the client of the military is the national authority structure of the 
social system of which it is a part. Thus, unlike other professions# the 
expert does not have a choice of client. Secondiy. 'in addition to the 
limitation of an autonomy noted aýove-p'the polity co I ntrols directly the 
monetary allocations to the militaryt and thereby can control to some de- 
gree the size and resource base of the military. A final problem and con- 
tradiction relates to the definition of the relative "spheres of competence 
of the civil polity and the military with reference to national security. 
It is within this area that the primary vocation of the military and the' 
polity's responsibility for national goal and policy formation overlap. 
Even the most clearly defined operation and the one 'which falls most ob- 
viously to the militaryg i, es the-actual'pro'oess'of fighting, is not 
without possible conflict as military and political- victories are not 
necessarily synonymous, Beyond the actiial 'process'of fightingo the 
nationa. 1 security syndrome becomes "even moro ýambiguous' as it takes in esti- 
mates of security threatt forM'of se'au , rity systemq' and general foreign 
policyt 
12 
Three factors are of interest with reference to corporateness. In 
the first placeg no other pro, fess, io, ýn,, is, --su, bj, eat to I the'same sudden expan- 
sions and contractions (precipitated of course' by war). ' The expansion 
rarely has deleterious consequences (due uýl I Y, to the 1, stimulation of' 
Patriotic loyalties) 9 but the'proc'ess of 
'demobilization' can'prove 'proble- 
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matic. In the second placep the very expansion of the modern army and 
the development of expertise, in the form of -increased specialization and 
interchangeability of civilian and military rolesp have posed problems for 
corporateness. The final factor relates to the hierarchical nature of 
the military organization. The development of formalp rational, hierarchi- 
cal organization as the means of coordinating complex actions and resources 
is a hall-mark of nation state society. The high degree of hierarchy 
found in the military erodes the ffaternity and egalitarian principles 
found in the majority of professions. Nonethelessp it should be pointed 
out that this type of limitation of corporateness differs from that noted 
in the case of induced politicisationg in that in the former it is precipi- 
tated by functional and occupational criteria whereas in the latter by 
extra-functional criteria. 
Two factors may be noted concerning internal affective neutrality. 
Firstlyp it is impossible to establish fully the achievement norm for 
recruitment in a vacuum, Although it may be possible to achieve short- 
term affective neutrality by applying certain standards for recruitment 
and training, it can always be objected that to the extent that the educational 
system has its biasesq then these will be reflected in the recruitment 
system. Secondlyq universal achievement criteria must be eroded in that 
not all individuals wish to join certain organizationsq and in that all 
organizations have value and norm structures, which condition not only 
recruitment but also promotion. Both these factors influence again the 
sample attracted to the military, and the body of rules and norms built 
by that sample. 
Three interesting quektions may be raised concerning external 
affective neutrality. The first concerns the issue of whwther the 
military could legitimately deviate from such neutrality if it perceives 
that its occupational expertise and competence is being invaded by the 
polity. The second problem is one which has already been notedt namely 
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the possibility of differential perceptions of roles and functions by the 
military and the polity. The final problem relates to the identification 
of the client for the military. Thus is the military's focus of social 
responsibility a group of politicians, or the government, or the total 
polityp or some perceived though not articulated national interest? The 
problem of the source of the national authority structure becomes particu- 
larly difficult when the political system is experiencing a marked degree 
of instability. 
The problems relating to the dimensions of professionalization which 
have been noted above, are of importance in indicating the limitations of 
professionalization, in indicating some of the internal contradictions# and 
in indicating some of the potential lines of conflict with the polity. 
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FOOTNOTES 4: THE MILITARY IN THE NATION STATE SOCIAL SYSTMI 
1. For some of the several discussions, see. S. P. Huntington, The Soldier 
and the State, Harvard Univ. Press, 1959; M. Janowitzq The Professional 
Soldier, Free Press, 1960; S. P. Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the 
Military Profession", Daedalus, 1963; J. van Dqorn, _11TIle 
Officer Corps: 
A Fusion of Profession and Organization", Eur. J. Sociol., 1965- 
2. For general discussions see H. Vollmer and Mills, ed., Professionaliz- 
ation, Prentice-Hall, 1966; W. E. Moore, The Professions, Sages 1970; 
A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations, Free Press, 
1961; H. L. Wilensky, "The Prof essionalization of Everyone? ", M. S., 
1964; T. Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Society, Free Press, 
196o. 
3- Unfortunately there is no single accepted definition of professionaliz- 
ation. However, a number of dimensions reappear so frequently that 
there is no major definitional problem (from the point of consensus*) 
4. The phenomenon of a non-political military, i. e. a military which does 
not engage in political activity, is inconceivable. Politicization is 
not to be contrasted with non-political, but is rather a measure of the 
intensity of political activity, i. e. that which lies outside the aphero 
of competence of any particular organization. A good hypothetical 
example of the movemen*btween non-politicized and politicized may be 
provided in the case of the British military and Rhodesia. Had the 
British military been ordered., into Rhodesia, and had it refused, then 
a non-politicized military would have become a politicized one. 
This is clearly differentiated fromýovert politicization by virtue 
of being more random, less ýpervasive, and more conciliatory. 
It is interesting to note the type-of conflict generated in the overt 
politicized professional armies, stimulated by the strong drive of the 
civilian polity for control. In,.. the Chinese case see E. Joffe, Party and 
Army: 
_ 
Professionalism and Political Control in the Chinese Officer Corpsl 
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Harvard Univ. Press, 1965; or in the Soviet case R. Kolkgwicz, The 
Soviet Military and the Communist Party, Princeýon Univ. Press, 1967, 
or R. L. Garthoff , "The Military___in Russia" , in J. van Doorn, ed. , Armed 
Forces and Society, Mou-ton, 1968. 
Even in the context of military organizations which are readily 
classified as professional, the degree of development of the achieve- 
ment criteria concerning entry and promotion must not be overemphasized. 
For limitations in the British case see P. Abram , "Democracy, Technology, 
and the Retired British Officer", in S. P. Huntington, ed., Changing 
Patterns of Military Politics, Free Press, 1962, and-C. Otleyl 
"Militarism and the Social Affiliations of the British Army Elite'll 
in J. van Doorn, ed., op. cit. 
For a comprehensive discussion of these factorsl see A, Vagts, A HistojX 
of Militarism, Hollis and Carter, 1959; S. Andrzejewskis Military 
Organization and Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954., 
For a variety of discussioms on this topics see S. P. Huntingtong The 
Soldier and the State, op. cit.; J. K. Galbraith, How to Control tho 
Military, Doubleday, 1969; C. W. Mills, The Power Elite, Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1956. 
10. See M. Janowitz, The Rofessional Soldierg op. cit.; and II. Janowitz, ed. 9 
The New Military, Sage, 1964. - 
11. For good illustrations see the military victory and political dofeat 
of the British over Suez in 1956, or the MacArthur-Trman conflict over 
Korea, or the American failure in S-Vietnam. 
12. See B. Abrahamsson, "Military Prof essionalization and Estimates on tho 
Probabil J ty of War" in J. van Doorn, ed. I Military Prof ession and 
Military Regimes, Mouton, ' 1969; and B. Abraha'msson, "The Ideology of 
an Elite - Conservatism and National Insecurity", in J. van Doorn, ed. 
Armed Forces and Society, OP-cit.; M. Janowitz, op. cit. 
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ST, ZIKARY 
The aims of this concluding section axe twofold: the first is to 
summaxize the various stages in the development of the'conceptual frame- 
work; the second is to illustrate the manner in which the conceptual 
framework may be applied for empirical research (and thereby to provide 
a transition to Part II of this study). 
The point of departure for this, study was a basic methodological 
discussiong which was useful on three'main"accounts* It served firstly 
to criticize and assess the c urr ent state of the study of military inter- 
vention and performance, secondly to outline our own approach in the form 
of the attempt to construct an empirical theory of military intervention 
and performance (an approach conditioned by the'critique of existing 
studies)p and thirdly to outline the methodological 'and conceptual pre- 
requisites for such a study. The second chapter-sought to'construot an 
empirical"analytic conceptual model of the nation state, ý 'derived from an 
abstract systems-function model p -and defined in terms of a collection of 
certain substantive functional processes. The model was outlined in 
terms of the dictates of the'coficeptual prerequisites" of comparative 
political analysis. The thirdýchapter represents an'extension and elub- 
oration of the basic framework established in Chapter 2. Thin extension 
and - elaboration takes the form'of 'the, introduction of development and , 
political instability which in'turn permit account to be taken of dif- 
ferentiation and changee The'fourth chapter moves from a generalized to 
a more specific elaboration -of the basic conceptual framework by, intro- 
duoing the discussion of the, professional military organization, - 'This 
discussion is directly related to Chapter 2, in'that the professional- 
military organization is'preciPitateaby the development of th4 nation 
state. 
In sum, the conceptual - framework represents'a developmental series 
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of empirical conceptual elaborations from an abstract systems-function 
framework which encompasses the conceptualization of a particular phenomenal 
macro social systemt and the particular type of military organization found 
in that system. The primary purpose of the studyp as will become evident 
shortly, is to integrate the analysis of political instability (i. e. chap- 
ter 3) with the analysis of the professional military (i. e. chapter 4)- 
Both parts of the study are derived ftom the model of the nation state 
(i. e. chapter 2) and conditioned throughout by the methodological prere- 
quisites of chapter 1. 
Given this interrelated conceptual frameworkp it is now pertinent 
to examine the manner in which . it may be applied for empirical research 
and more specifically for the construction of an empirical theory of mili- 
taxy intervention and performance in new nation states. The conceptual 
framework is integral to the production of an'empirical theory in two 
main waya: first, it provides the parameters and therefore deftnes the scope 
of the study, and secondo it provides the means of analysis. We may 
examine each of these contributions. 
Given the immense diversity of forms of military political aotivityg 
both in terms of an historical and ý comparative'perspeotive and in terms 
of the variety of forms such activity 'may'assume p it is essential that 
some order and uniformity be imposed on such diversity in order that com- 
parative'analysis may be undertaken. " " On the one hand, it is quite clear 
that it is impossible to deal with all'cases'of military political activity 
(the total frame of reference) by-virtue of the"very scope and complexity 
of the taskv but on the other hand, #'It iB'equally clear that no progreso 
can be made unless the discrete 'fallacy* (i. e. that each cace io unique and 
therefore incomparable) isýavoided *I, ', We'attempt, to control, for the first 
problem by simplifying the problem axea'by, establishing a number of para- 
meters; we attempt to control for'ýthe second problem', by constructing the 
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parameters'so as to satisfy a number of methdological prerequisites. 
A parameter is an analytic toolt which has been developed by probability 
analysis where it refers to boundary establishment and area definition within 
the probability distribution. The concept of a parameter has been general- 
ized from -probability analysis to characterize the primary mechanism whereby 
problem definition is made. The functions of a parameter are to establish 
the definition and boundaries of a problem areaq and are therefore funda- 
mental preliminaries of vital importance in apy research project, 11rameter 
definition is not a random task but one which is, dietated by the prerequisites 
and assumptions of empirical analysis., , 
Given that we, saFe. interested in 
comparative political analysis, --i. e, 
the identification, and explanation of 
uniformities in political interactionp it ý is necessary that the parameters 
be attuned to the major dictates: of such analysis, i. e. must facilitate 
the identification of uniformities in behavioural patterns of interaotion. 
Thus the parameters must be drawn from. the main conceptual, body of analyeiat 
they must be expressed in terms of behaviour and. processual patterns or 
collections of patterns of interactionp and they must, be capable of heur- 
istic application. 
We shall establish three parameters,, which will define our subjeot 
area of investigation and thereby ý make., the, problem of military intervention 
and performance amenable to comparative analysis. -The first parameter 
refers to the form of military political activity,, In this context we 
axe interested only in the, explicit -take-over of the major organs of civilian 
government by a domestiog, i. e. internalt military force. -- -The second, para- 
meter refers to the typerof military organization which makesi, the inter- 
vention. Thus we axe concerned only with national, professional armies 
(which excludes-Roman Legions t -, Janissaries 9. Candillo armiesq eto. 
)ýmani- 
festing non-, or induced-generalized-politicization (which, excludes both 
overt categories). The-professionalization-politicization parameter not 
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only provides information on the organizational nature of the military 
(professionalization) but also on the motivation of the intervention 
(politicization)t in that politicization refers to the political values 
and attitudes of the military. Thus coups precipitated by sectional 
motivations (military partisan or civilian sectional) are excluded. The 
third parameter refers to the'type of'social system in which the military 
intervention takes place. In thisýrespect we shall be concerned with 
nation state systems or threshold nation state systems manifesting a high 
degree of development towards a'nation state system. 
These three parameters define with some-degree of preoiaion our 
problem areat namely military, political activity involving total take-over 
initiated by a professional military motivated-by non- or induced general- 
ized politicization in a threshold or nation-state, system. It isp there- 
foreq within this area that we are interested in identifying behavioural 
uniformities and in providing explanations for such uniformitiese 
The second utility of the conceptual framework fot the construction 
of a theory of military intervention-and performanoo-io in providing the 
means of analysis, We may consider firstly the process of interventiom 
The main proposition with respect, to, intervention is that military 
intervention is a fimetion of . political., instability and military prodic- 
positions and capabilities. ,., The first,, task of analysis is therefore to 
examine the process of the development of political, instability within any 
specific social system. The various stagesq which, this entails# have 
already been outlined. Thus, we attemptl-initially to, identify the, form - 
andintensity of instability in. terms. of , the four main'types of, political 
instability; this is followed. -by the-, attempt to isolate the. dissynohro- 
nizations and dislocations in the major -functional processes of nation 
state development; finally the attempt is made, to identify the specific 
phenomenal factors accounting. for, the, dislocations, , Within the more 
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generalized framework of political instability we may examine the pre- 
dispositions and capabilities of the military. The capability syndrome 
will be examined in terms of four main variables: skill level, composi- 
tion and structureq autonomy and cohesion. The predisposition syndrome 
is attitudinal and involves the examination of two categories: attitudes 
favouring and attitudes inhibiting intervention. The former involves 
the examination of military diýsatisfaction towards three phenomena: the 
major stractures and organs of the political systemq the major policies 
(both general and army-specific) 1, . and the -incumbents of the political 
system. The latter involves the military perception of alternative poten- 
tial ruling groups and the threat, of opposition. The military's predis- 
positions and capabilities are influenced partly by the davelopment of 
professionalization, which in turn is reducible back to the development 
of the nation state, partly by the military's own pattern of developmentq 
and partly by the interaction of the military with the development of 
instability. 
Three main points may be emphaised concerning the method of analysil3 
of military intervention. In the, first placeq the conceptual framework 
dictates the structure which empirical research must follow in that it not 
only points out the major focus, for analysisp. . ie'e. patterns and types of 
instability and military predispositions and capabilitiesp but it also 
points out the major classes of factors which influence instability and pre- 
dispositions and capabilities and the, various stages which must be followed 
to identify these factors. Secondlyq both parts of the major proposition 
are closely interrelated by virtue of being derived from the same conceptual 
framework. Thus instability,. and military predispositions and capabilities 
are interrelated in -that they are both derived from the nature and develop- 
ment of - the nation state, and. in that the development of instability has a 
marked effect on the military. 
, 
Thirdly, ý it will be appreciated that the 
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method of analysis can be applied to a wide number of seemingly discrete 
cases and can also integrate data provided by thes6 cases. 
It is now pertinent to outline the method of analysis of performance. 
Performance may be analysed in terms of four main issue areas. The first 
relates to the manner in which the military tries to cope with the ongoing 
processes of national state development., In- this context we shall be par- 
ticularly concerned to examine the military's performance with reference 
to the - four major political functions of - decision-making, institutionaliz- 
ationg support mobilization and monitoring as these condition and are con- 
ditioned by the other major processes of-the nation state. The second 
dimension relates to the manner and success of the military in attempting 
to alleviate the conditions which predipitated the situation of instability 
which led to the intervention. The third dimension relates to the exam- 
ination of the repercussions of the military's predispositions and capabil- 
ities on its performanceg i. e. the manner in which it satisfien the major 
political functionsp and vice versa. , The fourth dimension concerns the 
analysis of the transfer of government controls, back from, the military to 
a civilian body, and examined the-process of andAhe conditions underlying 
such a transfer. 
4 
Four main points may be noted -concerning 
the -anlysis of performance. 
Firstly, as in the case of the examination of interventiong the conceptual 
framework dictates the lines of research. . Secondly, there is the same 
continuity in the conceptual apparatus in that the focus of attention still 
lies on the direction of the major functional processes in the nation state 
and the interaction of the military's predispositions and capabilities with 
these processes. Thirdly, the analysis of intervention and performance 
are closely related. Intervention and performance are not seen as discrete 
processes but as part of a larger phenomenon. Thus the analysis of inter- 
vention. and performance is interrelated both by virtue of the continuity 
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of the same conceptual apparatus and also by virtue of the deliberate 
analysis of the repercussion of the conditions of intervention on per- 
formance both concerning the pattern of instability and the military's 
predispositions and capabilities. Finally, it will be appreciated that 
the analysis of performance in terms of the four dimensionsq outlined 
abovet permits the comparative analysis of a wide number of otherwise 
discrete cases. 
In sum, the primary utilities of the conceptual framework are in 
defining the area of analysisl, in providing the means of analysiev in 
directing the lines of researchq md in providing the mechanism whereby 
the product of this research may be collated. To this extent we have 
provided a comparative conceptual apparatus which is capable of inte- 
grating the analysis of otherwise discrete patterns of behaviour. Although 
the conceptual framework does not in iWelf represent an empirical theory, 
to the extent that it provides an interrelated frame of analysis capable 
of comparative, heuristic and empirical application and capable of iden- 
tifying uniformities and explanations for such uniformities in'the area of 
military intervention and performancet then the conceptual frameworkmay be 
said to afford the outline of and introduction to an empirical theory of 
military intervention and performance. Such an empirical theory can only 
exist once a body of empirical findings, generated by the application of 
this framework to empirical researchp has been collected. It is the pur- 
pozý of Part Two of this study to initiate such a collection. 
PART WO : EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of Part Two is to apply the modell outlined in Part Oneg 
to empirical research. The method of application of the model for empiri- 
cal research is that of case study analysis. In each case study the format 
for the analysis of intervention and performance will be identical in 
following the procedure outlined in the summary of Part One. 
The primary advantages of a case study approach employed within a 
conceptual model are twofold. Firstp it permits a longitudinal analysis 
of the development of political instabilityp and the interaction of such 
inst%bility with military predispositions and capabilities. Secondt it 
is possible to reconcile the demands and prerequisites for the development 
of comparative patterns and uniformities with the demands for the identi- 
I 
fication of individual permutations. 
The only remaining problem is to stipulate the rationale for case 
selection. The three parameters outlined above have outlined the boun- 
daxies, which define the total number of cases which fall in our frame of 
reference. This number is sufficiently large and diverse to inhibit the 
examination of every single caseq but not sufficiently large to permit a 
random sample, Thus we shall attempt to make a more comprehensive survey 
of the diversity of cases within the three parameters by constructing a 
typology of military regimes and taking examples as defined by that typology. 
Using the dimensions of period of rule and degree of change induced 
f 
by the military regimet it is possible to identify four main types of 11 
military regime: the guardian, the caretaker, the equilibrator and the 
innovator. 
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Bep, Tee of Political ChanRes 
Incumbents/Offices 
Regime Modification 
Regime Substitution 
Time in Years of Militarv Rule 
fl, c: I Cý 
ian 
: Caretaker_ 
Equilibrator 
Innovator 
Diagram 3,: Types of Militaxy Regimes 
A number of points of explication of this diagram may be made. The 
degree of change dimension is of course a continuum ranging from simple 
change of incumbents or offices to the revamping of a new regime. The 
time dimension centres around the 5 year line, which is taken as the modal 
length of rule of civilian regimes., The unbroken line represents a line 
beyond which a type of military regime may not transgress without becoming 
transformed; the broken, line may be crossed without any type tranabrmation 
taking place assuming a projection of the unbroken line is not crossed, 
(For example a caretaker regime could move vertically downwards into the 
equilibrator sphere without becoming transformed but could not move beyond 
the 2 year time cut off line without becoming transformed into an equilibrator* 
Thus the unbroken lines are rigid type definition linesp whereas the un- 
broken ones are definition lines indicating most likely cluster bovndariese 
Finally, it will be appreciated that the diagram can take account of changes 
in regime format over time. ' 
The final problem relates to the selection of examples of the basic 
regime types. The cases to be examined are Pakistan under Ayub Khan and 
U. A. R. (Egypt) under Nasser, as innovators; Indonesia until mid 1970 (this 
is not to suggest any basic change at that date) 'and Ghana as equilibratorg; 
and Turkey (1960-1) and Burmag (1959-66) as caretakers. Guardian regimes 
will not be considered in the main body of the analysis as they have 
k 
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negligible ramification for performance. There are no technical reasons 
for the selection of the six cases. Howeverg the six cases do represent 
a wide diversity on a number of accounts such as levels of political and 
economic development,, population levelst geographic locationj or size of 
military. 
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5: INNOVATIVE MILITARY REGIMES 
VILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN -PAKISTAN 
INTERVENTION 
The nature of th9breation of Pakistan out of the larger system of 
India meant that the existence of Pakistan as a distinct social system 
dated virtually exclusively from its accession to independence in 1947. 
At that time Pakistan could only be classified as a threshold nation state 
systemq manifesting in embryo form most of the indicators of an independent 
nation state system. Although even in 1947 Pakistan was clearly committed 
to nation state developmentt by the declaration of martial law on October 7 
1958 and complete military rule on October 24 Pakistan had shown very little 
vertical or horizontal nation state development. 
Furthermore there had been a gradual growth from the time of inde- 
pendence of all four major types of political instabilityq each of which 
by 1955 had reached a high level of intensity. Although it is possible 
to see indicators of all four types of instability developing immediately 
after independence, the first most- marked type was monitoring failure 
(which is understandable given the massive dislocations associated with 
the creation of Pakistan). Mo I nitoring failure was followed and reinforced 
by decision-making failure'(scope), to which were added by the time of the 
death of Liaquat Ali Khan (1951) decision-making (method) and support 
failure. Institutionalization failureq not usually as easily identifiaUle 
as other types, soon became explicit, From 1955 when all types of insta- 
bility had reached high levelsp there w4s no appreciable decline in any Of 
the four types and indeed decision-making instability became increasinglY 
more pronounced by 1958-the, political system of Pakistan was virtually 
paralyzed. The first task is to identify the indicators of political 
instability in the period up to the military intervention of 1956- 
Both types of deeision-making failuret Le, method and scopel were 
manifested, Two main indicators may serve to illustrate the former. In 
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the first placep the',. tenure of: thýe executive organs was very short. At 
the central level there were--four Governor-Generals and eight Prime Ministers 
2 in the 11 years from independence-to October 1958- The same high circu- 
lation of executive. 'organsp punctuated by periods of Governor Rule or 
Martial Law is. 'even more marked at, -the profrincial level. In West Pakistan 
from 1947-55 there were 7 Ministries in Sind and 4 in the Punjab (excluding 
periods of Governor's Rule);, -"-- following unification in 1955 there were four 
3 
major ministries and'a period, of President's Rule. The situation in East 
Pakistan was essentially, ihe,, same and reached a climax in 1958 during which 
year (from March to. SeptemVer) the Pribmier was changed three timest the 
Governor-General was'dismissedg*there was a period of Governor-General Ruleg 
and finally there were. three'days_of fighting and chaos in the Assembly 
during which period-the-Deputy, Speaker was killed. 
A second major indicator relates to the conflict and rivalry between 
executive and legialative, organs'. _Under Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan there 
was no major problemv,, but'in 1951 when Nazimuddin moved from Governor- 
General to Prime Minister and'Ghulam. Mohammad became Governor-Generalp 
relations began to'_deteriorate. 
4'_. In October 1954 Ghulam. dissolved the 
Assembly and in Mar-ch-1955'Ponferred complete authority on himself. 
Although Ghulam, was forced-to, resignv. the-subgequent Governor-General 
Mirza continued basically the. same policies. Indeed Mirza apparently 
made a number-of_ . approached to'the ar - my to assist in dissolving the Assembly. 
The conflict, -at the. provincial level has already become explicit and resolved 
along an axis-of National-and/or Provincial Governor-General against the 
regional Cabinets'. '-ý 
The-second"ýtype of"deci, don-making failure (scope) is rather all- 
inclusive andwill become explicit as the discussion proceeds. Nonetheleseq 
it is possible, to, point out a'number of indicators, which adequately demon- 
strate this" type of instability, Thus with reference to the organization 
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of -the poliiyitielf, a constitution was not produced until 1956, provin- 
cial'elections were not held in the East until 1954, there was no major 
attempt to restructure the bureaucracyq and no universally elected central 
Assembly had been-e'lec'ted by the time of military intervention. Further- 
more many of the immediate substantive problems, such as the settlement of 
refugees or Kashmirv remained unsolved. Finallyt there were a number of 
indicators ofeconomic policy making failure. Thus per capita product 
was stagnant, exports as from 1950 were falling, and there had been no 
major change effected in the structure of the economy. 
Table 5: 1 : Pakistan's Per Capita Product at Constant Prices (1993 = 100 
U, N. Stat, Yearbook 
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 
97 96 99 103 101 
Table 5: 2 Pakistan's Exports (in-M (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
1948 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
494 533 439 359 401 340 358 302 
Table qj3 Industrial Origin Pakistan's G-D-P- (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
M. Rupees Percentages 
Total Agriculture Mmufacture Tranaport Trade Pub- Other 
Admin 
1950 18,146 60 73 9 5 16 
1953 199973 58 93 9 5 16 
1957 219523 56 11 3 9 6 15 
1958 21,638 54 12 3 9 7 15 
The second main type of instability was institAtionalization failure. 
Three main indicators were prevalent: the failure to develop a common body 
of rules on political interaction, the failure to delineate the sphere of 
competence of major political institutionsp and finally corruption and 
patronage. 
The first indicatorwas manifested in several manners. In the first 
placeg there was a failure to produce a constitution. At independence 
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Pakistan'had only the provisional constitution drawn up for British Indiag 
which was of course totally inadequate for independent Pakistan. It was 
not until 1956 that the Constitution Bill was drafted and passedp by which 
time most observersagree it was ineffective. 
5 In the second'ýplaceq 
there was a fiilure to develop any common consensiis on the modes of orienta- 
tion to political intercourse. This failure may be indicated on three 
accounts. Pirst there was the development of Personalp factional cliquesq 
which could only cohere on the basis of personal profiteering motives and 
6 
not on any agreed programmes, Second the IML employed a wide range of 
obstructionist tactics to delay the provincial elections in East Pakistan 
and to forestall the reconstitution of the Central Assembly. Thirdlyq 
there was a rising level of political conflict between rival factionsq 
which reached its apotheosis in the death of the Deputy Speaker in the 
East'Pakistan Assembly. 
The second indicator is closely related to the first an d may be 
docum I ented in two examples. Firstly, there was an inability to define 
the major'ex"eautive'po-sition. At the time of independence'the main 
political office was that of the Governor-General. '' On the death of 
Jinnah, Nazimuddin became Governor-General but due to the persoxial influ- 
ence of Liaquat, Ali El=, the most important position became'that of Prime 
Minisi'6r. (Note the change in emphasis was not on formaIq constitutional 
grounds but personal influence and prestige. ) On the death of Liaqu4 
Ali Khan, Nazimuddin moved to the office of the Prime Minister but by 1954 
Ghulam 1ý Mohammed the incumbent Governor-Generalt had succeeded in reconsti- 
tuting the office oif the Governor-General as the dominant one (having 
arbitrarily dismissed"'Nazimuddin in 1953)- The second example relates 
to crisis of'1954-5- In October 1954 Ghulam, Moh ed declared a state 
of emergency following deadlock over the constitution*' In February 1955 
the Sind Chief Oourt declared this action illegal. The Federal Court 
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finally reversed the Sind decision but ruled that all bills needed the 
assent of the Governor-Generalt thereby invalidating 45 bills with Some 
7 important consequences. To meet this situation Ghulam Mohammed pro- 
claimed a state of Emergencyl issued Emergency Powers Ordinanceg which 
legalized 35 of the billev and gave the Governor-General powers to draw 
up a new constitution. Again the-Federal Court ruled that only the 
Constituent Assembly could draw up a constitution and that the Governor- 
General had no powers to revalidate. Thus Ghulam, Mohamed was obliged- 
to order the constituent convention to meett assented to all laws of the 
former constituent Assembly and issued an Ordinance validating all acts 
passed by the Governors of Punjab, Sind and East Bengal. 
The third indicator of institutionalization failure is that of cor- 
0 
ruption. Thus by 1949 both the Punjabi and Sind cabinets had to resign 
on corruption charges; in the same yeax Prime Minister Ali Khan introduced 
a bill in an attempt to clean up political life; again in 1950 the Sind 
cabinet fell under Governor's Rule on account of corruption, Howeverp 
little action was taken generally, to curb corruptiont the scope of which 
became most explicit when martial law investigations took place. Those 
who were subsequently penalized in anti-corruption measures included one 
High Court Judgev one Provincial Governor, ten Chief-Ministersq 84 Senivr 
Officials, 120 East Pakistan officialst over 600 police were down graded, 
and C87-75 millions of untaxed income was declared. 
8 
The third major type of instability to be considered is support 
failure. The two major subdivisions of support failure are withdrawal 
and insufficience (the latter again subdivides into too narrow a base of 
support and incapacity to mobilize support). Although both bypes of 
support failure were manifested in Pakistang the second was the more 
important. With reference to the former, there was clearly some with- 
drawal of support at the intra-regime level in the eastern seetion of 
Pakistan. Thus in the 1954 provincial election in the eastern province 
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the MLj which up to that date had been the monopoly partypwas soundly beaten 
by a united oppositiong the United Front. (United Front 2? 39 NL-109 
Independents 39 Minorities 72. ) Although the United Front subsequently 
madeýdemands for the resignation of the central government and the autonomy 
of East Pakistan, which would suggest withdrawa. 1 of support above intra- 
regime level, it can be argued that at that time these demands were not 
very forcible since the Awami League subsequently participated in-the 
central government. Indeed the only significant oppo sition to be organ- 
ized above theintra-regime level was the National Awami Partyt founded by 
the Eastern peasant leader Bhashani after his split with the AL in July 
19579 and the-All-Pakistan Peasants Associationg founded by Bhashani in 
January 1958 which proved eatable of mobilising thousands of peasants. 
10 
Although it is possible to find some evidence of support withdrawal 
but little evidence of organized alternativesq the second subtype of sup- 
port failure is much more clearly indicated. Concerning the narrow base 
of support three indicators may be noted. In the first placep as in many 
situations of colonial system transformationt elections were held 
immediately prior to independence. Again as is common in many colonial 
situationsp the percentage participating in the election was very small 
(an estimated 15%). The problem in Pakistan was exacerbated because no 
further central election, took place before the military intervention of 
1958. (The new central Assembly of 1956 was indirectly elected'by the 
Provincial Assemblies. ) In the, second place, although provinciiýl, eled- 
tions were held on the basis of universal adult suffrageg participation 
in these elections was also low. 
1951 IhmJab election was 30- 
Thus, the participation level in the 
Thiraly, the political party, which dominatea 
Pakistan politics at the central level (and also Western province) cer- 
tainlY up to 1956, was largely recruited from and representative of a 
small pection, 167ofithe Population. The IML was-founded in 1906 by Muslim 
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landed interests and although it was later expanded to include certain 
educated and professional groupst after the death of Jinnah the landlord 
interests again came to the fore. Thus until 1956 and to a certain 
extent after that date, the polity was dominated, by a group of politicians 
elected prior to independence, with a narrow base of support and represen- 
tative of a small group of interests. 
11 
Concerning the failure to mobilize supportp three indioators, mav 
be noted. In the first place, the Muslim League after the death of 
Jinnah failedto become a national dynamic ppity but became a collection 
of a small number of cliques whose primary concern was to continue to 
dominate the central spoils system (hence the efforts to obstruct and 
delay, elections in the eastern province where defeat was suspected and 
the refusal to carry out universal central elections). Secondly, as 
the proliferation and factionalization of parties proceeded, parties 
became more oriented towards personal struggle for political goods and 
patronage rather than constructing party organizations and recruiting 
support. 
12 (This is borne out by the nature of the rise and fall of 
coalitions. ) Finallyl no party developed a consistent national programme 
of action. The closest approximation to this were the 21 points of the 
United Front, but the qualification must be noted that the United Front 
was itself an unlikely coalition. 
The final type of instability to be considered is that of monitoring 
failure. Three indicators may be noted. The most important indicator 
relates to the failure to establish governmental authority. Two parti- 
culax geographic areas may be noted: the outer regions and East Pakistan- 
At independence Pakistan consisted of 18 units of Governmentv of which 17 
belonged to West Pakistan. U provinces: East Bengal, West PunJabp Sinds 
North-West Frontier; Baluchistan; four Baluch princely statest 4 more P 
princely states on the North-West Frontier; Bahawalpur, Kaipur and Karachi. 
) 
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A major problem for the government was to integrate the princely states 
13 
and the quasi-autonomous provinces* In this exercise, the polity 
proved largely ineffective until the integration of West Pakistan as a 
single unit in 1955 at great political cost. (This effort may be con- 
trasted, with the Indian goverment which got rid of a much larger number 
of states - 600 in all - much more quickly. ) Even after the 1956 consti- 
tution many of the states continued to be autonomous and to exert a con- 
servative paxoohial influence on the central government. 
14 The second 
area is that of East Pakistan. It has already been noted that the 
January elections of 1954 in the East signalled a massive rejection of 
the ML and therebyg on account of the artificial structure of the polityt 
of the goverment itself. Although there was no major mass protest in 
the East during this periodp it can be assumed that governmental authority 
was low. 
The second indicator relates to the low range of resources available 
to the polity. Three indices may be noted. Firstlyt Vorys points out 
that the taxes available to the goverment were very low amounting to less 
than 7%xN. I., a level which is low even compared to many Asian countries. 
Taxes were lowq evasion was hight many agricultural taxes were set prior 
to World Wax 2 and many records had been lost during independence upheavals*15 
Secondly, the administrative structure was very ill-equipped, Thus only 
157 officials were available from the Indian Civil Service to join the 
Pakistan Administrative Service (renamed the Civil Service of Pakistanin 
1950) and of these only 136 were free for work within Pakistan; only 15 
had experience in central secretariat work; half of the 136 had less than 
10 years service; 50 of the 157 were British and about 25% of-thýe more 
exýerienced Itere Britishq most of whom left by 1958; approximately 74 
Positions above the rank of assistant secretary'had to be filled in the 
ptovinces but only 22 had held such positions before. ' Furthermore the CSP 
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remainea a conservative elite group unwilling to accept any majb: v. imova- 
tions and unsuitable to cope with many of the problems of post inddpendence 
Pakistan. 16 
The third indicator relates to the increasing reliance by the polity 
on force to maintain itself. In 1953 and 1954 there had been serious 
rioting involving several hundred deaths; in 1958 the violence had even 
entered the legislative assembly when the Deputy Speaker in East Pakistan 
was clubbed to death; but perhaps most significantly many parts of 
Pakistan had spent considerable periods under Governor's Rule due to 
general functional impairment. Thus marital law had been declared nation- 
ally from February to May 1953; In October 1954 a state of emergency had 
been declared; in West Pakistan Governor's *Rule had been delcared in the 
Punjab from January 1949 -, April 1951; in Sind from January 1951 - May 1953; 
in West Pakistan from-Maxch - July 1957; in East Pakistan Governor's Rule 
had been even more extensiveg being declared from May 1954 - June 1955 and 
from August 1956 almost continuously to the coup. 
17 
-ý Having indicated the main profile of political instability in 
Pakistant the next major problem is to identify the dissynchronizations 
which account for that profile. Four major dissynchronizations internal 
to the political system and three more generalized ones may be noted. 
The first-two more generalized dislocations relate to the interaction 
between the economic and political systems and concern in the first place 
the structure of the economy and in the second the polity's directives to 
the economy. 
With reference to the structure of the economyl three factors are 
of import. In the first placeg Pakistan was a primary producer and as subh- 
was subject to a number of major difficulties, Thts mineral resources were 
low with the consequence that most had to be imported; there was little 
control over a number of emlogical factors which affected the primary pro- 
duction of agricultural goods; further there was strong reliance on a 
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limited number of goods for export eaxnings (in 1954 cotton and jute con- 
stituted about W/o of the exports); and finally Pakistan had no control 
over external demand for its exports which together with the non-diversified 
pattern of exports meantsthat Pakistan was very vulnerable. 
18 The second 
major factor concerns the regional composition of the economy* Three 
factors may be noted. 
_ 
Firstlyp prior to independence there had been no 
patterns of trade between the wings. Indeed both areas of Eazt and West 
Pakistan haA been hinterlands to Indian seetions of Bengal and Puniab- 
This problem was particularly acute in East Pakistang which after parti- 
tion was out off from a major port and from the industrial area (i. e. 
Calcutta) which had previously manufactured its raw products. 
19 Secondly, 
the thousand miles separating the two wings of Pakistan Introduces a trans- 
port factor of such an intensity as to inhibit the tendency for factor price 
equalization across the regions (and presumably also exacerbates the psycho- 
logical aversion to movements of capital and labour). Thirdly, the problem 
of two clear economic units provides problems for balanced or unbalanced 
growth. Both wings are very differentt the East has only 15ý6 of the land 
area but 55% of the population; agricultural holdings in the West are large 
and concentrated and in the East very small; there axe more mineral resources 
in the West; and finally the West has better power potentials. Most edono- 
mists have resolved the debate of balanced v. unbalanced growth in favour 
20 OrIOL 
of the latter, but this poses major problems when the clearly identified 
region is likely to benefit more than another. 
21 The third major factor 
is that of partition. Paxtition had deleterious consequences for the 
structure of the economy on three accounts* Firstlyq partition involved 
massive dislocatiors through population movements, Up to December 1947 
4.68 million refugees arrived in West Pakistan with the figure ultimately 
22 
rising to 9 million (about 2YIo of the population of West Pakistan) , 
Secondly partition (though partially stimulated by communal rioting) led 
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to virtual civil war in the l'unjab in August 1947. Thirdly, partition 
involved'major I resource movements in which Pakistan fared badly. Thus 
a-s has already been noted*both West Punjab and East Bengal were hinter- 
ILS 
lands; Pakistan received only a comparatively small section of the ICS O-VL- 
ý'With reference to the second dislocation, i. e. the failure of the 
4 
political system to monitor the economy, two precipitants may be noted. 
The first concerns the failure to develop jitisfactory planning mechanisme 
Thus the first plan did not appear until 1951 and was soon rescinded and 
replaced by a2 year Priority Plan (1951-51); the 5 Tear Plan 1955-60 
was not submitted until May 1956 and not approved until April 1957; and 
finally within the relatively small industrial allocation of that plant 
the primary emphasis was on consumer goods and not on the more dynamic 
producer goods. 
24 The second major problem was the underestimation of 
the difficulties inherent in regional integration, Economic integration 
involves the progression through a number of inclusive stages: extensive 
trade interactiong abolition of restrictions on commodity tradet'the devel- 
opment of free trade areas, the development of customs unionst the estab- 
lishment of common markets, some degree of harmonization of policies to 
complete economic integration involving the unification of all economic 
policies. Pakistan proceeded to the last stage of integration without 
sufficiently developing the initial and intermediate stages. 
The third and final generalized dissynchronization that must be 
examined is that of system cleavage. Since system cleavage is an important 
rphenomenon, which has ramifications beyond the Pakistan case studyt a brief 
note on the nature of system cleavage as a dissynchronization in the 
nation state is essential before the causes and consequences of the specific 
cleavage in Pakistan are examined. 
Given that any system represents a colleetion of interrelated and 
interdependent variables, it follows that any major dislocation of such 
- 133 - 
interrelation-will lead to a breakdown of that system. Given that a 
social. system represents a collection of behaviour interaction sustained 
by certain-politicalg economict social and cultural forcest it follows 
that breakdown in the patterns of interaction must lead to a breakdown 
of, that social system. The-severity of cleavage depends upon a number 
of factors: the numbers involved in the cleavage; the degree of salience 
of the cleavage, the orientatinn of cleavage groups (i. e. intra-regimet 
regime community or discrete alternative systems)t and the degree of 
simplification of the cleavage. 
25 The consequences of cleavage may be 
at one extreme to precipitate a breakdwwn necessitating certain system 
transformations ar at the other extreme to lead to the creation of two 
or-more discrete systems. The main types of cleavage in the case of 
nation state social systemsp i. e. the lines along which communication 
and the attempted redefinition of interaction take place, are: regionalq 
ethnicq linguistieg religious and class. 
26 
Given that all social systems may experience cleavage formation there 
are a number of important factors associated with the phenomenal system of 
the nation state which must be noted. - In the first place the nation 
state Wstem demands a particularly high level of intensity of interactiont 
contingent particularly on the degree of economic differentiation and the 
development of-widespread political partioipation.. 
27 Secondly, new nation 
state systems emerging from colonial systems have interaction patterns 
which are very tenuous due partly to the arbitrary definition of the 
boundary ofýthe system and the modicum of interaction during colonial 
status. 
28 
, Thirdlyt theprocess of nation state development tends to 
exacerbate cleavage lines. Thus numerous process assocAed with nation 
state developmentt such as central expenditure, taxationg v'otingp central 
fiscal controlsp movement of goods and capitalq etc. 9 demand new patterns 
of interaction governing the total system. Howevert where central 
collating organs are weak andýwhere more easily identifiable systems of 
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interaction exist within the larger systemt then the processes of nation 
state development, can exacerbate internal cleavage lines. 
Given the above brief introduction to cleavage formation, it is not 
surprising to find the development of regional cleavage in Pakistan- 
Regional protests were evident soon after independence as for example 
in the Eastern protest when Pakistan did not follow the Indian devaluationt 
and in the disturbances following the attempt to impose Urdu-as the national 
29 language. The degree of regional hostility between East and West 
became most explicit in January 1954 when the perceived Western IS was 
soundly defeated and the United Pront made a series of demands for the 
resignation of the central goverment, the autonomy of East Pakistan and 
the rejection of the draft constitulion. 
30 The more important task is to 
identify the political, economic, social-cultural conditions accounting 
for the cleavage and then to consider the consequences of the regional 
cleavage for political instability. 
Several factors were of import in precipitating the development of 
the regional cleavage. In the first place, there was the complex of 
economic factors associated with the regional divisionp noted above. 
Secondly, a number of economic policies have served to perpetuate and 
exacerbate the regional division. Thus the disparity in per capita 
income grew from 18'15 1951-2 to 29% 1959-60; consumption in West Pakistan 
is higher (19 times as much electricityt 10 times as many carst 8 times as 
much tea and petrol); the investment level in the West has been 5-7ýo higher 
than the savings rateg whereas in East Pakistan the relationship has been 
reversed (investment 5-06, savings and finally exports from the West 
to the East have been persistently higher than vice versa. 
31 Thirdlyq 
prior to independence West Punjab and East Bengal had had no common patterns 
of interaction. This lack of interaction led to the mutual fear that 
either wing could dominate the other. (This was reinforced in West 
Pakistan since the Fast Pakistan population'was slightly larger ancl in 
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any proportional representative system could always dominate the central 
legislature. ) Fourthlyl there were a number of socio-cultural differences 
between the two wings. The population of East Pakistan speaks Bengali and 
is divided into small agricultural units of production; the population of 
West Pakistan contains a number of ethnic groups (principally Sindhist 
Punjabis, Baluchis) which do not speak Bengalit and is divided into much 
larger units of agricultural produotion. 
32 Fifthly, the West began with 
a number of advantages: the capital was located in the West; most of the 
ML politicians, the elite members of the civil service and the bulk of the 
officer corps came from the West. In additiong there were no major attempts 
to redress the imbalance. Thus there were no major changes in recruitment 
to the civil service or military; the East was generally under-represented 
in the cabinet; and the West was very reluctant to elect a new Central 
-Assembly. Finally with the collapse of the ML as a national party after 
the death of Jinnah, no major civilian political structure existed or sub- 
sequently emerged that was capable of accommodating the conflict. 
It is now possible to exanine the consequences of the three generalized 
dissynchronizations for political instability. The primary consequences of 
the first two dissynchronizations weig for decision-making (scope) and 
monitoring failure. The consequences of the system cleavage were more 
diffuse. The cleavage led to decision-making (method) failure in providing 
a permanent atrophy or obstacle to those policy areas requiring regional 
co-operation, and in undermining the basis for coalition formation. The 
major consequences for institutionalization were to erode the basis for 
the development of stable patterns of expectationst and to increase mutual 
suspicion and rivalry leading to patronage and corruption. The conse- 
quences for support mobilization were to negate the basis on which national 
Paxty organization could be established. Finally the consequences for 
monitoring failure were to undermine central authority. 
The first of the more localized political dissynchronizationsq which 
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may be examined, is the . failure of mass party formationg which took the 
form of the proliferation, and factionalization of parties. 
33 
The most important reason for this dissynob3conization, was the decline 
of the ML9 which in turn is attributalle to the following main factors . 
34 
Firstly, prior to independence the ML had had very little experience of 
government (having formed a ministry only in Bengal and Sind); secondlys 
soon after independence, it lost its two main leaders, Jinnah and Liaquat 
Ali Khan; thirdt although it had campaigned for a Muslim stateg little 
attention had been devoted to how this state ought to be constituted; 
fourth, the orientation of the ML toward political action had been largely 
that of violenceg mob riots and oppositional tactics; finally the HL was 
strongly tied to the landowning interests of West Pakistan. Thus the IIL 
had no strong group of provincial leadersq no strong party organizationp 
no collective leadershipq no means for dealing with intra-paxty conflictl 
no clear programme and a clear identification with West Pakistan. A 
second major reason was thatt as in many casest the nationalist movement, 
which had acted as an umbrella organization for a wide diversity of groups 
and interestsl fragmented. Thirdlyq the availability of political and 
economic rewards after independence led to an unremitting scramble for the 
spoils of officeg which in turn led to the formation of factional cliques 
forming and regrouping to gain control of such spoils. Fourthly, since 
there had been no large-scale elections prior to independence and since 
the post independence ruling groups succeeded in obfuscating any attempts 
týhold elections, one of the major mechaniamsaround which and towards 
which party organization is oriented, was removed. 
The consequences of party factionalization and proliferation for 
political instability were substantial. Concerning decision-makingi it 
meant that the major mechanism for recruiting national leaders was defuncto 
it precipitated the condition of perpetual coalition rulep and it resulted 
in Politicians devoting their energies to maintaining themselves in power 
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rather than engaging in long-term planning and policy formulation. With 
reference to institutiohalization failureq the lack pf party discipline 
led to the stimulation of personal and factional rivalry, and to the 
ephemeral nature of major patterns of interaction. Party proliferation 
and fragmentation were the most importknt factors in accounting for the 
laxge-scale neglect of support-mobilization and for the narrow base of 
support. 
A second dissynchronization within the political system related to 
the failure"to produce a ktional assemblyt i. e. a legitimated central rule 
making body. The independence congress was an outgrowth of -the provincial 
assemblies of India and as such had been elected by only 1 lo of the popu- 50al 
lation. This assembly persisted until 1955 when it was reconstituted 
not through any spontaneous action but through a constitutional crisis. 
Furthermore this'assembly was increasingly anomalous in that being dominated 
by the ML9 which after 1950 disintegrated and declined rapidlyg it was 
increasingly divorced from-any public opinion or demands. The new 
assembly was constituted by indirect election by the provincial assembliesq 
but this too proved equally inadequate in providing a central assembly 
based on universal suffrage. At the time of the coupt i. e. after 11 yea. -S 
of independence, the Pakistan political system still had not produced a 
universally elected national legislature. The reasons for this are two- 
fold. First, the entrenched interests of those politicians within the 
assembly made them reluctant to prepare a new assembly in which they may 
be displaced. It is interesting to note that the demand in 1954 from 
Fast Pakistan for the election of a new assembly was rejected on the grounds 
that the assembly had a specific duty (i. e. to draw up the constitution) 
and that since it had not been'elected by the populacet it could not be 
repea. led by them. Secondo contingent on the progressive development of 
regional cleavage, there was little consensus on what form the new assembly 
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should take (particularly with reference to representation)- The major 
consequences of this dissynchronization for decision: making were: first 
to consiitute'an atrophy of one of the main decisional goals; and seCondq 
in the particular anomalous form that the assembly took9 to provide a major 
obstacle to decision-making. The main consequence ft'institutionalization 
failure was to inhibit the formal rule-making procedure and legitimation 
of that procedure-and thereby to encourage the development of the indica- 
tors of non-consensus on the modes of orientation to political behaviour* 
The consequences for support mobilization were to debilitate one of the 
main organs whereby effectiveness of political'performance (and'thereby of 
the allocation-of retraction of support) could be made, and second to negate 
one of the main organs capable of support mobilization. Finally, the con- 
sqquences for monitoring failure were to render ineffective one of the main 
Qnd 
organizitions capable of monitoring and collating demandsqa second to 
undermine one of the primary sources of national authority. 
A third dissynchronization which in this particUhýe', dase is closelY 
related to the one above is-the failure to''produce a constitution. Thus 
at independenceg Pakistan had only a provisional constitution. Though a 
constitution was enacted in 1956 again as a consequence of the constitutional 
crisis. (It is interesting to note that after 8 years of stagnationp the 
1956 constitution passed through'all, its assent stages in 55 days. ) 
Nonetheless the new constitution did not serve it s functiong but indeed 
induced a more fluid pattern of political interaction. 
35 Most of the 
causes of the constitutional failure have already been notedg namely 
regional conflict and provincial autonomyg weakness of ML and subsequent 
factionalization of alternative parties, and the predominant influence of 
a number of Western influences. ' The consequences of this dissYnchrOni2a- 
tion were most obvious for institutionalization failure. Thus- there was 
no adequate formal body of rules outlining the structure and mode of' 
operation of the politidal system from which stable patterns of behavi0u: r 
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could develop; second, such an absence permitted and encouraged the 
development of personal and factional rivalries and cliques; and finallyl 
such a failure led to the development of corruption and political 
profiteering. 
The final political dissynchronization relates to the central 
administrative organization. Several observers have pointed out that 
neither the machinery nor the official disposition was adequate to satisfy 
past independence demands. The administration was compartmentalized and 
aloof, there was relative immobility between dadres and major classesp 
technical administrators were subordinate to geneialists and the whole 
structure became rather conservative. 
36 The reasons for this are several* 
In the first placep the manpower available for the administration was very 
limited. The CSP was founded by 157 members of ICS (Muslims constituted 
approximately 9% of the ICS) of which 136 were available for internal 
administration. Furthermore, mcuh of the personnel had limited experience: 
half of the 136 had less than 10 years experience, only 15 had experience 
in central secretariat work, and almost one-third of the 157 were British 
(most of whom had left by 1958)- Secondlyq Pakistan received few records 
(many of which were destroyed during partition disturbances) and few PhY- 
sical assets. Thirdly, the centra. 1 public service commission responsible 
for recruitment and selection (changed in 1956 to the Federal Public 
Service Commission) was very weak in that its authority was circumvented 
by bills limiting its functions and in the inadequate size and competence 
of staff at its disposal. The fourth and most important factor accounting 
for the ineffectiveness of the administration was that the structuret 
designed to colledt taxes and preserve law and order was not revamped to 
Promote gockes of social and economic change but continued essentially as 
under the British. 37 Most of the basic administrative units remained 
unchanged and furthermore the ex-patriate British continued to have a 
dominant influence for 3 or 4 years. Pinallyq West pakistan continued 
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to be over-represented in the CSP. - The major consequence of 
the lack of 
adaptation and transformation on the part of the administration was for 
monitoring failure in that the major monitoring mechanism was devoid of 
much of its effectiveness. 
The final task involves an examination of the organizational apabilities 
and predispositions of the military. 
With reference to skill levell a. number of factors point in the 
direction of this being comparatively quite high. Thfils the army was 
large and diversified; or again British training patterns had been adopted 
and a number of training academies established; and finally the educational 
requirements were strict. (For officers there was 1006 literacy in local 
languages and English and languages of, both wings wererequired. )38 With 
reference to the composition and structure five factors may be noted. 
First the armed forces were large, having expanded from 1509000at independence 
to 2009000 at the time of the intervention. 
39 Secondq although Pakistan 
possesses both an air-force and navyq the army constitutes the bulk of the 
military forces. Third, there was a strong recruitment bias in favour of 
West Pakistan. This trend had started under the British, who after the 
Mutiny of 1857 began to recruit extensively from the so-called martial 
races of the North-West (i. e. Punjabis, Pathans, Sikhs). At the time of. 
the coup only 1-elo of the ranks and T/6 of the officers werefrom East 
Pakistan. Fourthly most of the officers were drawn from lower middle 
class and rura. 1 groupings of West Pakistan. 
40 Finallyq the axmy had 
nationalized fully. There appears to have been a high degree of internal 
autgonomy,. although externally the army had been increasingly drawn into 
the civilian polity. Thus the army had been, employed extensively in 
emergency operations concerning floods, cyclonesp etc.; it had. been 
employed to control smuggling (Operation Jute 1952 and Operation Close 
I)OOr 1957); in October 1955 - May 1956 it had taken charge of the adminis- 
tration and rationing in the food crisis in East Pakistan; it had been 
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employed on several occasions to control riots; and finally Ayub Khan 
ha, d drawn up the plans for the unification of West Pakistan and had joined 
the cabinet to implement them in 1955- 
41 Finallyp there ie no evidence of 
any significant cleavage within the mili tary. The only division was in the 
Rawalpindi Conspiracy of 1951, which in general appeared to be a rather 
insignificant affair. Indeed given the high degree of internal autonomyt 
the long-standing existence, the continuous training procedures and homo- 
geneous recruitment, it may be concluded that cohesion was high. 
With reference to predispositions, it seems clear that army dissatis- 
faction at all levels was high. At the level of structure of the political 
system two factors may be noted. Pirst the military, as has been noted 
abovel was strongly in favour of the unification of West Pakistan and 
equally strongly opposed to continuing suggestions for decentralization. 
Second, the military was highly dissatisfied with the structure and activities 
of the political parties and was particularly opposed to the factionalism 
and degree of corruption (in several army investigations of corruptiong 
the army had been called off before investigations were completed in the 
event that politicians may be inculpated. )42 At the level of policiesq 
the most general comment is that the military was opposed to the slow rate 
of policy-making. More specifically with policy decisions that had refe- 
rence to the militaryq the army had been strongly opposed to the pextition 
settlement or again it had resented the decision of Ali Khan to call in the 
U. N. during the Kashmir war; or again the military resented attempts at 
interference by party politicians as for example in the use of ex-servicemen 
welfare agencies as patronage mechanisms. 
43 With reference to the third 
level, the two preceding levels of dissatisfaction were so generalized as 
to lead to the hostility towards all civilian politican incumbents in the 
polity. Given these favouring predispositionsq it must be noted that 
inhibiting predispositions were negligible. There was no organised group 
within the civilian politic3l system capable of maintining the major 
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decision-making positions; there was no major antipathy towards the army; 
and since there were no armed groups external to the army and since the army 
was cohesivep then there was no threat of armed retaliation, 
In sum, from 1950 the political system of Pakistan was manifesting 
an increasing degree of instability as it became more factionalized and 
inaapable of output. This was paralleled by the increasing skill level 
and cohesion of the army, which though divorced both from the immediate 
political coiSflicts and from the dissynchronizations precipitating 
instability, was becoming increasingly aware of and involved in the 
progressive breakdown of the civilian political system. On October 7 
1958 Mirza proclaimed ma tial law and esýablished Ayub Khan as Chief 
Martial Law Administrator; on October 28 Mirza was ousted and total 
military intervention was achieved. 
PERFORMANCE 
A number of introductory comments may be made on the eeneral format 
of the military regime of Ayub Khan. Firstv the regime was seen as inno- 
vative over the period 1958-629 after which date it became transformed 
into an equilibrating regime. Secondq although there was progressive 
civilianization particularly from 1962, the regime is still classified as 
military in that the primary executive post was held by a military member 
who initially assumed that position through a coup and in that the regime 
was designed and ultimAtely supported by the regime. Thirdly, during the 
period of the regime, the induced politicization (generalized) of a pro- 
fessional military began to manifest increasing indicators of m1litary 
Partisan and sectional politicization. 
The first iBsue area to be examined is the method and success of 
the military regime in coping with the four main political functions. 
With reference to the decision-making methodp two main factors may be 
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noted. First, there was a strong reliance on administrative techniques 
and resourcesq which can be indicated in a number of manners. First,, 
immediately following the coup Pakistan was divided into a number of 
administrative zonesq headed by military personnel. Secondlyt 33 maJOr 
commissions involving 280 persons covering most areas of policy formation 
were established. 
44 Although the reports of these commissions were only 
advisory, with a number of significant exceptions many of the recommenda- 
tions were enactedo and thereby provided the basis for much governmental 
policy formation. Thirdly, the military gove = ent was soon obliged to 
rely very heavily on administrative personnel. 
45 Although the close 
partnership which was to develop between the military and the civil service# 
did not appeax immediately (indeed the CSP had good cause to fear some 
major dislocation)ý6 fourteen months after the intervention the 272 mili- 
tary officers placed in the civil service to oversee certain civilian de- 
paxtments had been reduced to 53, the civil service constituted 4eo of the 
membership of the commissions (60o if military officersy judges and corpor- 
ation directors are included), 
47 
and little action was taken on the Cornelius 
Report, the Pay and Service Commission, which was very critical of the CSP 
and included some suggestions for major changes. Fourthlyp even when the 
process of civilianization was underway, Ayub Khan sought explicitly to 
reject the procedure, style and resources of the civilian politicians, 
Thusq even after legislative assemblies were constituted in 1962 and 1965t 
Ayub Khan and his cabinet of advisers were not responsible to those bodies; 
or again many former politicians were disqualified through EBDO (Elective 
Bodies disqualification Order); 48 or again Ayub In= exchewed direct 
elections fox more orderly and easily controlled indirect elections. 
The second factor of import concerning decision-making method is 
centralization. The high degree of centralization is manifested in a 
number of indicators. Firstj the high degree of centralization under 
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martial lawq during which period the constitution was abrogatedq the 
central and provincial assemblies dissolved'and political parties bannedg 
is self evident. However, through the 1962 constitution AYUb Khan managed 
to retaih a high degree of centralization. Ayub had Jaaae it clear from 
October 1958 - February 1960 that he favoured a unitary system with a 
strong executive President and a unicameral legislature indirectly elected 
with no political parties. 
49 Howeverg the commissions report submitted-, - 
in May 1961 was largely ignoredq and a constitutiong more in tune with 
Ayub's known preferences,, was evolved over the following ten months by a 
50 
series of cabinet sub-committees. A second indication of the high 
degree of centralization is provided by the Basid Democrat System. The 
B. D. system, one of the major innovations of the Ayub regimep was proclaimed 
in May 1959 and established'in October 1959 as the primary mechanism for 
popular participation in the polity. 
51 Developed from a number of Ayub's 
ideas on participationj the BD system has a number of important implications 
for the discussion of centralization. The five tiers (ranging from Union/ 
Town Council to Sub-District to District to Divisional to Development 
Provincial Councils) corresponded to administrative levels; the chairman 
of the cou2ý6ils belonging to the top four tiers was a government official; 
as the hierarchical system progressed so too did official representation; 
52 
only J; he lowest level was directly elected - the non-appointed members at 
higher levels being indirectly elected; and finally it is interesting to 
note in the original announcement of the BD system, there was no provision 
for the highest level. 
The scope of decision-making may be considered under three main 
headings: restructuring of the polity, general policy outputq and political 
control and direction of the economy. The restructuring of the polity 
involved in the main the establishment of 3 political structures: the 
BDsq'the 1962 Constitution and new central and-regional assemblies. The 
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BD system was established in 1959 as a five tiered hierarchy based on 
80pOOO elected members, which was fully integrated with the civil service 
and as such manifested increasing official representation as the pyramid 
was ascended, The BD system was devised both as the primary mechanism 
whereby the populace could participate in policy-formation and as the 
mechanism by which the central government could execute and explain its 
policies. The constitution of 1962, as has been noted, ran contrary to 
many of the recommendations of the constitution commission, and reflected 
the known preferences of Ayub for a strong unitary Presidential system. 
53 
(Indeed the only compromise on the part of Ayub was in the provision of 
Provincial Assemblies. ) In 1964 four important constitutional issues 
were clarified: 20 fundamental rights outlined in the 1956 Constitution 
were reinstatedg cabinet ministers were not allowed to participate in the 
assembly, a number of regional assembly duties were outlined and finally 
the courts overruled the executive wish to ban the Jazaat. 
54 Thereafter 
the constittLtion remained basically unchanged until the fall of Ayub. 
The central and regional assemblies were established in 1962 and 1965 on 
the basis of indirect election by the Basic Democrats. Both assemblies 
had strictly delimited roles. 
With reference to general policy formulationg the early stages of 
the military regime contrasted markedly with the former one in assuming 
a much more dynamic role. It is possible to document this with several 
examples. The most graphic example is the large number of commissions 
established under maxtial law, which submitted reports on a wide diversity 
of areas. The most important, excluding those having reference to the 
constitutionj were the commissions on the reorganization of the civil 
serviceg land-reforml law-reformg and education. The most importa3kt 
element of welfare legislation was the atempt to rehabilitate many of the 
ant( refugees. Finally there was a large-scale eal-t-corruption drive involving 
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screening committeest Public Conduct security ordinance 
(requiring all 
senior government servants to declare their assets and later expanded 
to, include Judges and MPs)j Scrutiny Ordinanceg Public Offices Disquali- 
fication Order, Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance, and tax 
evasion measures. Under the PCSO, SC and PODO 1662 were punished, 813 
bureaucratic officials dismissed; under EBDO 7000 were disqualified 
from political life; E87-75m of untaxed income was declared. 
55 
, 
With reference to the control and stimulatiion of the economy by 
the polityq the following observations may be made. In the first placet 
there was a strong emphasis on austerity and anti-corruption in the form 
of the reduction of consumer goodsp rationingg measures to clean up 
smuggling and collect undisclosed tax. Secondq a more dynamic planning 
section was established. This included an Ebcport Bonus Scheme; commis- 
sions to investigate commercial maritime affairs, textile industries$ jute 
industries and commercial law; the establishment of a new Economic Council 
and, Planning Commission (which when reorganized in 1962 gave Pakistan a 
comprehensive planning machine); and the promulgation of Five Year Plans 
196o-65 and 1965-70, which were more extensive and better organized than 
previous ones. 
56 Third, there was considerable reliance on foreign and, 
private investment, although the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation 
was established to stimulate industrial growth. 
57 
It is now pertinent to examine the success of the Ayub military'regime 
in terms of decision-making. With reference to the method of decision- 
makingp no significant dislocations appeared until the last few months 
of 1968 (to be examined below). On the other handt a number of features 
associated with the decision-making method, especially the degree of central- 
izationg and bureaucratizationg were responsible for precipitating other 
functionalfailures. With reference to the success of the decision-making 
scope, it is evident that the military regime was successful in establishing 
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a new polity, although as noted above the phenomenal nature of the polity 
was instrumental in precipitating alte3mative instability. Concerning 
the general policy formationg two general comments may be made, Firstq 
the extensive scope of deoision-making which characterised the martial 
law period was not sustained; and second many of the early policies were 
either not successfully executed, or not sufficiently extensive. Thus 
although large numbers of refugees were resettled, the problem was far from 
concluded; or again the corruption measures were restricted to the public 
services and later began to reappear, 
58 
or again the land reform was very 
mild involving only 2j million out of 46 million acreal most of which was 
bad landq and furthermore by 1964 only half had been redistributed. 
59 
With reference to the polity's control and direction of the economyq two 
observations may be made. First the rate of growth of the economy was 
undoubtedly much higher than during any previous regime; second although 
investment patterns and planning machinery improved intensely$ the rate of 
growth was not sufficiently diffused throughout the population. With 
reference to the former, the rise in GNP began very sOon after the military 
goverment came to power (rising by 9-7% over the first two yeaxs)l and 
over-the 10 year period as a whole GNP increased twice as fast as popula- 
tion averaging a 51% growth rate. As regards the second pointq although 
planning machinery improved, and industrialization began to develop (in- 
creasing as a percentage, of GNP from 5% (1955) to 8% (1960) to lelo (1965) 
with the third five year plan allocation to Industry being 206 as compaxed 
17% in the first Five Year Plan) . 
60 
industrial expansion came to be con- 
centrated in a small sector. Thus 20 families (of which Ayub's was one) 
owned 66% of the industrial capital, 80% of the'country's banking and 97ýo 
insurance (of the remaining 34% industrial capital, half was owned by 
foreiýgn firms), 
61 
The major processes involved in institutionalization were fourfold: 
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the BD system intended to involve the population in local government and 
to provide the primary means for paxtioipating; indirect election 
(Ayub 
first sought ratification in the BD elections held in December 1959 to 
January 1960, theredfter indirect elections were held for the Presidential 
election of 1965 and the national and provincial assembly elections of 
1962 
and 1965); the promulgation of a new constitution in 1962 intended to 
cbxi: ry and legitimize the new political structure; and finally new central 
and regional assemblies. Since these phenomena have already been examinedg 
it is possible to proceed-directly to analyze the effectiveness of the 
institutionalization procedure. 
In the first placeg it must be noted that the institutionalization 
measures were very limited. Thus the only universal elections were for 
the election of the BDsq the BD structure itself was increasingly dominated 
by offtials at the higher levels, and the functions and constraints of the 
central and regional assemblies were very slight (thus Ayub chose the 
cabinet which was not responsible to the legislature and further Ayub-also 
controlled theýbudget; concerning regional assemblies Ayub had not even 
wished to establish these and their list of powers was very small). 
Secondly there was a strong reliance on formal means of control* -Thus 
martial law was not lifted until 1962 (during which time decision-making 
was executed through ordinances and military courts existed throughout 
most of the period to supervise conformity to such ordinances); emergency 
rule was declared in 1965 and endured throughout most of the period until 
the resignation of Ayub; strong restrictive measures were employed against 
press and students (by 1961 only one free press association axisted) and 
many political oponents were held under emergency laws (especially EBDO); 
and finally Ayub refused to repeal the ordinances passed under martial law. 
Thirdly, it is claimed that corruption began to reappezE. Thus the BDs 
became sources of local patronageg whereas Ayub himself became a primary 
central source. 
62 
In conclusiong although the channels and modes of 
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political interaction were established and defined with a high degree of 
clarityq the major institutionalization drives were too restricted and not 
legitimated on a sufficiently broad base. Thus as soon as the regime 
moved out of the martial law period, during which time institutionalimtion 
is not of"primary importance, it began to encounter increasing demands 
motivated largely on account of the narrow base of institutionalization* 
These demands were to prove one of the major factors in precipitating the 
collapse of the regime. 
The third major processp support mobilizationg-as institutionalization, 
was not particularly problematic during the martial law period. The army 
initially was very popular, the former polity was bankrupt and Ayub could 
rely on the civil service. Nonetheless Ayub had realised the need for 
support mobilization (as evidenced by the ratification at the end of 1959) 
and it, was one of the functions of the BD system to accomplish this. How- 
ever, the military regime's assessment of both the means of mobilizing 
support and of the necessary level of such support was hopelessly inade- 
quate. Ayubs regime from 1962 onwards began to show indicators of both 
main types of support failure, which by 1968 had reached very high levels 
and together with institutionalization failure was responsible for the 
downfall of the Ayub regime. It is possible to examine the support failure 
under the headings of the two main types: insufficience and withdrawal* 
Insufficience may be examined by three main indicators. The first 
relates to the re-emergence of political parties. 
63 
Under martial lawt 
political parties had been banned and the ban had been retained under the 
1962 constitution. 
64 
However, soon after the first meeting of the National 
Assembly several members gave notice for private bills to-X: egaliz6 Political 
parties. The government forestalled them with the Political Parties Bill 
of July 1962. It is important to note the early stage at which this bill 
was introducedv that it was introduced despite Ayub's known -recriminations, 
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and that no licenting clauses or restrictions on the number of parties or I 
the regulation of the collection or administration of party funds were 
drafted. The Jamaat emerged in July 19629 Nizaam in Augustj 14L 
(Conven- 
tion) in September, EL (Council) in October 1962, and the Awami League in 
December_1963 - in May 1963 Ayub was forced to join the IML 
(Convention) 
of which he became President in December. 
65 
In the second place# the 
newly emerged political parties closely resembled those of the pre-coup 
period both in organization and personnelg and as such proved equally in- 
capable of crystallizing support. Indeed many of parties even looked 
back. to 
. 
1947: the ML (Convention) was organized by KhaliquZzaman Who 
failed in the 1948 organizationt and the ML (Council) was organized by 
Nazimuddin, Governor-General 1948-51t and PM and League President 1951-53.66 
Thirdly, the basic support for the regime was very narrow and unrepresen- 
tative. Thus 136/156 of the National Assembly were landlordst lawyers or 
businessmeng or again the BDs were monopolized by the larger landowners 
(which is true even for East Pakistan). 
67 
Withdrawal of support can be demonstrated by two indicatorsp the 
withdrawal of support from the regime and the progressive development of 
opposition. In the ratification Dece4er 195.0-January 1960 by the 13Dst 
Ayub received 95% of the vote. In the 1965 election despite the much 
greater resources of Ayub, the structuring of the electoral process6jthe 
incumbent regimeg Ayub won only 6elo of the total vote (7Y/- in West Pakistan 
and 53% in East Pakistan). 
68 
In the subsequent eleotions for the national 
and provincial assembliesq although the ML appeared as the dominant partY, 
it won onlY 55% of the central votes. 'and 
49% and 38% in the West and 
East Assemblies. 69 In the second place, it is possible to note rising 
opposition to the Ayub regime. Thus in betober 1962 Suhrawardy formed 
the National Democratic 11ront; the COP emerged to fight the 1965 elections 
and performed wellv but after its defeat in the Presidential elections it 
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disintegrated; in 1966 Ilujibur Rahman produced the Awani League's 6 Point 
Programme which made a demand for full regional autonomy; in 1967 5 0PPo- 
sition parties formed the Pakistan Democratic Ylovement. But the main 
opposition disturbances began in October 1968 from student protests against 
the 'University Ordinance in West Pakistan which spread to include workers 
and then in December to include workers and students in East Pakistan. 
The period from December 1968 to March 1969 was a series of riotsq strikes 
and demonstrations involving all sections of the population. 
70 It is 
significant-to note that the massive popular rejection began independently 
of any organized political party and although the opposition parties may 
have played some role in fanning the'protest (a combined oppodtion the 
Diiocratic Action Committees was formed in January 1969) they could not 
channellize or crystallize the protest. In sum, the regime established 
by Ayub completely underestimated the role of support mobilization in the 
nation state and the means of mobilizing and integrating such support* 
Despite the increasing evidence of support failure after 19659 the Ayub 
regime proved completely incapable of accommodating such failure and con- 
sequently experienced a total collapse. 
The major monitoring methods of the Ayub regime are already evident: 
the military's monopoly of forceg the use of mzrtial, law and emergency 
powers and the reliance on the administratinn. 
71 Initially the m tial 
law administration had considerable success. Thus the locus of government 
became clearly'establishedv massive corruption drives were initiatedg the 
policy-making procedure was extended and revitalized under the commissionst 
the economic monitoring mechanisms were revamped and some considerable pro- 
gress was made in a number of pressing problems. Nonethelesst by 1965 
it was clear that some degree of monitoring failure was beginning to re- 
appear but it did not become extensive until the final collapse of the 
regime from December 1968 onwards. Thus corruption began to reappeaxg 
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a number of major policies were not fully implemented (including land 
reform and the reorganization of the civil service); governmental autho- 
rity began to wane in East Pakistan after 1966; but the main indications 
of monitoring failure appeared after December 1968 and lasted until the 
resignation of Ayub, in March 1969 by which time the BD system had com- 
pletely collapsed, severa. 1 hundreds had been killed in riots ind in East 
Pakistan the police had been confined to barracks. The monitoring 
failure, which was largely contingent on the dislocations which precipi- 
tated institutionalization and support failure, reached chronic propor- 
tions'by the beginning of 1969, and since the regime could not control 
the consequences of the monitoring failure or alleviate the dislocations 
precipitating it, it collapsed. 
In conclusion, the military regime established by Ayub Khan showed 
considerable success in decision-making (method) and to a lesser degree 
in decision-making scope and monitoring; but it manifested a enntinuous 
failure of the institutionalizition and support mobilization processes* 
It is now necessary to examine the second major problem areat namely 
the success of the military in alleviating the basio d*ssynchronizations 
which precipitated the pattern of instability prior to the intervention. 
With reference to the first two dissynchronizationsg many of the 
main points have been noted in connection with the examination of the 
success of the military in dealing with decision-making scope. 1hance 
the main observations on this problem area may be summarized. The main 
conclusion is that although the military made major strides in alleviating 
the secoild dislocationt there was no fundamental change in the firstp'i. e. 
the economic struck=e. On the one hand, the planning machinery improved; 
investment-schemes, such as the Indus Basin, were initiated; and agri- 
cultural and industrial production expanded markedly. 
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Table 5: 4- : Pakis-tan's A 
Produntion I 
Agriculture 
(U. N. Statistical Yearbook 
1958 1962 1964 1966 1968 
83 93 99 103 119 
Industry 50 83 Ill 130 155 
Per capita Production (at constant prices) 85 94 102 108 117 
On the other handp as noted above industrial wealth was concentrated in a 
b 
very smallIsector thereby prohobiting the diffusion of income rises. to the 
bulk of the population; further there was little change in the structure 
of the economy, 
72 
q and finally as will be noted below the attempts 
to re- 
dress the regional imbalanceq though very marked, were not sufficiently 
extenpive. 
With, reference to the regional cleavage, although it may be argued 
that the military regime was able to diminish the salience of the cleavage 
it was not able to alleviate it. The indicators of the regional cleavage 
were present in 1962 when even before parties reemerged in the National 
Assembly, groups of "'like-minded" persons began forming along provincial 
lines. 73 -In 1966, the Awami League made a demand for full regional autonomy 
for the Fast and thereafter became consolidated as the major party of the 
East. Finally the riots immediately preceding the resignation of Ayub were 
more severe in the East: more people were killed, more groups participated 
in the demonstrations, the BD system collapsed more convincingly (involving 
the deaths of many Basic Democrats), and the police were rendered completely 
ineffective. On the. other hand, it must be pointed out that the 1966 6-Point 
programme contained a number of other major demands in addition to regional 
autonomy; and secondlyp the massive disturbances of 1968 and 1969 were not 
a regional phenomemon. and in fact started in the West. 
Given the observation that regional cleavage continued although in 
more moderate form, a more comprehensive picture may be gained by examining 
the militaxyls performance with reference to the conditions underlying the 
cleavage dissynchronization. Concerning the political factors some degree 
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of improvement was made to each but none was alleviated. In the first 
place, although attempts were made to even recruitment to some of the 
major political organizations, the West continued to be more favourably 
endowed, Thus although in 1964 provincial recruitment to the civil 
administration was evened out, the West continued to be better represented 
particularly in top-posts, e. g. in 1965 of 17 central secretaries only 2 
were from the East74; or again the position in the military was even 
worse where the East contributed only 20,000 out of 500; 900'9' and repre- 
sented only 51/'o of the officers (of 17 top army posts only 1 Major-General 
came from the East)75; or again the number of Basic Democrats was evenly 
divided between the two wings despite the larger eastern population. 
Secondly, no dominant national paxty emerged. Although Ayub's ML did 
have support in both wingst its support in the East was less and further 
it was rather a defunct political party. In the same veing some degree 
of improvement in the economic factors was evidentq but again none was 
alleviated. In the first placeg the geographic disparity could not of 
course change. Secondly, there was however an increase in, the trade 
between the two wings, which was particularly maxked in the increase of 
exports from East to West I Pakistan. 
76 Finally there was an increase in 
attempla to redress the imbalance between East and West. Thus the growth 
rate in the Fast 1959-64 was 5-W/o against 4-9% in the West, 
77 the alloca- 
tion for the Third Five Year Plan for the first time gave more to the East 
(53% of the total allocation)978 and finally there was some equalization of 
per capita income which was reduced from 7-7%, in 1959-63 to 2.8'It in 1967- 
79 
Concerning the social-cultural factorsy there is no evidnece to show any 
marked changes. In sums three conclusions concerning regional cleavage 
may be drawn. First, although the military regime did not alleviate any 
of the basic causes, it did induce a certain diminuation in their salience. 
Seconds the regional cleavage under the Ayub regime was not nearly as im- 
Portant a factor in influencing political instability. (Indeed its 
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repercussions for instability were confined primarily to support 
failure 
and were soaxcely noticeable concerning decision-making. 
) Third, the 
diminished effect of regional cleavage for political instability was 
somewhat artificial in that central military regime was not a spontaneous 
product of the political forces of Pakistan. Hence given that only 
moderate improvement had been made in decreasing the factors conditioning 
the cleavage, it was to be expected that once the unifying regime was 
removed cleavage-mobilization could be expected. 
With reference to the fragmentation and proliferation of paxtiest 
the Ayub regime was successful in diminishing the repercussions of party 
proliferation on politidal instabilityt but was unsuccessful in alleviating 
the conditions underlying the dislocation. Many of the indicators of the 
reemergence of party fragmentation have already been noted: by October 
1962 the IS had split into three factions in addition to the AL9 ITAPq KSPq 
Nizaant Jamaat and Republican Parties; many of the former Politicians 
dominated these parties; there were no restrictionsq regulationst or 
registration of parties, nor any inspection of the collection or distri- 
bution of funds; and the paxties were still cut from any popular base 
and soon became embroiled in oppositional tactics and manifebted the same 
vagaries in the forming and reforming of temporary alliances. 
Given the continued indicators of party proliferation, it is possible 
to examine the ramificitions of military rule on the conditions underlying 
the dissynchronization. The factors which underlay the decline of the 
HL still continued. Thus no cohesive group of national and provincial 
leaders appeared; the dominant party (Ayub ML) remained assoaciated vfth 
Western landowning and business interests; but on the other hand there 
were EFre-indicators of more experienced and longer-term planning. In 
the second placeg although some degree of patronage continued, there was 
not the same degree of factionalization within the ML9 and due to Ayub's 
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monopoly of office not the same'scramble for spoils. 'Thirdly, the dearth 
of electionag (the 1965 election of BDs was the only significant one for 
parties) combined with the very curtailed functions of partiesq continued 
to negate some of the primary mechanisms around which parties can consoli- 
date. 
Three conclusibns on party fragmentation may be noted. First, the 
Ayub regime was able to diminish the ramifications of party proliferation 
and fragmentation for decision-making and institutionalization instability 
(in that caalition problems were removed) but not for support mobilization. 
Secondl although the military regime made some progress in alleviating the 
causes of the party breakdown, such causes were not removed. Finallyq as 
has been noted above, the military regime was unable to develop a viable 
national party. 
- The dissynchronizations of the national assembly and the constitution 
may be examined together. Three major conclusions may be noted. In the 
first place, the military regime unlike the previous civilian one was able 
to produce a constitution and regional and national assemblies. Secondly 
many of the factors which underlay the dislocations of these institutions 
prior to the military intervention reappeared, e. g. the same small group 
interests dominating the BD system and the assemblies. Thirdly, the phen- 
omenal nature of the constitution and assemblies established by the Ayub 
military regime contained a number of . major contradictions. Thus us we 
noted above the constitution was very narrow, involved extensive centralized 
controlsq whereas the assemblies had negligible controls and functions and 
were narrowly recruited. 
Two observations on the final dislocatinn of the civil administration 
may be made. In the first place-there was some reorientation both in the 
composition and role of the administration. Thus after 1964 there was 
some attempt to even out the recruitment to the administrationg 
80 
or again 
there had been more attempts to, examine critically the' structure and function 
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of the civil service, or again through the Basic Democrat system 
there 
had been channels for the criticism of the administration and furthermore 
local administrative units had been used to undertake rfaral works pro- 
grammes. 
82 On the other hand, the administration had proved resilient 
to any major changes. Thus the most radical reportt "The Pay and Services 
commission Report", recommending unific&tion of the disparate services and 
the replacement of the CSPq had effectively been shelved, the elitist posi- 
tion of the CSP had been preserved (although it must be admitted that this 
was now based more on training capabilities), and finally the very nature 
of the military regime enhanced the salience of the civil service 
(thus CSP 
S3 
members presided over the most important branches of the BD system . 
In conclusion, it is argued that after an undoubted successful martial 
law periodq the military regime of Ayub Khan made comparatively little pro- 
gress towards alleviating the basic dislocations of instability. It is 
true that the. regime had stimulated a number of significant economic develop- 
ments but had acted as an artificial constraint on political development. 
Thus while there had been a dimunuation of political instabilityq since 
the military regime had been unable to remove the dislocations which had 
previ; tously stimulated instability and since it also had been unable to 
establish any viable alternativeg its rule represented a type of freezing 
operation at the conclusion of which many of the former problems reappeared. 
The third major problem concerns the analysis of the repercussions 
of performance on military predispositions -and capabilities and vice versa* 
The primaxy consequence of the skill level of the Pakistan a=q on 
performance was that the ipilitary regime experienced, no manor difficulty 
in providing the requisite number of technically qualified personnel, who 
were capable of occupying the necessary executive positionse The main 
consequences of composition and structure were twofold. Firstly the 
homogeneity of the military regime enabled it to maintdn a high degree 
of cohesion during the period of rule, Secondlyq the Webtern bias underlay 
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the incapacity to alleviate the regional cleavage. Although there is no 
evidence to indicate a regional sectional bias on the part of the Ayub 
regime, the regime was increasingly identified in the East as Western- 
oriented, and furthermore it made no major attempts to rectify the regional 
imbalance. The degree of internal autonomy was instrumental in precipi- 
tating the laxge-scale overt employment of the army in the Ayub regime as 
civilianization progressed. Finally the influence of the high degree of 
cohesion has already been illustrated in the context of composition and 
struclure. 
The consequences of the military dissatisfaction and hostility 
towards the structure, policies and incumbents of the pre-coup political 
system were very clearly manifested. The antipathy towardd parties and 
factionalization were reflected in the BD system, the strong executive 
constitution, the use of indirect elections, the reliance on bureaucratic 
techniques and the stringent monitoring controls. The antipathy towards 
policy failure was responsible for the period of innovation in the imme- 
diate post coup yeaxs. Finally$ the antipathy towards politicians was 
evident in the use of E. B. D. O. and the attempt to negate the role of parties. 
The consequences of performance on the organizational oapabilities 
of the army were not extensive. It may be assumed that the skill level 
of the militaxy increased. Allocations to the militaxy continued to rise 
(though in proportion to pre-coup increases)q and further the militaxy 
continued to play an important external role. With reference to composition 
and structure, three factors maylbe nobd. First it is interesting to note 
that there were no large purges in, the militaryq which is an indication of 
the high degree of homogeneity and, uniformity of politicization in the 
military prior to the coup. Second, the size of the military increased 
-, 
. to over 2509000.84 Finallyq there was no significant change in the 
regional composition of the army, which continued to be a Western monopoly. 
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With reference to autonomy and cohesion, there was no evidence of any 
change. 
The major predispositional change was that the level of poitticization 
increased. This could only be expected given the extended period of rule. 
However, there were indications of changes from generalized-induced to 
military-partisan and civilian-sectional politicization. The fo=er was 
indicated by the reluctance of the Ayub regime-. 3 to undergo any major civil- 
ianization or attempt to establish the conditions for a transfer; the 
latter was indicated by the inability to redress the regional imbalance. 
Howeverg it must be noted that at the time of the collapse of the Ayub 
regimeq these changes were not very significant. Thus the military did 
not intervene to prop up the failing Ayub regime, and further regional 
discrimination was not nearly as maxked as pre-1958- 
In conclusion, it is possible to note the post Ayub situation. As 
has already been noted the Ayub regime developed a high degree of instability 
which in March 1969 led to the complete collapse of the regime. Since no 
civilian body emerged from the disturbances as being capable of forming an 
alternative regime, the military formeJ another regime under its commander- 
in-Chief Yahya Khan. The subsequent civil strife in East Pakistang the 
extent of which is still unknown, was a product essentially of the changing 
politicization of the militaryg and of increased regional pressure from 
East Pakistan. Although the riots and disturbance from December 1968 - 
March 1969 occurred in both wings (and even started in the West), the Ayub 
regime collapsed more dramatically in the East. Given that one of the 
major reasons for the collapse of the Ayub regime was participation failurel 
the Eastern wing was now confronted with a new military regime of Western 
hue in which participation was even less (i. e. martial law had been 
declared and there were no civilian trappings). In sum, the new military 
regime was simply compounding the instability of March 1969 unless it 
6 
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achieved some major transformation. Procedures for elections and a trans- 
fer to civilian rule were established and this led to a containment of the 
instability. The subsequent tantamount rejecthn of the elections by the 
Yahya Khan regime, which could only be attributable to regional-sectional 
politicizationg cryztallized the situation which led to the civil strife in 
East Pakistan. With the rejection of the elections, the institutionaliza- 
tion and support failure of the Ayub regime were returned and intensified 
and were bound to stimulate a massive monitoring failure; the stronger 
Western identification of the military regime conditioned the source and 
direction of the monitoring failure. The combination added up to the 
civil wax in East Pakistan. 
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VILITARY IPTERVENTION AND FERFORXANCE IN 'U. A. R. -(EGYPT) 
INTERVENTION 
At the time of the military intervention in 1952, Egypt could be 
classified as a threshold nation state system. Unlike formal colonial 
systems, such as Pakistang Burmag Indonesia or Ghanaq Egypt hbd enjoyed 
a semi-independent status in the 19th and 20th centuries under the 
Ottomans and the British. As a consequence, Egypt had manifested nascent 
nation state processes (such as an economy integrated into larger external 
marketso an independent constitution, political parties, etc. ) at a much 
eaxlier stage than even Pakistan or Burma. On the other hand, whereas 
colonial systems undergo rapid transformation into low level nation state 
systems through independenceg the development of the nascent nation state 
processes in Egypt manifested a high degree of stagnation. Thus the 1950 
patterns of production, consumption and income did not differ maxkedly 
from those at the beginning of the 20th century; political parties had 
neither expanded nor organized; or finally the strong monarchical consti- 
tution of 1923 persisted. 
1 In similax manner, the indicators of political 
instability had. been clearly identifiable for some considerable timeg and, 
by virtue of their continued existence within a changing international 
2 framework, were becoming more acute . 
All four major types of instability were manifest. With reference 
to decision-making (method) failureq two indicators may be noted. Firstlyp 
there was a considerable degree of conflict inherent in the tripartite 
decision-making framework of the monarch, the conglomeration of political 
parties and paxliament, and the British. Thus the British forced the resig- 
nation of the Zaglul cabinet in 1924; the British obliged the King to rein- 
state a cabinet in 1926; a period of roya'I decree existed from 1930-35; 
popular pressure brought the royal decree goverment to an end but again 
in 1937 the king managed to force the resignation of the civilian goverment; 
again in 1942 the British forced the resignation of another civilian govern- 
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ment. The second indicator relates to the short tenure of governments, 
Thus from 1922 only one parliament had lasted its full term; there had 
been 10 general elections; there had been three major periods of rule 
by royal decree covering almost 9 years; and finally in the last two 
3 
parliaments, i. e. 1945-52, there had been 11 Prime Ministers. 
Two major areas of decision-making (scope) failure may be identifieds 
namely the economic and political fields. In the economic area there had 
been considerable stagnation following World War 1. Despite 19th century 
increases per capita farm output was fallingg the land tenure system had 
not changed# industrial output was very small-scale (in 1950 6e- of indus- 
trial concerns had annual outputs of less than C1000 and 75% employed less 
than 10 workers)q and again despite a World War 2 boost industrial produc- 
tion was falling. In sump by 1952 tjýe Egyptian economy was stagnant and 
over the period 1937!! ', 52 had registered a growth rate per capita of 0.01%. 
4 
In the political area, there had been no major change in the structure of 
the polity from the early 1920s. Although the influence of the British 
had probably declined, it was still significant; the powers of the auto- 
cratic monarch were undisturbed; the monaxchical constitution of 1923 
remained; the territorial problem of the Suclan was unsolved; and the status 
and role of political parties and parliament had not changed. In sum, from 
I 
1923 to 1952 there had been virtually no change or adaptation on the part 
of the polity - the threshold status of 1920 was perpetuated until 1950.5 
Three indicators of institutionalization failure may be noted. 
First, there was no progress in the development of a formal body of rules 
or more informal modus operandi governing Political interaction. Thus 
the 1923 constitution, which conferred extensive powers on the monarcht 
was something of an artifact; the British played a role, which is not en- 
compassed by independent nation state development; there was a marked 
Propensity for governvient to undo the acts of the preceding one; and 
finally there was a marked tendency towards overt and explicit Oanipulation 
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paxticularly on the part of the British and the monarch, The second indi- 
cator, that of the failure to delineate the spheres of competence of major 
institutionsq was closely related to the failure to develop a modus operandi. 
The manipulatory and arbitrary powers of the monarch meant thatnone of the 
major political organs, such as cabinet, legislative bodiesq civil adminis- 
tration, could develop autonomous spheres of action. The third indicator 
is that of patronage and corruption. The corruption and patronage of the 
monarch is evident from the attempts to undermine the constitution and 
civilian parties (particularly the Wafd) and to place royal puppets in the 
civilian polity. However, patronage in the civilian polity was no less 
marked. The main means of patronage were the replacement of personnel 
within the civil administration (thus following the elections of 1924P 19299 
1942 and 1950 the Wafd replaced large numbers of bureaucratic officials with 
its own supporters)v and the extensive use of emergency powers to curb and 
inhibit opposition parties (this is particularly true of the Wafd in 1942- 
44). 
6 
The attempts to restrict corruption and patronage were minimalt ancl 
indeed there vven appeared to be an increase after World War 2.7 
The main type of support failure was that of insufficience. Both 
forms of insufficienceonamely too narrow a base of support and incapacity 
to mobilize# were present. With reference to the former, the monarch made 
no attempt to accommodate to any of the political parties or to mobilize any 
mass political b4se, 
8 
whereas the political parties remained essentially 
clique parties though they did have broader orientations. 
9 With reference 
to the latter, the political parties remained weak organizations with very 
limited party structuresq 
10 
party'orgatLization or activity had not expan- 
ded significantly from the post World War 1 period, the paxties themselves 
had become increasingly fragmented and the Wafd party which had been the 
major nationalist party had experienced twckajor splinter groups by 19399 
the Parties had remained relatively discrete and had been unable to com- 
bine into effective unitsq and finally the political parties had become 
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more attuned to manoeuvering for central power and patronage positions 
than to mobilizing popular support. 
There were three main indicators of monitoring failure. The first 
relates to the rise of domestic violence, which became increasingly more 
marked after World War 2. The pattern of domestic violence was that of 
frequentp prolonged and violent rioting in the major cities and of guerilla 
activity in the Suez zone. Thus rioting in February and March 1946 led 
to 37 deaths, similar rioting for several days in November involved two 
deathst two more deaths occurred in September 19479 serious riots reappeared 
in January 19519 and riots which began in October 1951 continued into the 
following January and climased in 60 deaths. The rise in domestic vio- 
lence was reflected in the development of para-military wings by all the 
major political parties. The guerilla activity in the Suez area became 
progressively more pronounded after World War 2 ao that by 1950-51 it was 
clear that neither the monarch nor the political parties were able to con- 
trol it. The second indicatorg that of the rise in the goverment use 
of forceq involved both British and Egyptian deployments. In 1951 British 
troops occupied the entire Canal Zoneq Ismailia and Port Said; maxtial law 
was declared from MV 1948 to February 1950 and reimposed again in January 
1952.11 The third indicator relates to the general inefficacy of the 
civil administration. Howeverg this weakness was not as chronic as in 
many ex-colonial systems nor was it directly a-Ltributable to a shortage of 
trained personnel. Rather the weakness was a product of party patronage 
and also of the chronic level of instability. 
12 
The second major task involves an examination of the major dislocations 
which precipitated the above profile of instability. The first two that 
may be considered are the related ones of the economic inputs to the 
Political system and the political directives to the economy. 
With reference to the structure of the economy two factors may be 
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noted. In the first placeq Egypt was heavily dependent on a single 
export cropp namely cotton (contributing approximately 8eo of foreign 
exchange). As in the case of all economies heavily reliant on a single 
cropq the economy was very vulnerable on account of both price and pro- 
duction fluctuations. 
Table 5: 5 : Index Yield, Price and Total Value Ep_mMtien Cotton Crop 
(192 
1920 1938 1942 1946 1950 1952 
Yield 100 141 182 152 130 153 
Price 100 31 81 125 363 175 
Total Value 100 46 55 123 513 292 
Secondlyp land holding was badly skewed with the conseuqnece that many Small 
units were non-viable and many of the larger ones were inefficient. 
Table 5: 6 : Percentage Distribution Land Ownership and Total Area Owned by 
Size_Ownership 14 
Nlimber Land Ownership 
Less than 1 Acre 
1-5 
5-10 
10-21 
21-52 
52+ 
1916 1936 1950 
62 70 71 
29 24 23 
5 4 3 
2 2 2 
Total Area Owned 
1916 1936 1950 
8 12 13 
19 20 21 
10 10 10 
9 9 10 
11 11 11 
43 39 37 
Thirdly, a number of major enterprises were owned and controlled by foreign 
capital - the most notable enterprise being the Suez Canal. With reference 
to the second dislocation three factors may be noted. First, there had been 
no attempt to expand significantly land under cultivation from World War 1, 
onwards. Second there was very little central stimulus either to agri- 
cultural or industrial production, so that by 195_2 private enterprise employed 
92% labour force, produced 84% national output and 75'/a fixed capital formation. 
Thirdly central planning and monitoring controls were negligible. There 
had been a5 Year Plan in 1935 for a limited number of public services and 
utilities but World War 2 had interfered with this; there had been a second 
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plan in the 1940s but this had largely remained on paper. 
15 
The third dissynchronization was that of system cleavage. The 
particular type of cleavage experienced in Egypt was one which could, onlY 
be found in a threshold nation state and was represented in terms of the 
conflict between the non-nation state forces of the autocratic monarch and 
the role of the external influence of Britain and the emergent nation, state 
forces of the various political parties. The system cleavage hinged on 
two very simple factors: the relatively equal strengths of each of the 
three groupings and the very different interest and perceived role of each. 
The British could maintain themselves by virtue of a strong army and strong 
economic interests. Although the formal Protectorate had terminated in 
1922v the British were able to maintain a significant control over poli- 
tical events in Egypt. The major interest was. in maintaining Britain's 
economic interests and in excluding otherlEuropean powers. The monarchy 
had been established in the 19th century by an Albanian and had continued 
to be dominated by Albanians, Greeks and Syrians, i. e. non-Egyptians. 
The important factors concerning the monarchy in the 20th century were that 
no accorLnodation had been made to nation state developments (i. e. in devel- 
oping for example a constitutional monarchy) nor had the monarch been 
capable of stimulating any significant economic development. These two 
non-nation state forces were confronted by the political parties and, parlia- 
ment. But the problem was that the later groupingg through finding itself 
in contradiction both to the Britishaad the king, had insufficient resources 
to resolve. the contradiction. The consequence of this tripartite cleavage 
was to produce a basic atrophy in patterns of interaction, which inhibited 
any significant nation state developments. This condition of stagnationt 
contingent on the cleavagep, had repercussions for each of the main types of 
instability. 
The fourth dissynchronization, which relates closely to an aspect of 
the above cleavage, was that of participation failure, The participation 
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failure was related prima ily to the ineffectiveness of political Partiese 
The weak structure of the political parties has already been indicated and 
may be attributed to several factors. In the first placeg the monexch 
was unwilling to be opposed by strong parties and took extensive measures 
to undermine the major parties. Second the British were atually unwilling 
to see the emergence of any strong nationalist group- Third the Wafd 
party itself 9 which emerged after World War 1 as the primary nationalist 
movement, was unable to maintain its cohesion., Fourth the political 
parties never developed beyond the clique staget and although each had 
pretentions to mass movements none could contain the increasing popular 
dissatisfaction following World War 2. Finallyp the political partiesq 
though maintaining an anti-royalist pOsitionp accommodated to the type of 
political interaction fostered by the monarchy with the consequence that 
the parties became primarily occupied with an attempt to dominate the main 
executive posts. The consequences of this dissynchronization related 
primarily to institutionalization and support failure. 
The final dissynchronization was the failure to develop a satisfaotOrY 
constitution. The V23 constitutionj which was in force at the time of the 
intervention in 1952, was promulgated as a consequence of the British sur- 
render of independence in 1922, Nonetheless the British managed to sus- 
tain sufficient controls to render independence rather anomalous. (Thus 
the British retained'Control of security of communicationg defence of 
Egypt and protection of foreign irlarests in Egypt and Sudan. ) As a con- 
sequence of British and monarchical influence, the constitutiong which was 
finally promulgated in 19239 was heavily biased in favour of the Monarch. 
Thus the monarch could select the Prime Minister, dismiss the cabinet and 
Assemblyt appoint the President and 20% of the Senateg and approve all 
bills. Under this constitutiong which experienced periods of suspension 
and even replacement, it was inconceivable that any significant nation state 
development could take plaoe. 
16 Howeverg until the time of the military 
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intervention no manor revisions or replacements in the direction of nation 
state development had taken place. 
Having examined the major dissynchronizationsq the final problem in 
the analysis of intervention is the analysis of the organizational capa- 
bilities and predispositions of the military-17 
1ý 
Two factors are of note concerning the skill level of the Egyptian 
army. In the first place, the Egyptian a=W was not a novel organization. - 
Indeed the first signs of a professional army with training schools were 
evident from the reign of Muhammed Ali. Although this army was largely 
dissolved following the Orabi Revolt in 1881 the. British retrained another 
one. 
18 The second factor concerns the opening of the Military Academy in 
1936 to Egyptian officers., The combination of a relatively long-standing 
army together with British training and a permanent Military Academy meant 
that the skill level of the, Egyptian army was considerably in excess of 
the other ex-colonial armies that ye., have examined. Howeverp from the 
speed of -the defeat during the Palestine War (even given several. caveats 
such as the army not being fully prepared)v it was clear that in the con- 
text of more advanced nation states the technical eppertise of the Egyptian 
army was not very high. t ". " 
Three, factors may be noted concerning composition and structure. 
Firstv the Egyptian military was primarily, an army so that the potential 
for interservice rivalry was largely_excluded. , In, the second placet pro- 
gressive Egyptianization had. takenplace., Follwoing the dissolution of 
the ar"Y after the Orabi Revolt, exemption from the new army could only 
be made on a financial paymentq which meant the army came to consist pri- 
marilY of the peasant fellahin. 
., 
The opening of the Miliýsry Acad8MY in 
1936 permitted the further Egyptianization of the officer corps. The 
third factor of interest is that given the British and royal group control 
Of many of the major - economic concerns 
(the roYal group consisting of the 
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Greek, Syrian and Albanian interests) and given the stagnant nature of the 
political partiesq which were largely controlled by large land-owners, the 
military provided the only means of mobility for the poorer, more rural 
Egyptian*19 
Two factors are of note concerning internal autonomy within the army* 
Firstlyq the British attempted to retain strong controls# 'though these con- 
trols weakened progressively up to the time of the intervention. In the 
period following the Orabi Revolt the British retained almostýotal control 
of the structure and composition of the army. After World War 2, in con- 
sonance with the rise of the Wafd demands for independence, there was pres- 
sure to remove the British Commander-in-Chief to relax British inspection. 
However# the treaty of independence in 1922 continued the firm British hold 
on the army. Howeverg with the opening of the Military Academy in 1936t 
British controls began to wane. The second source of internal infleunCel 
was from the royal stratum. Despite the high degree of Egyptianization in 
the lower ranksq Hurewitz points out that the top army ranks were dominated 
20 by those groups of Ottoman-Circassian descent. , It is reasonable to 
assume therefore that the royal entourage and the top military leaders 
were closely allied and that 6onsequently the royal group had strong in- 
fluence within the army. However, it must be noted that in both cases 
of external" influence evidence points out that each was declining, The 
decline of British influence was sealed by the 1936 Treatyq whereas the' 
decline of royal influence was indicated by the-rejection of the King's 
candidate in the Army Officer club elections. Concerning external auton- 
OmYt two points may be noted. , Until-the time of world Wax 2-the army was 
effectively sealed from any extensive, participation in the civilian polity* 
Howeverg from the time of world War 2-anny participation began to expand. 
Thus the commitment to the Palestine War when the army was unprepaxed and 
scarcely consulted led to large-scale disaffection and later involved the 
army in the defective arms deal controversy, or again the increased rioting 
0 
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and two periods of ma tial law had the effect of increasing the military 
involvement in the civilian polity. 
21 
Two factors are of importance coneerning cohesion. First, there 
was a# division between the Ottoman-Circassian elite group and the rising 
group of Egyptian officersp though this division does not appear to have 
been acute. It is interesting to note that the Free Officer Groupp the 
clique responsible- for the coup, was founded in 1949 by 11 members# 8 of 
whom entered the Military Academy in 1936,2 in 1937 and 1 in 1938- Thus 
the F. O. G. was all Egyptian and of-more junior rank. 
22 Second, given 
this divisiong there is no other, evidence of any serious cleavages, This 
is attributable to two major factors. On the one hand. the army had never 
been a great attraction for the non-Egyptian groupst and on the other hando 
unlike Syria for example, the Egyptian population is relatively homogeneous 
and thus the army did not have, to contend with any serious regionalp ethnic 
or religious lines of cleavage. 
With reference to predispositionsg thelavouring faetorsl i. e* the- 
levels of dissatisfaction, were high whereas %the inhibiting factors were 
low* Concerning the first factor,, -the degree of dissatisfaction with 
major structures and groupsq the military (or that part of it which made 
the coup) was opposed to all the, major political groups. Thus the mili- 
tary even from the 1920s had resented the : British presence both in Egypt 
and in the army; the monarchy was also opposed in that it was perceived 
as a non-Egyptian obstacle to ', 'national, development"; and finally the 
existing parties were opposed since they, were, perceived as ineffective 
and corrupt. 
23 The degree of dissatisfaction against the major political 
groupings was such as to generalize t the major political structures of 
the parliamentg cabinetq constitutIong etc. - Dissatisfaction at the second 
level, i. e. against policiest included the: following. -The most important 
general ones were hostility, to the -British presencep the failure to solve 
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the Sudan problem, the failure to break the economic stagnation and to 
achieve a more equitable land distribution., The most important grievances 
against poli6ies which specifically affected the army were threefold. In 
the first place, the army was very 'dissatisfieawith the levity to which 
it was committed to a war against Israel for which it was totally unpre- 
pared. Second, the army was frustrated both by the bad supplies of muni- 
tionsp which were either defective or delivered too late, and also by the 
abortive attempts to gain an inquiry. Third, the army was opposed to 
attempted infiltrations. Thus theXing's nomination of General Osman to 
the executive of the Amy Club was defeatedq or again the military was 
opposed to the appointment of the King's brother-in-lawq a person with no 
military experience, to the post of Defence Minister in the Second Hilaly 
Cabinet. With reference to the third levelq that of incumbdntsp the 
degree of dissatisfaction at the first two levels was of such intensity 
as to involve virtually the total incumbents. With reference to the 
inhibiting factors, there was no evident alternative group in Egypt which 
appeared'- capable of alleviating the increasing political instability. 
24 
Secondq although there was a division in the army between the higher non- 
Egyptian and lower Egyptian ranks, this could not 'have been very serious 
for the F, O. G, since the upper ranks -were identified with the incumbents 
of the civilian polity-and would therefore'have to be replaced. 
In sum, by 1952 the'dissynchronizations in the Egyptian social system m 
had induced a condition of stagnation, at the level of ýthreshold nation 
state, development. which in turn was precipitating an increasingly acute 
degree of political instability0" The only major-change within the 
Egyptian social system was the'progressive development of a national- 
professional Egyptian axmyq"which'was'ihcreas'ing1y dissatisfied against the 
sources of the-instability. ýIt was'the interaction between the rising in- 
stability and the increasing military cap I abilities-and predispositions for 
interventiont which accounts for-the coup of July 1952. 
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PERFIDRMOCE 
knumber of introductory comments may be made on the general format 
of the military regime. Firstq until Neguib was ousted in 1954 the 
regime had an equivocal status between equilibrator and innovator. From 
the time of the consolidation of Nasser, the milita=y regime became inno- 
vative and remained as such until the end of 19649 by which time it had 
become an equilibrator. The military regime of Egypt provides an interest- 
ing contrast to that of Pakistan in that the innovative drive was both more 
intensive and extensive. Secondl although there has been considerable 
civilianizationt the regime of Nasser could be considered military in that 
former milita=y -and incumbent military personnel controlled a. 11 main exeou- 
tive positionsg and formulated the construction of the new political system. 
The civilianization process differed- from that in Pakistan in that on the 
one hand it was less marked (military personnel were deployed and retained 
in Primary executive posts more extensively) and 6n the other hand less 
salient (the party and the'national assemblies organized by the military 
regime more closely paralleled a'civilian polity than did the corresponding 
institutions in Pakistan). Thirdlyt there has been-some movement of 
induced Politidaed professionalization towards the overt category. 
The first issue axea to be exaiained is the method and @uccess of the 
military regime in coping with the four main political functions* With 
reference to decilon-making methodq two factors are of import: the high 
degree of centralization and the continued salience of the military in the 
decision-making process. 'These ýI two -factors may be illustrated by the 
following indicators. The-first relates-to the strong executive. 'Immedi- 
ately following the coup the -main' executive -body was'the Revolution Command 
Council to which was'attached, -advis6x7ýoivilian cabinet; -but by the time 
of the declaration of the Yyeýx'-#ansitional period in January 1953 this 
cabinet had become largely defunct* 25- Theýconstitution of 1956 outlined 
an executive president to be Head of State, -Chief Executiveg Commandet-in- 
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Chief of the armed forces with powers to formultte general policy and 
to 
nominate and dismiss officials. The subsequent establishment and 
fall 
of the U. A. R. and the promulgation of the National Charter and the 
1964 
provisional constitution made no significant changes. The second indi- 
cator relates to the weak powers of the legislative and party counter- 
balances, Thus by January 1953 the Assembly and all political parties 
had been dissolved; the Assembly envisaged by the 1956 constitution was 
elected only in July 1957 with only, one party permitted. The third index 
relates to the high degree of military control. , 
Thus after Maher resigned 
as P*M* in September 1952 no civilian held the post, of P. M. or President; 
immediately following the coup approximately 30 army officers were placed 
in each goverment department; the RCCj composed entirely of military 
personnel, was the primary executive until 1956; all members of the 1957 
and 1964 National Assemblies had to be approved by the executive of the NU 
and ASU respectively (both executives were headed by Nasser); defence 
committees were a military monopoly;, and although military titles were 
dropped (after 1956), ex-military personnel headed,, the organizational 
committees of the various party organizations and were represented in all 
top executive and administrative bodies. 
26 
There were major changes, in all the main areas of decision-making. 
With reference to the economy -the two most important changes that must be 
noted are: the increase in central =ntrol and, the increase in public 
ownerships Both changes were apparent as from the time of the COUP but 
became more marked after 19569 and both were initially directed mainly at 
foreign concernsy though later, encompassed-also-Egyptian ones. The MaJOr 
factors involved in the extension of central control were: the replacement 
in October 1952 of the defunct Econgiaic Advisory Committee by the Permanent 
Council for the Development of National Production; 
27 this was followed in 
1953 by the establishment of a Permanent Council for Public services; the 
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National Planning Committee was established in 1955 but was rather in- 
effective until 19579 on account of the Suez crisis and the continued 
existence of the two Permanent Councilsq when it was reorganized; in 
addition on the abolition of these two councilsp the Economic Development 
Organization was established to run the nationalized properties; by 1960 
the full planning mechanism was established and there was sufficient con- 
trol of investment and planning for the first comprehensive National 5 
Year Plan to be produced; in 1961 the Alexandria Cotton Exchange was 
nationalized with the consequence that full control over the buying and 
exporting of cotton was soon established; 
28 
and finally in 1965 the Second 
Five Year Plan was instituted* 
29 The major factors involved in the exten- 
sion of public ownership were: the nationaliztion of the Suez Canalg which 
was followed by a number of decree laws in 1957 sequestering all British 
and French property (this led to government control of all specialist banksg 
7 co=ercial banks and 68% of all insurance); in September 1959 all foreign 
banks were made into corporations with U., A, R. nationality (i, e, 70a of 
shares belonged to Arab citizens); in 1960 the nationalization drive 
turned to Egyptian property and the Bank of Egypt and Bank Misir were nat- 
ionalized; in 1961 la±ge-scale nationalization got underway so that by 
1964 virtually only small retail trade remained in private hands. 
30 The 
success of the military regime can be seen from the following, tabless 
I (U, N, Stat. YearboOk' Table 9: 7 Index Number F4mtls Industrial Proauct (1963-lLO 
1953 1958 1962 
16 37 
. 
77, 
-1 
1964 1966 1968 
116 117 131 
Table 5: 8 Index Number Exmt Is Agricultural Product (1952/3-195J/7 - 100 
(U. N. Stat, Yearbook) 
1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 1964 
102 107 '116 127 136 144 
I C: 
1953 1955 1957 1958 1961 1962 1964 1965 1967 
63 68 68 75 89 94 103 105 97 
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Howeverp from 1964 and particularly after the var in 1967 there were a 
number of indicators of economic strain. Thus trade deficits began to 
, 
31 
increase; ý the consumer price index rose markedly; although 
the rate 
of growth from 1960-65 was 7%9 many, of the 5 year, plan targets were not 
reached, and there was no major revision for the second Plan period; 
32 
and finally the 1967 war had a number of crippling consequences. 
33 ]low- 
everg it appears by 1969 that these strains had been contained (there was 
a positive trade balance, industrial production was rising and the consumer 
price index had stabilized). 
The second major decision-making axea that is to be exznined is that 
of the complete revamping of the structure of the polity. Thus immediately 
following the coup the monarch was obliged to abdicate in favour of a 
Provisional Regency Councilq, though by June 1953 Egypt had been declared 
a Republic. The second decree law of the new regime obliged political 
parties to purge their ranks and to devise specific programmesq but in 
January 1954 all political parties were dissolved and their funds confis- 
cated. The abolition of the 1923 Constitution in December 1952 followed 
by the declaration of a3 Year Transition Period completed the temporary 
demise of the pre-coup structure. .., Howevert it was not until March 1954 
when Nasser ousted Neguib and, a, decision on the forthcoming elections was 
postponed until the end of the transition period that it became clear that 
the temporary demise was a permanent one. -. The format of, the new polity 
emerged with the ddolaration of. the 1956 constitutLont which provided a 
strong executive Presidency and a single political party (the National 
Union)s which would nominate candidates, for a National Assembly. The 
establishment of the Uribn with Syria led to a number of structural changes 
but the essentials of the strong executive,, the single party and an 
Assembly based on-that. party continued. The collapse of the U. AeR. led 
to the establishment, in February 1962! of a National Congress-which approved 
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the National Charter presented by Nasser. In September 1962 Presidential 
and Executive Councils were established and plans for a new political 
partyg the AS% were announded. In March 1964 a further provisional 
constitution was announced and elections for a new National Assembly based 
on the ASU were announced. From 1964 until the ddath Of HaSBer, there was 
no major structural alteration. 
A number of policy decisions resulted in a number of changes in the 
third decision-making areaq i. e. the social and cultural systems. Thus 
the abolition of the monarchl the nationalization measures and the land 
reforms brought about a number of important changes in social stratification; 
literacy rates increased; ýthe role of Islamic institutions was curbedt 
e. g. in the abolition of the MB and of religious courts; and finally a 
wide number of social welfaxe measures were enacted, e. g. stipulated mini- 
mum hoursg fixed maximum rentsp insurance and welfare benefits$ and community 
welfare units. 
The attempts of the*military to institutionalize the regime have not 
been as successful as performance in the decision-making process* There 
have been two indicators of institutionalization failure. The first relates 
to the failure concerning the establishment of the rules of . procedure of 
the political system, which may be illustrateaby two inaioitors. First 
there has been a high degree of, political restructuring, which at the most 
intense periods of change inhibited the development of any stable patterns. 
From 1952-56 a temporary military regime, became transformed through a severe 
conflict into a long-term one; 1956-58,, witnessed the formal establishment 
of that regime; the UnLon with. Syria involved a, number of bewildering 
changes in the attempt to develop ý integration; 
34 the period from the col- 
lapse of the Union in 1961 until - 1964 led to another transitional stage; 
from 1964 a further formal structu: re was established. Secondq there have 
been few formalizations of the rules 9f. procedure. Thus from 1952-6 
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there was no constitutiong in 1956 a provisional constitution was promul- 
gated only to be replaced in 1958 and again in 1964 by further' provisional 
ones. The second main indicator relates to the delineation of the sphere 
of competence of a number of major political organs. The problem is not 
that the delineation is not explicit but that it is so restrictedl i. e. 
there is a too narrow base of institutionalization. ''In this aspect 
Egypt has experienced the same failure as Pakistan. - Thus ftom, 1952-56 
there was no legislative bodyq the cabinet was very weakq there were no 
elections or referendums and no organized political groups were permitted 
(parties were banned for most of the'period, the military-sponsored 
Liberation Rally was transitory and'- the, Republican Socialist Party was 
stillborn); the Assembly envisaged in the 1956 constitution did not con- 
vene until July 19579 and a decree promulgating the political party (Simi- 
larly envisaged in the constitution) was not passed until November 1957; 
the period of union with'Syria involvedq as has been notedq an extensive 
number of charg6s which culminated in'the dissolution of the Assembly; 
from 1962-64 there was no National Assembly and the only popular body was 
the 1750 strong Congress of National Foroesqý whose only'task was to ratify 
the National Charter; in 1964 another-National Assembly was elected under 
a provisional constitutiong and the NU'was replaced by-the ABU. In su4il 
the role and autonomy of a number of major political institutions has been 
very small. 
However, a number of factorsýhave mitigated thme two indicators of 
institutionalization failure toýsome degrees In the, first placeqýdespite 
the large number of changes in the, structure of the polity from the time 
of the-coupq there has--been a considerable common denominator throughout 
the period in the form of the"strong-executive. Second, -there 
has been 
progressively more stabilizationg particularly since, 1964- ", - The, 'most acute 
period of institutionalization "'failure was, 1952-56, subsequently 'followed 
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by the period of union; ýbut from 1964 with no major constitutional changes 
and a stronger legiklative body, the rules of procedure have become more 
clearly routinized. 
35 
-The performance of the military regime with reference to support 
mobilization has-a-number of factors in common with performance on insti- 
tutionalizationg namely*evidence of a degree of failure matched by a num- 
ber of compensating factors. Indications of failure relate primarily to 
insufficience (incapacity to mobilize). In this context three factors 
must be noted. First, the military ýregime has been slow to organize 
political parties. Although the Liberation Rally was instituted soon after 
the coupp it was only a transitory affair and the more permanent projected 
Republican Socialist Party was never launched; the National Union was not 
launched until the end of 1957 though it had been previewed in 1956 and 
was dissolved in 1961; finally although the ASU was envisaged in 1962, 
it had a long gestation period and even by 1965 many of the higher levels 
had not been fully established. 
36 
-,, Secondq there has been strong central 
control over the main organs of mass -participation. , Thus in the assemblies 
established on the basis of the varying constitutions all candidates had to 
37 be party members and approved by the' central'party executive; or again 
the central party executive'was controlled by -a small group of people with 
a high degree of overlap with the'Presidential executive body*38 Thirdly9 
as has been noted already no alternative"political parties were permitted# 
Trade-Unions were rather inaffectiveg and'particularly prior to 1964 the 
Assembly was a very weak organizatio I n,, 
39 
--On the-other hands there have 
been a number of mitigating factorso"' '-Firsts although 'there - hao'be en delay 
in organizing the two main paxties, "the! NU - and the ASU, both have been ex- 
tensive organizations. Tlie-NU was organized on three major, levels: 
foundation, district and governate and as may be expected closely paralleled 
the structure of the administration'. (a local government ý law of , 1968 had 
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divided Egypt into 24 governates). The ASU was composed in basic units 
(which existed not only in villages and towns but also in factories and 
other public enterprises) 9 district units, 
(elected from basic units) 9 
governate units, and finally an ASU general Conference (which is composed 
of members, from governate councils and other functional organizations$ is 
supposed to meet every two years but its General Council meets every 6 
months). 
40 Secondq elections have been held regularly both for Assemblies 
and the President. The Presidential elections have never been contestedl 
though the Assembly elections of 1957 and 1964 were contested by approxi- 
mately 1250 and 1750 candidates respectively for 350 seats. (It is-diffi- 
cult to interpret election results owing to compulsory voting. ) Thirdq 
the regime appears to, have been successful in expanding the base of 
support. Prior to the coup the main parties were clique ones, and even 
the Assemblies of July 1957 - March 1958 and the UAR one had been dominated 
by lawyers, bureaucratsv army officers and businessmen (with only 3% workers)* 
Howevert the Assembly of 1964 had 60 workers and farmers and all levels of 
the ASU were obliged to have 506 representation of workers and peasants*41 
7pýirtht the regime could use a wide range of -support control mechanisms. 
Control and utilization of propaganda and mass commmication have been 
extensive (initially through censorship and later through nationalization); 
public enterprises, i. e. cooperativesq factories, etc, q have served. as chan- 
nels of participation; and finally the regime has been able to rely on 
the contituing support of the army. ,, 
Fifthg the, regime had undoubtedly 
been successful in enacting a wide. range, of popular. policy decisions 
relevance Aj- large, sections of the, population. In sump as, in the case of 
institutionalization, 
- the -compensating, factors indicate that complete 
ý; ýýdmm is not imminent but there, are nonetheless indications of a degree 
of failure. 
With reference to. the monitoring process, the military regime has 
experienced little difficulty# although the extensive range of monitoring 
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controls is an indication of some degree of instability. The extensive 
monitoring controls have included the widespread use of arrestB42; in the 
post coup period the use of purge committees and Revolutionaxy Tribunals; 
43 
the use of m tial law (which was not lifted untik June 1956); and a host 
of mechanismsq which have ilready been reviewed and which are indirectly 
related to force, e. g. single partyq press controlsp control and supervision 
of Assembly and party candidates, and a strong central executive. In 
maintaining these controls the regime has been able to rely op the armyt 
which has continuously furnished top administrative personnelq and the 
bureaucracy, which unlike any ex-colonial bureaucracy was of such a level 
of development as -to be able to expand and accommodate successfully to a 
much more comprehensive role. There is no significant evidence of any 
failure to establish government authorityp or in the rise of domestic 
violenceq or in the failure to implement decision% or in the incapacity 
to collate demandst but there has been evidence, of the third indicator of 
monitoring failure, the use of force on the part of the polity, namely in 
terms of the widespread use of arrests moted above., Ilowevert again it 
must be noted that the time of the most acute problems was 1952-56. 
The second major task in the analysis of performance concemns the 
examination of the success of the militaxy in alleviating the basic, dis- 
synchronizations of instability* In generall the military regime has 
been very successful. 
With reference to the-three-factors underlying, the first dislocationg 
the structure of the economyý the miiitary regime, was successful 
- 
on, all 
accounts. The skewed land distributionwas eased through, two land reform 
measures and the establishment, of , cooperatives and rural welfare centres. 
(The land reform of 1952 placed a ceiling of 200, jeddans on any single 
holding and led to a redistribution of;,, Ieja of the land; the second reduced 
the, ceiling to 100 feddans)., - The'. success, of the agricultural policy 
(which 
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did involve more than redistribution) can be seen from the agricultural 
index noted above. The second factorp the strong dependence on cotton 
'for foreign exchange, has been alleviated to some degree by the diversi- 
'fication of the economy through an expansion of industrial and manufacturing 
activity. 
Table 5: 10 Percentage Distribution Industrial Origin of Em rPt's G. D. P. 
at Factor Cost (U. N. Stat. Yeaxbook) 
G. D. P. Agriculture Indust. Activity Constr- Trans- Trade Otheri 
at factor cost uction port 
LE millions Total Manuf . 
1952 76o. 2 36 9 9 3 7 7 38 
1954 880.6 35 -12 11 3 7 10 33 
1956 918.2 33 13 12 3 - 51* 
1958 1185-0 31 15 14 4 -21- 29 
1960 1516.6 25 22 17 4 9 10 30 
1963 1739.6 27 24 23 6 9 9 26 
1966 2193-5 28 23 22 4 9 9 27 
(* includes transport, ' trade and others) 
Howeverg it must be noted that raw cotton, cotton yarn and cotton products 
still constituted 63% of Egypt's' exports in 1967- 
44 With reference to the 
third factorg by 1960 most of the expatriate concerns had been nationalized 
(see above). 
There was also some considerable', success with reference to the second 
dissynchroinizationg the polity's controls over the economy. For the first 
time in the twentieth century concerted efforts were made to expand the land 
under cultivation and to improve irrigation facilities (see in particular 
the construction of the Aswan Dam). 
45 The response to the secondma third T-- 
dis synchronizations I namely the lack of stimulus to production and the poor 
planning mechanisms, has already been noted. Central stimulus increased 
through nationalizitiong, rising investmentl etc. (by 1959 74% of gross 
capital formation was undertaken by the -public sector, in'1952 17 eo had 
been undertaken by the private one) v and in additionp by 1960 'a compre- 
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hensive planning and supervisory meebani sm had been established. 
The system cleavage which represented the third dissynchronization 
was quickly terminated through the elimination of the major cnnf3. icting 
units* The enforced abdination of Fa: roukp the declaration of the Republic 
in June 1953, together with the extensive purges eliminated the monarchy* 
The role of the British was similarly diminished following the coup as 
the British influence had been contingent on the balancing forces of the 
monareby and the political parties. The nationalization of the Suez Canal 
and the subsequent sequestrations completed the minimization of the British 
role. The elimination of the pre-coup political parties did not become 
finalized until the victory of Nasser over Neguib in April 1954 and the 
cancellation of the projected July elections. , prioPthat date although 
there had been a number of major moves against the parties (Jle*, the Reform 
of Political Parties Decree in September 1952 'and the dissolution of parties 
in Januaxy 1953)9 Waguitk had insisted that early elections be held and that 
there be civilian involvement in the preparation of a constitution. The 
removal of Neguili combined with the measures taken against the parties en- 
sured their non-reappearance., The military regime was able both to allevi- 
ate and to eradicate the cleavage partially on account'of the relatively 
restricted nature of the cleavage (in terms of numbers involved), and 
paxtially on account of the military's own strong monitoring cnitrols and 
its capacity, to substitute an alternative regime I 
The performance and success of the'military regime-with reference to 
the fourth and fifth dissynchronizations closely parallels the performance 
on the above dis synchronization. ' ' Onýthe 6ne'ýhandq the military regime 
eradicated the immediate source of 'the dislocations by eliminating the pre- 
coup parties and abolishing the, 1923, constitution, " On the other handq the 
military regime was then obliged to ý attempt . to -'sub stitute'alternatives. 
The equivocal success of the military regime in-both these respects has 
already been examined under the support mobilization and institutionalization 
- 183 - 
processes respectively. 
The third major problem for investigation concerns the examination 
of -the repercussions of the military's predisposition and capabilities for 
performance and vice versa. 
- The skill level of the military was such that the military experienced 
no major difficulty in occupying and maintaining a wide range of executive 
positions. In this context the Egyptian military differed significantly 
for example from the Ghanaian military, which lacked the requisite range 
of ý skills to execute the type of innovative programme of the Egyptian 
military. The particular composition of the Egyptian military, in particu- 
lar the high degree of Egyptianization and the form of recruitment baseq 
has been of vital importance in conditioning the whole range of policy 
decisions ranging from the expulsion of the British to land refo=. The 
primary impact of the particular configuration of the Egyptian army's 
autonomy was in leading it to dismantle the pre-coup political structure. 
Since there were no ties or interactions between that segment of the army 
represented by the F. O*G* and the pre-coup polityq there was no inhibition 
or problem for the army in proceeding to a swift and drastic alteration of 
the pre-coup system. The ramifications of the nature of cohesion were 
twofold. In the first place, the cohesion format was responsible for 
an important struggle for direction of the military, regime during what was 
to appear later as the consolidation period. The F. O. G. as a young and 
relatively junior officer group was faced with the problemo common to many 
such coup, groupat of attempting,, in-, the immediate-post coup period. to legiti- 
mize its position both . *ithin the army. and the Egyptian system in, general. 
Its solution was the most common onel namely I of adopting a more seniorg 
more popular but sympathetic figL=e-7head,, i. e. Reguib. The ensuing con- 
flict after the coup was established-was between, the younger officers de- 
- manding a longer military rule, to-, execute, a number of major changes and the 
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older more conservative officers wishing to execute a modicum of changes 
and thereafter to accommodate to civilian forces. 
46 The victory of the 
former group set the format of the regime for a number of years. 
47 The 
second consequence of the nature of cohesion has been in contributing to 
the stability of the regime (once the initial leadership conflict had been 
resolved),, There have undoubtedly been a number of disputes within the 
military regime (as witnessed by the sporadic purges) but in general the 
regime has enjoyed a high degree of support from the 'army and in parti- 
cular at the top level from the continuity and cohesion of the original 
F. O. G. (In 1963 10 of the 13 members' of the U. A. R. Presidential Council 
had belonged to the F. O. G. ) Finally, the high level of dissatisfaction 
and the widespread focus of this dissatisfaction on the part of the mili- 
tary prior to the coup was instrumental* in influencing the innovative 
orientation of the military regime. ' 
The consequences of performance for the skill-level of the military 
have undoultealy been in the direction of increasing this level. The 
military have been able to control their defence allocationg and further 
the military has been used oontinuously to supply top administrative and 
executive positions. 
48 Thus not only'has - the direc, It military skill level 
increased by virtue of an expanding army'adopting -more sophisticated. weap- 
onryp but also the skill level of administration and'generalized policy 
decision-making has increased bi'virtue"of continiied'oocUPation I wide- 
ranging number of executive positions. ' The major changes with respect to 
composition and strticture are twofoldi Pirstq ý the armed forces have ex- 
pandedt over 200,000 with compulsory universal' two 'year servicet and'the 
size of the navy and air-force has expanded. 
49 '' 'Secondý the military is no 
16nger *on-prestige occupatio'n"and'hen6e-aýttrýact"sýa'ýider'base'o'f Egyptian 
recruft than prior to the coup. '" With iefe'rence to autonomy there has been 
an obvious decline in that-the regime and'the'armed forces'are firmly infused. 
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Thus as noted above the military or ex-military hold many positions in 
the administrationg executive and specialized bodiest in the only poli- 
tical party and in the Assembly;, or again the President is the active 
Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. With reference to cohesiony 
there has been no evidence of army major cleavages after the solution 
of the post-coup leadership dispute. Indeed even the death of Nasser 
did not precipitate any fundamenta. 1, immediate brekkdown in cohesion. 
Although there have been numerous policy divisionst such divisions have 
always been contained. 
50 The specific attitudinal, dispositions of the 
pre-coup period have of necessity lost much of, their immediate relevance 
by virtue of length of duration of the military regime and by virtue of 
the unanticipated form of this regime. -Nonetheless-despite these in- 
evitable changes, there has been a marked continuity in#a number of the 
original policy orientations towards the establishment of an independent 
Egyptian nation state committed to continuous economic development. The 
most important general attitudinal change has been in the obvious and in- 
evitable increase of military politicization. 
The fourth and final problem area to be examined is that of the 
military transfer of power. From the discussion above it is cleax that 
very little transfer has taken placeq and even in the post-Nasser period 
very little transfer is either evident or envisaged. From the time of 
the coup the regimeq despite numerous changes# has maintained a strong 
central executiveg strong monitoring controls and extensivermilitary and 
ex-military personnel employment in key administrative and executive posts. 
The Only transformation that has taken place is that the solid militaxy 
core of the regime has permitted the development of a number of civilian 
trappings. Thus there has been developed a Presidency, elections# a 
National Assembly and. a quasi political party. The only foreseeable 
direotion of further transfer in the i=ediate future is a greater devolu- 
tion of authority within the current structure (particularly the A. S*TJ, ) 
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and a wider involvement of civilians in executive bodies. Three factors 
would seem to underlie the form and extent of the military transfer. In 
the first place, the condition of instability in 1952 was such that there 
were no existing viable civilian bodies capable of exerting pressure on 
the military. In the post coup period, the military regime has made a 
sufficient degree of accommodation on the one hand and imposed a number 
of restrictions on the other, so that organized civilian opposition to 
the military has been preempted. Second, the military regime has ex- 
perienced a high degree of performance-success. Thirdlyq the crisis 
situation concerning Israel has served to maintain the salience of the 
military. Unless there is any marked change inthese three factorsq it 
is unlikely that the current direction of transfer will be significantly 
affected. 
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FOOTNOTES 5: INNOVATIVE MILITARY REGIMES 
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORHANCE IN PAKISTAN 
1. For general background on the creation of. Pakistan see P. Spear, 
India, Penguin, 1965; I. Stephens, Pakistan, Penguin, 1964; K. Sayeed, 
Pakistan: the Formative Phase, Oxford Univ. Press, 1968. 
2. The Governor-Generals 
' 
date Aug. 1947-Sept. 1948 (Jinnah), Oct. 1948- 
Oct-1951 (Nazimuddin), Oct-1951-Aug. 195ý (Ghulam Mohammed), Aug. 
1955-Oct-1958 (Mirza); the Prime Ministers date Aug. 1947-Oct-1951 
(Liaquat Ali Khan), Oct-1951- April. 1953 (Nazimuddin), April. 1953- 
Oct-1954 (Mohammed Ali), Oct-1954-Atig. 1955 (new Ali government), 
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1957-Dec-1957 (Chundrigar), Dec. 1957-Oct-1958 (Noon). Keesings 
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3. K. Callard and R. S. Wheeler, "Pakistan", in G. M. Kahin, ed., Major 
Governments of Asia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1963; and Keesings 
Contemporary Archives. 
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and_Military Rule in the Middle East, Speller, 1965- 
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bills passed by the Provincial Assemblies could be seen as null and void. 
8. Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
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of the election consisted of the Awami League, Nizaam-i-Islam, and 
the Krishak Sramik Party. 
10. T-Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or Peoples Power, Morrow, 1970. 
11. See ibid.; T. Manruzzaman, "Group Interests in Pakistan Politics: 
1947-58", Pac. Aff., 1966. 
12. For a discussion of the decline of the Muslim League and other parties 
see, K. Callard, op. cit.; and K. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan, Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 
13. Under the British colonial rule numerous alliances had been made with 
princely states subsequent to which such states were virtually 
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14. Thus of the N. W. F. states, Dir did not even send representatives to 
the central assembly; and Kalat, one of the Baluchistan states, was 
lawless and experienced a tribal rebellion in October 1958. It was 
not until the advent of the military regime that princely rule was 
broken and central authority eatablished throughtoiA Pakistan. For 
a discussion see, W. Wilcox, Pakistan: Consolidation of a Nati 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1963; and C. M. Ali, The Making of Pakistan, 
Columbia Univ. Press, 1967. 
15. K. von Vorys, Political Development in Pakistan, Princeton Univ. Press, 
1965. 
16. R. Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary in Pakistan", in 
J. LaPalombara, ed., Bureaucracy and Political Development, Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1963. 
17. Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
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19. K. L. Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, Dehlij Sterling Pub., 1968. 
20. For a discussion of balanced v. unbalanced growth see, B. Higginsq 
Economic Development, Constable, 1968; W. Krause, Economic Developmentq 
Wadsworth, 1960; A. U. Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic Developmento 
Yale Univ. Press, 1958. 
21. Basically three alternatives seem to appear. First, E. Pakistan could 
develop as a satellite emphasizing agricultural production, whereas 
W. Pakistan could develop industrially. Although this wpuld provide the 
greatest complementarity, it is not feasible. Second, an attempt 
could be made to develop industrial and agricultural complementarity 
in the two wings, but this is a case of almost impossible balanced 
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each other as self contained units. See K. L. Seth, Interwing Trade 
in Pakistan, op. cit. 
22. The figures are from C. M. Ali, op. cit.; K. Sayeed, op. cit., cites 
7.2m. refugees of which 6.5m. were located in W. Pakistan. 
23. C. M. Ali, op. cit. 
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27. Two important elaborations may be noted. First, although there is 
no definitional specification of the size of a nation state system 
(although the size must be sufficient to maintain the necessary 
functional activities), once a formal system has been established 
it follows that any cleavage redefinition within that system must lead 
to a breakdown. Second, there are a variety of means of accommodating 
intensities of interaction, e. g. the centralization-decentralization 
dimensiom. 
28. It can be argued that all formal nation state boundaries are 
arbitrary. The major difference between early and late nation state 
development in this context is that in the former case there was 
always some spontaneous internal definition, whereas in the latter 
the formal definition was frequently imposed externally. 
29. The Indian devaluation of the rupee in 1949 had the effect of 
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30. Fighting broke out in Dacca between Bengali and non-Bengali MuslimS 
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Exports into W. Pakistan 
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Exports into E. Pakistan 
14-03 
30-50 
56.94 
(K. L. Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op. cit. ) 
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24 mindars owned 870/6' of the land, (C. M. Ali, op. cit. ) For socio- 
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34. For a discussion of the decline of the M. L. , see K. Sayeed, op. cit. 
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37. See R. Braibanti, op. cit., and A. Gorvine, "Administrative Reform: 
Function of Political and Economic Change" in G. S. Birkhead, ed., 
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Commonwealth country, R. Braibanti, "Public Bureaucracy and Judiciary 
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Dev. Areas, 1967, and Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
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1969. 
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Armed Forces and Society, Mouton, 1968; and G. M. Hahhad, op. cit. 
41. K. Sayeed, op. cit.; R. A. Moore, op. cit. 
42. See in general M. A. Khan, Friends Not Masters, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. 
43. Gen. Muqueem Khan, 
, 
The Story of the Pakistan Army, Karachig Oxford 
Univ. Press, 1963; and S. P. 13ohen, "Arms and Politics in Pakistan", 
India Quart., 1964. 
44. R. Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit.; and 
H. Feldman, op. cit. 
45- See T. Ali, op. cit., or K. Sayeed, "The Role of the I-11ilitary in 
Pakistan", op. cit. 
46. Thus the C. S, P. was seen as partly responsible for the 1958 breakdown, 
the new regime had a comprhensive scheme for change, and several 
members of the C. S. P. had been charged with corruption, see S. J. 
Burki, op. cit. 
47. Ibid.; and R. Braibanti, op. cit. 
48. In the 1962 election, 6, c; W were disqualified, see G. M. Haddad, op. cit. 
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vol. 2,1960, and vol-3,1961. 
50- See K. P. Misra, et. al., op. cit.; E. A. and K. R. Schuler, Public-Opinion 
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Press, 1967; D. P. Singhal, "The New Constitution of Pakistan", A8. 
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51. The B. D. system has been widely discussed, see G. H. Haddad, op. cit., 
K. Callard and Wheeler, op. cit., K. Sayeed, The Political System of 
Pakistan, op. cit., K. Sayeed, "Pakistan's Basic Democracies", I-I. E. J. 9 1961. 
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nominated; at the second level the division was that the nominated 
should not exceed the elected; at the third and fourth levels 25i'or 
were elected; at the fifth level only Irio were elected, see K. von 
Vorys, op. cit. 
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53. The Constitution Commission carried out 6269 questionnaires and 
565 interviews. Its major findings were: 1. Form of government: 
equally divided Presidential and Parliamentary government; 2. 
Unitary v. Federal: 66% for federal; 3. Legislature: majority 
opinion for unicameral but commission recommended bicameral; 4. 
Division of Powers: 411/'o for only defence, foreign affairs, and 
currency for the centre - the commission recommended three lists 
but the constitution provided only one for the centre; 5. Electorate: 
the commission favoured universal direct elections; 6. Political 
Parties: the recommendation was for the lifting of the ban; 7. 
Fundamental Rights: the commission recommended these but they 
were not included in the constitution. See E. A. and K. R. Schuler, 
op. cit. 
54. R. Braibanti, "Pakistan: Constitutional Issues in 196411, As. Surv., 1965- 
55- See K. von Vorys, op. cit.; Keesings Contemporary Archives; Feldman, 
op. cit., cites S118m. recovered out of a total money circulation of 
E375m. 
56. K. L. Seth, The Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, op. cit. 
57. G. F. Papanek, Pakistan's Development: Social Goals and Private 
Incentives, Harvard Univ. Press, 1967. 
58. Evidence will be provided below. 
59- See Feldman, op. cit., and T. Alij op. cit. The limit was set at 500 
acres of irrigated or 1000 acres of unirrigated landl but this did 
not affect significantly the distribution of land given that the 
average holding was 10 acres. (6000 persons or 0.1% of the population 
owned 7-5m. acres, 2.2m. persons owned less than 5 acres, and 2-5m- 
owned no land at all. ) 
6o. * K. L. Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan,, op. cit., and K. L. Seth, The 
Pattern of Economic Development in Pakistan, op. cit. 
61. See G. E. Papanek, op. cit.; T. Ali, op. cit,; K. Sayeed, "Pakistan's 
Constitutional Autocracy", Pac. Aff., 1963. Papanek points out that 
the new entrepreneurial class is dominated by four small communities 
of about 0.05,016 of the populationg which control over half Pakistan's 
industrial wealth. 
62. In E. Pakistan B. D. membership was highly skewed with 66% of the B. Ds- 
being drawn from 10% of the population, (families with annual incomen 
over Rs-3000); and further by dint of the provision of rural 
development funds, the B. Ds. became the main source of patronage. 
See R. Sobhan, "Social Forces in the Basic Democracies", As. Rev. j 1968. T. Ali, op. cit., notes the general corruption in , 
the distribution of 
land, (gained from evacuees, land reform, 'former 'CrownLands' etc. ); 
and more specific corruption in the Ayub family. The eldest son, 
a B. D. member, had taken over three large industries, the second 
son was a director of 32 firms, and Ayub was reputed to have a large 
bank account in Geneva. 
63. Political parties were seen by Ayub as the basic cause of instability 
prior to 1958, and as such were excluded from Ayub's conception of 
the new political system. 
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64. The martial law ban was reinforced in May 1962 by the_Prohibition 
of Unregulated Activity Ordinance to ban parties before the issue 
was discussed by the National Assembly, and the National and 
Provincial Assembly Order of April 1962 warning candidates who 
, mdidates of a 
group or party would be projected themselves as c. - 
guilty of corrupt practices. See S. M. Qureshi, "Party Politics in 
the Second Republic of Pakistan", M. E. J., 1966. 
65. Ibid. 
66. R. Ifheeler . "Pakistan: New Constitution, Old Issues", As. Surv. 9 1963- 
67. See K. von Vorys, op. cit., for the National Assembly; see R. Sobhan, 
op. cit., for a discussion of the B. Ds. 
68. Ayub won unanimous support in the NWFP and Baluchistan and about 
75% of the votes of Sind and Punjab (where large landholdings were 
prevalent), but lost Dacca, Chittagong, and Karachi. See S. al- 
Mujahid, "Pakistan's First Presidential Elections", As. Surv., 1965- 
69. See S. al. Mujahidj "The Assembly Elections in Pakistall", As. Surv. 9 
1965; and M,. Huq, op. cit. 
70. See II. B. Naquis "Pakistan: Revolution without a Plan", As. Rev. 9 1969; 
G. S. Bhargava, Pakistan in Crisis, Dehli, Vikas Pub., 1969; T. Alij 
op. cit. 
71- Two major mechanisms employed by the government to regulate law and 
order were Section 144 Criminal Procedure Code (involving restrictions 
on meetings and invoked almost every month), and the Defence of 
Pakistan Rules (framed under the Defence of Pakistan Ordinance 1965 
and used to detain persons). See K. Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges 
to the Political System", As. Surv., * 1968. 
72. Industrial Origin of Pakistan's GDP at factorcost(U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
Percentage 
total Agricul. Indust. Construct. Transp. Trade Other 
1958 28; 0 52 10 26 11 18 
196o 34*8 53 10 26 12 17 
1963 41.4 48 12 46 12 17 
1967 62.8 47 12 47 13 17 
73- S. M. Qureshi, op. cit., notes* that they were the Pakistan's Peoplesq 
a group of 20 led by Ahmad of Nizaam; Democrats led by M. Ali of 
ML (East); Progressives led by Bari of the Republican Party; 
Independents of ML (West); Independent"neutrals; an undefined 
Independent group from E. Pakistan led by 14u, ýhahed; and'members for 
Sind and Karachi. 
74. K. Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, op. cit. 
0 
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75. R. A. Moore, "Pakistan: the Role 
- 
of the Army",. Pol. Sci. (Wellington)q 
1968; and K. Sayeed, op. cit. Furthermore it appears that the low 
contribution of the East has remained relativily constant. 
76. Exports to W. Pakistan Exports to E. Pakistan 
1959-60 36.24(crores of Rs. ) 56.94 
ig6o-61 36.85 82.89 
1965-66 52.23 
. 
84-39 
(11'. L. Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op. cit. ) 
77. T. Manruzzaman, "National Integration and Political Development in 
Pakistan", As. Surv., 1967. 
78. Although the East got 53% of the allocation, this did not include 
900m. dollars for-the Indus Basin Scheme; and furthermQre_there was 
a greater emphasis on consumer goods in the East and capital goods 
in the West. See K. L. Seth, Interwing Trade in Pakistan, op. cit. . 
79. K. Sayeed, "Pakistan: New Challenges to the. Political System", op. cit. 
80. K. Sayeed, Political System of Pakistan, op. cit. 
81. R. Braibanti, Research on the Bureaucracy of Pakistan, op. cit. 
Braibanti notes that there had been 26 major efforts to reform the 
bureaucracy - 11 of these reports and half the volume had been 
presented in the martial law period. 
82. A. Gorvine, op. cit. 
83- S. J. Burki, "Twenty Years of the Civil Service of Pakistan: 
Reevaluation", As. Surv., 1969. 
84. Pakistan's Force Level and Allocation (J. C. lIurewitz, op. cit. ) 
Force Level(OOOs) Defence(Rs. m. ) Defence 'YoGNP 
1955-6 200 814-3 4.2 , 
1958-9 837.3 4. o 
196o-i 225 1044.3 3.2 
1962-3 g6o. 7 2.5 
1965-6 253 1360.9 2.6 
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MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFOR-IANCE IN U. A. R. ( EGYPT ) 
It'is interesting to compare the sequence of political and economic 
developments of Egypt and Turkey in the twentieth century. Although 
Egypt and Turkey were far from identical prm*r to World War 1, 
within the framework of the Ottoman Empire they had many elements 
in common, such as relative autonomy, limited political parties, 
decaying monarchies, reasonably advanced bureaucracies and central 
sevices, and a significant degree of external economic interaction. 
Following World War 1, whereas in Turkey a nationalist movement 
was able to depose the non-nation state forces and to thwart external 
domination, in Egypt the pre-war societal organization was perpetuated. 
2. For general surveys of historical developments in Egypt, see P. M. 
Holt, ed., Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt, Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1968; N. Safran, Egypt in Search of Political Community, 
Harvard Univ. Press, 1961. 
3. Figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives, and P. J. Vatikiotis, 
11odern History of Egypt, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1969. 
4. See P. O'Brien I The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System, Oxford Univ. Press, 1966; 1,1.11. el-Kammash, Economic Development and Planning_ 
in Egypt, Praeger, 1968; C. Issawi, Egypt in Revolution, Oxford Unive 
Press, 1963; P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit. 
P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit. 
An expelled Wafdist leader produced a 'black book' containing a 
record of corruption and venality in the Wafd- 
Thus in June 1950 a Royal Decree removed 29 Opposition Senators and 
replaced them with 19 Wafd ones in an attempt to halt Senate 
interpellations calling for an inquiry into scandals concerning 
the supply of munitions to the army and funds to a Cairo hospital 
and to prevent further inquiries of other alleged irregularities, 
including Wafd involvement in the Alexandria Cotton Exchange. (Later 
in June the Saad and Liberal-Constitutional Parties decided to boycott 
the Assembly in protest. ) In November 1950 the opposition parties 
presented a petition to Farouk alleging corruption on the part of 
palace officials and the Wafd government. Again in April 1952 Prime 
Minister Hilaly set up inquiry commissions in each Ministry, an 
action which led to his downfall in June. See Keesings Contemporary 
Archives; and also P. J. Vatikiotis, op. cit. 
8. Several monarchs have been successful in support mobilization by 
mobilizing traditional groups, placating aYf number of nationalist 
groups, and executing a number of nation state policies. (See for 
example Haille Selassie in Ethiopia). However, the monarchy in 
Egypt was subject to a number of limitations. First, it was not 
an indigenous monarchy; second, it did not rely on indigenous groups 
but small numbers of Syrians, Greeks, and Albanians; and third, the 
monarchs in the twentieth century proved to be weak. 
9. See P. Mansfield, Nasser's Egypt, Penguint 1965; and P. J. Vatikiotis, 
op. cit. 
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10. Thus the political parties had proved almost completely ineffective 
in containing the arbitrary dismissals of cabinets and parliaments 
by the monarch. The two most notable exceptions are 1922 when the 
Wafd gained a veiled Independenee Treaty, and in 1935 when it 
forced the termination of a period of Royal Decree. 
11. Figures from Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
12. See M. Berger, Bureaucracy and Society in Modern Egypt, Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1957. 
13 M. M. el-Kammash, op. cit. 
14: Ibid. 
15- P. O'Brien, op. cit.; C-Issawil op. cit.; A. Abdel-Malek, Egypt: Military 
Society, Random House, 1968, . 
16. The constitution was of course suspended during the periods of Royal 
Decree. During the third period of Royal Decree, 1930-35, a new 
, constitution was promulgated in 1931 but was repealed in 1934 and the 
1923 constitution was finally restored in 1935- 
17. For pertinent general background on the military in the Middle Fast 
see E. Beleri, Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, Pall Mall, 
1970; S. N. Fisher, ed., The Military in the Middle East, Ohio State 
Univ. Press, 1963; G. H. Haddad, Revolution and Military Rule in the 
Midile East, Speller, 1965; J. C. Hurewitz, Middle East Politics - 
The Military Dimension, Pall Mall, 1969; M. Halpern, "The Army in 
the Middle East", in M. Halpern, Politics of Social Change in the 
Middle East and N. Africal Princeton Univ. Press, 1963; II. Khaddurij 
"Role of the Military in Middle East Politics", A. P. S. R., 1953- 
18. The Orabi Revolt was the first important independent intervention by 
the Egyptian army into the civilian polity. The revolt does not 
fall within our parameters since the army was not professional, 
the revolt was not an explicit take-over, and it was largely 
motivated by purely army grievances. For accounts of the Orabi 
Revolt, see H. Berger, "Military Elites and Social Change: Egypt 
since Napoleon", Res. Mono. 6, Centre for Internat. St., Princeton, 
1960; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The Egyptian Army in Politics, Indiana 
Univ. Press, 1961. 
19. Ibid. 
20. J. C. Hurewitz, "Egypt: Military Rule in a Rapidly Changing Society", 
in J. C. Hurewitz, op. cit.; and E-Belerij op-cit.. 
- I 
21. See P. J. Vatikiotis, The Army in Egyptian Politics, op. cit. 
22. For an analysis of the Free Officer Group see ibid. and E. Belerij 
op. cit. 
23. See A. Al-Sadat, Revolt on the Nile, Wingate, 1957;. II. Neguibi E=tls 
Destiny, Doubleday, 1955; and G. A. Nasserj The Philosophy of the 
Revolution, Egypt, National Publishing House', 1954. 
24. Although it must be recognized that the potential armed resistance 
from civilian groups was not insignificant, especially from the 
MB and the para-military units of the Wafd. To this end the F. O. G. 
adopted Neguib as a popular figure-head. 
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25. In February 1953 Neguib annotmced his sovereign powers including 
the right to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers; in June Neguib 
became President. 
26. For an emphasis on the high degree of centralization see, M. 
Rodinson, "The Political System", in P. J. Vatikiotis, bd., op. cit.; 
and A. Abdel-Malek, op. cit. 
27. The Permanent Council for the Development of National Production 
produced a 4-Year Plan for Public Investment in 1953, which was 
immediately enacted, see P. O'Brien, op. cit. 
28. The nationalization of the Alexandria Cotton Exchange in 1961 led 
to the establishment of the Egyptian Cotton Commission as the sole 
buyer of cotton; export firms were 35/2'a government owned and export 
prices were fixed by the government; by 1963 the whole cotton 
industry was fully nationalized. 
29. On the two Five Year Plans see, B. Hansen, "Planning and Economic 
Growth in the U. A. R. (Egypt) 1960-6511, in P. J. Vatikiotis, ed. 9 op. cit.; 
F. Dolp and D. Breebaart, "Evolution of Planning Organization in the 
U. A. R. (egypt)", M. E. J., 1966; and P. O'Brien, op. cit. 
30- In 1953 the output of the private sector was six times that of the 
public one, but in 1963 it was less than twice, (P. O'Brieng op. cit. ) 
For an account and discussion of the nationalization process, see 
Keesings Contemporary Archives; II. M. El-Kammash, op. cit.; C. Issawij 
op-cit.; S. El-Serafy, "Economic Development by Revolution", M. E. J., 
1963; C. Leiden, IlEgypt; The Drift to the Left", M. E. Aff., 
_1962. 
31. Egypt's Imports, Enorts, Trade Defecits (dollars m. ) 
1958 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Imports 667 740 916 953 933 1070 792 666 638 
Exports 478 398 520 537 6o4 6o4 566 622 745 
Defecit -189 -342 -396 -416 -329 -466 -226 - 44 +107 (U. N. Stat. Yearbook). 
Egypt's Consumer Price Index (1963=100) (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
1953 1960 1962 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
99 102 99 lo4 lig 130 131 104 107 
32. B. Hansen, op. cit., gives a detailed breakdown. 
33. The major losses were canal tolls (which had been 227M. dollars in 
1966), 50m. dollars per annum from oil refineries, 56m. dollars of 
oil from Sinai, an estimated 84m. dollars from tourist trade in 
1967, and 1-1-5 billion dollars of military equipment. See E. 
Kanovsky, "The Economic Aftermath of the Six Day War", III. E. J. 9 1968. 
34. The original plan envisaged an executive President, a single cabinet, 
a single legislature, and two regional councils; these plans were 
amended to provide a central cabinet of joint ministers and ministers 
with separate regional heads; in October 1958 a return to the 
original plan was made with reference to cabinet organization; in 
October 1959 Field-Marshall Amer was made effective President of 
Syria; in March 1960 a single UAR National Assembly was announced; 
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in August 1961 Regional Executive Councils were abolished-See 
Keesings Contemporary Archives. For explanations of the split see 
A. Etzioni, Political Unification, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964; 
M. Palmer, "The UAR: an Assessment of its Failure", M. E. J., 1966; 
and P. Mansfield, op. cit. 
35- See R. K. Dekmejian, "The UAR National Assembly -A Pioneering Experiment", 
II. E. St. 9 1967; or M. Rodinson, op. cit. 
36. For an account of the struottLres of the various patties, see Pe 
Mansfield, op. cit.; P. J. Vatikiotis, "Some Political Consequences 
of the 1952 Revolution in Egypt", in P. M. Holt, ed., op. cit. 
37ý Of 2528 candidates in the 1957 election 1210 were rejected, c. f. 
Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
38. Foýr example in 1962 4 main executive bodies were established: a 
Presidential Council, an Executive Council, National Defence Council, 
and a provisional Supreme Executive Committee ( to organize the 
A. S. U. ). Both the Presidential and Executive Councils were appointed 
by the President with the Executive Cbuncil headed by Sabry, a 
former F. O. G. member; the National Defence Council xxx was headed 
by Nasser with Amer, a former F. O. G. member, as Vice-President 
together with 14 members of the Presidential and Executive Councils 
and the three Chiefs of Staff and Head of Intelligence; the Supreme 
Executive Committee consisted of Nasser, Sabry, 11 members of the 
Presidential Council, and the 7 most senior members of the 
Executive Council. (Keesings Contemporary Archives). 
39- Although direct expressions of popular withdrawal of support have 
not been extensive, there are examples of popular demonstrations 
against the regime, e. g. in 1965 there were large demonstrations on 
the death of Nahhas, former leader of the Wafd, and the trial of 
hundreds of MB members, or again there were massive student 
demonstrations in 1968. Furthermore in 1968 plans were announced 
for far reaching reforms of the ASU to provide for increased 
participation. 
40. It is interesting to note the similarities and differences vis- 
a-vis the BD system of Pakistan. On the one hand, there were indirect 
elections, the party structure parralleled the civilian administra- 
tion, and further it was not very powerful. On the other hand, in 
Egypt the National Assembly had a greater degree of independence 
from the party system and was not indirectly elected, and further 
there was not the same progressive diminuation of party members as 
the party hierarchy was ascended. 
41. See R. K. Dekmeiian, op. cit.; P. Mansfieldj op. cit. For a more critical 
view of the base of support see either A. Abdel-Malek, op. cit. or 
J. Heaphey, "The Organization of Egypt: Inadequacies of a Non-Political 
Model for Nation Building", W. P., 1965- 
42. In the period of the succession struggle following the coupt there 
were widespread arrests: 50 in Sept. 1952,205 Jan. 1953, over 100 
in Feb. 1953,40 Ap. 1954, mass arrests Ap. 1955, thereafter there 
were sporadic periods such as Ap. 1957, the end of 1958, mass arrests 
June 1966,181 arrests Sept. 1967. (Keesings Contemporary Archives. ) 
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T. 111 . 
In August 1952 7 purge committees were establihed with powers of 
arrestq search and trial; the Revolution Tribunals were disbanded 
in June 1954 after 32 trials; and the last decree of the R. C. C. 
gave the Minister of the Interior powers to arrest ot imprison 
persons previously condemed by the various revolutionary tribunals. 
(Keesings Contemporary Archives). 
44. Egypt's Cotton and Total Exports (Europa Yearbook 1970) 
196_7 1966 1969 
Total Exports(LEm. ) 246.1 270.3 323.9 
Cotton Exports 164.4 164.1 183-0 
Cotton %; Total 66.8-- 60.7 56-5 
45. M. M. El-Kammash, op. cit.; M. R. El-Ghonemy, "Economic and institutional 
Organization of Egyptian Agriculture since 195211, in P. J. Vatikiotis, 
ed., op. cit. 
46. By the time of the declarati6n of the Republic Neguib was Presidents 
Nasser Vice-Prime Minister, and Amer C-in4C of the armed forces. 
The struggle between Nasser and Neguib became open in February 1954. 
On Feb. 25, it was announced that Neguib had resigned and had been 
replaced by Nasser, on Feb. 27 Neguib with army backing was rein- 
stated; the move toward greater civilian involvement began but 
in March there were large army, navy, and police demonstrations 
for Nasser and in April Nasser replaced Neguib as P. M. See Keesings 
Contemporary Archives; and P. J. Vatikiotis, The Army in Egyptian 
Politicss op. cit. 
47. Comparison with Turkey is interesting in that the ratio of higher 
to lower ranks in the Turkish junta was much higher than the 
Egyptian case and led to a victory for the higher ranks. (It is also 
important to realize that the levels of development and types of 
instability were also very different. ) 
48. For example, in 1961 3400/4100 employees in the ministry of the 
Interior were either active or resigned military; there were 300 
military in the remaining ministries; in 1964 22/26 Provincial 
Governors xwa were military, see J. C. Hurewitz, op. cit. 
49. Egypt: Force Level and Expenditure (J. C. Hurewitz, op. cit. ) 
Force Level Defence % GNP 
1952-3 8oooo 5.3 
1955-6 80000 9.3 
196o-i 160000 7.1 
1965-6 180000 9.1 
50. Evidence of such divisions is provided by the several purges: 
Sept. 1952 purge of 450 officers; Jan. 1953 25; April 1954 15; 
widespread purge of army and police during 1966; arrests and trials 
1967 of Field-Marshall Amer and 181 other military and civilian 
officers, see Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
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6: EQUILIBRATING EILITARY REGIVES 
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFOIDUMCE IN GHANA 
INTERVENTION 
The British colony of the Gold Coast became independent in March 
1957 and in the process became transformed into a low level nation state. 
I 
While the economic indicators of nation state development were at a very 
low levelp the political indicators were at a =ch higher comparative 
level of development thereby differentiating Ghana from other African 
colonial systems. 
2 Following independence there was some considerable 
vertical and horizontal economic development (and -to a lesser degree 
social and cultural development) but very little accompanying political 
development despite-some considerable changes in the phenomenal representa- 
tion of political processes. 
In gross terms, all types of instability with the exception of decision- 
making (method) were represented in 1966 at the time of the coup. The 
two most marked types of instability (monitoring failure in particular 
was notvery extensive) were institutionalization and support failures. 
These two types had become significant by 1961 and continued to increase 
with only a number of minor oscillations until the time of the coup. 
The first task is to identify the indicators of political instabi2ity. 
Decision-making (scope) failure was restricted for the most part to 
economic policy decision making. 
3 Four indicators represent this failure. 
In the first place, there was a growing imbalance between imports and 
exports. Exports which had doubled from 194,8-59 became stagnant from 1959, 
whereas importss which had been persistently lower than exportsi overtook 
the export level and continued to rise. 
'+ 
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Table 6: 1 Ghanats Exports and InDorts (rdlliong US -) 
(U. N. Statistical 
Yearbook) 
1953 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965, 
Exporta, 224 263 286 294 292 291 273 2193 291 
Imports 207 237 317 363 394 333ý 365 341 448 
The reserves of E180m at independance had been transformed by 1964 into 
an external debt of 1: 132m and by 1965 reserves showed a deficit of 5: 250m. 
In the second place, following the imposition of import restrictions in 
1961 there was a rising inflation (eitacerbated for the consumer by a wage- 
freeze imposed in 1962). 
Table 6: 2 Ghana' s Cons umer Price Index ( 1963--100) (U. N. Statistical Yearbook) 
1953 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
All items 76 80 80 82.82 88 96 100 112.144 
Food 75 81 80 83 82' 87' 96 100 3.16 158 
Thirdlyý there was a gradual slowing down of rates of growth. IU=or 
suggests a 4DP growth rate of 6% in the 1950s had been cut to 2.5% 1960- 
68 (just less than population growth). Kraus suggests aMP increase 
1955-62 of 4.8% had been reduced by 1964 to 2.8% and by 1965 to 0-2%- 
6 
The index numbers of total per capita product are: 
I 
U. N. Statistical Yearbook 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
97 97 99 100 100 98 
Finallyy although Ghana was a primary producert it was importing food at 
the rate of C2-Om per annum*7 
There were three major indicators of institutionalization failure. 
The first relates to the failure to produce a satisfactory body of x-ules 
governing political interaction. Three indicators illustrate this 
phenomenon. First, a large number of measures were enacted to harrass. the 
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opposition and thereby to inhibit the institutionalization of interaction 
between the dominant convention peoples party and any other of the 
opposition parties. This process had begun even prior to independence as 
the CPP, which dominated the major executive offices from. the 1951 elections, 
used the perquisites of office to sustain itsbegemony (for example, see 
- the financial expropriations from the Cocoa Purchasing Company. ) After 
independencep the mhves against the opposition increased. Thus in 1957 
the Avoidance of Discrimination Act forbidding the existence of parties on 
a regionalp tribal or religious basis, was passed; a number of bills were 
enacted inhibiting individuals within the opposition., such as the Deportati on 
Actý (by December 1958 deportations numbered 61) . the Emergency Powers 
Act 
of 1957Y and the Preventive Detention Act of 1958 (extended in 1962 so that 
detainees could be held beyond 5 years without trial); In November 1958 40 
members of the United Party (the consolidated opposition group) were arrested 
on an attempted Nkrumah murder charge; in April 1959 a bill was enacted to 
unseat those who boycotted ten consecutive sittings of parliament or were 
detained under PDA; the Presidential Affairs Act and Emergency Powers Act 
and Public Order Act of 1961 attempted to control public meetings and 
processions* finally in 1964 all parties other than the CPP became illegal. 
9 
A second indicator of the failure to develop a satisfactory body of ruleI3 
of political interaction relates to the inadequate nature of the two 
constitutions. The first constitution) which had been drafted by the 
British and unduly influenced by a number of Ghanaian opposition demands, 
was totally inappropriate for a low income nation state system intent on 
rapid economic and political development. (In particular there was a need 
for a stronger executive and second the regional division of powers was 
excessive. ) The first constitution ene - ouraged a number of manipulations, 
e. g. the Regional Assembly elections were not held until, 1958 and then 
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in 1959 the Assemblies were dissolved or the large number of control 
bi I Is outlined above could be seen as attempts to increase the executive 
controls of the PM. The second constitution of 1960 swung to the opposite 
extreme in that patterns of political interaction were ambiguously 
defined 
and excessively controlled by the executive President. Thus there was 
no limit on the term of the Presidency, the President could appoint all 
judges, control appointments and dismissals in the civil service) and 
there were 
I 
virtually no legislative controls. 
10 The third indicator 
relates to electoral manipulations. The first election to be held after 
independence was the Regional one of October 1958 which was boycotted by 
the opposition on charges that there were insufficient controls. In the 
1960 referendum and Presidential elections, the constitution was approved 
by 1,008)740 to 131Y425 and Nkrumah elected by 1,016,076 to 124*623. The 
1964 referendum resulted in a claimed poll of 96.5% of which 99.9% voted 
favourably-11 The referendum was 
I 
generally considered a farce: 96.5% 
turn out was virtually double anything previously experienced in Ghana 
as was the percentage voting for the CFP; there was not a single 111ol vote 
in Ashanti) the main opposition area) each voter had a serial number and 
could be checked on,, and there were widespread reports of intimidation 
and the 'No' voting boxes with the covered slots. 
The second major indicator of institutionalization failure relates 
to the undermining of the sphere of competence and autonomy of many of the 
mjor political functional organizations. The process may be illustrated 
with reference to a number of groups. The erosion of the sphore, of 
competence of the opposition had already been notedv The judiciary came 
under attack as from 1960. The 1960 constitution gave the President 
powers to appoint judges; the nature of FDA and a number of related bills 
Put a proportion of offences beyond the control of the judiciary; the 1961 
amendment to the criminal procedure code enabled the President to take 
certain offences out of the jurisdiction of district magistrates; ond 
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'-finally in November 1963 when a special court dismissed treason charges 
against three persons, the Chief Justice was dismissed and a bill was 
rushed through parliament (and made retroactive) enabling the President 
to quosh court decisions. 
12 The erosion of the sphere of competence 
of the civil administration began soon pLfter independence. In 1957 the 
administrative Regional Officer was replaced by a party appointee; in 
1959 Gardiner, the British trained Ghanaian head of the civil service 
was sacked; and increasingly the most important administrative departments 
were transferred to the Presidents Office. However, it must also be 
noted that particularly in the 60% there began a movement to grant 
greater autonomy to and encourage increased efficiency in the administration. 
13 
Finally, it is necessary to note the extensive array of associations which 
were incorporated into the Cl'Pp including the TUG, the Cocoa Farmers 'Union 
(UUFC). (The CPP also controlled a number of lesser- associations such as 
Youth Groups2 Womens Associations and the Workers Brieade. ) 
The final indicator ok institutionalization failure relates to 
corruption and patronage. The first charges of corruption and patronage 
were levelled in 1951+ and 1955 (see e. specially the Korsah Co=ission) in 
connection with the activities of the Cocoa Marketing Board. The CPP had 
control of the CEB which at that time was a very profitable organization 
and furthermore the OPP used the Cocoa Purchasing Company.. ' a CMII subsidiary) 
to build up a patronage machine by giving loans to CPP backers'4 (in tho 
6 week period prior to the 1951+ election advanceafrom. the CPC rose 
Again in 1961 Nkrumah made a famous dawn broadcast against corruption and 
a Committee of Inquiry showed that many ministers had assets far in excess 
of their salary. Although 2 or 3 leading members were forced from the 
cabinet, the corruption drive was halted. Again following the coupy a 
number of commissions were established to investigate corruption and 
ministerial malpracticeSp though it is significant to note that little 
corruption could be directly related to Nkrumah* The n- ni=s for . 
15 
--necha 
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corraption and patronage were those which become available in many low 
income systems evolving from colonisation, * i. e. a large number of posts 
to be distributed, control of Import Licencest distribution development 
grants etc. It appears in the case of Ghana that not only was there 
evidence of considerable corruption and patronage (exacerbated by UP 
hegemony ) but that also the efforts to combat it were rather ineffective. 
With reference to support failurep both major types, i. e. withdrawal 
and insufficience, were manifestj, although. the more important would appear 
to be the latter. The degree of support failure of the regime became most 
explicit at the time of the coup2 when not only was there no popular 
opposition whatsoever to the coup with the CPP apparently collapsing 
totallyp but alsz the coup was popularly received. 
Although it is difficult to estimate precisely the degree of support 
withdrawalt two indicators may be noted. In the first placey it can be 
argued that by 1960 all opposition support for the regime had been with- 
drawn, and certainly with the enactment of the 'one-party-statel in 1964 
this pxocess mist have been finalized. Apter argues that in the post 
World War 2 period the first two organised groups to appear from the morass 
of ethnic factions and pressure groups prior to that period were the national 
progressive chiefs and the constitutional progressives. These two groups 
i 
were preempted by a thirdt a populist groups which became the CPP calling' 
on the partially educatedý the young) the now Urban groupst journalists 
and ex-servicemen. 16 Although the first two groups could not adapt an 
easily an the app to rising political and economic demands, they were 
nonetheless still very prevalent at Independence. However, ' through bills 
to curtail the secular opposition (e. g. PDAs deportations etc outlined 
above) and to demote chief a (e. g. destoolmonts- or 3 major Chieftancy Acts 
of 1959 which placed chiefs at the disposal of the governmoat)p these 
groups by 1960 had become totally excluded. 
17 Second and perhaps of 
- 205 - 
greater significanceý there does appear to have been some loss Of 
urban support for the CPP and also some loss of support by the cocoa 
farmers. Thus there had been large scale protests in 1958; in 1961 the 
Sekondi-Takoradi strike took place despite the ban on strikes and CPP 
control of the TU's; the animosity engendered by the 1961 strike could 
be expected to be continued given the increasing inflation and wage freeze; 
the cocoa farmer, -ýecame more disaffected as cocoa prices were reduced. 
18 
Two main typedpf insufficience of support mobilization have been 
outlined: too narrow a base and inadequate mobilizing mechanisms. The 
narrow base of support of the CPP can be seen from an examination of the 
1951+ and 1956 elections which illustrate quite vividly the small percentage 
of the vote won by the CPP. It has been one of the ill-examined generaliza- 
tions of comparative political analysis that single party systems are 
attuned to massý: mobilization -a generalization which has only recently 
been dismissedq, 19 
Table 6: 4 Performance-OPP In Ghanaian Elections of 1954 and 195 
eo 
%'Electo . rate '510poll % Poll won No. of % Total 
Registered by CPP CPP Seats Electorate 
won by CPP 
1954 50 6o 55 72/104 16.5 
1956 6o 50 57 71/lo4 17.0 
Since there were no elections after 1956 it is difficult to provide any 
further comprehensive evidence. NonethelesdZiven the indicators of 
incapacity of mobilization which will be outlined belows it would not be 
expected that the CPP population would expand significantly. Two strands 
of evidence would seem to support this. Thus Austin notes in the 1960 
Presidential elections Vkrumah won only 16.8 of the Accra vote; and at 
the local level Owusu, notes the static nature of political and electoral 
mobilization between 1953 and 1958.21 
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The incapacity to mobilize support in the case of Ghana was 
contingent on two processes: the ossification of the CPP and the sealing 
of alternative channels of'mobilization. These factors will be emmined 
in greater detail in the dislocations. At the present it is simply 
necessary to notetthree major indicators of the incapacity to mobilize 
support. In the first place, the CPP made no concerted drive to recruit 
members especially inrural areas. Although some effort was made to , 
revitalize the party in 1960y the CPP never seriously applied itself to 
mass mobilization. 
22 Second an increase in the decline of the .. 
there wa 
significance of constitutional and branch organizations., and increasing 
dissatisfaction and intrigue both at the centre and local levels as the 
centre became unable to sustain economic pay"offs and the local levels 
became more attuned to localized problems. 
23 Finally, a whole range of 
measure4served to seal channels of mobilization which lay outside the 
CPP hierarchy. Thus opposition parties were curtailed and finally banned; 
alternative organizations were taken over by the CPP and any non-compliant 
personnel abandoned in the piocess; 
24 
elections were made redundant; the, 
parliamentary body was transformed into a self-perpetuating body in which 
members were selected by the CPP central conmittee; and finally internal 
CPP recruitment became closed cixtdexcessiveýdependent on Vkrumah. 
25 
. There is no evidence of any large-scale monitoring failure. It is 
usual for monitoring failure in the form of the rise of domestic violence 
or the increased use of force on the part of the government to accompany 
any high levels of other types of instability. The primary reason 
accounting for the absence in the case of Ghana is that no co-ordinated 
groups existed which could mobilize sufficient protest against the regime. 
In other wordsp although there were significant disaffected groups, the 
monitoring mechanisms of the regime combined with the nature of these 
grouPs, inhibited any significant protests. 
26 Although there had been a 
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number of cases of domestic protests both immediately following independence 
(e. g. Ewe rebellion in former British Togo, aggressive Ga movement in Accra) 
the threatened strike of public service personnel, the state of emergency 
in Kumasi) and a number of more isolated incidents thereafterf (e. g. 
Sekondi-Takoradi strike).. these, cases-ýwere relatively isolated or involved 
only very small sections of the population and could not therefore be seen 
as indicators of significant levels of monitoring failure. Only two 
indicators of monitoring failure may be noted., and again it must be 
emphasized that neither of these had reached chronic proportions. The 
first relates to the establishment of governmental authority. Although 
there had been no challenge made to the regime's authority either in terms 
of a secepsionist movement or an alternative national challeage) there 
is sufficient evidence to deduce that the regimes authority in some areas 
of Ghana was most certainly flimsy. The primary basis for this argument 
lies in an analysis of the distribution of voting figures in the 1956 
election. 
Table 6: 5 Diotribttion of seats in GhariýAan Election 1956 by ReFtion 
27 
CPP NIM ITPP Others 
Gold Coast 44 44 
Ashanti 
_8 
12 1 21 
Transvolta 8--5 13 
N-Territories 11 - 15 - 26 
71 12 15 6 1o4 
It becomes clear from this breakdown that the CPP did not have a majority 
in either Ashanti or the Northern Territories. This may not have been 
significant were it not that the CPP failed to extend its support effect- 
ively and that it subsequently excluded non CPP groups from political 
Participation. Hence we argue that certainly outside the gold Coast areat 
regime authority was far from substantiated. On the other hand, we wish 
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to qualify this position by arguing that although regime authority was 
weak, it was no .t seriously challenged. Thus it will be noted that the 
OPP was the only national party (and indeed the only party to win any 
significant number of seats in at least two regions)s and furthermore 
the alternative partiesp especially the ITPP and MAP, were very weak and 
ineffective organisations. 
28 The second indicator relates to the regime 
use of force. The argument again is a. qualified onep namely that although 
the regime made little explicit use of force, there were a large number 
of control mechmisms in which force was an important element) and a 
secondary array of mechanisms., whichp though not contingent on forces had 
the same consequence or effect as forcey i. e. the perpetuation of the 
regime irrespective of demands.. The first category refers to such mechanisms 
as FDA and deportation measures; *the second category relates to press 
controls) the 1960 conbtitution and 1961+ amendments the ban on strikest 
the range of bills forbidding criticism of the CPT or the President (e. ge 
the Presidential Affairs Act 1961p the Public Order Act 1961 or the 1961 
Amendment to the Criminal Code making it illegal to undertake anything 
, 
likely to make the President an object of hatred ridicule or contaiapt), 
and finally the measures which incorporated control of political bodies 
additional to the CPP within the CPP. 
Having examined the main profile of political instabilityp the next 
task is the examination of the main dissynchronizations. The first two 
dissynchronizations relate to interaction between the economic and political 
systems. The first relate*ore particularly to the organization of the 
economy (upon which inputs to the political system are contingent); the 
second relates to the mechanisms employed by the political system to monitor 
the economy. 
29 
Three factors are of import concerning the first dissynchronizatione 
In the first place, Ghana could be classified as a single crop economyy 
i. e. one in which excessive dependence lies on a single product* In the 
case of Ghana) the product was of course cocoa, which earned approximately 
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65% of the export earnings. Single crop export economies are subject 
to a number of severe problems. Given the nature of agricultural product 
it is difficult to control the amount of productiony and furthermore the 
price of the commodity is largely beyond the control of the primary 
30 
producer being set by the world market., Ghana was particularly 
unfortunate in that cocoa manifests one of the highest price fluctuation 
rates, and further from 1958 the world price of cocoa began to decline 
so that although Ghana doubled her ei-ports after 1958 the eamings 
remined stationary. 
31 
I 
The second factor responsible for the structural dissynchronization 
was the very weak position of Ghana in the international economic system. 
The weak position of low income systems in the global economic system was 
noted in the first section of this work and was seen to be a function of 
the type of production of various systems and the profitability and stability 
of such productions. The weak position of Ghana, whose level of economic 
development until 1961 was tied to export proceedsPver which Ghana had 
little controlf im., not unique among Africaa nation states (which manifest 
some of the lowest levels of economic development in the world); but 
became exacerbated after 1961 when Ghana attempted to develop some degree 
of economic insulation and autonomy. The primary consequence of the weak 
low income economies is the small degree of control over external patterns 
of economic interactions whether these be trade or external investment. 
The vulnerability of Ghana in this respect is easily documanted. For 
example) although Ghana was left with not inconsiderablo reserves at 
independence, these had been invested by the Colonial Office in Britain 
and not in Ghana; or again even after 1961 Ghana was unable to dictate 
32 the most favourable terms for the Volta project. . 
The third factor relates to the verymm. 11 size of the market in Ghana* 
With a population of about 7m (even so considerably above the African 
average), Ghana has an internal market considerably smaller than any of 
the other systems we have examined. Small markets are not problematic 
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i4ubsistence economies but immediately become of Signif icance once 
growth is anticipated. In this situation small markets provide one of 
the many vicious circles (encouraging low demand and low investmmt and 
low production) end become q=jor inhibiting factor in the pxogressive 
development of basic goods as economieqof scale become more important. 
33 
The second dislocation relates to the control by the. policy of the 
economy. The first causal factor of import with reference to this 
dislocation is that the diversification of the economy and the attempt 
to generate internal expansion which was not contingent on exte7mal cocoa 
earnings took place too late. Until 1961 there had been little diveraifica- 
tion (which had not been encouraged by the first two plans which invested 
89% and 8CF5o respectively in social services) and economic development had 
been financed and stimulated only through export earnings or accumulated 
export reserves. After 1961 Ghana embarked on a much more ambitious path 
of development and began to try to produce somqdegreo of economic autonomy 
through the introduction of exchange controls and import restrictionap 
measures to make the banking system autonomousp and through the development 
of state corporations. Though this was a very correct line of development 
for Ghana) severe problems could be expected on two accounts. Firsts the 
foreign reserves essential to buy machinery were exhausted (and cocoa 
prices were in marked decline); and second the new industries must operate 
at lower costs than imported goods and also demand a time lags i. e. a 
period over which there is no immediate return on investmefits. 
34 
A second problem was that there was Little central control or even 
Imowledge of the external debt. In 1963 the economic survey recorded the 
external debt as 938m, but in 1961+ after a critical inquiry the debt was 
found to be at 187m of which 157m was in suppliers credit with the bulk 
of repayment due in /, -6 years time. 
35 
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A third causal factors which has been widely noted is that the 
state corporations were not functioning very satisfactorily. A 1964 
Report gave spectacular delays in the purchasing of equipment and its 
installation. Again the 1965 Budget ýreported that although &40M had 
been invested in 32 state enterprises, virtually no dividend had been 
received in 1964 except for two banks and the National Trading Corporation 
- accumulated losses at the end of 1963 were 915m- In this contextp it 
is also important to note that the CVB was not working well. The 
rationale behind the CIM is such that it should pay a low price when 
there is a largeýrop and vice versa for a small crop. However$ the price 
was determined at a time when it was difficult to estimate the eize of 
the crop (with the result that there were sometimes high prices for 
large crops) and further after 1959 the price of cocoa was fixed (though 
later reduced to a lower fixed rate. In fact the CEB requires to receive 
E200 per ton for its cocoa sales (and the 3 plan was contingent on this) 
but in fact the price of cocoa was less than E200 per ton since 1960 4136 
Finally., it appears that there were a number of planning failures* 
Thus some of the import licences were badly applied and led to inadequate 
supplies of essential goods, particularly saltp sugarp milk) soap and 
materials for new industries. 
37 Ortgain Dowse argues that the 7 year 
Plan was the work of CPP politicians and its amendments and changes of 
emphasis were a reflection of this. 
38 Finallys it would appear that the 
management of foreign loans was badly executed in that much of the loans 
from the West were short-te= whereas a number of bad barter contracts 
had been signed with a number of communist systems (although the 
communist loans had much more favourable Interest rates. ) 
The primary consequences of the economic di ssynchronizations were 
threefold. The most direct of course was for decision-making failure 
(scope). The second consequence was for institutionalization failure 
with reference to the development of, corruption. The third consequence 
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was for the withdrawal aspect of support failure. 
The third dissynchronization relates to the failure to develop 
channels of political participation. The primary reasons for this 
dislocation would appear to be a function of two major factors: the 
ossification of the CPP and the total failure of alternative participa- 
tion mechanisms. The ossification of the CPP had already been adequately 
illustrated and appears to be responsible Pýr three main factors., In 
the first places the role of Nkrumah seems vital. Nkrumah emerged 
prior to independence as the most popular political leader within Ghana 
and certainly until the 1960s, maintained this position. Howevers the 
dominant position of Nkrumah within the CPP and thereby in Ghana (cf 
early grant of life executive responsibility of CPP)s which was never 
seriously challenged until 1966s encouraged a certain assification in 
that Nkrumah could arbitrarily appropriate political functions or issue 
directives or executive posts. 
39 In the second places it could be argued 
that from its very inception the CPP had a strong tendency towards spoils 
and the distribution of patronage. 
40 The CPP was the first organised 
group which could successfully participate in the spoils formerly 
monopolized by the colonial system. From the evidence of the CPCp it 
seems clear that the CPP quickly adapted to the control of spoils. After 
independence) the CPP control over the distribution of spoils significantly 
increased and indeed the CPP used extensive measures to protect these 
spoils and conversely employed the spoils to maintain its own position. 
Indeed Owusu argues that the ability of the CPP to handle economic rewards 
was the primary rationale for that party. 
41 The repercussion of the 
development of the spoils and patronage network for ossification is that 
it tends to divest party activities and encourage the emergence of 
intrigue, localia; non-circulation etc. A third factor contributing 
towards ossification was that the CPP developed into a control mechanism 
rather than a device for mobilizing support. 
42 The reason for this would 
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appear to be that given the relatively weak party organizationp the 
party could only ensure its continuation given excessive controls as 
opposed to spontmeous supports. 
The second major factor contributing to the failure of the develop- 
ment of political participation would seem to be the atrophy of alternative 
participation mechanisms. A number of reasons account for this. In the 
first place, the CPP enacted a host of measures designed to curtail the. 
emergence of any alternative parties (e. ge PDAp Avoidance of Discrimination 
Actp 1960 constitution etc. ) Secondlyp the alternative political parties 
were exceptionally feeble organizationst which relied on localized interests 
and which had ineffective organizations or programmes. It is certain that 
none of the opposition parties at the time of independence could have 
successfully adapted to mss mobilization. Finallys mmy of the associations 
which became absorbed into the CPP not only found little capacity for 
participation but also lost many of their more active members in the process 
of absorption. Thus it appears that much rank and file support was lost 
as such organizations became monitored by the CUPP. 
The consequence of the failure of the development of political 
participation had direct relevance for all the indicators of institution- 
alization failure and for all the indicators of support failure. 
A fourth dissynchronization, which was not nearly as important as 
the above dislocations) was the failure to develop and adapt the civil 
administration. Several reasons account for this. In the first place, 
the type of administrative system established by the British was designed 
primarily to maintain law and order from the British vantage and was 
consequently of ill-design as far as assisting major development programmes 
were concerned. Second, there were insufficient trained personnel at 
independence. The civil service plans of Guggisberg were sabotaged and 
by 1948 Only 94/1300 senior posts were held by Africans. Thirdly) it was 
not until 1960 that the College of Administration was established. Finally. * 
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it appears that there was considerable interference and manipulation 
within the administration) especially with reference to branches being 
transferred to the Presidentialoffice. 43 
The consequences of the general wealmess of the civil administration 
for institutionalization failure were twofold. In the first placey the 
administration was' unable to establish its own sphere of competence; and 
second) to the extent that there was insufficient personnel, corruption 
and partisan appointments were encouraged. There was also a ramification 
for monitoring failure to the extent that the bureaucracy could not 
assist in the establishment of regime authority. 
The third task in the analysis of intervention concerns the exanina- 
tion of military organizational capabilities and predispositions. 
The first variable that must be examined with reference to the 
organizational capability category is that of skill level. Within the 
context of professional armies, it was clear that the skill level within 
the Ghanaian military was not very high. This can be illustrated by 
three indicators. First the officer corps was comparatively small end 
for the most part of recent standing. At independence there were 220 
British officers to 25 Ghanaian and byUpril 1961,230 British to 150 
Ghanaiany although shortly after this date total Africanization was 
achieved. 
" The plans for Africanization had been drawn up by General 
Alexanderj who had replaced Major-General Paley as Chief of Defence Stafft 
for full Africanization by late 1962, but in September 1961 11krumah 
summarily dismissed Alexander and the remaining British officers . 
45 
Second) like most African armies, the Ghanaim one has a simple and non- 
diversified commad structure due to its sma-11 size. Finally) the Gha4iian 
arlkrndid-'hotihav6 
-d very. ýmdmplexainange of equipment. 
46 On the other hand, 
it appears that given the size and equipment availdble to the militaryt 
it was well-trained -a Ghanaloon military Academy had been established 
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in 1960, and all officers had at least secondary training. 
With reference to the second variable) composition and structure) 
two factors are important. In the first placey there had been a mrked 
growth in the size of the armed f orces. At independences they consisted 
of 3 batallions almost completely dominated by British officers. 
47 By - 
1966 the army had expanded to 15000 being composed of 1., 200 in the 
2 brigades of 6 infantry batLUionss 1 reconnaissance squadronp some 
a 
paratroop, engineer and transport formations - the navy and air force 
had about 1000 men each. 
1+8 The second factor related to recruitment* 
The British had initiated a recruitment drive whereby appr6ximately Z/3 
of the ranks were drawn from the north but the bulk of officers were 
drawn from the more educated southerners. It seems that a similar type 
of policy was continued after independence. 
49 
With reference to the autonomy of the military., it seems clear that 
up to 1960 the army was clearly divorced from the civilian polity. The 
armyv as notedp had been small at independence, it was officered mainly 
by the British, it had not been involved in the independence movement 
and had not been deployed much after independence (Ghana had no significant 
border problems or internal insurrections. ) After 1960y although the 
army became much more involved in the development of political instability, 
it still retained a high degree of autonomy. The major factors impinging 
on the military's autonomy were twofold. In 1961 the army was ordered to 
send 400 recruits to the USSR for training. This., was highly resented by 
the army., which thought that a second major type of training would only 
lead to confusion and a diminution of its effectivenessG50 In the end 
only 68 recraits-I were sent and they returned after one year. The second 
factor concerned the President's own Guard Regiment. This had initially 
been established by the British as a ceremonial body. Howeverp Nkrumah 
began to develop it as his own bodyguard, employed Soviet arms and personnel 
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to train it and finally in 1965 the command of the POGR was removed 
from the army and placed in the Presidential Office. By 1966 the POGR 
had 50 officers and 1142 men. 
51 In sum, by the time of the coup the 
Ghanaian army was a reasonably autonomous body which had cutp its explicit 
ties with the former role of colonial police-force and had become 
91 
identified as an explicitly Ghanaian military force. 
With reference to cohesion of the): military) there was little to point 
to any major cleavages (with the exception of the POGR). There were no 
major ethnic rivalries as in the case of Nigeria,, the army was not very 
large and there was no significant interservice rivalry) there was no 
partisan rivalry, and finally the divisions which had appeared were 
not very significant. 
52 The most serious potential threat to cohesion 
lay in the fact that with the relatively rapid expansion and Africanization, 
many officers had received rapid promotions) which in turn meant that 
future promotion channels would be rather atrophied. 
With reference to the predispositions favouring intervention, a high 
OU StA 
ikYA %X1 iV., t UYII'ah -polliýj 6epav, ýo dQvekap tv, ýTn tqtbo (s"w(kra& - fth level of diLsatisfactionLagainst all three major points of reference 
structuresp policies and incumbents), it would appear that it was dis- 
satisfaction against certain policies, which was instrumental in precipating 
dksatisfaction against structures and incunbents. Hence the examination 
S of predisposiiional d: ýsatisfactionsýay focus on the policy level. 
One of the first problems to occur centered around the Ghanaian 
deployment in the Congo. Even prior to the Congo's independence) Nlaumah 
had established a special office in Leopoldville to link with Lumumba. On 
July 12 1960 a6 man Ghanaian delegationt led by Colonel Otup was sent 
to the Congo to see how Ghana could assist Lumumba in controlling the arry- 
The subsequent conflict appears to stem from the confusion of the 
Ghanaian troop's responsibility to the UN mission and INkrumah's occasional 
attempts to be of assistance to Lumumba. The second issue appeared in 
1961 when aninsh ordered 1+00 cadets to be sent to the USSR. This move 
was strongly and saccessfully resisted by the military) which did not wish 
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to mix. e#her. - training patterns or arsenals. 
A third problem related to the 1962 move to open an Armed Forces 
Bureau designed to engage officers in political discussion. This was 
followed in 196/+ by more concerted efforts to persuade the military to 
. -% , '54 join the Cpp. Fourthlyy Nknnmh attempted to undermine the autonomy 
of the armed forces. Thus there was consIderable military resentment 
at the POGR., a number of measures were enacted to balance the police 
against the military (e. g. the police were given control of a national 
radio networkLagain the police force was very large), j in June 1964 
military training was introduced into the Workers Brigade,, and finally 
when the POGR was transferred to the Presidential Office so too was the 
control of defence affair*oved from the Ministry of Defence to a 
secretariat in the Presidential Office. 
55 Fifthly, in July 1965 major 
Generals Otu and Ankrah were suddenly dismissed and replaced with more 
favourable Nkrumah men, 4feri, and Barwah. Finally., it seems that the 
military was strongly opposed to the consequences of the economic policies 
of the regime (especially rising inflation) and also to the level of 
corruption (i. e. the more visible aspects of the growing instability. ) 
The factors inhibiting intervention were much higher than in either 
the case of Pakistan, or Egypt. The main factory which would inhibit 
intervention, was the threat of opposition from the POGR and branches of 
the OPP. Furthermore the coup-makers could not count on the support of 
the head of the armed forces. (It was probably this constellation of forcesp 
which led to the alliance with the police-force. ) The OPP opposition, did 
not materializes although the POGR did make some armed resistance. On the 
other hands the military could assume it would receive civilian support 
from non-OPP groups. 
Although the Ghanaian military did not become directly involved in 
the condition of instability (on account of the absence of a high degree 
of monitoring), by 1966 Ghana was manifesting a high degree ofinstability 
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which was intimately related to the military' s predispositions - In 
57 
1966 the mi I itary made a coup in coordination with the police. 
PERFORYANCE 
A number of introductory comments on the Ghanaian military regime 
may be made. In the first place,, the regime was clearly an equilibrating 
regime. Although the pre-coup regime was totally dismantled and an 
alternative substituted, the military regime at no time constituted an 
alternative2 and further the revamped regime contained many elements of 
a previous form of political organization. Secondly$ a significant 
degree of civilianization took place in the course of the regime in 
terms of the employment of civilians in executive and top administrative 
0 
positions. There was no civilianization, as in Pakistan or Egypty whereby 
the military regime itself attempts to imitate or conform to standardized 
patterns of a civilian regime (as in the formation of a political party). 
Thirdly there was no major change in the induced generalized politicized 
professional syndrome during the regime., although it must be noted that 
at the time of the coup the indicators of partisan and sectional identifi- 
cation were strorger than in either the case of Pakistan or Egypt. 
The first problem area to be examined relates to the manner and 
success of military performance with reference to the major nation state 
political functions. 
Two factors are of import concerning the method of decision-making. 
The first relates to the structure. Although there was a considerable 
degree of centralization) there was a progressive and marked devolution 
in the decision-making process during the military rule. The degree of 
centralization is indicated in that the National Liberation Council 
remained the primary executive body until the return to civilian govem- 
ment In September 19695ý or again political parties were banned and the 
CPP dismmtled. Nonetheless"Ibere were a number of indications of 
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significant devolution. First there was considerable relianc6 on 
the 
administration) to be examined below; second in June 1966 th6 
VLC 
appointed an advisory political committee of 23 
(overwhelmingly composed 
of professional groups and led by former supreme court judge Akafu-MAaO); 
third in July 1967 an executive council of 17 commissioners (14 of whom 
were civilians) was appointed; 
5R 
week after the establishment of the 
Executive Council, the Political Committee was abolished and a National 
Advisory Committee of 31 established; 
60 
finally in January 1969 a 
constituent Assembly was established to consider the draft constitution*61 
The second general factor of import concerns the reliance on administrative 
techniques and the civil administration itself. Thus with the exception 
of the period of the Constituent Assembly (which could be seen to some 
extent as a popular body)2 all bills and policies were-direct decrees. 
(It nust further be noted that the constituent Assembly was not a powerful 
body and was concerned only with a limited area of decision making. 
) 
The reliance on the civilian administration can be seen from two 
indicators. Firstthe ! TLC relied on a large number of commissions for 
Policy formulation: for example an economic commicsion (consisting 
solely of government officials and the governors of the Bank of Ghana 
and Ghana Commercial Bank) was established on the day of the coup., this 
was followed a few days later by a constitution commission and in later 
months by additional commissions such as commission on Public, Services) 
commissions to inquire into malpractices, Prices and Incomos Commission 
etc. Second2 the nine regions of Ghana were headed by military or police 
officials, i. e, the military used the administrative chain of co=and; 
or again pr3mcipal secretaries were placed at the head of the various 
ministries and directly responsible to the HIC. 
62 
With reference to the scope of decision-making two major areas 
require analysis,, namely those policies concerning the reorganization 
and restructuring of the political and economic systems. Six factors 
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are of import with reference to the economic reorganization. In the 
f irst place 2a lar ge number of the state enterprises were off ered either 
for total private sale or partial private ownership. The Peoples 
Trading Corporation and the United Ghana Farmers Counci I Cooperative 
were dissolved. Secondly2 the 7 Year Plan, representing the first major 
attempt to diversify the Ghanaian economy and promote industryy was 
abandoned for a much more limited two year plan focused primarily on 
agriculture. Third, considerable attempts were made to balance the 
budget2 which was cut by over half. The budgetary cut was associated 
with a number of austerity measures such as, reduction by 405, of the 
Ghanaian embassy staff, a number of projects such as the Accra-Teina 
motorway and the construction of Temale airport were stopped. Fourth2 
in July 1967 a further range of stabilization measures were introduced., 
including a 3(Yio devaluation, the reduction of import duties and sales 
taxes on certain commodities and the increase of the minimum wage. 
Fifthly2 a number of control measures were improved. Thus import 
licensing was improved, imports were cut drastically2 in September 1967 
the remaining state-run enterprises were reorganizeds and in March 1968 
a Prices and Incomes Commission was established to control all pay 
Increases and prices. Finally2 Ghana's external debts were rescheduled 
in December 1966 to ease repayments. Further there were-. "increased loans 
and aid from the West. 
63 
Although the military regime did undoubtedly experience some success 
inits economic performancey this success was certainly equivocal. In 
the first placey the military was successful in drastically reducing 
imports (in consonance with easing imports on certain essential goods) 
and also after an initial 
-decline 
in boosting exports. 
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Table 6: 6 Ghana ImDorts and Exj)orts in U-S- millions (U. N. Statistical 
Yearbook) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
Imports 448 352 310 308 
Exports 291 244 278 307 
In this context the military were undoubtedly assisted by the rising price 
of world-coco4i a factor clearly beyond their control. 
Table 6: 7 Ghana's Cocoa Exports (Europa Yearbook) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
Tons 000s. 493.9 391-5 329.6 329.9 
Value S000s. 689238 51,529 65,335 92,800 
Secondly, the military had some success in controlling inflation as recorded 
by the consumer price indexs although by 1968 such control was clearly 
diminishing. 
Table 6: 8- Ghana' s consumer Price Index (19637-100)-(U. N. Statistical Yearbook) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
All Items 144 151 140 155 
Food 158 163 139 157 
Thirdly, there was a significant rise In the Industrial production index 
though it is dubious as to how much this can be attributable to the military 
regimep (certainly the rise in electricity output was a consequence of the 
Volta project. ) 
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Table 6: 9 Ghana' s Industrial Production Index (19637-100)(U. N. Statistical Yearbook) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
Total 1o4 112 120 135 
Manuf 1o4 1o8 122 149 
Electricity 129 163 222 247 
Fourthly, q in 1967 the budget was made to balance. 
These successes were 
tempered by four (not too-favourable) factors. In the first placep the 
public debt continued to rise. 
Table 6: 10 Ghana' s Public-debt in new cedis millions (U. N. Statistical Yearbook) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
Domestic 407.1 464.7 487.3 538.1 
Foreign 378.4 414.7 4ol. o 492.7 
Secondly, there was a decline in per cpLpita product. 
I 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
287 314 250 238 
or again: 
: 12 Indpx rn Cxhn. nqt 
U. N. statistical Yearbook) 
U. N. Statistical Yearbook 
1965 1966 1967 1968 
98 96 95 94 
Thirdly, as state enterprises were cut back and the budget reduced, there 
was a marked rise in unemployment. Although there appears to be consensus 
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on the marked increase., estimates of it do vary. Bing sites un- 
employment of 105,000 in April 1967 and 30% unemployment in Accray 
while Dowse cites unemployment in 1968 of probably not less than 
80,000 and that 40,000 of 52pOOO middle-school leavers in 1967 were 
unemployed. 
64 Finallyp there was a rise in foreign dependencep and from 
early 1968 there were strong efforts to reduce the number of foreigners 
involved in business enterprises and there were provisions established 
for the reservation of certain categories of trade to Ghanaians. 
The major policy decisions concerning the reorgnization of the 
political structure were fivefold. First, the whole of-the CPP establish- 
ment was dissolved. The CPPp which had made no resistance to the coup 
and more or 3o ss spontaneously disintegratedp was bannedp as were the 
associated organs of the Young Pioneersp the Bureau of African Affairs, 
the Nkrumah Ide'ological Institute, the United Ghana Farmers Council and 
the Peoples Trading Corporation. Seconds the civilian administration 
was reorganized in the f orm of a reduction of 11inistries from 32 to 18, 
and of districts from 168 to 147, a commission of public services was 
appointed to overhaul the entire administrations many Regional and District 
Officers were replacedp and finally since many stgte enterprises were 
relinquished the load on the civilian administration was lightened. 
Third., a number of changes in the juridicial apparatus was effected. 
In September 1966 many local court magistratesy who had been appointed 
on grounds of loyalty to the CPP than any other qualificationso were 
replaced; the number of judges was reduced from 36 to 29 (with 16 of 
the original number not being reappointed); the final chages in the 
Juridicial structure were effected in the new constitution. Fourthlyp 
a new constitution was pro=lgated. The major provisions of the new 
constitution were to list a number of general safeguards for civil 
liberties (e. g. no detention for longer than 24 hours without a charge) 
safeguards against election rigging, against tribalift and press 
restrictions; there was provision for a non-executive President; for a 
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Prime 11inister and a cabinet of collective responsibility and responsible 
to Parliament; for a parliament of 140 members in which procedure was 
laid down in detail (al. 1 bills were to be examined by committees) 
salaries were set by the President, there were penalties for defamation 
and loss of seat for absence of 15 sessions or for crossing the floor); 
and finally for an independent judiciary whose members could only be 
removed by an elaborate procedure involving a tribunal. Fifthly., political 
parties) which had been banned at the time of the coup., were allowed to 
reform in April 1969 in accordance with a number of provisions approved 
by the constituent-assembly. The major provisions were that parties were 
not to be formed on tribal or religious basest were not to include certain 
members of the former regimep and before being registered had to submit 
54 members with at least three drawn from each of the regions. 
Since most of the policy decisions concerning the reorganization 
of the political system had reference to the future civilian regime) 
their success or non-success may be examined below. 
With reference to the institutionalization processy the longer- 
terms problems were avoided for a number of reasons. First, the military 
was not committed to any long-term rule - in fact in May 1968p afterf just 
two years of rulep the withdrawal date was set for September 1969; and 
second it was clear that the previous regime had little support and 
that the military regime had been received with considerable popular 
enthusiasm. Having made this caveat., it seems clear that the military 
regime made little effort to institutionalize its regime. Thus it provided 
no body of rules for th rule (as the provisional constitution in Turkey)y 
there were no rules for political succession (and there did appear to be 
some covert jockeying in the NLO) and finally there did appear to be some 
degree of corruption. 
65 
The only degree of institutionalization was 
contingent first on the fact that the NLC was a clearly identifiable body 
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and that all decrees were to be channelled through it2 and second in 
that the sphere of competence and autonomy of a number of major organizations 
did increase. The small scale development of military regime institution- 
alization would have led to severe problems had the regime perpetuated 
its rule - 
Three fact=, s are of imporý with ref erence to support mobi 11 zation. 
In the first place, unlike the previous cases which had been examinedy 
the military sought no formal popular mandate. Indeed the only degree of 
popular participation was in the constituent assembly and even in this 
case the Assembly was not popularly elected. Secondly2 although the 
military regime did not seek any popular support) it could count on the 
: tacit support of a number of salient groups. - Firstly, it could count 
on the support of both the army and police-force, both of which received 
increased allowances and had a number of functions restored. Secondp it 
could count on the support of the civil administration. The administration 
was closely involved in the regime, its burden had been lightenedp its 
structure had been made secure and finally it had received a significant 
pay increase. Thirdly, the military could rely on a large number of 
miscellaneous groups which had been suppressed during the Vkrumah regime, 
such as former members of the United Party, exiled or deposed members of 
the CPPp deposed former members of the courts, the universities and the 
press* Fourthly., the TUC soon swung round to support the new regime, as 
also did the private entrepreneur who now found easier credit and tax 
restrictions. Finally, although the coup could not be seen at all as 
tribaly the regime did enlisL- a degree of chieftancy support when in 
December 1966 the chiefs dismissed by Nkrumah were restored and 194 
wrongly elevated paramount chiefs reduced., and further the new constitution 
eave them increased power in local councils where they had a majority 
over elected members. The third general point is to reiterate an 
observation made in connection with the institutionalization process, 
namely that the coup was popularly received and that there was no organised 
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popular support for any political body in 1966. 
In sum) although the military made no attempt to mobil ize any 
mass supportp the nature of instability in 1966 combined with the 
military's short-term rule plus its support groups, meant that the 
military regime e:; perienced no major problem with reference to the 
maintenance of support. Indged a national poll of over 8000 people 
in December 1967 showed that 91.8% were happy with the NLCY 45% did 
not want a return to ciirilian rule) -4ao wanted a return in 1970 and 
31% wanted it in 1971 or 1972 or were uncertain. 
As in the case of most military regimes, the NLC had an extensive 
array of monitoring mechanisms., including its control over the police) 
armed forces, administration. Howevers although short-term monitoring 
is rarely a problem for a united militaryp particularly when it is 
backed by the civil administration, there were a number of indications 
that the military regime was experiencing a number of difficulties. In 
the first place, it was not completely unified as illustrated by the 
attempted coup of April 1967 (to be exmUned below) or the changes in 
the. 1U. Second although IV., was abolishedy it was replaced by Protective 
Custody and Bing claims twice as many were held as under the FDA. Further 
in January 1967p military tribunals were established to try certain 
offences. Thirdly, a degree of press control was retained as evidcnced 
by the dismissal of the editors of three major newspapers which criticized 
the policy of the NLC with reference to the foreign companies of Abbott 
and Nomment. 
The second major task in the analysis of the military. performance 
is to exmnine the degree of success of the military in allieviating the 
basic conditions of instability. With reference to the first dissynchron- 
ization) i. e. the nature of the economic structure) the following points 
may be noted. In the first places there was no significant change in 
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the dependence on a single crop - economy* Although there was greater 
attention devoted to agricultural development and althougu the industrial 
production index rosep the 7 Year Planp the first technical plan and 
the first major attempt to diversify systematicallyswas abandoned and 
furtherp consLderable credit for the rise in industrial production index: 
must antecede the military period of rule. Secondlyp the weak position 
of Ghana within the international financial system was not improved. The 
polidies of the 11krumah era had left Ghana in a rather ambivalent 
position in that although the policies were correctly directed towards 
closing an 'open' economy$ they had been so badly devised and executed 
that Ghana was still in a weak position, ef size of external debt. The 
approach of the military was much more pragmatic and eclectic. Although 
as will be shown below, economic decision-making improved, the basic 
policies of the military began to retract from. the drive to autonomyP 
i. e. in surrendering state enterprises, encouraging more foreign capital, 
increasing theexternal debt. In sump the longer-term prospects of the 
military economic policies would not have produced the same degree of 
autonomy and insulation for Ghana as these anticipated under Nkrumah. 
Thirdly there was of course no basic alteration in the internal market 
size) although it is likely that the military regime found more favourable 
external markets. 
The following observations are pertinent concerning the second 
dis synchronization. The military could not of course affect the fact 
that the decision to close the economy was taken too late. Secondp the 
problem of the malfunctioning of a number of state enterprises was cured 
to some degree by releasing state control; further a number of other 
state organizations were reorganised) e. g. CEB. Finally, there was an 
undoubted increase in the efficiency of economic decision-making. The 
Mdtiple focus of decision-making under 17krumah was simplified) there 
was greater leeway given to economic experts, and there was greater 
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general efficiency and organization. Thus imports of essential goods 
were stimulated and made easier., import controls in general were much 
more rigorously and selectively applied, a number of necessary austerity 
measures were enactedp superfluous and prestige spending was cut) and 
some success, was achieved in rescheduling external debts. 
In sumwith reference to the economic dissynchronizationsp the 
performance of the military regime was ambivalent. It was undoubtedly 
much more pragmatic and efficient in its economic policiess and although 
its long-term. policies would not guarantee Ghana as strong a position 
as those of Nkrumah, it must be recalled that the Nkrumah policies were 
far from successful and that the military inherited a chronically, weak 
economic position. 
With reference to the dislocation of the atrophy of political par- 
ticipationp the military regime was generally more successful. The first 
factor precipitating this dissynchroniZationp the essif ication of the 
CPP, was easily solved by the removal of that party. This action was 
easily executed and had no significant ramifications because the CPP had 
become so moribund that its dissolution was virtually spontaneous. The 
factors which contributed to the assification of the CPP are unlikely to 
reappear since the new constitution has created a number of mechanisms 
which would severely inhibit the development of the legemony of any single 
party. The second factor contributing to the atrophy of political 
participation was the restriction of alternative channels and mechanisms 
of participation. In this context three observations my be made. First, 
the military regime has opened up more channels of participation by virtue 
of the removal of the CPP. Second2 since the CPP never had any mass ' 
support, and did indeed suppress a number of significantly large group3, 
there has been no problem or 4earth of groups which have emerged and 
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coalesced to form political patties. 
67 Third, a large number of the 
re-emerged groups are precisely those which were excluded at independence 
and to that extent it would appear that the new political parties are 
far from strong organizations. In sum, the military had some degree 
of success with reference to the dislocation of participation in that 
not only did the military regime itself experience little major difficulty 
in this areas but also the nature of instability meant that there was 
little problem in removing the former political party and permitting 
the reemergence of new ones. 
With reference to the final dislocation concerning the administrationp 
the military again registered some success. Thus by easing the load 
on the administration, it was able to ease the problem of the shortage 
of insufficiently qualified personnel. Secondly, the administrative 
structure was rationalized and given a greater degree of autonomy. 
The third major problem concerns the repercussions of performance 
on military capabilities and predispositions s and vice versa. With 
reference to the main indicators of capabilities, the following observations 
my be madee Firsts performance had very little effect on skill levels. 
Se condy there were very few changes with reference to cojýpozition and 
organization. Since the coup had no significant party or tribal or regional 
motivations there was no change in recruitment patterns. Estimates of the 
size of the army indicate that there was a decline in size from 17000 in 
April 1966 to 152900 in April 1970; 69 the structural organizational of the 
army in terms of 2 brigades of 6 batallions plus engineering and transport 
supports was unchanged; the relative sizes of the navy and air-force were 
unchanged; the military allowance does seem to have risen. 
70 Indeedp the 
Only significant change in the composition was that the POGR was dissolved 
and the advisers from Eastern Europe expelled. There, were howevery a 
number of changes in autonomy in the direction of increasing military 
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autonomy. Thus the POGRp which had not been under army commands 
waý. dissolvedj as were the other para-military organizations; a 
number of functionsp such as border patrolp which had been taken from 
the military and police., were restored; and finally in the new con- 
stitution control of the army was split between the President who 
chose the Chief of Staff and the Armed Forces Council which was under 
the Prime Hinister. Fourthlyp a number of threats to the cohesion 
did appear in the army. Two main changes may be e= ined. The first 
pertains to the splits precipitated by the NIL. Since the coup was 
not led by the top army commanders, it was clear that these commandersl 
Baniah and Aferip had to be removed (Barwah was in fact killed during 
the coup), but there were no mass dismissals following the coup. 
Further there appeared a number of conflicts within the NMO and top 
army command. In 1968 Ankrah gave up the post of commander-in-chief 
to Otuy but the latter was arrested in November and replaced by Ocran. 
In April 1969p Ankrah was replaced by Afrifap at the time of the coup 
only a majors as head of state and chairman of the HIL. The second 
main cleavage was the attempted coup of April 1967 led by Lt. Arthur 
and two other lieutenants. Although the attempted coup very nearly 
achieved its objectives (Kotoka one of the main originators of the 1966 
coup was killed), it appears that the attempt was not really serious. 
Thus it was led only by lieutenants, it involved only 120 troops of 
Squadron B of the Reconnaissance Regiment, it seems as though the 
motivation was personal grievances, and even before it was suppresded 
students were organizing in favour of the ,, W. 
71 
The ramifications of:, porformance for the military predispositions 
were twofold. In the f irst place., the total collapse and removal of 
the CPP regime immediately removed the specific military griuvances. 
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Secondly$ performance led to a heightened military Involvement in 
the policy. Not only could the military have some determining effect 
on the nature and structure of ttýe new civilian regime$ blit also by 
occupying certain gove = ent posts. Thus there was permanent provision 
for the Commander-in-Chief as a member of the Presidential Council of 
State., and further for the first three years of civilian rule the 
trio of Afrifas Hartley and Ocran w ere to constitute the Presidency. 
The general conseq'2ence of the organizational capabilities of 
the arnyj it is suggestedp did not predispose it to stay in power too 
long. Thus it evidently did not possess the requisite skills to 
execute a fully economic or political programme and was Increasingly 
dependent on various civilian bodies. Further., although the/cleavages 
were never very severeo it was equally clear that military rule was not 
fostering cohesion. The general predispositions led to an eclecticp 
pragmatic period of rule during which time most of the policies were 
directed to establishing greater austerity or efficiency. Certainly 
this consequence is clear seen both In the economic policies and in 
many of the provisions for the return to Civilian rule. The more 
specific Iredispositions) derived from interactions with the I&xumah 
regimes are quite clearly reflected in individual policy decisionso 
such as establishment of the autonomy of major functional organizations, 
and measures to inhibit the legemony of any single party etc. 
The fourth and final problem relates to the examination of the 
military transfer of power. The two main problems to be examined are: 
the nature of the transfer and the conditions underlying the transfer. 
With reference to the formers three factors are of import. In the first 
placep the transfer was peaceful and clear-cut. Second the mechanism 
of transfer was the most co=on in the situation where such a clear 
transfer is effected. That mechanism consists of the promulgation of 
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a constitution -which receives some popular ratification and which 
precedes national elections prior to which political parties are 
allowed to reorganize. 
72 Third., although the military rule by 
necessity influenced the nature of the subsequent civilian regime) 
the direct military controls on the subsequent civilian regime were 
very small and concentrated largely in the occupancy of the Presidency, 
which is a non-executive post and is of only 3 years duration, (the 
Busia cabinet contains no military members. ) 
The peaceful and successful transfer of power could take place 
because three essential conditions were satisfied. In the first place) 
the military was clearly committed to withdrawal. The military clearly 
did not possess the requisite skills to perpetuate their rule; the 
cleavages within the ITM were becoming problematic; and the military 
had had some success in achieving it9berceived goals. In the second 
placej on account of the nature of political instability prior to the 
coupj there existed civilian forces which could assume theVcentral 
decision-making positions. Finally, the military regime had had come 
small degree of success in all%eviating the constellation of instability, 
though this was particularly ambivalent in the case of the economic 
dislocations. 
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MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERPOPITANCE IN INDONESIA 
INTERVENTION 
Indonesia differs from the other case studies on two important accounts. 
In the first place, it is inadequate to consider the development of instability 
within a single regimeq but rather it is necessary to examine two breakdownst 
that of the regime existing from independence to the inception of Guided 
Democracy (dating formally from 1959) f1 and that of the Guided Democracy 
Regime. Although the second period is the more important for our purposes, 
it cannot be analyzed satisfactorily without an examination of the preceding 
regime. The second difference relates to the nature of the coup itself* 
The coup was not an immediate, explicit military take-over in that it was 
precipitated in the short-term by factors immediately outside the sphere of 
control of the militaryq and in that it was a period of months before the 
military government was completely established. Nonetheless the Indonesian 
case may be analyzed within our frame of reference in that although the coup 
was precipitated to a degree by factors outside the immediate military con- 
trolp these factors were the product of the instability profileg and further 
a coup is clearly identifiable in that a civilian government was replaced by 
a military one. 
Until the Japanese occupation in 1942, Indonesia was a colonial sys- 
tem Which manifested very little nation state development. Although the 
colonial status of Indonesia was not significantly changed until the end of 
the occupation, many of the nascent nation state processes were allowed to 
develop. 2 During the period 1945-49 two competing political systems exis- 
ted in Indonesia. One was that of the emerging Indonesian nation state 
system occupying about half of Java and most of Sumatra (as in 1947) and 
organized under a 1945 constitution; the other was that of the returning 
Dutch forces which sought to isolate the Republic through the establis); ment 
of federal negaras and through rdlitary force (despite U. N. pressure and 
the Linggadjatiand Renville Agreements). Ultimately the Dutch attempts 
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to reimpose their colonial system proved abortive and in 1949 Indonesia 
became formally independentp and established as a threshold or low level 
3 
nation state system. 
During the period up to 1959 all the main types of instability 
developed. Until 1953 instability was not particularly ma ked but after 
1956 very high levels had been reached. It is interesting to note that 
with the exception of institutionalization failurev which showed a con- 
tinual and progressive growtht the other types of instability showed 
marked degrees of oscillation. The first'taxk concerns the idenfification 
of the indicators of instability. 
The indicators of decision-making method axe numerous. In the 
first place there was a high degree of cabinet instability. From August 
1949 to July 1959 there were 11 cabinets; in no cabinet did a single 
party have a majority and in only one cabinet did two parties hold a 
majority (2nd Hatta cabinet August-December 1949); and considerable dif- 
ficulties were experienced ih the formation of cabinets. 
4 Secondly$ there 
was considerable conflict within and between cabinets. (The policy 
oscillations between cabinets can be seen most clearly in the four sue- 
cessive cabinets from Augus ,t 195 - 3p all . of which reversed a significant 
number of policy decisions of the previous one. ) Thirdlyq the fragmen- 
tation- of cabinets was represented in parliamentary committeesp which had 
one member from each party* Fourth, there was increasing conflict and 
obstruction between the parliamentary parties and cabinets and the 
President. 
_ 
The conflict between the President and parliamentary bodies 
stemmed from the 1945-49 period during which time the powers of the President 
had been successfully curtailed. However, given the increasing cabinet 
instability, the President was able to reassert an increasing degree of 
control until in 1957 the first extra-pFliamentary cabinet was intro- 
duced and later in 1957 the National Advisory Council was introducea. 
5 
With reference to decision-making scopet two main areas may be noted, 
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The first area is that of the economy in which decision-making failure 
can be represented by three indicators. In the first place export pro- 
duction was declining: 
Table 6: 13 9 Indonesia's Enorts as Percentage G. D p*6 
1951 1953 1955 1957 1959 
22 11 965 
Second goverment deficits were beginning to increase so that the deficit 
in 1959 was almost half of the goverment revenue. 
Table 6: 14 : Indonesian Central Government Finances (Rupiahs 
Receipts Expenditure Deficits 
1955 14.2 16-3 -2.1 
1956 18-4 20-7 -2-3 
1957 20.6 25.6 -5 - 00 
1958 23-0 35-3 -12-3 
1959 30-3 44-4 -14-1 
Thirdlyq although inflation was reasonably contained until 1956, a marked 
rise was becomiýapparent. Thus the cost of living index rose from 100 
(1953) to 250 (1958) to 292 (1959), or again the money supply began to 
rise: 
Table 6: 19 : Indonesia's Money Supply (in 1000s m Rupiahs)8 
1951 1953 1955 1957 1958 1959 
5-03 7.49 12.24 18.91 29-36 34-88 
With reference to the second decision making areaq the major problems 
appeared to be the incapacity to establish the major national political 
structures. Thus the draft constitution of 1950 was. still, in force when 
it was repealed in 1959 and the Constituent Assemblyq which had not been 
established until 1956, had made no progress by that date; or again the 
national elections foreshadowed in the 1950 constitution were not held 
until 1955; or again elected regional assemblies were not established 
until 1957ý 
There were three indicators of institutionalization failure. In the 
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first place, there was no established body of rules for conducting politi-- 
cal interaction. The draft constitution of 1950 soon became ineffective 
and was virtually superceded by 1956-7; both the President and the army 
played an increasingly large non-institutionalized role; or again there 
was an increasing personalization of political interaction as parties 
fragmented. 10 In the second placeq there was an increasing erosion of 
the spheres of competence of a number of major institutions. Thus cabi- 
net authority was increasingly undermined by the President until in April 
1957 the first non-parliamentary cabinet appointed by the President took 
office; or again in 1959 when the cabinet refused to reenact. the 1945 
constitution, it was issued by Presidential decree. The cabinet decline 
was again part of the larger process of decline of parliamentg which was 
finally dismissed in 1960 when it refused a budget. The same process of 
the erosion of the defined role and limits of a number of other political 
organizations was also evident as in central planning associations or the 
civil administration. Thirdly, there is general consensus that by 1953 
corruption and patronage had reached high levels. Thus in the change 
from the Ali cabinet to the Harahap one in 1955t there was a massive change 
in the civil service; or by 1954 smuggling and tax evasion in the regions 
had become extensive; although the, Haxahap cabinet tried to launch an 
anti-corrupti, on drive this gradually slowed and an emergency law to make 
the prosecution of curruption easier was defeated and in the succeeding 
Ali cabinet the anti-corruption drive came to a halt* 
11 In sum# there had 
been little concerted attempt to institutionalize the political system: 
in 1959 Indonesia remained under a provisional constitutiong the major 
channels and processes of political interaction remained unclarified and 
became increasingly fluidg and finally patronage and corruption expanded 
continuously., 
Two types of support failure were evident: withdrawal and insuffi- 
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cience. There were two main cases of withdrawal* The first was the 
regional protest which began in 1957 when a number of regional governments 
in Sumatra were overthrown; unrest later spread to include East Indonesia 
and Kali mantan. Efforts at negotiation between the regions and the 
centre, i. e. Java, failed so that in February 1958 a Provision4 Regional 
Government was declared. Finally government troops were deployed in 
April 1958 and by the end of May the major armed opposition had been broken. 
12 
Nonetheless, the length of time taken to quell the rebellions together with 
the conciliatory attitudes towards the rebels has been taken as an indi- 
cation of the significance of the protests and the comparative weakness of 
the centre. The second source of withdrawal of support was the transfer 
of allegiance of the PNI and PKI away from the parliamentary regime of the 
1950 constitution to the outline of the Guided Democracy regime which was 
increasingly propagated by Sukarno after 1957- 
13 The second type of 
support failure was that of insufficience which is characterized primarily 
by the atrophy of political parties. The political partiesl which by 
the 1955 election numbered approximately four dozen (though it must be 
noted that 4 paxties claimed 75% of the vote)j never developed beyond 
loose clique structures, which in the situation of progressive institution- 
alization failure became transformed into patronage seeking organizations. 
14 
The major indicators of monitoring failure are threefold. In the 
first place, there are a number of cases of the inability of the govern- 
ment to establishibs authority. The most important of such cases have 
been regional rejections of central goverment authority. The first pro- 
tests followed immediately after independence in the Westerling rebellion 
in West Javaq the Aziz rebellion in East Indonesia and a more severs 
revolt in Amboina. Howeverg these c'ases of government authoritY rejec- 
tion could not be seen as very significant since most were easily defeated 
and since by August 1950 the Republic had managed to establish a unitary 
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goverment integrating the last of the former Dutch negaras. The secona 
incidence of authority failure was the series of regional protests of 1957v 
which were of a much more extensive nature and posed a much more serious 
threat to the central goverment. Nonethelessq the central goverment 
did manage to survive the crisis,, though there axe several indications that 
survival was not easily achieved. 
15 The second indicatort that of the 
rise of the government use of force, is closely related to the regional 
protests noted above. This is indicated by the maintenance of a large 
military force, by the oantinuously high volume of violence in regions, 
and finally by the declaration in August 1957 of full martial law. The 
third indicator relates to the failure to implement decisions* This 
process was tied to the increasing ineffectiveness of the civil bureau- 
cracy which became progressively more marked after the first Ali cabinet* 
16 
The second task is that of identifying the major dissynchronizations. 
The first two concern the interaction between the economic and political 
systems. With reference to the first dissynchronizationg the structure 
of the economy, four factors are of import. In the first place, the con- 
flict with the Dutch 1945-49 led to a number of major dislocations includ- 
ing a scorched-earth policy and a debt by Indonesia to the Dutch of 
$1,130 m. 
17 Second, until 1957 the most important sectors of the economy 
continued to be held by the Dutch. Although it could nat be denied that 
the Dutch economic interests had some beneficial ramifications for 
Indonesia (especially the shipping lines) , nonetheless many of the Dutch 
enterprises were of an enclave nature with litle diffusion from the capi- 
tal intensive sectors of the economy to the labour intensive ones, 
18 
Thirdlyp there was a significant regional imbalance. Colonialism had 
failed to promote domestic inter-island trade and, many of the colonial 
trends became accelerated after independence, Thus Java became increas- 
ingly dependent on the exports of the Outer Islands with the ratio of 
Java's exports to the Outer Islands moving from 1.21 in 1940 to 6-70 in 
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1959.19 Finally, the export pattern of Indonesia was a very unstable 
one. As in the case of Ghanat foreign exchange was dependent to a large 
degree on a single agricultural export (and as such was subject to the 
dangers of wide price fluctuationg production fluctuationg etc. ). ý Pelzer 
notes that agricultural exports provide two-thirds of all foreign exchange 
with rubber contributing about 45%* 
20 
With reference to the second dislocation, four points are of import. 
In the first place there'was little coordination of in-testment and prodUc- 
tion. There was no central planning body to allocate production and in- 
vestment resourcesl and there was little coordination among the various 
agencies'participating in this process. Both the first two plans (the 
Urgency Economic Plan 1951, and the First Five Year Plan 1956-61) proved 
ineffective,, were frequently revised and finally abandoned. Secondlyt 
there was little attempt made to contain inflation. Although the situ- 
ation was reasonably contained until 1954, although a number of stabiliz- 
ation attempts were made later, and although as Schmitt points out so4e 
degree of inflation was implicit in the attempt to control Dutch inbrestsp 
the stabiliztion'measures were not sufficiently extensiveg and the govern- 
ment deficits were getting beyond control. Thirdly the goverment made 
no major attempt to increase iW revenue through internal taxation and 
continued to rely heavily on indirect taxation of imports and exports. 
Finally, the nationalization of the Dutch enterprises took place both 
too late and was generally mismanaged in-that Indonesia did not possess 
the requisite personnel and skills to suddenly replace the Dutch. This 
dislocation was later compounded by the expulsion and restriction of many 
Chinese retail traders* 
21 -- 
The third dissynchronization is that-of system-cleavage, which in 
the case of Indonesia was, of a regional nature. 
22 Three"factors contri- 
buted to the development of this B'ystem' breakdown. The first and most 
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evident is the regional diversity of Indonesia. In the second placeg a 
number of historical factors have provided the basis for regional conflict. 
Thus although 90% of the population is recorded as Islamic, Islam has had 
23 
a very uneven impact. More importantly Dutch impact was very unefen. 
Dutch penetration of the Outer Islands was generally more laissez-faire 
and of a later date that that of Java. As has been noted already the 
structural economic dichotomy between Java and the Islands was established 
by 1930 and thereafter enhanced as the initiative for development (rubber, 
petrolq tint copra) moved to the Outer Islands* Finallyt the Japanese 
occupation continued the uneven development. 
24 Thirdly, the imbalances 
created through geographical and colonial factors were perpetuated in the 
first years of independence particularly through economic policy making. 
The consequences of regional cleavage were primarily for support failure 
(withdrawal) and monitoring failure. 
The fourth dissynchronization was the failure to develop the 
mechanisms of participation as evidenced in the atrophy of political 
parties and the failure to develop electoral mechanisms. Five factors 
explain the atrophy of political parties. First there was no unified 
nationalist movement which was dominated by a single large grouping. 
Second the parties were largely clique groupings which operated primarily 
at the national level with very poor linkages to intermediate and local 
levels. Thirdly, with the exception of the PKI)party fOctionalismt 
based on personal ambitions and not issues, was high. Fourthlyq it was 
only the secular parties which were concerned with popular mobilization 
and recruitment. Fifthq until 1955 all party members were appointed and 
could easily move from one party to another thereby inhibiting any party 
discipline. 25 Electoral mechanisms were restricted largely by patronage 
considerations of incumbent power groups, The failure of participation 
mechanisms had consequences for decision-making (method) (particularly with 
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reference to cabinet instability) p institutionalization 
(particularly the 
failure to develop stable bodies of expectations concerning interaction 
and also corruption) and support instability (especially insufficience). 
The final dissynchronization. concerns the failure to develop satis- 
factorily a number of political institutions. Three major ones may be 
considered. With reference to the first, the constitutiong the draft 
consteibutiont drawn up in October 1949 by the Republic and representatives 
of the 15 Dutch states, was a weird and unbalanced constitution designed to 
favour Dutch. interests. 26 Although demand for a unitary system led to the 
promulgation of a further draft constitution in August 1950, this consti- 
tution also was-very inappropriate. The powers of the Presidency were 
ill-defined, as also were relations between a number of majur decision- 
making bodies, or again the Assembly could only be dissolved if elections 
were held within 30 days (but no electoral law was specified). The 
second major organization to be considered is the parliamentary or legis- 
lative body, The independence legislative body was composed largely of 
appointed or nominated members who were unwilling to face elections; there 
had been little experience of legislative institutions prior to indepen- 
dence; and finally parliament had no substantial resource base since it 
was opposed both by Sukarno andthe army and since the weak parties were 
unable to consolidde its podition, The third major organizatio4 to be 
examinec; is the civil administration. A number of factors account for 
the inefficacy of the administration. First the Dutch had trained very 
few Indonesians in higher education and had allocated very few top bureau- 
cratic posts; second during the Japanese occupation and anti-Dutch 
strugglev the bureaucracy had expanded to twice its necessary size and 
further several autonomous administrative structures develpped; Uird 
after independence iio mator successful attempt was made to revamp the 
bureaucracy so that its large size was maintained as it was used to catch 
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the urban unemployed, or again there were inadequate facilities to train 
the bureaucrats, or again axtensive party politicization was taking placeg 
or again the low salaries encouraged corruption, 
27 The major consequences 
of the constitution failurý were for all the major indicators of institution- 
alization failure; the major consquences of parliamentary failure were for 
institutionalization failure (stimulated erosion any stable Patterns of 
interaction and facilitated corruption) and support failure (proved incap- 
able of providing a stable source of support); the major consequence of 
the administration failure was for monitoring failures 
During 1959 and 1960 the Indonesian polity was completely transformed. 
The 1965 Constitution was reenacted by Presidential decreet the President 
became the main executive post, a Kerdja (Work) Cabinet was establishedf 
two advisory bodies (the Supreme Advisory Councilq replacing the National 
Councilq and the National Planning Council) were institutedp in 1960 a 
Gotong Rojong (Mutual Aid) Paxliament replaced the formeroone and a 
Peoples Consultative Assembly was established, and a new political credo 
(the Manipol-Usdek) was pronounced. 
28 The new political organizition 
had the effect of changing the patterns and dissynchronizations of 
instability. 
In generalt there was a reduction of decision-making method failure 
in that the immobilism stimulated by party fragment; LtLon and cabinet in- 
stability was eliminated. Howeverg this form of instability was replaced 
to a degree by breakdown manifested in the over-centralization of decision 
making, which in turn introduced a high degree of stagnation* 
29 Howeverp 
the level of instability with reference to the scope of deeisiork-making 
increased. The failure with reference to economic decision-making can 
be represented by the following indicators. Firstq the consumer price 
I 
index became tiiBd to a massive ezaalationt 
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Table 6: 16 Indonesia's Consumer Price Index (1963 = 100) (U. N. Stat. Yeaxbook) 
1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
10 13 17 46 100 205 830 
Second budgetary deficits were increasing 80 that in 1965 central goverment 
expenditure was almost three times the revenue. 
Table 6: 17 'Indonesia's Budgetary Deficit-(Rwiahs 1000m) (U. N. Stat. Yeaxbook) 
1958 1963 1964 1965 
-12-04 -117-12 -308-14 -1347-8 
Third, the money supply had likewise become involved in a marked escalation. 
Table 6: 18 Indonesia's Money Supplv (Rupiahs 1000m) (Roederv op. cit. ) 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 
67.64 135.9 263-36 675-11 2713.69 
Fourthj export earnings had declined from $750m 1960, to E450m 1965- 
Finallyp'the foreign debt was $29400M. 
30 With reference to the second 
major area of decision-making (scope) failure, there was a similar con- 
tinuation of the incapacity to establish the major national political 
structures. Thus the provisional constitution of 1949 was still in effect 
by 19659 the requisite elections for the new central decision-makihg bodies 
did not take place. 
With reference to institutionalizationg there was a ganeral increase 
on all the three indicators noted above. In the first place, although 
there was no explicit breakdown in the manner of interaction until 1965, 
no formal body of rules crystallized. Thus relations betweentthe major 
central bodies were not specifiedg there was considerable confusion between 
the civilian and military martial law administration and finally the 
Indonesian polity came to be balanced on a shifting triangle of forces 
which bore little relevance to any formal prescription. In the second 
placeg the erosion of competence of many bodies cuntinued. Thus each 
agency had very poorly demarcated responsibilities (for example control 
of the NPC seemed to be passed around a number of organizations)q new 
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bodies continued to be created (such as state leadership consultative 
council 1962 and the Council of Assistants to the Leadership of 
Revolution 1963)9 administrative heads became dependent on civilian 
ministers, the new regional assemblies were effectively truncated and 
regional heads became central appointments. Thirdly corruption and 
patronage continued to increase. In sumq the fluidityq non-routine 
patterns of interaction involving personalization and patronage, which 
increasingly characterized the pre-1959 period, continued to grow. 
31 
It is difficult to estimate precisely the nature of support failurej 
but it would appear that this type of instability also increasedo With 
reference to withdrawal, it would seem that much Muslim support was cut 
off with the banning of the Masjumi Party. (In fact all but 10 parties 
were banned though with the exception of the Masjumi, all were small. ) 
Howeverg the second type of support failure was more marked than the 
firsto Thus Sykarno came to rely for support partially on mass rally 
type campaigns (as "Liberation West Irian" or "crush Malaysia") but were 
partioulaxly on the growing strength of the Communist Party, PKI. The 
PKI Prior to 1959 was the only organized mass paxty and after the incep- 
tion of Guided Democracy became the only significant party organization. 
The failure to mobilize support may be illustrated by a number of factorso 
Thus the weak parties became even more circumscribed through the Political 
Party Simplification Ordinance cC 1954 and through being b1lanced by 
functional groups and through martial law restrictions; 
33 
or again the 
new quasi-party bodies did not materialize. - The National Front estab- 
lished by the military was taken over by Sukarno and soon after faded; 
the BPS (Body for the Promotion of Sukarnoism) likewise faded, though this 
time under direct PKI pressure. 
There was in general-a decline in monitoring failureq although it 
must be noted that the monitoring controls employed by the polity increased. 
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On the one hand, there were no major challenges to central goverment 
authority and again there was a decline in domestic violence. On the 
other hand ma tial law remained in effect until 1963; central controls 
were increased (as in the dimimution of autonomy of regional assembliest 
or in the increase in appointive powers of the President, or in the 
w 
stronger press controlsv or in the control of the Supreme Court); and 
M 
finally as there was no increase in the effectiveness of the civilian 
administration and since its load was increasedg there was a paralleled 
increase in the failure to implement decisions. 34 
The next task must be to examine the dislocations underlying the 
new pattern of instability. With reference to the structure of the 
economy, there had been, only one significant change, namely the kation- 
alization. of the Dutch enterprises and the expulsion of many Chinese 
traders. , Although these roves had given greater economic control to 
the polityq their immediate economic consequences had not been beneficial. 
The expulsion of the Chinese traders led to a serious debacle in retail 
trading until government-run organizations could replacathem. The 
nationalization of the Dutch enterprises generally led to a fall in pro- 
duction since insufficient personnel. were available to replace the Dutch. 
35 
With reference to the second dislocation, i, e, economic decision- 
making by the polity, three factors are of import. In the first place, 
the planning mechanism was not satisfactory, The NPC was a very large 
bodyq which was not immediately controlled, by economic experts and which 
had to vie, with a number of other bodies for control of thý plan. It was 
replaced in Maxch 1965 by a new planning, bodyp the Natiaul Development 
33uming Assembly, whose first priority was to "Nation and Character Building" 
with the production of basic necessities Aaking second place. 
36 Secondly, 
there was no concerted commitment to execute the 8 Year Plan. There was 
general mismanagement and a serious shortage of raw materials and spare 
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I Parts; in December 19 4 only 200 out of the 335 A projects were being -im- 
plemented and not'one of the B projects had been realised; or again the 
plan was explicitly based on the need to attract a considerable amount of 
foreign currency yet a number of major policy decisions were deliberately 
aimed to repell overseas investors; or again the "Crush Malaysia" cam- 
paign could only aggravate economic difficulties. 
37 Thirdly, there was 
no attempt to control inflation. Although Djuanda iniroduced a moderate 
stabilization programme in May 1963 , with Djuandal s death at the end of 
1963 all the May Regulations were soon rescinded. Budgetary deficits 
stimulated by the military expenditure on the "Crush Malaysiall campaignt 
continued to'inerease. 
38 Thirdly, there contined to be no major effort 
to increase the goverment revenueg which as a percentage of net national 
product fell from 13% 1960 to 1.5% 1965- 
39 In su4ip there was a total 
neglect -of economic problem-solving as economic decision-making became 
tied to other policy outputs. 
The third dislocation analyzed abovet i. e. regional system cleavage, 
was alleviated, to some degree, although many of the basic factors condi- 
tioning this cleavagiy6mained unchanged* 
%, The fourth dislocationg the failure to develop satisfaotorily meohan- 
isms of participationg remained. This dislocation was attributable to 
three factors. The first was the legacy of the former regime during 
which time political parties had become ineffective. The second factor 
was the formal nature of Gilded Democracy which itself did not provide any 
extansive measur"es for participationG, Thirdly, the three major groupings 
of Guided Democracy were such that, none wished to see any other extra- 
external group develop a mass base, and none wished to see any of the 
other two develop a strong independent populaX' base. 40 
The final dissynchronization concerns the failure to develop satis- 
factorily a number of major political. institutions. The 1945 constitution 
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which replaced the 1950 one was equally unsuitable. It wair a draft con- 
stitution which was prepared in the last two months of the Japanese 
Occupation by a very small number of people and contained few clear 
structural provisions. By 1965 there was no indication that this draft 
constitution was to be replaced by a fuller one. In the second place, 
many of the major organizations or instruments of Guided Democracy were 
ineffective organizations. The regional assemblies were replaced by 
appointed onesq the Reoples Consultative Assembly was still by 1965 a 
11 . 
provisional onet and the Gotong Rojong was largely appointed. Finallyt 
the civilian administration continued to be ineffective on the following 
accounts* First there was still no attempt to reduce its size. Second 
patronage within the administration increased, and the post of secretary- 
general as head of a government depa: btment was destroyed and replaced by 
a number of principal assistants directly dependent on the Minister. 
Thirdq the increased area of government controls together with rising 
inflation and the low pay of civil servants combined to enhance corruption. 
41 
Having examined the profiles and dissynchronization of political in- 
stability, the next task must be to analyze the military's organization 
capabilities and predispositions. With reference to the organizational 
and predispositional indicatorsq there was some considerable variation over 
the period from independence to 1965- 
The index of skill level probably shows the most continuous develop- 
ment. Under the Dukh Colonial system skill levels of Indonesians were 
virtually nill, but under the Japanese extensive Indonesian training was 
introduced. From the time of independence there was a continuous growth 
in skill levels on account of the relatively frequent deployment of the 
military and the large grants given to the military in order to acquire 
complex weaponry ýnd the most important arms build up began after 1961 with 
Soviet and East European aid which totalled $1.2 billion). 
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With reference to composition and structure the following factors 
may be noted. In the first place, the Indonesian armed forces are large. 
By 1945 the Peta forces trained by the Japanese numbered some 62,000 but 
by independence the Indonesian armed forces stood at 200tOOO. Although 
strenuous efforts were made by some military officers to reduce this num- 
ber to 120F9000 there was some considerable resistance. -t' Howevert unlike 
the civilian administration there was some successful reduction in numbdrs. 
Aga6n following the regional revolts and the implementation of the West 
Irian and Crash Malaysia Campaigns the size of the armed forces increased 
reaching 355oOOO in 1963 but by 1965 had been reduced to 234,000- Iii the 
second placet unlike for example Ghana or Burmag Indonesia has naval and 
air-force services. Although much of the Soviet aid was channelled to 
these services, they axe not very large constituting sometking 16ss than 
206 of the total. a=ed forces. 
44 Thirdlyp the Indonesian army has , ex- 
perienced a diversified recruitment base. Two major problems have 
plagued the army with reference to recruitmentt the reiional aspect and 
the training origin of the army pers'onnel. 
45 In the years'preceding and 
succeeding independence both problems were compoundeap but 'though the 
salience of the latter faded rapidly after 1962, "the'former continued to 
be problematic. The issue of the training origin "of the army was proble- 
matic given its wide diversity. The -main stream was composed of Indonesian 
officers trained by the Japanese ii a force known as Peta, numbering by 1944 
about 359000- However, during the struggle against the Dutch two'other 
groups came to be included, independent 'guerilla units and additional 
groups which'4had been trained by the Japanese but not armed and which had 
subsequently taken to arms. Finallyg in 1950 a number of elements in the 
Dutch trained KNIL became incorporated into the Republic army- The strains 
of 'these diverrsified origins ýiereý "evident in the KNIL protests in 1950 and 
the October 17 Affair 1952. Although-the two'groups in the''Octob6r 17 
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Affair became reconciled in 1955, the regional problem persisted. Regional 
PQhV 
recruited dated to the Japanese Occupation after which effectively two 
independence armies emerged, the one based on Java and the other on 
Sumatra. IN=ther the nature, of-the struggle against the Dukh enhanced 
the decentralizedp regional focus of the armed forces. Although follow- 
ing independence the army was centralized to a degree u: 6der 7 districts, 
the regional recruitment and focus of several units continued to be a 
major problem which climaced in the rebellions of 1957- 
Internal autonomy of the military has again shown a numler of (Boil- 
lations. During the conflict with the Dutch there was obviously a high 
degree of interaction between military and nationalist leaders. Immedi- 
ately following independence efforts were made to - rationalize the army 
and to increase its autonomy. However, the defeat of the Nasution group 
in October 1952 led to three mutinies against divisional officers which 
received the approval of Sukarno. Howevertjollowing the Charter of 
Unity and the reinstatement of Nasution in 1955P internal autonomy again 
increased. 46 During the period of Guided Democracy some. degree of 
Sukarno intervention in the armed forces was evident, as in, the, replace- 
ment of Nasution by Ygni in 19629 but this did not- become, excessive. The 
eAernal autonomy, i. e. the degree of divorce, of the army from general 
political activity has never been great. Numerous. examples illustrate 
the extensive military involvement: . the nationalist struggle 1945-49 is 
self-evident; October 1952 amounted to a major attempt to influence policy 
decision-making; the military have formed or participated in a number of 
front or quasi-political paxties such as the I. P. K. I. 9 the Democratic 
League, and the National Front of 1960 and the. B. P*S.; in 1967 m tial 
law was declared and this lasted until 1963 during which time the military 
had extensive controls through the maxtial law administration;, again in 
-1957 
the military, took over the management of many of the nationalized 
Dutch enterprises and again played an important economic role following 
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the expulsion of the Chinese traders; from 1957-59 the military were the 
major force pushing and supporting Sukarno to declare the reintroduction 
of the 1945 constitution and the banning of political paxties; in the- 
subsequent Guided Democracy Regime the military enjoyed a major position 
(in the 1959 cabinet 25% of the positions were held, by the military and 
the new parliament included 40 military members). 
47 
., 
Military cohesion in Indonesia has generally been much higher follow- 
ing the successful defeat of the regional revolts than, in the decade of 
the 1950s- Even post 1960 it has not been very greatq which is under- 
standable given the regional diversity of Indonesia 'and "the large size of 
the armed fordes. However, it is most certainly1rue, that cohesion in- 
creased markedly after 1959 over the number of serious cleavagest' which 
had appeared in the 50s, i. e. the October Affair of, 19529 the smuggling 
1952-579 and the outright civil wax of 1957- 
The pattern of military predispositions, also evidenced a number of 
important changes. 
In the period up to 19,599- military dissatisfaction 'against the poli- 
tical structure was high and very generalized. Thus paxt of the motiva- 
tion for the 1952 Affair was the attempt to replace parliament with a new 
type; in 1955 the axmy successfully resisted-, attempts by Sastroadmijojo 
to politicize the officer corps and indeed brought aboutthe fall of that 
cabinet; following the defeat of the Sumatron uprising Nusttion banned 4 
political parties in central Sumatraq and later in 1959 banned all party 
activity; finally the military was one of-the major groups supporting 
Sukarno in his attempt to replace the parliamentary system and to reintrob 
duce the 1945 constitution based on stronger - executive controls and " func- ý 
tional representation, Howeverp after the inception-of Guided Democracy, 
military dissatisfaction against the, structure of -the'political. system 
declined markedly. The military played an*extensive role and was probably 
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the major group supporting Sukarno in the establishment of the post 1959 
structure. The military's main point of dissatisfaction was its anti- 
pathy towards the Communist Party, The antipathy to the Communist Party 
stemmed from 1948 when a PKI uprising at Madiun was seen by the military 
as a stab in the back. The subsequent reappearance of the PKI after the 
1955 elections and then as a rival counterbalance to the military during 
Guided Democracy exacerbated the tension between the military and the PKI. 
With reference to dissatisfaction against policy outputs9 it may be assumed 
that, as the military was an important integral unit in the GD system, 
there was no generalized policy dissatisfaction. The two main policy 
axeast which were not favoured by the militaryq were the economic and 
external relations (particularly the "Crush Malaysia! ' Campaign and the 
rapprochement with China) decision-making areas. With reference to incum- 
bents of the political system, military dissatisfaction was much more 
specific than the cases we have examined previously, and was related 
prima ily to antipathy towards C. P. members and only to a much less degree 
to the Sukarno entourage. The inhibiting factors were also much higher 
than the previous cases that have been considered. The two most impor- 
tant elements were the perceived strengths of Sukarnop based on a degree 
Of Popular support and an extensive patronage network9 and the PKI9 which 
possessed an extensive popular organization and a more limited armed- 
capacity. 
In sum, it will be seen that both from the negative and positive 
standpoints the military predispositions for intervention were not high. 
Thus although Indonesia in 1965 was experiencing a high degree of instab- 
ilityp and although the military's organizational capabilities were highs 
, a., coup was unlikely on account of the low predispositions. Howeverp the 
events of September 30 and its immediate aftermath were sufficient to 
change the pattern of interrelation between instability and predispositions- 
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capability by significantly increasing the degree of instability by 
shattering the triangle of interaction between the military-PKI-Sukarno 
and by significantly increasing the military predispositions. It is 
necessary therefore to mxvey briefly the September 30 Affair. 
Unfortunately the explanation of the events of September 30 (known 
as the Gestapu Affair) remain clouded. Howevert the. sequence of events 
of September 30 and its aftermath is more clear and may be elaborated in 
three stages. 
48 On the night of September 30 armyr air-force and commu- 
nist units murdered 6 top army Generals (Nasution narrowly escaped). A 
Revolutionary Council was proclaimed but in the confusion General Suherto 
with loyal troops quickly stabilized the situation. Stage one was over. 
Stage two began with reports of the murders spreading together with accounts 
Of c0MMUnist complicity, which in turn led to one of the worst massacres 
of modern times in which thousands of PKI supporters were slaughtered. 
49 
Stage three involved the question of how to reconstitute the polity with 
one of the major props of Guided Democracy virtually annihilated. This 
had largely been solved by March 1966 by which time Sukarnot who had failed 
to emerge unscathed from the Gestapu Affairt was obliged to confer full 
powers on Suharto. 50 The Sukarno regime was at an end and a military 
government was installed. Although there is consensus on the sequence 
of eventsq interpretation of the Gestapu affairs are legion. 
51 It is 
impossible within our frame of reference to debate fully these interpre- X 
tations but simply to note the consequence of events, namely that by March 
1966 the Sukarno regime was endedg the PKI was decimated and a military 
gover=ent was installed, 
PERFORMANCE 
A number of introductory comments concerning the military regime may 
be made. Firstq the regime (until mid-1970)-was clearly an equilibrating 
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one, which manifested a greater degree of continuity with the previous 
one than did the Ghanaian military regime. Second there has not been 
a movement towards the progressive civilianization-of the regime (though 
there was some adaptation in 1971 with the formatinn of a military poli- 
tical party) but rather the military regime incorporated a degree of civilian- 
ization from its very inception. Thirdly, of the several case studies t 
Ck 
have been examined in this studyq the Indonesian military shown the clearest 
movement from induced generalized to partisan politization. 
The first issue area to be examined relates to the manner and success 
of military performance concerning the major nation state political func- 
tions. 
With reference to decision-making (method) 9- the following main points 
may be noted. In the first placeg the interim period from September 1965 
to the consolidation of the military regime in March 1966 was one of con- 
siderable confusion. Unlike the majority of coups. the Indonesian one 
was not followed by an abolition of the constitution and of, ý11 the central 
decision-making bodies. Sukarno retained the dominant executive positions; 
this was counterbalanced to some degree by Suharto becoming co=ander in 
chief of the Armed Forces and by the establishment in December of an inner 
cabinet (Koti) including Nasution, the Sultan of Jogjakarata and Abdulgani. 
However, in February 1966 Sukarno made a number of changes in the total 
cabinet (standing at 97) but more significantly in the inner cabinet, which 
was renamed '"Crush Malaysia". The ensuing demonstrations obliged Sukarno 
to confer full powers on Suharto. In the second placep there were no 
major structural changes after March 1966 except that in general the decision- 
making structure was clarified. In March a Praesidium, Of six deputy Prime 
Ministers was announced (each Praesidium member headed a group of. ministries); 
in July the Praesidium was reduced to five; in October 1967 the Praesidium 
was abolished and replaced in Juhp 1968 by a new cabinet. Thirdlyq there 
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was a high degree of concentration of control by the military. Thus in 
July 1966 Suharto became heaA of the Praedidium and 11 out of 24 Tninir- 
tries were headed by the military; in March 1967 Suharto became provi- 
sional President and full President for a5 year term in March 1968; 5 
out of 23 members of the 1968 Development Cabinet were military; by 1957 
22 out of 25 heads of the provisional regional governments were military; 
further there was extensive representation of the military in the parlia- 
mentary bodies with large-scale appointive powers being reserved (in 
February 1968 the parliament was enlarged from 347 to 414 including the 
purging of 123 members with 75 places reserved for the army and 90 members 
to be appointedý; additionally many military personnel were drafted into 
the civil administration; and finally Suharto began to build a presiden- 
tial advisory corps. 
52 
With reference to decision-making scope, the primary area of activity 
has been in the economic stihere. The main brunt of activity has been to 
reduce inflation largely through monetary and fiscal policies. The main 
activities have included the following. First external debts were re- 
scheduled so that payment on many existing de7gts would not recommence for 
a number of years. Second Indonesia has sought large sums of external 
aid and has tried to attract foreign investment (e. g. in 1967 foreign banks 
were legalized and 13 industrial companies confiscated during confrontation 
were restored and Indonesia rejoined IMF). Third, attempts have been made 
to balance budget accounts both by increasing revenues and by cutting 
expenditures involving both defence cutst a cessition of the crush Malaysia 
Campaign, a reduction of subsidies and an end to administrative recruitment. 
Fourthp planning procedures have been improved. The Ministry of Finance 
has received greater autonomy and control; a stabilization progranme was 
drawn up with the IMF in August and September 1966 (which in turn involved 
a unitary exchange rate , abolition of preferential treatment to state 
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enterpriseq a new credit policyq etc*); a priority listing of imports has 
been established; professional economists have been more widely utilized; 
and finally in 1969 a5 Year Development Plan was produced. 
53 The non- 
economic decision-making areas have not attracted as much attention. 
There have been no major policy-ddoisions which have affected social or 
cultural organization. With reference to the political system the most 
important changes within our period of examination have been with reference 
to occupants of major decision making positions. The most important have 
been the annihilation of large nukubers of PKI members and the subsequent 
banning of the party and the removal of Sukarno. The structural changesp 
involving the changes in size of the parliamentary bodies and the modifi- 
cations of the cabinet bodiesl have not been as extensive. 
Three points are of import with reference to the institutionalization 
process., In the first place, unlike most non-guardian regimes -the Indonesian 
militaxy left virtually unchanged the institutionalized structure of the 
previcua regime. Thus most of the major political bodies have remained 
with very few changes and the 4945 constitution has been retained as the 
overall legitimation. In the second placetsDme clarification to rules of 
interaction has been made and a greater degree of, autonomy towzxds many 
decision-making bodies has been granted. - Thus parliament and 
the 14PRS 
have been given greater powersq the President is supposedly responsible to 
parliament, and professional planners and administration, heads have been 
given more autonomy. Thirdq although corruption remains a major problemg 
a number of drives have been made to eradicate it'and in February 1970 Suharto 
announced an advisory coamittee to make recommendations on ý corruption. 
Despite these efforts, the institutionalization process in Indonesia remains 
at a low level of development. The 1945 constitution is a vague and 
ambiguous documientp military control and centralimtion remains very hight 
and the rules of procedure are still vague (e. g. - the 1968 elections were 
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postponed for 3 yearst or again parliament was suddenly expandedq or again 
military appointive powers were increased). I 
Three factors were of assistance to the military with reference to 
support mobilization. In the first place, the nature -of the coup removed 
the, major source of organized oppositiong namely the PKI; the other major 
potential source of opposition to the militaryq i. e, Sukarnop had been 
weakened by complicity in the Gestapu Affair and also through a gradual 
loss of support during Guided Democracy. Secondly, the military could 
rely, on a number of groups which had been opposed-to or excluded by the 
Guided Democracy regime. These included in particular the Muslim groupsp 
and of great importance in the period up to March 1966 the student popula- 
tion. 54 In the third placeg the military regime has continued to use 
existing modes of support mobilization. Thus the major parliamentary 
bodies have remained intact as also have the functional groups within them; 
furthermore to the extent that these bodies have been revitalized then so 
too haS support mobilization been increased. On the other handq until the 
elections of 1971 and the organization of the quasi-military-party Golkar, 
the military made no direct or explicit attempt to mobilize support. , 
Further the military regime is confronted with the problem that it has 
excluded the best organized political group in Indonesiap whicho through 
the main party and the numerous and more populous branch and subsidiary 
organizationag was in co=munication with an estimated 30-40'ifo of the , 
Indonesian Population. 
The military regime has experienced no major difficultyýinthe 
monitoring process. As in the case of support mobilization it has con-- 
tinued to rely on existing structures -and organizitions and, also ý the ex- 
pertise and body of knowledge gained from the long r tial law period 
1957-63. The military has a monopoly of force ana also has had extensive 
operational contact throughout the whole of Indonesia. On-the other handl 
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it must be noted that the military has continuously relied on a high- 
degree of coeroionq and further the problem of the reconciliation of the 
former PKI population remains. 
The second major area of performance analysis concerns the exami- 
nation of the success of the military in alleviating the conditions of 
instability. With reference to the first two dissynchronizations-the 
military regime has had some degree of success. First, planning mechan- 
isms have been improved technically in terms of greater autonomy granted 
to professional planners and administratively in clarifying and central- 
izing the planning offices. Second, more concerted efforts have been 
made to implement both the stabilization programme and also-the Five 
Year Plan of 1968/9-73- Third, there has beenýan e1tensive array of 
measures introduced to control inflation. These have included devalua- 
tiont balanced budgets (as from 1968). credit squeezes, etc. - Finally 
more attention has been devoted to increasing goverment 'revenuesl which 
in turn have risen markedly, The moderate, success of the'military - 
regime in alleviating in large part the major factors precipitating the - 
dislocation of the polity's failure to control the, economy (the second 
dislocatinn examined above) can be demonstrated as, followse After 1966, 
during which year all the indicators of economic breakdown increased, the 
economy began to move rapidly towards stabilization. Thus in 1968 the 
budget balanced, and the inflation rate was, cut from 860% 1966'to'i76%' 
1967 to 85% 1968.55 However, the activities of the'military' regime have 
largely been confined to monetary, and fiscal policiesq which though they 
have made considerable progress in alleviding the -conditions I of the second 
dislocation have had little effect with reference' to ý the structure I of 'the 
economyg i. e. the first dislocation. Indeed in this-axea the'most impor- 
tant structural change is that the economy has been ý foreed'to ý become more 
open and dependent on external aid. 'Thus in - 1966'ýit was ý'calc, ýlated that 
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Indonesia required a minimm of $560m to finance necessary importsg without 
which any development would be impossible. Since estimated exports were 
only- approximately 8VIa of this figureq in addition to which debt payments 
had to be includedg it was inevitable that Indonesia must borrow externally. 
56 
The consequence has been that Indonesia has been obliged to increase the 
1966 foreign debt of 12,400m- It is this external, dependence on 3111F, 
Americang Japanese and West European finance whic4tempers the economic 
sulocesscfo the military regime. 
" 
With reference to the next di s synchronization, that of the failure 
of participation mechanismsp the military have made no a4vance. Thus the 
Guided Democracy constraints on participation continue: political parties 
have a small role and zre still not very effective bodiesp elections axe 
few and countered by extensive appointive powerst and regional influences 
are very slight; furthermore the only viable political partyt -_the 
PKIt hag 
been banned (though it mast be noted that the Masjumi party, has been allowed 
to reorganize). Thus the underlying conditions of participation disloca- 
tion continue. The only mechanism for alleviation resta in a revitaliza- 
tion of the parliamentary bodies and of the functional groups. Although 
undoubtedly so#e progress has been made in this sphere,,, the threshold still 
remains very low on account of the extensive and dominant. position of the 
military in this network. 
There 'was also very little change with reference- to the final dia- 
synchronization 9 namely the failure to develop sufficiently a number -o; 
major political institutions. Thus the 1945 draft constitution with all 
its 
-ambiguities remains in force and there appears 
to be no 
I 
commitment to 
replace it. However, there has been more success with reference to the 
civil administration. First, the size problem is being solved partially 
by the termination of recruitment and partially by a cut-back. Secondq 
it appears that greater autonomy is being ceded and interference by non- 
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administrators is lesseting. Finally although corruption is still a 
problem it can be expected to decline as inflation comes under controlp 
as administratinn salaries rise, and as the administration becomes better 
organized and more efficient. 
In general, with the exception of the second dissynchronization, the 
military regime has had only very limited success in alleviating the con- 
ditions of instability. This would appear to be a function of two factors, 
on the one hand the level of political instability prior to the coup and 
on'the other hand the failure by the military regime to stimulatethose 
civilian forces to which a transfer of power may be made. 
The third major task is to examine the ramifications of military 
predispositions and organization capabilities for performance and vice 
versa. 
The military predispositions have had three important ramifications 
for performance. In the first placel the degree of identification with 
the Guided Democracy regime accounted for the rather slow rate by which 
the military took control of the polity. Secondlyq the low level of 
grievances by the military against the structural organization of the 
political system under 
_Guided 
Democracy explains the retention of-the 
basic format of Guided Democracy under the military regime. (In this 
context it is interesting to note the parallel between Guided Democracy 
and the lasic Democratic regime of Ayub Khan or the Egyptian system in 
tems of strong central controlq emphasis on administrative and technical 
efficiency and controlbd participation especially through functional 
groups. ) Thirdlyq the major spedific grievance of the armed forces, i. e., 
their animosity towards the PKI, also became very evident. Thus the 
militaxy made very little effort to contain the PKI massacres-and later 
banned the party. 
The organizational capabilities had four ramifications. Firstp the 
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skill level and structural composition and deployment of the military 
meant that it experienced no severe difficulties in decision-making, 
as for example in Ghana. Second the skill level and composition of 
the military conditioned the prggmaticq efficiency-oriented programme 
of the economic stabilization. Third, the nature of the military's 
external autonomy reinforced the military's acceptance and retention of 
the basic format of"Guided Democracy. Finally, the nature of the cohe- 
sion of the armed forces conditioned the slow progress of the cutting of 
Sukarno and the adaptation of the previous regime. 
The consequences of performance on predispositionsreapabilities are 
not very marked. This would be expected given the relatively small trans- 
formation of military role involved as a consequence of its take-over. 
The primary conseuqence for organizational capabilities is that cohesion 
has been increasedg though the primary mechanism whereby this has been 
achieved is through partisan personnel selection. DuringI967 massive 
purges took place within the armed forces, involving 119000 in Central 
Java alone; and agiin in 1967 the three services were reunified in the 
Ministry of Defense though in 1969 responsibility was transferred -to the 
57 presidency. The primary consequence for predispositions thus fax has 
simply been to increase the military's level of partisan politicization. 
The military regime is of course still in existence (1971)t hence 
an examination of the transfer of control to a civilian polity is impoo- 
Bible. Certainly an imminent return to civilian control seems most 
unlikely since basically sufficiently %ýell-organised civilian groups do 
not exist. The continuation of the c=ent military-civilian coalition - 
seems more likely, a trend which has received further confirmation by the 
elections of 1971- However, the longer-term projection of the c ent 
regime could expect in its present form to experience institutionalization 
and support failure and if these reach sufficiently high levels and the PKI 
begins to reorganize it can expect to experience monitoring f ailure, also. 
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20. The figures are adapted from D. Austin, op. cit. 
21. Ibid. and M. Owusu, Uses and Abuses of Political Power, Univ. 
Chicago Press, 1970. 
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22. J. Kraus, op. cit., It. Owusu, op. cit. 
23. D. E. Apter, IINkrumah, Charisma and the Coup", Daedalus, 1968, 
M. Owusu, op. cit. 
24. Fitch and Oppenheimer, op. cit., note that when the CPP took over 
the Trade Unions, many of the militant leaders, who had been 
instrumental in the rise of Nkrumah and the CPP, were dropped. 
25. Given that the effectiveness of many parties in Africa had been 
overestimated, it is not surprising to find that many experienced 
the same type of problems as the CPP. For an example of a party 
system which has generally been more successful in combatting 
these problems, see T. A. N. U. of Tanzania: H. Bienen, Tanzania: 
Party Transformation and Economic Development, Princeton Univ. 
Press, 1969; H. W. Stephens, The Political Transformation of 
Tanganyika 1920-67,, Praeger, 1968; L. Clif fe , ed. , One Party 
Democracy, E. Af. Pub. Ho., 1967; G. A. Maguire, Towards Uhuru in 
Tanzania,, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969. 
, -)4. Indeed had it not been for the military coup, there was no C-%d 
immediate reason why the Nkrumah regime could not have continued 
for some time. 
27. Figurer. from Kee8ings Contemporary Archives. 
28. J. Kraus, op. cit. 
29. Despite the many failures in the Ghanaian economy, two important 
factors must be noted in qualification. First after 1961 Ghana 
embarked on a very ambitious economic development line which would 
(had it been successful) have provided Ghana with internal self- 
sustaining development and given Ghana some considerable 
. sulation from the vagaries of the international economic system. 
(Many low-income systems have maintained better short-term 
developments but with worse long-term prospects. ) Second there 
had been some considerable achievements in terms of infra-structure 
development, education, expansion government services, the 
construction of Tema harbour and especially the heavy investment 
project of the Volta Dam complex. 
30- See D. Seers, "The Stages of Economic Development of a Primary 
Producer in the middle of the Twentieth Century", Economic Bulletin 
of Ghana, 1963- It is true that some degree of insulation and 
protection can be established through the creation of buffer stocks (C11B played this role) and international commodity arrangements, 
but both mechanisms have severe limitations. For a discussion, 
see for example W. Krause, Economic Developments Wadsworth, 196k 
or B. Higgins, Economic Development, Constable, 1959. 
31- G. Bing, op. cit. , B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op. cit. and T. Killick, "The Economics of Cocoa" in W. Birmingham et al., 
A Study of Contemporary Ghana, vol. I, Allen and Unwin, 1966. 
Austin, op-cit. notes the following cocoa prices: 
4 
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World Cocoa Price 1949-61 (f, per ton) 
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 19.57 1958 1959 1960 1961 
190 208 2-85 301 287 467 302 221 247 352 285 225 177 
32. G. Bing, op. cit., and B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op. cit. Thus 
for example loans on the Volta Dam were due for repayment before 
the project was making a profit or again Jamaican bauxite was 
made into alumina powder in the USA before being brought to Ghana 
for the final processing, i. e. local materials were not used. 
33- Nkr=ah had clearly perceived this problem and included it as one 
of his Pan-African demands. See K. Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite, 
Heineman, 1963, and K. Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: the Last Stage of 
Imperialism, Nelson, 1965; see also R. H. Green and A. Seidman, 
Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism, Penguin, 1968. 
34. D. Rimmer, op. cit., T. Killick, "The Possibility of Economic 
Control", in W. Birmingham, op. cit. 
35- D. Rimmer, op. cit. 
36. R. Genoud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Ghana, Praeger, 
1969; B. Fitch and M. Oppenheimer, op. cit.; E. Omaboe, ' "The 
* Birmingham, op. cit. Process of Planning1t, in W. 
37- In 1965 the Minister of Trade was dismissed and the portfolio came 
under the Presidential Office. In 1966 the Commission of Enquiry 
into Trade Malpractices made strong criticism over import licensing, 
see D. Rimmer, op. cit. 
3-60. The -plans up to the 7 Year Plan 1963-70 were limited ef forts and 
were much tampered with. * The 1963-70 Plan, though a much better 
plan and well drawn up by experts, was largely ignored by the 
politicians. See R. E. Dowse, Modernization in Ghana and the USSR, 
op. cit., and D. Rimmer, "The Economy of Ghana", op. cit., R. Genoud, 
opecits 
39- We have deliberately avoided the use of the concept of 'charisma' 
which has been widely applied in the case of Nkrumah. We have 
chosen to ignore this concept sin6e it is used as a catch-all 
concept, since it is very difficult to provide empirical indicators 
to measure it, and since it seems to have little heuristic utility. 
The original discussion of course stems from Weber (M. Weber, The 
Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Free Press, 1947), 
became popular in the field of development via E. Shils (see for 
example E. Shils, "The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma: 
their Bearing on Economic Policy in Underdeveloped Countries", 
World Politics, 1958) and has been widely applied in Ghana (see for 
example: ý. G. Runciman, "Charismatic Legitimacy and One-Party 
Rule in Ghana", Eur. J. Sociol., 1963, or L. Tiger"Ghana: A Charismatic 
Vation", Current History, 1963, or L. Tiger, "Bureaucracy mid 
Charisma in Ghana", cito or D. E. Apter, IINkrumah, Charisma and 
the Coup", op. cit. 
? 
though it must be pointed out that Apter is very 
critical of the concept and in fact limits Nkrumah's Icharismal to 
1949-5g). 
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40. For a general discussion see A. Zolberg, Creating Political Order, 
Rand McNally, 1966, and "The Structure of Political Conflict in 
the New States of Tropical Africa", A. P. S. R., 1968, and H. Bienen, 
"One-Party Systems in Africa", op. cit. 
41. M. Owusu, op. cit. 
42. B. Fitch and 11. Oppenheimer, op. cit., and R. Murray, op-cit. and 
for a very full description and emphasis of the CPP failure see 
R. Genaud, Nationalism and Economic Development in Gharia, Praeger, 
1969. 
43- See A. L. Adu, The Civil Service in Commonwealth Africa, Allen and 
Uhwin, 1969, and G. Bing, op. cit., and R. E. Dowse, op. cit. 
44. J. Kraus, "The Men in Charge", Africa Report, 1966. Gutteridge 
notes that by mid 1961 3 out of 4 battalions were commanded by 
Ghanaians and 1 out of the 2 brigades were commanded by Ghanaians, 
W. F. Gutteridge, "The Armed Forces of Ghana Today", Canadian Army 
Journal, 1961. 
45- See H. T. Alexander, African Tightrope: 
Chief of Staff, Praeger, 1966. 
r Two Years a's Nkrumah's 
ILA. See in general'R. Murray, 11militarism in Africa", New Lef t Review, Tw 
1966; or more precisely D. Wood, "The Armed Forces of African 
States", Adelphi Papers, 27,1966. 
47. In general, the British did not recruit such3arge armies as the 
French, since the French recruited for the metropolitan army, and 
also the British tended to recruit regionally (although the West 
Africa Frontier Force had various regiments corresponding to its 
major constituent units). See W. F. Gutteridge, The Military in 
African Politics, 'Methuen, 1969, and J. S. Coleman and Brice, 
"The Military in Sub-Saharan Africa", in J. J. Johnson, ed., 
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countriesq Princeton 
Univ. Press, 1962. (The only exception to the small size of 
British colonial forces was when Britain had a major security 
interest in that area, e. g. Sudan. ) 
48. D. Wood, op. cit. The army had grown from 4000 (1957) to 6000 (1960) to 15000 (1966); military expenditure as a percentage of tho 
budget had grown from 4-5/06 (1957-60) to 7-5/06 (1962-3) to 8% (1965)- 
J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", opecit. 
49. See M. J. V. Bell, "The Military in the New States of Africa", in 
J. van Doorn, ed., Armed Forces and SocieýZ, Mouton, 1968, and 
W. J. Gutteridge, The Military in African Politics, op. cit. 
50. A. A. Afrifa, The Ghana Coup, F. Cass , 1966; H. T. Alexander, 
op. cit.; I. Markovitz, "Ghana without Nkrumah", Africa Reports 1966. 
51. J. Kraus I "The Men in Charge", op. cit., and J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", op. cit. 
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. 
52. There had been a mutiny of 200 soldiers during the Congo Mission, 
and in 1958 Major Awhaitey had been involved in some nefarious 
plot against Nkrumah, see E. W. Lefever, Spear and Sceptre, 
Brooklings Institution, 1970. 
53- See A. A. Afrifa, 6p. cit., E. W. Lefever, op. cit., and for a 
broader view E. 1-1. Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of UN 
Congo Operation, J. Hopkins Univ. Press, 1967, and W. Scott 
Thompson, Ghana's Foreign Poliby 1957-66, Princ6ton Univ. Press, 
1969. 
. 
54. J. Kraus, "The Men in Charge", op. cit. 
55- J. K. Sale, "The Military in Ghana", in W. C. McWilliams, 
Garrisons and Government, Chandler, 1967, or E. W. Lefever, 
Spear and Sceptre, op. cit., A. A. Afrifa, op. cit. 
. 
56. A. A. Afrifa, op. cit., I. Markovitz, op. cit. 
-97. 
For a military account of the coup, see A. K. Ocran, A Myth is 
Broken, Longmans, 1968. 
. 
58. The NLC had 7 members: 4 from the military - Ankrah, Kotokaj 
Ocran and Afrifa - and 3 from the poli6e - Hartley, Deku and 
Yakabu. 
59. , The Executive Council had a number of subcommittees of which only three (defence, economic aild international affairs) were under the 
direct. control of the military. See Keesings Contemporary 
Archives. 
60. J. Kraus, "Arms and Politics in Ghana", op-cit. 
61. The Constituent Assembly was composed of 150 members: 49 were 
elected through electoral colleges formed by 133 local councils, 
91 were chosen by 38 electoral bodies (e. g. army, TUs), and 10 were 
nominated by the NLC. 
62. See D. Austin, "The Ghana Case", in The Politics of Demilitarization, 
Instit. Commonwealth Studies Papersq 1966, d A. K. Ocran, opecite, 
R. E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development", in C. Leys, 
ed., Politics and Change in Developing Countries,, Camb. Univ. Press, 
1969, and J. Kraus, op. cit. 
63. 
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Ghana's Foreign Aid (million U. S. g) (Europa Yearbook) 
Up to 1964 1964-66 1967 1968 1969 
U. S. Grants 16.0 6-3 3.6 2.0 2-7 
U. S. Credits 14-3 30.4 32-5 18-3 26.9 
IBRD Loans 26. o 20-5 - 0.2 - 
Other Internal African Aid 9.0 77-0 25-0 9.9 10.8 
Western Aid 10.0 15-3 20-3 15-9 22.1 
Soviet Aid 104.2 25.2 lo. 4 - 15.6 
Chinese Aid 42.0 1.1 - - 
Czech Aid 14. o 20.6 4.2 - - 
Other Co=unist 59.7 10.1 3-9 1-1 0-3 
64. R. E. Dowse, "The Military and Political Development", op. cit. and 
J. Kraus, op. cit. 
65. Thus the originally most junior officer ended up as head of the NLC - 
and Ankrah the original head was ousted for corruption. 
66. Cited in J. Kraus, op. cit. 
67- The major parties to emerge in April 1969 were: Progress Party 
(led by Busia), National Alliance of Liberals (led by Gbedemah), 
United National Party (led by Appiah), and the Peoples Popular 
Party (led by Lutterodt), which was banned in June because it was 
held to be a resurrection of the CPP. 
68. See E. Feit, 111ilitary Coups and Political Development: some Lessons 
from Ghana and Nigeria" , World Pols. , 1968, and 
R. E. Dowse , "The 
Military and Political Development". 
69. See B. Wood, Armed Forces and African States, Adelphi Paper 27, 
1966, and R. Booth, Armed Forces of African Statesl Adelphi Paper 67, 
1970. Slightly different figures are given in T. N. Dupuy, 
The Almanac of World Military Power, Dupuy and Stackpole , 1970, where 
the 1970 armed force level is given as 17000. 
70. Wood gives the 1966 military allocation as 042m. and Booth the 1970 
allocation as $48 m., but Dupuy gives the 1970 allocation as 942m. 
71. See C. E. Welch, ItGhana: The Politics of Military Withdrawal", 
Current History, 1968, and E. W. Lefever, op. cit. 
72- On the election see D. Austin, "Elections in Ghana 196911, Indian 
Council for Africa, 1970, and D. Austin, "Ghana Election Background", 
"What the Parties Say", "Good Guys and Bad Guys", West Africa, 1969. 
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MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PFRFOMIkNCE IN INDONESIA 
1. The major formal mechanisms of Guided Democracy were introduced in 
1959 and 1960 (i. e. the 1945 constitution, the Supreme Advisory Council, 
the Peoples Consultative Assembly, the Gotong Rojong), although 
discussion of and movemaýt towards Guided Democracy was evident from 
1957 onwards. In other words the breakdown and transformation of the 
'parliamentary' regime was not abrupt. 
2. For example there was greater Indonesian participation in the civil 
administration, freer rein was given to political parties, and 
in March 1945 a committee of 60 Ind6nesiaris and 7 Japanese was 
established to draw up plans for independence. 
3- For general accounts of this period see, G. Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1952; and B. Dahm, 
History of Indonesia in the Twentieth Century, Pall Mall, 1971. 
4. Thus in 1951 Sartono failed to form a cabinet following the demise 
of the Natsir cabinet, and it was one month before the Sukiman 
cabinet was formed; following the fall of this cabinet 2 attempts 
were necessary to form the Wilopo cabinet; 58 days and 4 attempts 
were necessary to form the next Ali cabinet; and two attempts were 
necessary to form the Harahap cabinet. See Keesings Contemporary 
Archives and H. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in 
Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1962. 
5. The decision-making immobilism is clearly stated in a number of works, 
see for example D. Hindley, 'I'Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: 
Indonesia's Search for a Political Format", Govt. and Opp., 1969. 
6. D. S. Paauw, "From Colonial to Guided Democracy", in R. T. McVey, ed., 
Indonesia, HW Press, 1963- 
7. O. G. Roederi "An Expert Review", Far East Econ. Rev., 1966. 
8. D. S. Paauwl op. cit. 
9. In 1950 'temporary councils' were established by government appoint- 
ments, and since there was no electoral law persisted until 1956 
when they were replaced by transitional councils (established on the 
basis of the national election returns of 1955) until the first 
regional elections of 1957. See J. D. Legge, Central Authority and 
Regional Autonomy in Indonesia, Cornell Univ. Press, 1961. 
10. On the decline of any acceptance of a common set of political rules 
see H. Feithq op. cit. 
11. See G. Kahin, "Indonesia", in G. Kahin, ed., Major Governments of S. E. 
Asia, Cornell Univ. ýressq 1963- 
12. On the major regional revolt of 1957, see J. D. Legge, op. cit.; H. Feith, 
op. cit.; H. Feith and D. S. Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion"t 
Pac. Aff., 1963. 
13- The Masjumi Party was the only large party to resist the introduction 
of Guided Democracy. 
14. See H. Feith, op. cit.; G. Kahin, op-cit.; and D. S. Lev, "Pol#ical Parties 
in Indonesia! ', J. of S. E. As. Hist., 1967. 
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15. Thus there was considerable delay in quelling the revolts or again 
the centre adopted a very conciliatory positions towards the rebels 
both before and after the uprising. 
16. See G. Kahin, op. cit.; H. Feithq opcit. 
17. Ibid. 
18. See D. S. Paauw, op. cit.; and H. O. Schmittq "Foreign Capital and Social 
Conflict in Indonesia 1950-8119 Econ. Dev. Cult. Change, 1962. On the 
take-over of Dutch interests see, K. D. Thomas and B. Glassburner, 
"Abrogation, Take-Over and Nationalization: The Elimination of 
Dutch Economic Domination from the Republic of Indonesia", Aust. 
Outlook, 1965- 
19. D. S. Paauw, op. cit. 
20. K. J. Pelzer, "The Agricultural Foundation". in R. T. McVey, ed., op. cit. 
21. There are a number of accounts of economic decision-making with its 
attendant problems up to Guided Democracy. See B. Glassburner, "Economic 
Policy Making in Indonesia, 1950-57"g Econ. Dev. Cult. Change, 1962; 
D. S. Paauw, Financing Economic Development, the Indonesian Case, Free 
Press, 196C-1 B. Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and 
Development, Instit. Pac. Rel., 1957; B. Higgins, "Indonesia's Develop- 
ment Plans and Problems'll Pac. Aff., 1966; H. O. Schmitt, op. cit. 
22. The background to systera cleavage was provided above in the analysis 
of Pakistan. 
23. See C. Geertz, The Religion of Javal Free Press, 1960; or more generally 
H. Geertz, "Indonesian Cultures and Communities", in R. T. McVeyj ed., 
op. cit. 
24. Not only did the Japanese establish three major autonomous administrative 
zones with neglible intercommunication, but also carried out varying 
policies within these zones. On colonial policies with refurence to 
regional conflict, see G. Kahin$ Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, 
op. cit.; G. Kahin, "Indonesia", op. cit.; W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian 
Society in Transition, van Hoeve, 1959- 
25- For a good account of political parties, which also takes account of 
important differences between parties, see R. W. Liddle, Ethnicity2. 
Party and National Integration, Yale Univ. Press, 1970. 
26. G. Kahin, "Indonesia", op. cit. 
27. H. Feith, op. cit.; G. Kahin, op. cit.; Feith notes that in 1950 the 
bureaucracy was twice its necessary size at 420,000; Kahin notes that 
in 1953 the bureaucracy stood at 599,721. 
28. On the new organization see 'J. A. C. Mackie, "Indonesian Politics under 
Guided Democracy", Aust. Outlook, 1961; or H. Feith, "The Dynamics of 
Guided Democracy", in R. T. McVey,, ed. , op. cit. 
29. G. Kahin, op. cit. 
30. H. W. Arndt, "Economic Disorders and the Task Ahead"', in T. K. Tan, ed., 
Sukarno's Guided Indonesiaý Jacaranda Press, 1967. 
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31. H. Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", in R. T. McVey, ed., 
op. cit.; H. Feith, "The Politics of Economic Decline", in T. K. Tan, 
ed., op. cit.; and G. Kahin, op. cit. 
32. There is a good literature on the PKI. See for example J. van der 
Kroef , The Communist Party of Indonesia, Internat. Pub. Serv. , 1967; D. Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-63, Univ. Cal. Pressq 
1965; or on the PKI's role in GD: D. Hindley, "President Sukarno and 
the Communists: the Politics of Domestication", A. P. S. R., 1962; or 
J. van der Kroef, "Dilemmas of Indonesian Communism", Pac. Aff., 1963- 
33. The Political Party Simpilification Ordinance provided that any 
party which contravened Sukarno's directives could be dissolved; 
the Gotong Rojong had about 50916 functional group representation, 
functional representation in the Provisional Peoples Consultative 
Congress was higher; in 1959 Nasution banned party activity under 
martial law. 
34. H. Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy", op. cit. 
35- On the increasing government controls, see J. A. C. Mackie, "The Political 
Economy of Guided Democracy", Aust. Outlook, 1959; and on the 
government management of former Dutch interests see J. A. CMackie, 
"Indonesia's Government Estates and their Masters", Pac. Aff., 1961, 
and J. A. C. Mackie, "The Government Estates", in T. K. Tan, ed., op. cit. 
36. T. K. Tanj I'Sukarnian Economics", in T. K. Tan, ed. , op. cit. 
37. The 335 A projects were largely welfare progra=es, whereas the B 
projects were designed to provide the necessary finance. The 8 Year 
Plan was finally shelved in April 1965. 
38. T. K. Tan, op. cit.; H. Feith, "The Politics of Economic Decline", op. cit. 
39. H. W. Arndt, op. cit. 
40. Invariably the discussion of GD is couched in terms of the triangle 
of forces of the PKII the armyl and Sukarno. Political activity is 
seen essentially as the attempt of each of these forces to balance 
itself against the others. See H. Feith, "President Sukarno, the Army 
and the Communists: the Triangle Changes Shape", As. Surv., 1964; 
D-Hindley, "The Political Situation in Indonesia", AustlQuart., 1963; 
M. Leifer, "The Process of Political Change in IndonesiOg Roy. Cent*A13, J*J 
1967; G. Y. Pauker, "Indonesia in 1964: Towards a Peoples Democracy? H, 
As. Surv., 1965; E. T. Pauker, "Has the Sukarno Regime Weakened the 
PKI? 11, As. Surv. , 1964; J. van der Kroef , "Indonesian Communists Revolutionary Gymnastics", As. Surv., 1965; D-Hindley, "Political Power 
and the October 1965 coup", J-As-St-i 1967; J-Pluvierl "Indonesia 
before the Holocaust", J. Contemp. As., 1970. 
41. See H. Feithq "The Politics of Economic Decline"s op. cit.; D. S. Lev, 
"Political Parties in Indonesia", op. cit. 
42. T. N. Dupuy, The Almanac of World Military Power, Dupuy and Stackpole, 1970- 
43. The major confrontation occurred in what has been termed the October 
17 Affair. The attempt to rationalize the army and cut back its size 
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angered the 'bapakist' revolutionary leaders. A censure motion 
against Nasution was taken up in parliament, and despite army 
demonstrations againstparliament President Sukarno and the PNI 
supported the 'bapakist' group and Nasution was dismissed. See 
H. Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia, op. cit. 
44. In 1963 the navy and air-force were repectively 25,000 and 30,000 in 
a total of 355,000; and in 1965 much the same proportion 16,000 and 
20tOOO in a total of 234,000 (Europa Yearbook). 
45- See G. Y. Pauker, "The Military in Indonesia", in J. J. Johnsonj edej 
The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, Princeton 
Univ. Prem, 
-62; 
H. Feith, op. cit. 
46. In February 1955 a Charter of Unity was signed by 270 officers of both 
the pro- and anti-October 17 Affair. Bambang Sugengj who had replaced 
Nasution, resigned, and the Ali government installed Utojo (a clear 
'political' appointment). But the army boycotted this installation 
and the government fell. 
47- See in general G. Y. Pauker, op. cit.; D. S. Lev, "The Political Role 
of the Army in Indonesia", Pac. Aff., 1963; R. K. Pagetj "The Military 
in Indonesia", Pac. Aff., 1967; K. D. Thoma , "Political and Economic 
Instability: the Gestapu and its Aftermath'19 in T. K. Tan, ed., op. cit.; 
and D. Hindley, "Political Power and the October, 1965 COUP", OP-cit- 
IrJ8. For an account of the i=ediate events see, J. Hughes, Indonesian 
Upheaval, D. MacKay, 1967- 
49. As many as one million PKI supporters may have been killed. Most ofthe 
killing was done by youth groups, affiliated with the NU and by 
local self proclaimed 'civic guards' with the tacit support of the 
army commanders. 
50- The process of the replacement of Sukarno was a slow one, and was 
not terminated until 1967. In the period from September 30 to March 
1966 Sukarno had initially failed to support the Revolutionary 
Council, but in February 1966 had attempted to regain his former 
control. This had led to violent student demonstrations, which 
enabled the military to isolate Sukarno and place many of his colleagties 
in custody. 
51. See for example: A. J. Dommen, "The Attempted Coup in IndonesiO, China 
Quart., 1966; J. van der Kroef, "Gestapu in Indonesia", Orbis, 1966; 
L. Reyj "Dossier of the Indonesian Drama", New Left Rev., 1966; W. F. 
Wertheim, "Indonesia before and after the Untung Coup", Pac. Aff., 
1966; W. F. Wertheim, "Suharto and the Untung Coup", J. Contemp. As., 
1970; M. Leifer, op. cit.; D. Hindley, "Political Power and the October 
1965 Coup", op. cit.; D. Hindley, "Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: 
Indonesia's Search for a Political Format", op. cit. The interpretations 
include PKI plots/coups, military plots/coups, military faction plot/ 
coups, Sukarno plot/coups. The interpretation that we favour is that 
of Hindley (1969), namely that no coup was planned but rather a 
PKI-Sukarno attempt to remove the top army command in order to 
sustitute a more pliant one failed. 
52. See particularly Keesings Contemporary Archives, but also D. Hindley, 
"Dilemmas of Consensus and Division: Indonesia's Search for a Political 
Format", op. cit.; G. Y. Pauker, "Indonesia: The Age of Reason", As. Surve, 
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1968; J. D. Legge, "General Suharto's New Order", Int. Aff., 1968. 
53. See H. W. Arndtj op. cit.; 
_K. 
D. Thomas and J. Panglaykim, "Suharto Plans 
Again", Far East Econ. Rey., 1967; K. D. Thomas and J. Panglaykimt 
"Indonesia's Development Cabinet, Background to Current Problems 
and the 5 Year Plan", As. Surv., 1969. 
54. On the vital role of the student groups, organized in KAMI and KAPPI, 
during this period, see P. N. Lyman, "Students and Politics in Indonesia 
and Korea", Pac. Aff., 1965- 
55- See K. D. Thomas and J. Panglaykim, op. cit. The consumer price index 
began to stabilize: 
Indonesia's Consumer Price Index (19 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
830 9502 25612 57712 61250 
The budget figures are: 
Indonesia's Budget 1266-9 Woos m. R 
1966 1977- 
Expenditure 29.01 87-56 
Receipts 13.68 84.9o 
Balance -15.23 -2.66 
3=100) (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
piahs) (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
1966 1969 
185.28 58.64 
185.28 58-79 
- +0-15 
56. See H. W. Arndt, op. cit. However, by 1968 all routine expenditure was 
covered by domestic revenue. 
57- See Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
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CARETAKER MILITARY REGIMES 
MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY 
INTERVENTION 
Of the various case studies, the Turkish social system represents 
the one which showed, the greatest degree of vertical and horizontal nation 
state development. The Turkish nation state system emerged from the total 
breakdown of the Ottoman Empire, which in turn was pocipitated by the 
incapacity of the Ottoman system to accommodate to nation state develop- 
ment. The resistance to nation state development was dominated by a 
number of social groups, such as the Caliphateg Sultanate, and Ulama, 
which supported a number of processes antithetical to a number of the 
major processes of the nation state system, (particularly industrial- 
ization, participation,, and certain changes in social stratification. 
The major period of attempted innovation was during the Young Turk period 
which saw the first significant civilian participati6n through the 
Constituent Assembly and the Union and Progress Party. This period proved 
abottive nonetheless due to factionalization of the civilian forces, 
corruption, and the incapacity to initiate any major changes, such as 
the removal of the Caliph or Sultan. From the defeat of World War 1, 
the flight of the triimvirate of Talat-Enver-Cemall the ineptitude of 
the Sultan and the Allied invasiong there appeared a resistance movement 
led by Mustafa Kemal orgafiized as a-civil-military coalition (Defence of 
the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia), which by 1924 had succeeded 
in driving out the Allies, abolishing the Treaty of Sevresq deposing the 
Caliph and Sultan, establishing a popular civilian government and thereby 
establishing Turkey as an autonomous nation state sYstem. 
2 From the early 
twenties until the coup of May 1960 Turkey experienced continuous nation 
state development. The major change in the pattern *of nation state 
development occurred after World War 2. partially as a consequence of the 
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war itself and the changing international context, and partially as a 
consequence of the relaxation of the hegemony of the RPP (until that time 
the Republican Peoples Party founded by Ataturk had been the sole permitted 
party. ) The most important period for the analysis of political instability 
is that following World War 2, and particularly from 1950 onwards during 
which time the Democratic Party (the major party to emerge from the RPP 
relaxation) initiated a number of policies having important repercussions 
for nation state development. 
The most marked type of instability that could be seen to be develop- 
ing continuously from the early 1950s was institutionalization failure. 
This type of instability was accompanied at a later stage and to a less 
marked intensity by decision-making (scope) failure and monitoring failure. 
The initial task is tb identify the indicators of instability. 
There is little evidence of any significant decision-making (methodO 
failure. The major aspect of decision-making (scope) failure relates to 
the polity's control of the economy. Although there was a continuous 
increase in per capita income from 1950-60 and in the investment ratio, 
3 
two major indicators of failure in this area may be noted: rising inflation 
and the rising foreign debt. Two indicators of inflation may be listed. 
In the first place there was a marked rise iij the money supply of 98% from 
1948-53 and by a further 106% up to November 1957; second the wholesale 
price index rose from 100 (1948) to 107 (1953) to 148 (1956) to 231 (1958)4 
and the cost of living index in Ankara was growing at a rate of 2. Y16 
5 proir to 1954, at cy/6 in 1954, and at 1556 af ter 1954. In the period 1950- 
60 there was also a colossal rise in the size of the f oreign debt. The 
reliance on foreign borrowing to support balance of payments defecits 
(there were defecits for all 15 years up to 1960) became marked by 1952 
when the defecit to the European Payments Union was 0233.9m.; loans from 
the U. S. A. were 030.8m. in 1953, $91.2m. in 19579 and 0359-Om- in 1958; 
the foreign debt rose from $297-3m. in 1954 to $1.0 billion in 1956 to 
6 
91-5 billion in 1960 (or about 25% GNP. ) 
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The secondand most pronounced type of instability was institutional- 
ization failure. The emergence and development of institutionalization 
failure was related primarily to the rise of the Democratic Party. The 
Democratic Party was the first major opposition party of any significance 
to appear in Turkey, and in 1950 it won a convincing victory in the 
general elections and thereby ousted the RPP for the first time. 
7 The 
manifestations of institutionalization failure are largely cast within the 
context of the failure of the DP to cope with the institutionalization 
process of the nation state particularly as related to the context of its 
emergence. The major indicators of institutionalization failure are three- 
f old: the drive to undermine the sbhere of competence of a number of 
major organizations, the erosion of formal patterns and rules of interaction, 
and the manifestation of corruption and patronage. 
With reference to the first indicator, the main offices and structures 
that may be considered are: opposition partiesq the administration, and 
the courts. The undermining of the sphere of competence of the RPP (by 
far the largest alternative party) began in 1952 with a bill providing 
for the confiscation of all liquid assets and real properties of the RPP, 
the taking-over of the premises of the RPP newspaper, and the closing of 
200 branches of the RPP. In 1956 a bill was passed curtailing the meetings 
of political parties except under certain specified conditions. Outside 
the period of 45 days prior to an election, parties were allowed only 
three conferences per annum and such conferences were open only to card- 
carrying members and ia; i excluded the press, permission for meetings was 
to be sought from the government 48 hours in advance and the names of 
speakers and the subjects were to be submitted also, and finally political 
demonstrations, processions and other forms of propaganda were illegal. 
In April 1960 the DP tabled a motion demanding an inquiry commission to 
investigate the opposition on charges of interfering in the army, 
blackmailing and so on. 
8 
The Inquiry Commission was composed entirely of 
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DP members and issued two orders on the very day of its establishment: 
the one suspending all political activity during the period of the inquiry, 
and the other prohibiting the publication of any news about the inquiry 
or the debate leading to it. Some days later the Assembly passed a bill 
giving the Commission powers of press censorship, powers to subpoena 
persons or records and to impose sentences of up to three years. 
9 With 
e referxýce to the other main offices and structures, the major move against 
the civil service came in 1954 when civil servants were made liable to 
dismissal without appeal. A move was made against the judiciary in May 
1956 when 16 judges were compulsorily retired. 
10 In June the President, 
Vice-President and four members of the Supreme Court and the Attorney 
General were removed. 
11 
The erosion of formal mechanisms of political interaction can be 
indicated by the manipulation of electoral procedures. The first most 
blatant action occurred immediately prior to the 1957 election when the 
government amended the electoral law in an attempt to prevent a coalition 
of the three opposition parties (RPPIFP, RNP) and tp prevent the 
12 
Democratic deputies who had recently resigned from running for the opposition. 
Furtherl the 1957 election results were never officially announced and 
were generally considered to be fraudulent. 
13 The RPP contested the 
validity of the results in five provinces; in Istanbul the results were 
announced before the counting was completed; and there were two deaths 
in S. Turkey following riots in which several thousnad RPP supporters' 
claimed their names had been omitted from the register. 
14 Finally opposition 
party activities were restricted within parliament by a number of measures 
such as limitations on the number of questions that may be asked and the 
time allocated to these questions*15 
Patronage and corruption were generallyýconsidered to be extensive. 
Thus in 1955 several Ministers, including a Finance Minister, Minister of 
Commerce and Deputy Prime Minister were accused of irregular practices in 
M-1.1i 
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in granting import licences; several judges were dismissed or retired to 
make way for more favourable appointments; and the 1957 election was 
held to be fraudulent. However, the most extensive boost to patronage was 
provided by the large increase in foreign aid. This was particularly true 
in the distribution of rural construction progra=es. 
16 
There is no evidence for stpport failure. Thus the DP had managed to 
sustain a significant percentage of the vote: 1950 55%, 1954 58%, and 1957 
4896' (further the elections showed high turnouts with 80/ and 9oWQ in 1954 
and 1957-) 
17 Furthermore the DP possessed a dynamic party organization. 
18 
There was increasing evidence of monitoring failure, particularly 
after 1957, but it must be noted that it never reached a high degree of 
intensity. Two indicators may be noted. First, the government developed 
an increasingly broad array of mechanisms intended to sustain itself. The 
measures to restrict opposition parties, the control of elections, 
widespread appoimtments, and the control of the press indicate this 
tendency. 19 The second indicator relates to domestic violence. The major 
disturbances prior to 1960 had been confined to the anti-Greek riots of 
1955 and a number of disturbances after the elections of 1957- In 196o 
the two major focal points of domestic protest were the students and the 
army. In April mass student demonstrations followed the establishment of 
the Inquiry Commission which led to the declaration of martial law and 
four deaths in Istanbul and Ankara; the maj or army involvement in the 
anti-government demonstrations occurred in May when hundreds of cadets 
from the Ankara War College paraded against the goverment. But again it 
must be noted that the protests were not very extensive or prolonged, and 
were confined to urban areas. 
20 
Given the above pattern of instability, the next problem is to 
identify the major dissynchronizations. The first two dislocations concern 
the relationship between the political and economic systems and as such 
may be considered conjointly. The first relates to the general structural 
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organization of the economic system, (i. e. a dislocation of the economic 
system having repercussion for the political system); the second relates 
to the failure of the political system in monitoring the economy. 
The causes of the structural deficiency are several. First, Turkey 
has constant problems, as do all low income systems, with capital shortage. 
During the earlier part of the nation state development, the capital 
shortage was exacerbated by a number of factors, such as the continuation 
of the Ottoman debt, the refusal of the RPP to borrow external loans, and 
the small trader population loss of 1924.21 Second, an equitable ratio 
between industrial and agricultural production had not been achieved. Thus 
in 1938 the industrial contribution to GNP was 12.6% and only 13-Vo in 
1960; or again, in 1960 70,0'L of the population was employed in agriculture, 
but agriculture yielded only 40-45% GNP. Furthermore, agricultural 
production was subject to marked fluctuations - in 1953 Turkey was the 
world's largest exporter of grain but in 1955 had to import grain. 
22 Third, 
agricultural organization was subject to a number of problems. Thus land 
was highly concentrated (62% of the population owned only 18.61/16 of the 
land whereas 1.5% owned 24.8%), and more importantly land was highly frag- 
mented (only 5, qo' of the farms were in one unit, and the average number of 
unite per farm was 7. )23 
With reference to the second dislocation, the failure of the polity 
to develop effective specialized agencies for the control of the economy 
may be examined under the following headings. First, although a number of 
coordinating agencies did exist (such as the Bank Credit Regualation 
Committee, the Central Bank, the Foreign Exchange Committeet the Internal 
Finance Committee, and the Ministries of Finance, Commerce and State 
Enterprises), there was no central coordinating agency with the consequence 
that decisions were made on a day to day basis by diverse agencies. 
24 
Second, there was inefficient usage of capital resources both regarding 
the allocation and deployment. Only 6. TI41 of government investment was 
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distributed to industry, 12.7% to public works, 28.2/16 to agriculture, 
and 52.4% to transport and communication. 
25 Furthermore investment 
failed to flow into areas of high productivity or to yield reinvestible 
funds; infra-structure projects and industrial plants were badly planned; 
and political pressure resulted in huge wastes of investment in the public 
sector. 
26 Thirdly, there had been no attempt to cope with agriculture. 
With the exception of a limited number of measures, the Ottoman Laws of 
1858 were still valid; 
27 the most important attempts at land reform had 
failed; although too many resources were channelled into agriculture, these 
were rarely in the most necessary and productive areas of irrigation and 
fertilizers; and finally land taxes were too low. 
28 Fourth, planning attempts 
were feeble. There were no plans; the railways were never a well-planned 
network; the Karabuk steel plant was badly located and its capacities never 
coordinated; there were no adequate surveys of economic resources; and 
until 1956 there were no austerity programmes or attempts to control 
inflation, and even the stabilization programme of 1956 was ineffective. 
29 
Finally, the attempt to encourage foreign captial. was misdirected. Although 
foreign capital is one of the easiest ways to increase capital resources, 
it is wise to place a number of restrictions on such investment. The 
Turkish polity failed to place any restrictions whatsoever (a policy 
encouraged bythe U. S. A. and O. E. C. D. ý, Thus in 1951 and 1954 the 
government guaranteed the right to withdraw investments (including original 
capital, value of installations, and value of trade marks andX patents) 
in the original currency. (There was an import surplus jump from 62-3m- 
TL in 1950 to 246.4m. in 1951 to 516m. in 1952. )30 
The consequence of these two dissynchronizations, for political 
instability was restricted primarily to decision-mak'ng (scope) and did 
not have further ramifications because large groups were not effected. Thus 
the bulk of the agricultural population was protected because either it 
was not a firm part of the monetary system or it was compensated by the 
various rural grants. 
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The third type of dissynchronization was that of party polarization. 
31 
Party polarization represents a particular type of system cleavage, which 
is manifested in terms of party identification. Party polarization began 
after 1950 and became increasingly pronounced as indicated for example 
in the number of occasions on which fighting broke out in the Assembly, 
and by the. number of occasions on which the Opposition walked out of the 
Assembly. Although the Polarization was acute in terms of the relatively 
equal proportions involved in each group, the polarization was constrained 
to some degree in that it was largely intra-regime (which meant that 
some degree of interaction continued between the parties) and in that 
neither of the polarized groups was completely closed. 
32 
Two basic factors contributed to the party polarization. The first 
relates to the position of the RPP at and prior to the emergence of the 
DP. From the very inception of the Turkish nation state, the RPP had 
been the dominant party. Thus the RPP had proved intolerant of all 
opposition: the abolition of the Sultanate and Caliphate had removed the 
traditional and religious groups, the independence tribunals and the 
suppression of the Kurdish Revolt (1925-29) had been used to eliminate 
additional opposition, and finally both formal opposition parties (the 
PRP of 1924 and the Liberal Party of 1930) were both very short-lived. 
Furthermore the RPP increasingly strengthened its control throughout the 
political system. Thus party members were put in government posts (for 
example regional inspectors were in charge of both party and government 
affairs, Provincial Governors were appointed by-the local party organ- 
ization 
, and the Minister of the Interior was the Party General Secretary, ) 
the Labour Law of 1936 forebade strikes, and the Law of Association 
forebade political parties. 
33 In sum, until 1946 the RPP completely 
monopolized the political system. 
The second factor relates to the different groups mobilized bY the 
RPP and DP, and the degree of antagonism between these groups. On account 
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of the severity of controls maintained by the RPP and on account of the 
perfunctory nature of the elections prior to 1946 (1950 was the first 
secret, universal ballot), there were many groups which had become , 
disaffected and which until 1950 had not successfully united to express 
such disaffection. The major groups were: the religious elements, the 
businessmen, the minority groups, and most importantly the peasantry. The 
religious groups had been opposed to the secular drive under Ataturk; 
the business groups were opposed to the government controls; the minority 
groups had been opposed to the Varlik Vergisi tax introduced in World 
War 2, and under which non-Muslims could pay as much as ten times as much 
tax as Muslims; the peasantry represented a large and generally conservative 
orthodox Muslim force, which had in many repects been excluded from the 
urban-industrial drive of the RPP. Although the need to mobilize support 
among the peasantry had been perceived, as is evidenced in such measures 
as the Village Law of 1924 and the Peoples Houses of 1931, such measures 
were generally ineffective or antagonistic to the peasantry, 
34 
The importance of both these factors was increased by the role of the 
DP. Thus not only did the DP displace the RPP and completely undermine its 
former monopoly, but it also sought to reestablish for itself the hegemony 
previously enjoyed by the RPP. Further by a whole range of policies, the 
DP won the support of the former disaffected groups and thereby provided 
representation for formerly quiescent groups. 
The consequences of party polarization relate directly to the three 
main indicators of institutionalization failure and to the indicators of 
monitoring failure. It may be noted that the constantly large size of the 
polarized groups explains why there was no significant support failure or 
decision-making (method) failure. 
Having outlined the pattern and dissynchronizations of political 
instability, the next task must be to analyze the military predispositions 
and capabilities. 
The first variable of organizational capabilities to be examined is 
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skill level. By the end of World War 2, it appears that the Turkish army 
was in a state of disrepair. It wa still equiped with World War I 
weapons; it was still horse-drawn; and as opposed to the time of Ataturk, 
the army was no longer the major channel of mobility. 
35 However, as a 
consequence of U. S. A. aid, a massive reorganization scheme was initiated 
in 1948. By 1959 02 billion of U. S. A. and European equipment and assistance 
had been channelled to Turkey. 
36 The consequences were that the Turkish 
army was reduced from 700,000 to 400,000 well-trained and well-equipped 
men; service training schools were opened; and there was a great expansion 
in technical training and training abroad. In sum, the military was 
revamped to manifest a high level of technical expertise. 
The second variable relates to the structure and composition of the 
army. First, unlike the other military forces that have been examined, the 
Turkish military possessed significant services in addition to the army. 
Second, although the armed forces were fairly large, the officer corps 
was disproportionately so. The reason was that the DP in an attempt to 
control the army had engaged in a programme of rapid promotions and Slow 
retirement with the consequence that the army had 250 Generals though it 
required only 50 and 2600 Colonels though it required only 1200.37 Finallyl 
after having become rather frozen by the end of World War 2, the military 
had once again opened its channels of mobility, particularly for lower 
middle class groups. 
38 
With reference to autonomy, two main points may be noted. First, from 
1919 onwards the large-scale involvement of the military in Civilian 
Politics (as under the Ottomans, the interventions of 1908,1909, and 1913, 
and the establishment of the Turkish Republic after World War 1) ceased. 
Extensive measures were taken to divorce the military from the RPP and 
civilian politics in general. Thus in 1919 Ataturk resigned from the 
army (whenever he took up military command on subsequent occasions, 
Command was only taken from the Civil kssembly); the 1923 constitution 
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made it impossible for Assembly members to hold additional government 
posts; the Progressive Party suppressed in 1925 contained opposition 
Generals; in 1949 a Supreme Council of Defence, including several cabinet 
Ministers, was established to counterbalance the General Staff; in 1946 
and 1950 the articles 8 and 9 of the electoral laws of those years 
withdrew the vote from the military; and finally the percentage of retired 
military in the National Assembly declined: 1920 17,169 1943 1301o, 1950 596, 
39 al instability 1958 4%. In the second place, certain developments in politic 
during the 1950s forced the military to play a more direct role in the 
ciý, ilian polity. Thus martial law had been declared in 1955 following the 
anti-Greek riots; in April 1960 four military were obliged to resign after 
refusing to halt Inonu, head of the RPP, on a campaign journey; and again 
in April 1960 the military were employed in quelling anti-government riots, 
which led to the reimposition of martial law. 
The fourth variable relates to cohesion. Although it is difficult to 
gain direct information, a number of indicators may be isolated. On the 
one hand, a number of factors point to an erosion of cohesion: the army 
was large and both occupationally and geographically diversified, the DP 
had made a number of attempts to attract a number of military officers, 
the officer corps was too large, and a number of conspiratorial groups 
had emerged after 1954.4o On the other hand, party politicization was 
not extensive and on account of the history of the armed forces within 
the Turkish nation state and the increase in technical expertise after 
1948, it seems that the military was a relatively autonomous and cohesive 
organization. 
41 
With reference to the military's predispositions, as in the cane of 
most caretaker regimes, there was little explicit dJSsatisfaction on the 
part of the military against the structure of the political system. The 
main di4satisfaction was at the level of policy and at the level of 
incumbent. Three basic policies in particular would appear to have 
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encouraged this negative evaluation . 
42 
The first concerned the measures 
of the DP to restrict the RPP (these have been reviewed above. ) The 
military opposition to such measures can be deduced from two events. The 
first, the Kayseri incident, occurred in April 1966 when a number of 
military men were ordered to bar Inonu from making a campaign joutney. 
The consequence was that four officers were obliged to resign. 
43 
The 
second was a letter sent by the retiring General Gursalq second in rank 
to the Chief of General Staff, to the Minister of Defence demanding the 
resignation of President Bayar, the abolition of the committee investigat- 
ing the RPP, and the release of students and journalists. 
44 
The second 
policy concerned the revival of Islam and the perceived threat to 'modernity' 
and secularism. 
45 
The opposition of the military to such a revival was 
explicit from post coup interviews. 
46 
The third policy area was that of 
general economic and social policies including the planning failure, 
agricultural tax invasion, increasing inflation, failure of land reform. 
47 
From the discussion of military disatiSsfaction at certain policiesq it is 
clear that incumbent disattsfaction was directed at the DP. It must be 
emphasized that although the military was in greater consonance with the 
RPPI there was no evidence of civilian sectional (party) identification 
or politicization. The specific dissatisfaction at the incumbent level 
against the DP was attributable partly to the lack of dSsatisfaution at 
the generalized structural level and partly to the fact that the DP Xxx 
was seen as directly responsible for the above policýdizatisfaction- There 
is no evidence of any any strong inhibiting factors. Thua although the 
RPP could form an alternative ruling group, there was no means in 1960 
whereby it could establish its rule. 
In sum, growing political instability was concomitant with and 
indeed stimulated the increasingly negative evaluation by the military Of 
the incumbents and policies of the civilian polity. The military cliques 
which existed from 1954 became more extensive in 1957 when military interest 
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began to move beyond military reform alone. After initial contacts with 
civilian leaders were rejected, one of the military groups decided to 
locate a military leader. 
48 
The only problem then was the timing and 
planning of the coup, which took place on May 27 1960 in a well-planned 
and executed exercise. 
PEIUORMANCE 
A number of introductory comments on the military regime in Turkey 
may be made. First, the regime maintained a caretaker focus in conforming 
to a strictly defined time period and in initiating a limited number of 
political changes. However, the caretaker orientation was not finalized 
until the defeat of the Turkes group. Second, given the limited focus 
(both in the time and change dimensions), the military regime involved a 
significant degree of civilian participationg though there was no overt 
civilianization on the part of the military regime itself. Third, although 
the period of rule led inevitably to increased politicization, there was 
no evidence of the development of any partisan or sectional politicization. 
The first issue area to be examined concerns the manner and success 
with which the military coped with the major nation state political functions. 
With referenve to the decision-making methodq a brief survey of 
the structure of the primary decision-making bodies may be made before 
the main points of interest are extrapolated. Immediately following the 
coup a military executive, the National Unity Committee, was established 
under General Gursel and was composed of the unusually high number of 38 
members. A provisional government containing 17 members (of which 2 were 
Generals, one a politician, and the remaining were civil servants or non- 
party experts) was established. 
49 (The former Assembly had been dissolved 
and political parties banned. ) In June 1960 a provisional constitution was 
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published and provided for a division of function between the cabinet and 
the NUC, in which the NUC was to be the legislative body, and the Council 
of Ministers, chosen and headed by Gursel from among the members of the 
NUC or those citizens who had not belonged to a political party at the 
time of the coup and consisting of 15 civilians and 3 military, was the 
main executive body. Two important changes to this structure took place. 
In November 1960 the NUG split and 14 members were expelled. 
50 In January 
1961 a tempory National Assembly was established. The NUCýbecame trans- 
formed into the upper house, while the lower one consisted of 272 
representatives recruited in the following manner: 10 nominated by Gursel, 
18 by the NUC, the 19 mvmbers of the Council of Ministers, 75 elected 
representatives from the provinces, 74 representatives from the political 
parties (49 from the RPP and 25 from the RPNP), and the rest from other 
organizations. 
51 Gursel formed a new cabinet which initially contained 2 
but later3 NUC Generals. This structure remained essentially unchanged 
until September 1961 when the Assembly and NUC were dissolved to be 
replaced by the new civilian parliament. 
Concerning the decision-making method, the following observations 
may be made. First, as compared with the previous regime there was a 
marked increase in centralization. Thus the Assembly and parties were 
temporarily dissolved; martial law was retained throughtout the whole period; 
and Gursel and NUC members held key positions in all major decision-malting 
bodies. Second, there was considerably more structural differentiation 
within the central decision-making framework than is found in such early 
stages of the-majority of military regimes, (see the majority civilian 
representation in the cabinet and the establishment after 7 months of the 
National Assembly. )52 Third, although the NUC did appoint a number of 
commissions, such commissions were not nearly as extensive as for example 
in Pakistan. Finally, it is necessary to note the emphasis on simplicity 
and order in the decision-making process, a phenomenon manifested by most 
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professional military regimes. Thus, for example, the military deliberately 
eschewed politicians, since politicians were seen as likely to engender 
partisan lines and thereby to obfuscate decision-making. 
With reference to the scope of decision-making, the military regimu 
was primarily occupied with three major problem areas: the first was to 
introduce a number of economic controls, the second was to change a 
number of personnel, and the third was to provide the basis for an 
alternative civilian regime. The most important economic measures were: 
state expenditure was reduced by approximately 955m-; interest rates on 
bank credits were adjusted to accord with the type of economic activity; 
a State Planning Office was established to prepare long term investment 
plans; a number of austerity measures were intriduced (for example work 
on 448 major projects was suspended, the number of directors in state 
enterprises was reduced, and three departments in the Foreign Ministry 
were dissolved); forced savings of 3% on salaries above a certain level 
were introduced; a number of import controls was established; and a number 
of tax changes was introduced including agricultural income tax and a 
declaration of wealth to prevent tax invasion. 
53 
The second area of interest relates to the military's attempt to 
remove a large number of personnel. Three groups were concernedlinamely 
D: PI members, military officers, and university teachers). Immediately 
following the coup large numbers of DP members were arrested, and a High 
Court of Justice was established to try these persons. The consequence 
was the Yassaida trials, which resulted in 14 death sentences (although 
three only were implemented), 31 life sentences, 
'418 2-15 year sentences. 
54 
With reference to the removal of military personnelg in August 235 Generals 
were removed and almost 5000 Colonels and Majors. 
55 Although a primary 
motivation for this move was to streamline the officer corps, which as 
noted previously was too large, the number of retired officers also 
included those who had identified with the former regime. The third large 
movei; ent of personnel was the retirement of 147 university teachersq who 
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were seen as occupying a position analagous to that of the retired military. 
The third area of decision-making relates primarily to the 
promulgation of a new constitution. One of the first acts of the NUC was 
to establish a commission of ten professors with instructions to submit 
a draft constitution. (This constitution 
ýas submitted five months later. ) 
Meanwhile the Faculty of Political Science of Ankara University also 
submitted a draft constitution on their own initiative. There was some 
dispute over the draft constitutions, which were therefore passed over to 
a constitution commission drawn from the 1961 National Assembly, which in 
turn submitted a final draft in March. This draft was approved by the 
Assembly in May and by popular referendum in July. The major provisions 
were for a series of checks and balances against personal rule: a number 
of political, economic, individual and social security rights were given 
constitutional protection; there were to be two houses; the Council of 
Ministers was to be nominated by the Prime Minister who in turn was 
designated by the President; the President was to be elected by the 
combined houses; an independent judiciary, including a constiti; tional 
court, was to oversee all legislation; and finally civil servants were 
not allowed to join political parties. 
56 This constitution provided the 
basis for the return to civilian rule after the October 1961 elections. 
Concerning the degree of success of the military in relation to 
decision-making, the following points may be noted. Although there was no 
indication of any decision-making (method) failure, there were a numberpf 
of indications of potential lines of breakdown. The first relates to the 
split in the NUC between those who wished simply to execute a caretaker 
role and those who wished to play a more extensive one. The second relates 
to the degree of strain between the NUC and the Supreme Military Council. 
57 
The third relates to pressure from civilian groups for a return to civilian 
power. Thus the RPP was never seriously dislocated, the DP quickly reformed 
as the JP, and again a large National Assembly was established-only 7 
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months after the coup, which indicated that civilian groups were strong 
and that in the event of any sustained military occupation would provide 
a major source of instability. 
58 With reference to the scope of decision- 
making, it must be noted that the military was not preoccupied with an 
extensive area of decision-making, but on the other hand there was no 
indication of instability due to the failure of policy decision-making. 
With reference to the major policies implemented, the military had a 
limited degree of success. Given the poor economic situation, the militayy 
did achieve some stabilization. Although unemployment rose, price stabilization 
was achieved; the trade gap was narrowed; and the 1961 budget was balanced . 
59 
The policy concerning the removal of personnel associated by the military 
with the former regime was latgely unsuccessful. The DP reemergedl albeit 
with a new group of leaders, as the JP; the issue of the Yassaida trials 
proved a major problem in civilian governments after 1961; the military 
retirements were generally more successful although a number of the retired 
military joined the JP, which was initially strongly opposed to the military; 
and finally many of the 147 university teachers were later restored. Finally, 
the policy concerning the redrafting of the constitution was successful. 
In sum, there were no indicators of decision-making instability, although 
there were a number of signs that such instability could develop should 
the military regime persist too long. 
The institutionalization process for the military was largely non- 
problematic. Assuming Oondition of instability at intervention and 
assuming no severe internal breakdown on the part of the military, then 
the long term problems of institutionalization are largely non relevant; 
the shorter term problems of the definition of the major offices and rules 
of interaction are also non problematic given a relatively cohesive 
military and no major revamping of the political system. The interesting 
feature in the Turkish case is-that the military paid some considerable 
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attention to institutionalizing its position. Thus in a matter of days 
following the coup, the military produced a provisional constitution, 
which was to regulate the period until the establishment of a National 
Assembly (and stipulated among other things the division of power and 
various areas of competence between the NUC, the Council of Ministerst 
and the High Court of Justice); these procedures were changed slightly 
by the introduction of the National Assembly in January 1961; and 
finally one of the major themes of the new constitution was to stipulate 
the early institutionalization of the subsequent regime. 
The problem of support mobilization though not as important as decision- 
making was more urgent than ins#tutionalization. Two major factors were 
of assistance to the military. First the intervention was popularly 
received; and second the military was committed to short term rule. On 
the other hand, four main factors were responsible for restricting or 
undermining support maintenance of the military. First, there had been no 
significant support failure for the regime prior to the coup. Thus unlike 
the case of Ghana where the CPP had ossified or Indonesia where once the 
PKI was removed there was no significant support mobilization mechanism, 
the Turkish military following the coup was confronted with two large and 
well-organized parties. In the second place, the military made no attempt 
to organize directly any support either through some kind of party mechanism 
or referendums. It could be said to have mobilized some indirect support 
through the, civilian Council of Ministersq the civilian constitutional 
commission, and the National Assembly. Third, the military regime engendered 
the hostility of the former DP members through not only displaciing a 
large and populat party but also through prosecuting about 400 of its 
leaders. The continued support for the DP and inversely the opposition to 
the military regime were manifested quite clearly in the October 1961 
elections when the J13 won 34.7ýý' of the vote in the lower house (the second 
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largest bloc of votes to 36.71/6 by the RPP) and 70 seats in the upper house 
(the largest bloc of seats. ) Finally, once the DP leadership had been 
decimated, it was evident that the RPp would be the victors in the next 
election, and hence the RPP was constantly applying pressure to the military 
to prepare civilian elections as soon as possible. In sum, at the end of 
just over one year of military rule, it became clear that although there 
was no mass violent opposition to the military, the military did not 
enjoy widespread support. Thus in the July referendum for the new constitut- 
ion, there was a positive poll of only 61% or just less than half the 
total electorate, or again the Assembly was increasingly refusing measures 
introduced by the military. Nonetheless, the successful transfer of power 
back to civilians in October 1961 forestalled any major problems developing 
from the military's gradual loss of support. 
The military regime experienced no major problems with reference to 
the monitoring process. The military was able to employ extensive 
monitoring facilities thriugh martial law, additional powers granted to 
Governors, and the special Revolutionary Tribunals. Given the extensive 
range of monitoring capabilities of the military in addition to its 
short term commitment and the non reappearance of other indicators of 
instability, it is not surprising to find f ew indicators of monitoring 
failure. 
In conclusion, it is argued that the caretaker regime managed 
successfully to sustain the major nation state political functions. On 
the other hand, despite the absence of any significant indicators of'' 
political instability, it was evident that had the military regime contin- 
ued without undergoing some major transformation it would have quickly 
expýrienced a number of critical problems particularly within the areas 
of support mobilization and decision-making (method) but also in the other 
functional areas. 
The second major problem concerns the analysis of the degree of 
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success of the military in allieviating the basic conditions of instability. 
With reference to the structural organization od the economy, it was 
evident that the military could make no major changes in such a short 
period of rule. One of the few small attempts in this area was the removal 
of 55 feudal-type large land-holders in E. Turkey, and the confiscation of 
their land for redistribution. However, with reference to the failure of 
the polity to control the economy, the military registered some marked 
successes. First, it established a State Planning Organization, and the 
necessity for planning was later included as article 129 of the constitution. 
Although the subsequent enthusiasm of the civilian governments for planning 
did not equal that of the military, a Five Year Plan was produced for 
1962-7 envisaging investment of ZT59,646m. (or 181% GITP) and aimed at 7% 
growth rate, (and in fact achieved a 6.6516 rate. ) Second, the military was 
more critical concerning the allocation of resources. Although there were 
no major changes in budgetary allocation, the military cut back on a 
number of projects and initiated an austerity programme. Third, the military 
renewed the demand for land reform, but was nob as successful in implement- 
ing any changes as it was for example in the sphere of planning. Article 
37 of -the new constitution stipulated the need for land reform, but 
although a Land Reform Bill was drafted (limiting farm size, encouraging 
the establishment of cooperatives, and prohibiting renting and share- 
cropping), there was insufficient time to present it and subsequent 
civilian governments have persistently stalled in this area. 
6o 
Finally, 
the military regime provided the basis for the reexaminati6n of the tax 
system involving an increase in income tax and the establishment for the 
first time of an agricultural tax. 
61 
Three main observations are of import concerning the performance of 
the military regime with reference to the dissynchronization of party 
polarization. In the first place, the two dominant parties of the pre-coup 
period reemerged virtually unchanged after the coup. There had been a 
4 
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change of name of the DP to the JP and there had been a change of the top 
leadership, but otherwise party programmes were essentially the same, and 
the parties continued to recruit the same groups. 
62 
Indeed the period of 
military rule exacerbated the cleavages through the Yassaida trials in 
two ways. First the harsh and extensive sentences on the DP members 
increased the animosity of the surviving ones; and second the issue of the 
amnesty for the Yassaida prisoners proved a major point of controversy until 
1966. The amnesty was responsible for the resignation of the coalition 
in May 1962 due to conflict between the RPP and JP; in October 1962 after 
a bill releasing 280 prisoners there was a violent demonstration and the 
JP offices were sacked; in February 1963 fighting broke out in the Assembly 
over an amnesty debate; in March 1963 Bayar was released for 6 months to 
a triumphal JP welcome but was retained after four days of hostile demonstrat- 
ions; but in November 1964 Bayar was released and 50 others pardoned (leaving 
only 7 or 8 out of 400 still in prison) and in July 1966 extensive pardon 
measures were granted by the JP government. 
63 
The second main observation 
relates to the manner in which military performance minimized the party 
cleavage. In the first place, the proportional system of representation 
permitted greater repersentation for the smaller parties at the national 
levelq and furthermore their percentage of the popular vote was increased. 
In 1957 the two small parties, NP and FP, won respectively 715 and 4% of 
the vote but only 4 seats each (or 0.66Ya of the seats); in 1961 the 
distribution of seats was RPP 173, JP 158, NTP 65, -and RPNP 54.64 Although 
the RPP and JP were still the dominant parties, the simple polarization waS 
no longer as marked. In the second place, the new constitution provided an 
extensive array of mechanisms to prevent any single party undermining the 
autonomy or sbhere of competence of another. The third major observation 
is that the type of instability caused by the continued dissynchronization 
of party polarization changed. Thus after December 1961, the end of martial 
law, there was a marked increase in decision-making (method) failure, which 
had not been present in the pre-coup period. Thus from December 1961 to 
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the elections of October 1965s there were four coalition governments; 
furthermore these governments were frequently difficult to form (two 
attempts covering two months were necessary to form the government of 
June 1962, and in December 1963 Gumuspala proved unable to form a govern- 
ment); and finally it is clear that coalition formation would have been 
even more problematic had it not been for military pressure. 
65 
Although the military regime did not allj: eviate completely all the 
conditions of instability and although these conditions in part persisted 
and in part changed their ramifications, it did auhieve some degree of 
success particularly with reference to some of the economic conditions of 
dislocations and to a lesser degree in containing and minimizing party 
cleavage. 
The third problem in the analysis of military performance concerns the 
repercussions of performance on the military's predispositions and 
capabilities and vice versa. The major effects of performance on the military 
were threefold. First, occupation of the major decision-making posts enabled 
the top military command to change its immediate structure. Thus, as has 
already been noted the military quickly purged 5000 officers. In addition 
the military managed to secure an increase in its budgetary allocation. 
66 
The second ramification of performance was to exacerbate a number of 
divisions within the army. Such divisions could be expected given the 
number of conspiratorial groups that had existed prior to the coup, and 
given that the coup was initially motivated by the more junior officers. 
It is important to note that the major cleavage that appeared was not a 
simple sectional onel such as tribe, regional, ethnic etc., but one based 
on different perceptions of the role of the military government. The 
split was between a group that wished to play a short-term role and one 
which demande a long-term regime to exvcute a number of major economic and 
social changes. *The conflict between the two groups in the NUC became 
evident immediately following the coup when the more radical group wanted 
all ministries to be held by NUC members, whereas the more moderate group 
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wanted to use civilians (the subsequent cabinet was largely civilian with 
only three military members. ) Although in October 1960 it appeared that 
some compromise had been reached between the groups, any such compromisp 
*as soon eroded for in November 14 members of the NUC were dismissed. 
67 
The next major problem for the regime was the decision to move Lt. Gen. 
Tansel, Chief of the Air-Force, to Wasington. Tansel had criticized-two 
NUC members for continuing to hold army positions (all other NUC members 
had resigned from the army. ) The Supreme Military Council ordered 86 jets 
to buzz Ankara and Eskisehir until finally the NUC rescinded its decision - 
Tansel was not moved and the two NUC members reigned their military posts* 
68 
The final cohesion problem during the period of military rule occurred 
following the October elections. Following the success of the JP and the 
proposal that the JP support Basgil for the Presidency, a large group of 
officers wished to annull the election results. Only after Gursel and the 
Supreme Military Council had succeeded in getting the Presidential 
nomination for Gursel and a number of undertakings from all the political 
parties(not to revise the laws of the NUCI not to grant an amnesty to the 
Yassaida prisoners, and not to reistate the officers retired in August 
1960), did the threat be withdrawn. 
69 
Two further threats to army unity 
appeared in two attempted coups in February 1962 and May 1963. The first 
was the more serious but resulted only in 68 army retirements and one from 
the air-force, the leniency of the sentences being attributable to a degree 
of general army sympathy for some of the demands. The second attempted 
coup was again led bý the now retired Colonel Aydemir tognther with 27 of 
the 69 retired after the February attempt and the unsuspecting Ankara 
Cadets. This coup was easily suppressed and resulted in a5 month period 
of martial law and 2 death sentences. 
70 Despite these four cases of evident 
cleavage, the army remained relatively cohesive. The Turkesh group did not 
have widespread support and his RPNP won only 2.2ý5' of'the Votes in 19651 
and the two Aydemir coups did not- involve large sections of the army. 
A third repercussion of performance was to increase the involvement 
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and thereby the level of politicization of the army. This was a function 
not only of having provided the major decision-making positions during the 
period of rule but also of a desire to safeguard the changes, which had 
been introduced and to protect themselves against any recrimination. The 
increased level of politicization can be represented by two indicators. 
First, the number of serious military threats to the civilian politymay 
be noted, namely that following the October elections of 1961 and the two 
attempted coups of 1962 and 1963-71 Second, the military continued to 
play an enhanced political role above that of pressure group. Thus, in 
October 1961 Gursel, together with the NUC and the Supreme Military Council, 
were responsible for virtually forcing a civilian coalition government 
and extracting from civilian politicians a number of undertakings (see 
above); not only was Gursel elected President but all NUC members were 
given ex-officio places in the Senate; in March 1962 the military backed 
a bill entitled "A Law Concerning Acts which disturb the Constitutional 
Regime and National Order and Tranquility"; 
72 
and finally Gursel and the 
Supreme Military Council continued to be instrumental in forming coalitions 
and in considering domestic problems. 
73 However, there were also a number 
of factors which counterbalanced the military's increased involvement and 
which deterred in general any further total intervention. First, the 
military was well aware of the internal divisions, which had been created; 
second it had been subject to constant civilian pressure for withdrawal; 
third, it had also to endure some considerable civilian criticism; and 
finally, it had undoubtedly lost much of its former popularity. 
In conclusiong performance had effected the military's organizational 
capabilities in the following manner: there had been no appreciable change 
in level of expertise although some change could be expected by Virtue 
of the increased budgetary grant; the structure and composition had been 
changed partially by the forced retirement of a large group of officers and 
partially by the increase in the physical size of the army; the degree of 
autonomy had obviously decreased; and finally the degree of internal 
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cohesion had also dereased. With reference to predispositions: the military 
was able to effect a number of changes which would make its gross 
evaluation of the general part of development more favourable; it was 
unlikely that its attitudes towards politicians changed; and finally 
many of the specific grievances were removed. 
The consequences of the military's predispositions and capabilities 
for performance were fourfold. First, the military's predispositional 
antipathy at the policy and incumbent levels was very clearly reflected 
in the new constitution, the emphasis on and the restructuring of. the 
planning mechanism, and the Yassaida trials. Second, the particular 
structure and composition of the military was responsible for the mass 
retirement programme. Third, the degree of separation of the military 
from the civilian polity meant that although the military became consider- 
ably more involved in the political system, no partisan or sectional 
politicization took place, and further the military could successfully 
transfer. power back to a civilian regime. Finally, the number of divisions 
which appeared in the military seems to have been an important, though 
not sole, factor in restricting the. military to a short period of rule. 
The final problem area relates to the examination of the military 
transfer of power. The two basic problems to be examined are: the nature 
of the transfer, and the conditions underlying the transfer. With 
reference to the former, three factors are of import. The mechanism of 
transfer was the most common in that the military permitted political 
parties to reorganize and to campaign prior to a national election, Second, 
the transfer was peaceful and relatively clear-cut. Thirdl although military 
kX rule by necessity influenced the nature of the subsequent civilian 
regime, the direct military controls were not extensive. Thus, there were 
no major restri#ions on political parties, (the exception being that 
the DP was not allowed to reappear, but the JP represented very little 
change); the elections of 1961 were free; although Gursel became President 
and the NUC members. became Senators, a number of bills were passed contrary 
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to the expressed wishes of the military; and finally, the conditions 
under which the NUC relinquised control (as embodied essentially in the 
t'Law Concerning Acts which disturb the Constitutional Regime and 
National Order and Tranquility") were not extensive and some were easily 
circumvented, (e. g. the early release of the Yassaida prisoners. ) 
The peaceful and successful trasfer of power could take place 
because three essential conditions were present. First, the military was 
committed to withdrawal. The dominant group within the military had 
always been committed to short term rule (although the division within 
the NUC was close, the Supreme Military Council backed the Gursel group); 
the cleavages which appeared in the military crystallized this view; the 
declining popularity of the military further reinforced the short term 
committment; and finally the military managed to achieve its perceived 
goals. Second, there existed civilian political forces which could assume 
the central decision-making positions. In this context, it will be recalled 
that the pattern of political instability prior to the coup had not had 
any major debilitating effects on the majority of civilian political 
organizations. In addition, the changed nature of the political system as 
a consequence of military rule was not extensive. Third, the military 
regime had had some success in allkeviating some of the batic conditions 
which had precipitated the pattern of instability prior to the coup. 
In sum, although the military regime did not completely alIXeviate 
political instability and although its period of rule did produce a 
number of problems for the subsequent civilian regime, the caretaker regime 
was generally successful in containing a situatio#, of acute instability 
and in managing the consequent return of a civilian government. 
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MILITARY INTERVENTION AND PERFORMICE IN BURAA 
INTERVENTION 
At the time of the Japanese invasion in early 1942, Burma had 
experienced over one hundred years of British penetration and an extensive 
period of absoption in the British Indian Empire (1886-1935)- Under two 
constitutions there had emerged a number'of political groupings, of which 
the most important was to be the Thakins. 
1 The Japanese occupation did 
not immediately grant the promised independence, but as in the case of 
Indonesia the worsening Japanese involvement in World War 2 led to a 
grant of indeýendence in August 1943. Furthermore, the occupation 
permitted the development of a number of indigenous nation state forces. 
These forces had reached a sufficient level to be able to resist the 
British attempts of 1945 to reinstate the former colonial system. 
2 In 
January 1948 Burma became independent and was established as a low level 
nation state system. 
In the period up to September 1958, when the caretaker military regime 
was established, Burma experienced all four type a of instability. Four 
factors are of interest concerning the profile of political instability. 
First, decision-making and monitoring failures were the most marked; 
second, the most intense period of instability was in the two years 
immediately following independence; third, following theoe two years 
there was a decline in decision-making and monitoring failures, though 
all four types of instability remained clearly identifiable; finallyl 
the immediate precedent of the intervention was a marked rise in decision- 
making (method) failure. 
The first major problem is to examine the indicators of instability. 
In the first years following independence, decision-making method failure 
was evidenced by three indicators. First, Prime Minisýer U Nu had difficulty 
in maintaining the cabinets; second, the AYPFL, the major political 
party, was rent by a number of quarrelling 'Jac-tions of Socialists, and 
- 301 - 
PVO members; finally, the channels of communication between central 
3 
bodies in the capital and branch organizations elsewhere were very weak. 
From 1950 the degree of decision-making failure diminished as U Nu 
became more firmly established, the cabin et became more stable, many of 
the warring factions had gone underground and had not fared very favour- 
ably, and finally channels of communication were reestablished. On the 
other handl decision-making became more stagnant as governmental bodies 
proliferated. Nonetheless, such failure was conýained until 1958 when 
a major split occurred in the AFPFL. The split led to a division 
throughout the polity in the cabinet, parliament, party executive, 
planning councils etc. The consequence of this division was to induce 
" complete atrophy in the decision-making process. It was decided that 
" special session of parliament would be called for June in an attempt 
to vote a majority group. This session did give aU Nu group a very 
small majority (127 to 119), but since each of the two opposed groups 
contained a number of smaller groups, which were unlikely to cooperate 
on any significant range of issues, it was clear that no majority group 
could be maintained. 
4 
With reference to the decision-making (scope) failure, there was a 
degree of failure in the economic area, though it must be noted that 
this failure did not reach the same chronic degree as for example in 
Indonesia. The major problem was not that Burma was incapable of maintain- 
ing any growth rates but that such a growth rate was so modest that on 
many growth indicators it was not until 1959-60 that Burma was achieving 
pre-war levels of production. 
Table 7: 1: Burma's GDP in constant prices (1938-9*100) 5 
1938-9 1947 1951 1953 1955 1957 1958 1959 
100 72 74 82 go 95 102 107 
Table 7: 2: Burma's Agricultural Production (1938-9=loo) 5 
1938-9 1947 1951 1953 1955 1957 1958 1959 
100 77 74 79 81 82 95 100 
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On the other hand, it must be noted that there were a number of promising 
indicators. Thus, the consumer price index had been held relatively 
6 
constant, or again gross domestic capital formation was increasing 0 
A second indicator of weakness was that there was an increasing reliance 
on foreign aid (although it must be noted that reparations constituted 
205% of such aid. ) 
Table 7: 3: Origin of Resources Available r Public Ca ture 
in Buma 
1952-3 1954 
Domestic 39.1 25-7 
Foreign 
+ or - 6.4 -52.1 
195_5 1956 1957 1958 
26.5 26.5 16.1 8.5 
10.0 35.2 23.0 31.8 
-11.8 8. o -13.2 -11.4 
There were three major indicators of institutionalization failure. 
With reference to the first indicator, i. e. the definition of a bodY of 
rules for political interaction, although a full constitution and its 
requisite elections had been enacted, two major problems remained. 
8 
The 
first centred on those groups which were unwilling to accept the 
structural organization of independent Burma's polityq namely the 
Communists, the PVOI and a number of minority groups (most notably the 
Karens. ) However, with the exception of these groups, there is no evidence 
of any deterioration in the acceptance of a common body of rules up to 
1958. The second problem area concerned the personalization of political 
interaction. Several observers have pointed to the personalization in 
terms of faction formation, distribution of various rewards etc., which 
in turn undermined more stable bodies of rules. 
9 The second major indicator q 
the delineation of the sphere of competence of major political organizations, 
was very marked. Most observers of the Burmese political system have 
pointed to the high degree of centralization, which has inhibited the 
clear development of spheres of autonomy and competence of a number of 
major institutions, notably the planning agencies, the state enterprisess 
and the upper echelons of the civil administration. Thirdly, there was 
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widespread recognition of corruption and patronage. Although a Bureau 
of Special Investigation was established in 1951 under the Prime Minister, 
attempts to curb corruption were largely ineffective. Indeed as the 
AFPFL maintained its hegemony and as government bodies expandedq then 
so too did the scope of corruption and patronage, 
10 
The indicators of support failure were rather more marked. The major 
indicators of the first type of support failure, i. e. withdrawal, were 
of course the retraction and susequent armed insurrection of a number of 
groups immediately preceding and following independence. The major groups 
were fourfold. The Communist Party of ýurma (the 'Red Flag Communists') 
had been banned in January 1947 and began its insurrection in March 1948 
together with the second group, the Burmese Commimist Party ('the White 
Flag Communists'), which did not go underground until the end of 1947* 
The third group was the Peoples Voluntary Organization, a private army 
organized by Aung San which had cells throughout the country and which 
had been incorporated by Aung San into the AFPFL. The majority 'White 
Band' of the PVO joined the insurrection in July 1948. The fourth group 
was the Karen National Union which through its militant wingg the Karen 
National Defence Organization, joined the insurrection in December 1948.11 
It has been estimated that these groups provided some 209000 armed 
personnel, which together with the sympathizers and other supporters 
constituted a significant section of the population. However, by 1951 
the insurrection had been contained and although it continued until the 
time of the military intervention, many groups surrendered or were 
defeated and further there were no other major withdrawals. 
12 Both types 
of the second category of support failure were evident. The first, the 
narrow base of support, can be illustrated from the voting figures for 
the elections of 1952 and 1956. From these figures, it is clear that a 
large percentage of the population was not participating and that although 
the absolute vote of the AFPFL increased, its*vote as a percentage of the 
total vote declined. 
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Table 7: 4: Voting Figures for Burmese National Elections 1952 and 1956 _13 
1952 1956 
% Population Voting 19 40 
AFPFL Vote 0%) Total. Vote 6o 48 
AFPFL Vote 94 Total Electorate 11 19 
The second type of insufficience relates to the failure of party and other 
organizations to mobilize support. Thus, although two post independence 
elections were held and although a number of additional organizations 
existed (such as the All-Burma Peasants Organization, the TUC, the All- 
Burma Youth League with the ABPO and TUC having 550,000 and 60,000 
members respectively) and although a more threatening opposition emerged, 
the political parties were generally rather moribund. Thus channels of 
communication between Rangoon and other areas were poor; the AFPFL did 
not hold a conference from independence to January 1958; in June 1956 
the AFPFL organization was so bad that U Nu resigned as P. M. for a 
year to reorganize it. 
14 
In the case of Burma, the first three indicators of monitoring 
failure (failure to establish governmental authority, rise in domestic 
violence, and the rise in the employment of force) were closely 
interrelated and centred primarily around the various insurgent group, 
which have been outlined above. First, in territorial terms, at a time 
in early 1948 government authority was restricted to an area immediately 
around Rangoon, but following the recapture of Mandalay in April 19499 
government authority was reestablished throughout most of Burma. Thus$ 
in 1952, elections could be held in 233/250 districts. 
15 The position 
remained relatively stationary after 19529 Second, the incidence of 
domestic violence can easily be documented by the number of deathe 
precipitated by the insurrection (which in 1955 came to 28,000) and by 
the amount of damage (which again by 1955 totalled some $950m. ) 
16 Third, 
martial law was declared in August 1948; Ne Win as Defence Chief joined 
- 305 - 
the cabinet from April 1949 to September 1950; or again government 
expenditure on defence remanied relatively high at about one third of the 
budget. 17 In sum, by 1950 the chronic level of monitoring failure as 
manifested by these three indicators declined markedly up to 1952. 
Thereafter the situation stalemated so that by the time of the intervention 
in 1958 there was still an estimated number of 10-12,000 rebels with 
6-7,000 active supporters. 
18 The fourth indicator of monitoring failure 
is that of the inability to implement decisions. This indicator was again 
more marked during the initial stages of the insurrection. Thusq for 
example, land revenue ceased during the disturbances and writing off 
continued into 1950 (even by 1952-3 revenues were only 321, ý of the value 
1,938-9), or again there was no serious attempt to implement the 2 Year 
Plan of 1948, or again the scheduled ele#ioms of 1949 had to be postponed 
four times. 19 Although this indicator did decline after 19529 the decline 
was not as marked as in the three cases above. For example, the State 
Agricultural Marketing Board was notoriously inefficient, or again until 
1956 the Land Resources Development Corporation implemented virtually 
none of the programmes outlined by the U. S. consultants. 
20 
Having examined the patterns of instability, the next major problem 
is to identify the major dislocations. The first two dissynchronizations 
that may be considered are the interactions between the economic and 
political systems. With reference to the first dislocation, i. e. the 
structure of the economy, three factors are of import. First, the economy 
experienced massive dislocations during World War 2 as a consequence of 
which agricultural output fell by two thirds, much land returned to jungle, 
the mines ceased to function, the oil well at Chauk and the refinery at 
Syriam were destroyed, and timber trade virtually ceased. Thus, not only 
were trade patterns disrupted, but many basic sevices and productive units 
were destroyed. Second, in common with most ex-colonial systemsj the output 
of Burma is extractive. Under the colonial system one sixth of the total 
output was transferred abroad, and the capital-intensive sectors tended to 
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be expatriate enclaves, which stimulated very little diffusion. Third, 
Burma's exports are heavily dependent on, a single export com: modity, viz. 
rice. In this context three factors may be noted: first the rice exports 
have remained fairly constant since 1948 at approximately 75% of the 
total exports; second, this percentage is higher than the pre-war figure; 
Table 7: 5: Burma's Total and Rice Exports 
21 
1938 1947 19511 1955 1957 1959 
Total Exports (K crores) 47.8 74.4 110-0 117. o 89. o 117.0 
Rice Exports (K crores) 22.8 58.4 81. o 87.7 '66-3 82.7 
Rice % Total Exports 47 78 74 75 74 70 
third as in the case of other agricultural exports both the volume and the 
export price tend to fluctuate markedly. In the case of Burma exports have 
Table 7: 6: Price (9, ) and Volume (m. tons) Burma's Rice Products22 
1938 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 
Price 6o 50 42 36 34 32 33 
Volume 3-3 1.16 1.22 1.27 1.63 1-93 2.0 1.46 1.61 
gradually been rising, with one ma4or drop in 1957-8, but the price has 
been constantly falling. 
With reference to the second dislocationg two factors may be noted. 
First, the major mechanisms involved in the planning and supervising procesoOD 
were not fully coordinated. The first plan was neither comprehensively and 
thoroughly defined, nor was it implemented. Although the second plan had 
a much more comprehensive and flexible format, it still experienced a number 
of coordination problems. 
23 Thus no comprehensive agricultural plan was 
executed; there was poor coordination between the Unistry of Finance and 
the Ministry of Planning; the public, enterprises had insufficient autonomy, 
lacked adequate accounting procedures, and were dominated by Ministers who 
were both nepotistic and inexperienced; finally the Economic and Social 
Board, responsible for supervision and coordination, met only infrequently, 
failed to follow through decisions or to check on programme progress, made 
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inconclusive decisions and had an insufficient secretariat. The second prob- 
lem was that the plan was founded on a number of assumption which proved 
incorrect. Thus the export price of rice in 1959-60 was projected to be 
950 but was in fact only 932-5; the budget was supposed to stay at K70 
crores but by 1957-8 had reached K90; and finally the insurrection was 
projected to have been terminated by 1954 but was of course still in 
progress in 1958-9- In sum, it is interesting to note that despite the 
-comprehensive 8 Year Plan, there was little change in the structure and 
output of the economy. 
Table 7: 7: Industrial Origin Burma' s GDP by % (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
Agricul. Manuf. Mines Construct. Transp. Trade Admin. Other 
1951-2 46 10 232 24 76 
1953-4 43 10 232 27 85 
1957-8 42 12 233 24 95 
1958-9 41 12 133 23 11 6 
1959-60 43 12 233 20 11 6 
The consequences of both the political-economic system dislocations wero 
for decision-making failure (scope) and monitoring failure. 
The third dissynchronization to be examined is that of system 
cleavage of which two types were apparent, namely regional cleavage and 
party polarization. Burma is a federated system containing in addition to 
the Burmese populace a number of semi-autonomous units, such as the Shanst 
Mons, Kachins, Karens, and Arakanese, of which the most important and most 
populous is the Karen unit. The Karen regional protest bears all the hall- 
marks of this type of regional cleavage in new nation state systems. 
Traditional patterns of interaction between the Karens and Burmese had not 
been extensive, and this situation had become-crystallized under the 
British colonial rule, which was generally, more - favourably directed towards 
the Karens. Consequently the Karens fought more'strongly against the 
Japanese invasion, and even fought against the Burmese Independence Army, 
which led in 1942 to a Karen massacre by-the B. i. A. 'Thus at the time'of 
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independence the Karen system with its own political and military organ- 
ization was faced with the prospect of incorporation into a larger unit 
with which it had few patterns of interaction and considerable suspicion 
and hostility. The mediating mechanisms of the Frontier Area Inquiry 
Commission and the Karen National Board and its successor the Karen 
Central Organization failed to achieve any consensus and the Karen revolt 
broke out soon after the enforced union through independence. The second 
cleavage, that of party polarization, involved the Communist Parties and 
the PVO- It is interesting to note that in comparison with Turkey the 
degree of polarization was more acute in thaj; all patterns of non-violent 
interaction atrophied and were replaced by open conflict, but not as 
acute in that the numbers involved were not as extensive. The party 
polarization was a function of two interrelated forces: the adoption of 
alternative paths of nation state development and the failure to reconcile 
or accommodate such paths. The Communist Party was originally one of the 
groups within the AFO. The CPB, a splinter of the CP, was banned and in 
1947 went underground; the BCP was effectively removed from major decision- 
making posts by Aung San and joined the CPB in the insurrection in March 
1948. The PVO had by independence developed from' its original position 
as a private army to almostA rival party to the AFPFL. With the death of 
Aung San, its founder, relationships with I the AFPFL deteriorated until 
faced with either total integration with the AFPFL or insurrections the 
PVO chose the latter. The consequences of thes e two types of system 
cleavage relate directly to support failure (withdrawal) and monitoring 
failure. 
The fourth dissynchronization was that - Of participation failure as 
manifested primarilY in the failure to develop viable 'mass political 
parties. Thus until 1956, the only legal mass' party was' the - AFPFL; , the 
other opposition parties were small coterie organizations'* Sbvbral factors 
explain the low level of development of the main'party. First, the AFPFL 
developed from a very amorphous and IoOselyý integrated, - nationalist 
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movement. Prior to World War 2, the parties had been clique ones which 
operated through patronage. Under Thakin influence the AFO (which later 
became the AFPFL) emerged to crystallize these various groupings with 
the consequence that the AFPFL itself was a very loose organization. Prior 
to independence the Communist groups left and these were soon joined by 
the PVO, but still cohesion within thu AFPFL did not increase. Factional 
groups within the AFPFL remained clearly Visible, until in 1958 the split 
between the better-educated, urban-industrial-oriented versus the rural 
less well-educated groups (i. e. Kyaw Nyein-Ba Swe v. Tin-Nu) crystallized. 
24 
Second, the AFPFL remained a feeble organization. There were no annual 
conferences, party dues were not collected regularly, many local units 
were moribund, and there were no procedures for the election of central 
executives. 
25 The ramifications of this dislocation related to all types 
of instability, but particularly to the decision-making (method) failure 
of 1958, and support failure (insufficience. ) 
The final dissynchronization to be examined is that of the failure to 
develop satisfactorily a number of major political institutionsq of which 
the civil administration is the most important. It is also necessary to 
examine the legislature. Several factors account for the weakness of the 
administration. First, there had been little training of Burmese admin- 
istrators under the British, which left a void after independence especially 
as few British expatriates remained, (Of 99 in the, superior civil Service 
immediately prior to independenceg, 71 had left immediately following 
I 
independence. ) Second, the framework of, the old colonial structure, which 
was completely ill-adapted to post independence -tasks, remained 
virtually unchanged. Third, the personnel distribution was badly skewed 
in that therewere too many clerks and -too few executive officers. Fourth, 
there were few established procedures 9-. considerable overlapping, and 
extensive depaIrtmentalism. Finally, the civil service, was either penetrated 
or in competition with AFPFL units. 
26, 
The,, consequences of this dislocation 
related primarily to monitoring failure but also to institutionalization 
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failure. The legislative Assembly was a weak body. Although the legis- 
lative Assembly had been quickly established through the constitution 
and was reelected regularly, it was nonetheless largely a rubber- stamping 
mechanism, which had very few powers. (For example, draft bills were 
frequently made available only on the day that they passed through the 
Assembly. ) The primary reason for the weakness of the legislative body 
was the hegemony of the AFPFL and the negligible size of the opposition 
parties, combined with the high degree of centralization of the executive 
leadership of the AFPFL. 
27 The consequence of this failure was primarily 
for institutionalization failure but all other types of instability were 
also effected. 
Having examined the major dissynchronizations, the next task is that 
of identifying the military's organizational capabilities and predis positions. 
With reference to the variable of skill levelq five factors may be 
noted. First, following the usual colonial pattern, there had been no 
extensive training of a Burmese officer corps, although there were four 
battalions in Burma by the time of World War 1. Second, the first major 
intensive training of Burmese officers was that of the 'thirty comrades's 
28 
who had been taken to Japan. As in the case of Indonesia, the later 
stages of the Japanese occupation led to an, expansion and improved 
training of Burmese troops (particularly after, the establishment of the 
Burmese National Army in August 1943. ) Third, after independence 
stringent efforts were made to improve the organization and training level 
of the Burmese troops. Thus a number of academies were established (notably 
at Rangoon and Maymyo) both for training and retraining. Fourth, the 
large military budgetsl noted above, enabled the military to build a large 
and well-equipped force. Finally, on account of, the insurrections, the 
military had had considerable experience in local administration. 
29 
The size of the Burmese armed forces has varied'markedly. 
30 The 
Burmese Independence Army reached 23,000 but was quickly pruned to 3000 
once the Japanese invasion was achieved. By September 1945 the Burmese 
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Army stood at approximately 5000 men and 200 of ficers. However, soon 
after independence the government troops, following the mutinies and 
desertions, numbered something just over 1000. From this figure the 
army grew rapidly to 6 battalions, in 1949; the battalions numbered 9 and 
41 in 1952 and 1953 respectively; and finally the army expanded to 
12510w- 31 With refernce to composition and recruitment, three factors 
are of import. First, until the post independence era, the recruitment 
base of the army was very variable. From 1925 Burmese recruitment to the 
colonial army ceased with the consequence that the army became dominated 
by Karens, Kachins, and Chins. The BIA was more solidly Burmese, as was 
also the subsequent BNA. The return of the British led to the reintrod- 
uction of a strong Karen sections but this issue was finally solved after 
the start of the Karen insurrection after which time the army has been 
predominantly Burmese . 
32 Second, the majority of 'the senior officer corps 
consists of those officers introduced into the armed forces through the 
. 
33 1 BIA Lhird, the army constitutes the dominant service with little 
rivalry from either a navy or air-force., 
With reference to autonomy, there was a marked change after independence. 
The first political parties tended to organize private armies. Although 
the BIA superseded any such status, the nature of the, - struggle 
during 
World War 2 and the role of Aung San and the Thakins made for a very - 
close interaction between the armed units and what was to be the AFPFL. 
The single fusion of military and civil administration failed with the 
collapse of the BIA attempt to establish a local government network. 
From that time onwards despite the close alliance between military and 
civilian units, the political party of the AFPFL and the military began 
to develop autonomous and independent chains of command. The , phenomenon 
of the private army ceased when the PVO went underground. 
ý4 After 
independence the AFPFL and the military continued toldevelop autonomously. 
The level of cohesion in the military was' low until the conclusion of 
the first stage of the post independencý_ insurrections I after which time 
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P 
cohesion has expanded contauously. The low'level of pre independence 
cohesion was largely a function of the relatively low level of training 
(particularly in the BIA) and the recruitment patterns. Fragmentation 
within the military reached its highest point at the beginning of the 
insurrections. Thus in August 1948 2 battalions under Major Sein Tin and 
Lt. Col. YE Htut mutinied; and at the start of 1949, the Karen battalions 
also rebelled. 
35 Although these secessions almost defeated the government 
and its remaining military force, they did have the effect of removing 
the divergent elemants from the armed forces leaving a very cohesive and 
homogeneous residue. Until 1958 there were no indicators of any reversals 
in the trend towards increased cohesion. 
With reference to predispositions, there is no evidence of any high 
level of diýatisfaction at the structural level. At the policy level, two 
dileatisfactions may be noted. First, there was opposition to the slow 
rate Of Policy output on the part of the civilian polity, which became 
more marked as the military's own organizational expertise increased. 
Second, the military was opposed to any major concessions to the 
Comunist and secessionist groups. This issue was not the cause of any 
hiatus between the military and civilian polity 'until 'the s plit in the 
AFPFL in 1958 when U Nu was only able to support his coalition by maldng 
extensive concessions to the crypto Communist and minority groups. 
36 At 
the level of incumbents, the military was d5satipfied with the performance 
of the AFPFL politicians in their failure to ýuild a strong party 
organization capable of more dynamic policy Outp, ut. 
37 Although the 
diVatisfaction predisposition of the military was not very generalized, 
the more specific dissatisfactions may'be assumed to have'taken a sharp 
rise following the split in the AFPFL. 'There -is no indication of any 
major inhibiting predispositional. factor. 'Any'potential threat of 
retaliation or opposition from the civilian polity was dispelled when 
an overt invitation was made from the civiAlian Polity to' the military 
to assume the major decision-making positions. 
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As 1958 progressed it became increasingly, plear that on account of 
the AFPFL split no stable civilian government co! 41d be expected, and 
further that the complete atrophy in decision-making was exacerbating a 
number of other problems, such as the insurrections. As the breakdown 
in the civilain polity became more. evident, the armed forces remained the 
only cohesive complex organization. In September U Nu asked Ne Win, as 
head of the armed forces to assume th e position of P. M. in a tempolýary 
capacity until arrangements could be made for the execution of elections 
in early 1959. 
PERFORMANCE 
A number of introductory comments on, the Burnese military regime may 
be made. First, the very clear caretaker role was much more clearly 
defined and maintained than in the case of Turkey. Second, as in the case 
of Turkey, the military regime involved a significant degree of civilian 
participation (or rather conformity to civilian dictates), though there 
was no overt civilianization on the part of the military regime itself. 
Third, although there was an increase in military politicization and 
although the military was more favourably. disposed to the Socialist 
faction in the AFPFL, there was no evidence of any partisan or civilian 
sectional Politicization. ý. 11 1 
The first issue area to be examined is the. 'manner and success of the 
military in coping with the main nation'state political functions. 
Two factors are of import *with reference to the process of decision- 
making method. First, a large number of civilian trappings were maintained. 
Thus the legislative assemblies were maintainedj. ýhe cabinet contained 
only one military member (Ne Win himself) , and . 
the, new regime, continued 
to rule through parlimentary approved bills. and not through decrees. The 
second factor of import is that such trappings should not be overestimated. 
Although the Ne Win regime was unusual in retaining the civilain trappings 
outlined above (a factor which can be explained primarily by the caretaker 
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role), it did share many elements in common with 
the majority of military 
regimes in their early stages. Thus military personnel were placed 
in 
charge of almost all important goverment operations; 
38 the civilian 
cabinet contained only 5 politicians- 
(these were the representatives of the 
state governments and were required by the constitution) ; 
39 
more important 
than the ciVilian cabinet as the primary executive body was the Military 
Staff Council presided over by Brigadier Aung Gyi and Colonel Maung Maung 
(to which all military officers in the various governmant departments and 
enterprises reported); and finally there was a 
ýuch stronger emphasis on 
streamlining and improving the edficiency of the administrative procedures, 
such as filing and record keepingg the checking of personnel files, and 
the dismissal of non-qualified office holders. 
40 
With reference to the ecope of decision-making, the Ne Win programme 
made f ew innovations but was primarily an austerity-ef f iciency programme , 
which was applied within the framework of existing policies and structures. 
This may be illustrated with reference to those areas which attracted 
the most persistent attention from the military. In the economic area, a 
large number of prices were lowered through price ceilingag hoarders were 
penalized, food supplies were increased, two-thirds of registered importera 
lost their licences, many development projects wre reviewed, and a number 
of state enterprises were put on a profit- making basis, and finally a 
number of agricultural measures were introducedl such as the onlargement 
41 
of the capital of the state Agricultural'Bank. The only major problem 
concerning the organization of the 'civilian polity was that of preparing 
the elections for the return to'civilian'power. Although this process 
involved more time than was originally envisagedý it must be pointed out 
that the most extensive register. 'in Burma's history was compiled and that 
the 1960 elections were the most scrupulous. The"third major problem 
area was that of contro3ling the insurrections, the comparative auccess 
of which operation will be'e - xamined below. 
42 
Finally, the military moved 
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200,000 squatters into satellite towns, and effected a clean-up of 
Rangoon. In sum, the major point concerning decision-making scope is 
that the military were preoccupied primarily with a broad-scale austerity 
programme with few structural innovations. There were no indicators of 
instability with reference to either the method or scope of decision- 
making. 
Short term military regimes can expect to experience few problems 
concerning institutionalization. This was even more marked in the case of 
Burma given both the nature of the intervention and the structure of the 
military regime. With reference to the former, the intervention was made 
on the ostensible invitation of the civilian polity, and We Win was voted 
P. M. with a very large majority. With reference to the latter, several 
factors may be noted. Firstj the military regime continued to use many 
of the formal mechanisms of the civilian polity. Thus, the constitution 
was retained, parliament was not dissolved, parliamentary bills and not 
military decrees were issued, and finally when Ne Win wished to retain 
office longer than six months (this was the maximum period defined by 
the constitution that non-elected personnel could hold executive posts), 
a constitutional amendment was voted. Second, as with most military 
regimes, the formal structure of decision-making and the definition of 
offices was very clear. The Ne Win regime was additionally aidod in 
that the coup was led by the most senior officers and the armed forces 
remained cohesive. In sum, the nature of the intervention and tho structuro 
of the military regime served to mini& institutionalization problems, 
and again there was no evidence of any instability in this area. 
Three factors are of import concerning support mobilization, First, 
the Ne Win regime made no formal effort to mobilize popular support. 
However, this is not surprising given the short-term commitment of the 
regime. Secondl the military regime could rely on the support of a number 
I 
of important groups, primarily the armed. forcesl the administration, and 
to a lesser dgree many of the constituent elements of the civilian polity. 
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Third, it was in the area of support mobilization that the military 
regime experienced its most marked failure. The incidence of support 
failure may be explained in the context of the combination of the failure 
to mobilize any support and the withdrawal of support contingent on the 
austerity programme of the military regime. Several observers have pointed 
to the increasing dissatisfaction among a number of civilian groups with 
the Ne Win regime; this trend was confirmed in the 1960 elections when 
the faction of the AFPFL, which had more closely identified with the 
military regime, was soundly beaten. 
43 
In common with unified military regimes I the Ne Win government exper- 
ienced no major difficulty with reference to the monitoring processe 
Two factors are of import. First, the military regime could take more 
effective action agadýnst the insurgents. The possibility for am amnesty 
was firmly dismissed and Divisional and Districi Security Councils were 
established with the consequence that by 1ý60 the number of rebels and 
44 
active supporters had been drastically cut to 5000. Second, the military 
regime could not only cope with the decision-making implementation 
mechanisms but could even improve them. Thus there was some degree of 
sympathy between the administrators and the military, and futthor the 
military placed a number of technically-trained personnel in the 
administration, The consequence was to lead to an undoubted increase in 
the efficiency and efficacy of decision-implementation. 
The second major task is to examine the success of the military in 
alUeviating the basic conditions of the dissynchronizations. In generall 
the military regime did not make extensive progress in all; kbviating the 
preconditions of instability, although it was much more successful in ita 
shorter term task of effecting the return of a civilian goverhment, 
The military regime made negligible chahge to the structure of the 
economy (the fýrst dislocation), as may be expected given its short term 
rule. only two actions by the military were likely to have any ramification 
for the structure of the economy. These were, on the one hand, the expranSiOn 
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of the role of the Defence Services Institute from an organization which 
simply provided f or its own personnel into the largest business organization 
in Burma with interests in such areas as banking, shipping, department 
stores, and fishing; and, on the other hand, the impfmentation of a number 
of agricultural actions, primarily the enlargement of the capital of 
the State Agricultural Bank and the emphasis on more intensive farming. 
However, these two factors were unlikely to have any significant 
ramification for the weaknesses of the economy. Furthermore the military 
regime continued the basic pattern of the former regime's allocation 
retaining the inherited budget for 1958-59, and making very few changes 
in the one for 1959-60. Thus from the figure above indicating the industrial 
origin of the GDP, there is no change during the period of military rule. 
The consequences of the military regime for the second dislocation 
are rather more problematic. On the one hand, its rule could have little 
effect on the consequences of the plan, which as far as possible was 
retained. However, with reference to the first collection of factorss 
which precipitated the. dislocation, it appears that the military regime 
was much more successful. Thus coordination by the polity was improved 
by increasing the autonomy and capabilities of the major coordinating body, 
the Economic and Social Board; numerous public enterprises were reviewed; 
staffing problems were allkeviated to a degree through the deployment of 
military personnel; and patronage and corruption were cut markedly 
thriugh the review of import licehcesl the removal of nepotistic ministers, 
the introduction of stricter auditing and accounting records and raids 
on hoarders. In sum, although there was no significant change in economic 
policies having reference to the structure of the economyq the economic 
policies having repercussions for the coordination and supervision of the 
economy did change markedly in the direction of increased efficiency. Although 
it is difficult to interpret results over such a short time scale and 
although a number of factors such as, increased rice harvest, cannot be 
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attributed to the military regime, a number of economic indicators would 
seem to support the success of the military. Thus, the consumer price 
index for 1959-60 dropped to 89, the index number for GDP rose to 107, 
and rice and total exports increased to 82-7m. Kyats and 117.0m. Kyats 
respectively. In sum, the military did have a significant degree of 
success with respect to the second dissynchronization. 
With reference to the third 4islocation, that of system cleavage, the 
military regime had much less success. It will be recalled that the two 
major lines of system cleavage were regional and party polarization. 
Towards both the main groups invblved in the cleavages, the military 
decided to abandon any conciliatory programme and to concentrate their 
efforts on a military victory. To this end the military, without any 
civilian constraints, could deploy more easily, and further the military 
established District and Divisional Security Councils. The military did 
record some degree of military success in that rebel activity was confined 
to a smaller area and the number of insurgents was reduced. Howeverl the 
military was unable to eliminate the rebels (which would be an exception- 
ally difficult task given the terrain of Burma), and they were certainly 
through this method unable to eliminate the underlying causes of the 
insurrection. Thus, the insurrection problem remained stalemated on the 
return of the civilian government in 1960.47 
With reference to the fourth dissynchronization, the particular 
conditions underlying the participation failure experienced an ephemeral 
and rather paradoxical all; keviation. The military regime did not take 
any action to allieviate the party failures. Thusq the military did not 
chose to organize an alternative party, nor did it execute a number of 
measures which may have all.? eviated to some degree the problems which had 
plagued the AFPFL. The paradoxival success was that one of the former 
factions of the AFPFL won a substantial majority in the 1960 elections, 
and thereby all; Veviated the decision-making method failure, which had been 
the immediate precedent of the intervention in 1958. (In the 1960 election 
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in returns for 207 of 250 seatsq the 'Clean' AFPFL won 1639 the 'Stable' 
24, and the NUF 3-) The success was ephemeral in that neither of the two 
factions had experienced any significant change in terms of organization, 
policies, or leaders. The parties remained top heavy with local branches 
being satellites of the centre; the parties were still dominated by 
personal factions; corruption was still present; and there had been little 
49 
concerted effort to mobilize mass support. 
Concerning the final dissynchronization, the military regime had 
considerable success in one area and negligible success in the other. 
There had been no change whatsoever in the structure or role of the 
legislative assembly. The pre-coup legislatures had continued through the 
military regime, there had been no constitutional changes having relevance 
for the legislative assembly, and there had been no other measures enacted 
to reinforce the role of the legislative assembly. In-the second area, 
that of the civilian administration$ the military regime did have some 
considerable success. Although there were no radical changes in the 
structure nor any major increases in qualified personnel, a number of 
important changes were effected. The top administration was reshuffled, 
politically appointed parliamentary secretaries were dismissed, pay 
and recruitment were improved, unqualified personnel were dismissed, records 
and personnel files were improved, efficiency and job discipline were 
increased, and much corruption was eliminated. 
50 
In general, the military regime had a rather limited degreo of success 
in all: Veviating the basic conditions, of instability. This rather limited 
success is attributable partly to the nature of the dissynchronizations 
and partly to the caretaker nature of the military regime. 
'The third major problem area is the analysis of the relationship 
between military predispositions- capabilities and performance, and vice versa. 
Three important factors concerning performance may be noted. Firsts 
although the Burmese armed forces did not achieve a major success in 
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all%eviating the conditions of instability, there was no evidence, as in 
the case of Ghana, that the military experienced any major difficulties 
in the execution of the main political functions. This factor may be 
attributed primarily to the skill level and degree of cohesion of the 
military. Second, the most notable feature of the policy decisions of the 
military rule, namely the austerity programme, may be attributed both 
to the skill level of the military and to its more specific grievances 
against the performance of the politicians prior to 1958. Third, the more 
specific actions against the rebel forces may be seen as a consequence of 
the general predispositions of the military concerning their attitudes 
towards a unitary Burma and anti-Communism. 
There were no major consequences for organizational capabilities on 
account of performance. There was no change in the composition and 
recruitment of the military; 
51 
cohesion also was unaffected, which is 
unusual, but may be attributed partly to the rather limited role of the 
military regime and partly also to the high deýree of cohesion prior to 
the intervention in addition to which the regime was initiated and led 
by the top military officers; autonomy was unaffected except that as a 
consequence of performance the military had a more extensive political 
role (through the extended Defence-Se3; ices Institute and the Security 
Councils); finally, it may be assumed that regime performance increased the 
skill level of the military. Two factors concerning predispositions may 
be noted. First, although it may be assumed that performance led to some 
degree of politicization within the military, this level of politicization 
was not extensive, Thusl there is no indication that the military wished 
to maintain its control beyond the necessary minimum period, or again 
the military made no provisions for continued military supervision after 
the transfer back so civilian government, as for example in the cases of 
Ghana or Turkey. Second, there is no evidence of any partisan or sectional 
Politicization. Although the 'Stable' faction of the AFPFL tended to 
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identify with the Ne Win regime, there is no evidence that the military 
regime offered any assistance to that party during the 1960 elections, 
nor was there any indication that the 1960 election results would not 
be allowed to stand. 
The final problem area is that of the transfer of power. With reference 
to the mechanism of transfer, three factors may be noted. First, the 
transfer was peaceful and clear-cut. Secondl the most common means of 
selection of civilian government was employed, i. e. the holding of 
national elections. As opposed to both the Ghanaian and Turkish cases, 
which also employed elections, in Burma the elections were not preceded 
by a new constitution nor by a defined period for party campaigning (since 
parties had never been banned. ) Finally, again in contrast both to the 
Ghanaian and Turkish cases, there were neither any direct military 
controls on thu subsequent regime (as for example in the occupancy of the 
Presidency), nor any indirect structural controls (as for example in 
the influence on the structural organization of the new polity through 
a new constitution. )ý 
The peaceful and successful transfer could take place because three 
essential conditions were satisfied. In the first place, the military 
had committed itself only to short term rule. Thus although there was 
undoubtedly some pressure for military intervention in 1958, the 
intervehtion was at the formal request of the civilian government; 
further, the military regime had maintained a number of formal civilian 
controls (e. g. had retained the legislature and had continued to conform 
tXo the constitution); and finally the military regime had not enacted 
a number of measures which would have been necessary for longer term 
rule, as for example the banning of political parties or the abolition of 
the constitution. Secondl there existed organized civilian forces, which 
could assume the central, decision-making positions. The pattern of 
instability prior to 1958 had not vitiated totally the civilian political 
ft 
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organizations, and further more the civilian political groups were 
permitted to maintain themselves and prepare for transfer during the 
period of the military regime. Third, as we have argued above, although 
the military made little progress in alleviating the basic condition. -> 
of instability, it was successful in bringing about those conditions, 
which would permit the transfer of power. These conditions consisted 
essentially of the temporary assumption of the major decision-making 
organs in order to forestall further atrophy, and the execution of 
national elections. It is interesting to note that following the coup 
of 1962, the military regime immediately dismissed any pretence of 
short term rule, and began to address itself more directlýto the basic 
dissynchronizations, which in the caretaker regime of 1959-60 it had 
only contained. 
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FOOTNOTES: 7: CARETAKER MILITARY REGDIES 
MILITARY I14TERVENTION AND PERFORMANCE IN TURKEY 
1. It is interesting to note that the Ottoman ruling groups perceived 
their relative demise vis-a-vis Europe and attributed this demise to 
certain European military transformations. As a consequence a number 
of military innovations were made, (1826 Janissaries were abolished, 
training schools were established, ) but there wa s no attempt to 
imitate the broader economic, political, social and cultural changes 
which were going on in Europe and which underlay the military changes. 
2. For a survey of Ottoman history seeg B. Lewis, The Emergence of Modern 
Turkey, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961; G. Lewis, Turkey, Benn, 19-9T, -and 
F. Bahrampour, Turkeyl T. Gaus, 1967. 
3. There was a per capita GNP rise of almost 3j%, see J. A. Iforria, "Recent 
Problems of Economic Development in Turkey, " M. E. J., 1960; and an 
investment growth rate of 4.1% 1950-58, (although it must be noted 
that the incremental capital-output ratio had begun to rise from 
1: 1 prior to 1950 to 2: 1 1958-9 and was expected to be 3-4: 1 1950-60), 
see R. D. Robinson, The First Turkish Republic, Harvard Univ. Press, 1963- 
Morris, op. cit. 
Robinson, op. cit. 
Ibid. 
7. In 1946 political parties, other than the RPPq were allowed to form. 
Although a number of parties emerged the DP soon became pz the major 
alternative party. In 1946 it won 64 seats to 395 by the RPP but in 
1950 won 408 to 69 by the RPP. For an account of the emergence of 
the DP, see K. H. Karpat, Turkey's Politics: The Transition to a Multi- 
Party Systeml, Princeton Univ. Press, 1959* 
8. An account of these various measures may be found in Keesinga 
Contemporary Archives. 
In the context of the erosion of the sphere of competence, it is interest- 
ing to note some of the major demands of the opposition parties. Thus 
in 1950 the RPP had called for a second chamber, in 1954 the new 
RNP had called for U. N. rights to be incorporated into the constitution 
as well as the creation of a constitutional court empowered to rule 
on the validity of the bills passed by the Assembly. 
10. Karpat, op. cit. 
11. Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
12. More specifically anyoneýwhose 
party could not join another; 
candidates in every province i 
organization could participate 
candidates submitted must equa 
no person could become a candi 
independents could not be incl 
Contemporary Archives. 
vandidature was discussed by a political 
only parties which produced a list of 
n which they maintain a political 
in the elections; the number of 
.1 the number of deputies to be elected; date for any party but his own; and 
uded on party lists. See Keesings 
13. See K. H. Karpat, "The Turkish Elections of 1957"1 W. Pol. Quart., 1961. 
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28. That the agricultural subsidies etc. were biased towards -a small group 
may be seen in that the 1953 farm mechanization programme benefitted 
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Military Intervention and Perf ormance in Burma 
1. A number of clique groupings emerged in the 1920s. The Thakins (Thakin 
means 'master' and was restricted to address to the British) emerged 
1930-1 as the most militantly 'anti-British group, and was later to 
dominate both the AFPFL and the army. 
2. In May 1945 Governor Dorman-Smith reimposed the 1935 constitution 
and attempted to revamp the former system ignoring the nationalist 
movement of the AFPFL. It soon became clear that this path was 
impossible. Smith was recalled and the next Governor organized an 
Executive Council which-included a majority number of AFPFL. By the 
end of 1946 agreement on independence was reached. On the general 
background see, H. Tinkerg Union of Burma, Oxford Univ. Pressl 1967; 
Maung Htin Aung, A History of Burma,, Columbia Univ. Press, 1967; 
J. F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma. ' Cornell Univ. Press, 1958; and 
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.. 7ý1, 
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119 127 
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Clean had 10. ) See J. H. Badgleyl "Burma's Political Crisiall, Pac. Aff., 1958. 
5. Figures from L. J. Walinskyj Economic Development in Burmal Twentieth 
Century Fund, 1962. 
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1948 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 - 1956 1957 1950 1959 
97 109 102 100 95 99 -106 . 11ý 108 96 
Burma's Gross Domestic Capital Formation (Kyats m. ) (U. N. Stat. Yearbook) 
Value %GNP Construct*",, 11'ransp. /klachinery Increase Stock 
1950 330 11 83 % 17 % -11 76 -1953 652 14 24 224 
1957 1o18 19 60,. -- 
4o 67 
1958 1135 21 57,43 48 
1959 1015 19 61, -39- 110 
7. L. J. Walinskyj op. cit. 
8. For an examination of the constitution and the elections see, J. 
Silverstein, "Burma" , in G. Kahin,, ed., Major Governments of S. E. Asia, Cornell Univ. Press , 1964. _ 
See for example, F. N. Trager, "Political Divorce in Burma! 1q For. Aff., 
1959; H. Tinker, op. cit.; R. Butwell, U Nu of Burma, Stanford Univ. Press, 
1969; J. H. Badgley, "Burma's Political CrisiO, Pac. Aff., 1958-1 1jaung 
Maung, "Burma at the Crossroads", India Quart., 1958* 
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10. J. F. Cady, op. cit.; L. J. Walinsky, "The Rise and Fall of U Null, Pac. Aff. 9 
1965; Maung maung, Burma and General, Ne Wing -, Asia Pu. House, 1969. 
11. There are numerous accounts of tlfd insurrection. See for example, 
F. N. Trager, Bumal Pall 11all, 1966;, B. Crozier, The Rebels, Chatto, 
1960; H. Tinker, op. cit. 
12. The figure of 20,000 is from Trager, op. cit. ' 
In the amnesty period 
1955-6, some 28 000 rebels surrendered; -a further 5,000 surrendered 
in an amnesty of 1958 leaving approximately 10-12,0009 (figures from 
Keesings Contemporary Archives. ) 
13. The figures are taken from H. Tinker, op. cit. 
14. See Maung Maungs op. cit.; R. Butwell, op. cit.; H. Tinker, op. cit. 
15- Keesings Contemporary Archives. 
16. F. Trager, op. cit. 
17. Burma's Defence 
Defence 
Budget 
Def. % Budget 
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1948 1949 
48.4 loo. 8 
489.6 401-3 
10 25 
U. N. Stat. Yearbook) (m. Kyats. ) 
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117-5 136.4ý, 284.6 376-7 368-5 4o7.6 
41g-9 517.8 846-3 1028-3 1136; 0 1275.7 
28 26 33 37 32 33 
18. See F. Trager, op. cit.; Keesings Cont'empo'ra'ry' Ac -Archives. 
19. H. Tinker, op. cit. 
20. L. J. Walinsky, op. cit. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. The first plan was a two year one drawn up in 1948. It was less of a 
plan than an outline of what needed to be done. The second plan, the 
8 Year Plans was drawn up by three American firms, Knappen-Tippotts- 
Abbett, Pierce Management Inc., and R. R. Nathan Assoc. The main 
economic targets were accepted by the Pyidawtha Conference (August 
1952) and the full plan presented at the end. of 1953- However, plan 
proposals had been in effect for"some time prior to the presentation 
date. - 
24. The 1958 split was not unheralded. Indeed in'19ý9 the Socialist Partyq 
the single largest group within the AFPFL, had left the' cabinet; 
Butwell argues that the line of the, 1958 cleavage was clearly ovident, 
from 1953. 
25- See J. Silversteing op. cit.; and H. Ti nker'q opecit, 
26. See J. S. Furnivalls op. cit.; H. Tinker, op. cit.; L. Pyej Politics, 
Personality and Nation Building, Yale 'Univ. Press, 1962. 
27. See R. Butwell, op-cit.; J. Silverstein, op. cit.; L. J. Walin-sky, "The 
Rise and Fall of U NO, OP-Cit-, 
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28. Contacts with the Japanese had been established in thý early thirties 
but it was not until af ter the start of World War 2 that 30 Thakins 
were secretly taken to Japan through a Colonel SuZaki. 
Yrained in 
Japan, these 'Thirty Comrades' formed_the organizational nucleus 
of the first Burmese army. See Maung'llaung, -- op. cit.; and Ba Maw, 
Breakthrough in Burma, Yale Univý Press, 1967- 
29. L. W. Pye, "Army and Politics in Burma",, in J. J. Johnson, ed., Role 
of the Military in Under-developed Countries, Princetbn Univ. Press, 
1962. 
30. It is necessary to note the various titles of the Burmese armed forces. 
December 1941 the Burmese Independence Army (BIA) was established; 
in July 1942 it was transformed into the Burmese Defence Army (BDA), 
in August 1943 into the Burmese National Army (BNA) , in May 1945 
into the Patriotic Burmese Forcesq and in September 1945 into the 
Burmese Army. 
31. Figures from Maung Maungs op. cit.; F. Trager, op. cit.; H. Tinkerl opocite 
32. L. W. Pye, "Army and Politics in Burma", op-cit.; and II. Tinker, op. cit. 
33. D. Guyot, 11BIA: Civilian Independence Movement in Military Garb", 
S. E. Asia Mono. Series, 71 1966. 
34. On the collapse of the BIA see D. Guyot, op. cit. Despite the close 
alliance of the politicians and the military during the independence 
struggle, the heterogeneous nature of the AFPFL and the presence of 
both the Japanese and the British had prevented the various forms of 
the Burmese Army becoming an integral part of the AFPFL. The move- 
ment underground of the PVO, which had originally been established 
as a private army of the AFPFL by Aung San but had been considerably 
transformed beyond this, finally sealed the possibility of any party- 
army relationship as found for example im Algeria or the Communist 
systems. 
35. H. Tinker, op. cit.; Haung Maungj op. cit., 
36. L. W. Pye, op. cit.; A. Joseyj "The PoliticaL Significance of the BWPIII 
Pac. Af f. 1 1958; 14aung Maungj -"Burma at -the Crossroads", opecit, 
37. Maung Maung, Burma and General Ne Win,, op. cit. 
38. F. Trager, op. cit. 11 cites 150 military officers transferred. 
39. The cabinet was reduced from 30 to 14, and consisted with the exception 
of Ne Win and the five state representatives of non-party technical 
personnel. 
40. See for example Maung Maung, op. cit.; R. Butwell, op. cit.; J. Badgley, 
"Military in Burma! ', in W. C. McWilliamsl Garrisons and Governments, 
Chandler, 1967. 
41. L. J. Walinsky, op. cit.; R. Butwell, op. cit. 
42. In this context, it is interesting to note' that the -crime rate was 
cut drastically from 6452 to 46o4i (L. J. Walinsky 9.1 op. cit. ) 
43. See L. W. Pye, op. cit.; R. Butwell, op. cit. 
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44.5000 is the figure given by F. Trager, op. cit.; Keesings Contemporary 
Archives cites 8000. 
45. L. J. Walinsky, op. cit.; Maung Maung, op. cit. 
1+46. The figures are from U. N. Stat. Yearbook, and L. J. Walinsky, op. cit. 9 
and should be compared against the tables provided above. 
47. It is interesting to note in 1964, during the second military regime 
(an innovative one), negotiations with insurgent bands were attempted. 
But the main insurgent groups continued to exist. Both these points 
are made by F. N. Trager, "Burma 1967 -A Better Ending than Beginning"$ 
As. Surv., 1968; and J. Silversteins "Problems in Burma: Economic, 
Political and Diplomatic", As. Surv., 1967. 
48. Keesings Contemporary Archives. See also R. Butwell and Mehden, it "The 
1960 Elections in BurmO, Pac. Aff., 1960. 
49. T. N. Dupuy, "The New Political Outlook in Burma", Far Eastern Survey, 
1960; and J. Silversteinq I'Burmaý', op. cit. I 
50. F. N. Trager, op. cit.; R. Butwell, op. cit.; Maung Maung, op. cit. 
51. The military budget remainedýunchanged. In 1958-9 the military 
budget was 407.6m. Kyats or 32% of the total budget, and in 1959-60 
was 403.3m. Kyats or 31% of the total budget, (U. N. Stat. Yearbook. ) 
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EVALUATION 
The purpose of this final chapter is to evaluate the total study. 
This involves two tasks. The first area of evaluation involves a review 
of the substantive problems of intervention and performance. This will 
take the form of attempting to produce a number of general summary 
propositions and observations covering the phenomena of military 
intervention and performance. The second area of evaluation is closely 
related to the first and involves an analysis of the model, outlined in 
Part One. The focus of this evaluation is substantively oriented, and 
involve s an examination of the value and viability of the basic paradigm 
in confronting the empirical analysis of military intervention and 
performance in new nation state systems. 
Intervention and Performance: A Review 
The most important and rather disappointing conclusion concerning 
military intervention is that it is impossible at this stage to identify 
a single or several syndromes of conditions which precipitate intervention. 
On the one hand, our indicators both of military predispositions and 
capabilities and of nation state instability are not sufficiently 
sophisticated, and on the other hand, the conditions under which coups 
take place are sufficiently complicated, to make this task not feasible 
at the present. Nonethelessq it is possible to point out, assuming a 
nation state system and a professional military organization of non- or 
induced politicization, t4at the propensity for military intervention will 
increase in direct relation to the intensity of instability and the military 
predispositional disatisfactions and organizational capabilities. Further- 
more, the more generalized the instability and the military disatisfactiOns 
and the higher the organization capabilities, then the more likely that 
the military regime will move along the scale from guardian to innovator. 
The second conclusion involve sa number of elaborations concerning 
the indicators and dissynchronization of instability. With reference to 
the indicators of instability, two observations may be made. First, there 
- 333 - 
are a wide number of possible permutations of the indicators of instability, 
and hence a wide variety of conditions under which intervention may take 
place. Second, itis interesting to note that the different types of 
instability vary in the immediacy of their debilitating effects on the 
performance of the political system. Thus, decision-making method and 
monitoring failure have the most immediately debilitating effects, 
followed by support failure (of which withdrawal is the more immediate 
type) and decision-making scope, and finally by institutionalization 
failure. With reference to the dissynchronizations precipitating instability, 
three observations may be made. As in the case of the indicators of 
instability, there is no single syndrome which precipitates instability. 
second, any single dissynchronization, depending on the factors precipit- 
ating it and the particular form it takes, may have varying ramifications 
for individual indicators of instability. For example, participation failure 
will always lead to support failures but it may also in some cases have 
ramificati6ns for decision-making method or institutionalization failure. 
Third, the most common dissynchronizati6ns are those of system cleavage, 
structural inputs of the economy to the polity, the polity's inadequate 
monitoring of the economy, participation failure, and administration 
failure. Fourth, the factors conditioning the development of the dissyn- 
chronizations are the most extensive and most diverse as it is in this 
area that the idiosyncratic focus on individual systems is strongest. 
However, these factors may be ordered under three headings. The first 
concerns the complex of ramifications from the total global constellation 
of nation state systems. This complex includes that body of factors, such 
as-the obligation to interact politically and economically in the inter- 
national market which contains much moe powerful trading partners and 
the problems of compressed economic and political development, which are 
contingent on global patterns of poli tical- ec onomia; -so cial- cultural 
organization and which provide the general backgroundof intense strain 
to instability common to all new nation state systems. The consequence 
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of the global patterning of nation state organizations is that the 
propensities and strains towards instability are much greater for current 
new nation state systems than were any such propensities for the 
currently more developed nation state systems in their earlier stages of 
vertical and horizontal development. The second main heading contains 
those ramifications from pre-nation state organization, i. e. the legacies 
of political, economicq social and cultural organization prior to% nation 
state development. The third and most diversified heading contains those 
ramifications from adaptation to nation state development, i. e. the 
manner of attempting to cope with and accommodate to the major processes 
of nation state development. 
The third general conclusion relates to military predispositions and 
capabilities. Two observations may be made. In the first place the varying 
levels of the development of professionalization and the varying intensities 
and types of the development of politicization lead to some considerable 
diversity in the constellations of predispositions and capabilities. 
Second, despite such diversity in the development of predispositions and 
capabilities, a number of factors tend to encourage the greater compara- 
tive salience of the military organization in new nation state systems 
from the military organization in the more developed (vertically and 
horizonýally) nation state system. Although it would be grossly incorrect 
to underestimate the role and position of the military in the more develop- 
ed nation state system either in terms of budgetary consumption or in 
terms of their influence on certain policy areas, a number of factors 
serve to emphasize the greater hiatus in organizational capabilities and 
predispositional diZatisfactions of the armed forces as against civilian 
political organizations in new n ation state systems as against the same 
juxtaposition in more developed nation state systems. Two main factors 
account for the greater organizational hiatus in the new nation sý, ate 
system. First, because the functional sphere of the military is more 
specific and much less complex. than those of the major civilian political 
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organizations, the military organizational capabilities can develop more 
easilyg more quickly, and More efficiently. Secondl the problems of 
the development of the military are not as intense as the problems of 
the development of the political system in the context of late nation 
state development. Thus since the military is less complex than the total 
structural organization of the civilian polity, it is not faced with 
the same intensity of difficulties of compressed development; or again 
it does not experience the complex of pressures of the global patterning 
of nation state organization, which as noted above provides tremendous 
continuous strain for the development of instability in the political 
systems of new nation states. With reference to the greater predisposit- 
ional dissatisfactions, although the intensity and levels of such 
dissatisfactions may vary markedly, they have in common the fact that 
they st6m essentially from the military's evaluation of its own organization- 
al capabilities and performance vis-a-vis the organizational capabilities 
and performance of the civilian political system. Thus to the extent that 
the military is a more ready and capable consumer of modern technology, 
to the extent that it is more readily attuned to external interaction 
than the greater part of the civilian polity and is as aconsequence more 
readily attuned to the international context of modernization, and to the 
extent that on account of the factors noted immediately above the military 
is more likely to manifest a more satisfactory degree of performance in 
its own functional sphere than is the civilian polity, then the military 
in the new nation state is more likely to generate a higher level of 
Predispositional diezatisfaction than is its equivalent organization in 
the more developed nation state. 
The fourth conclusion relates to the interaction between the 
development of instability-and military predispositions and capabilities. 
The most obvious observation is that the military invariably becomes 
involved in the development of instability in that when civilian groups 
atrophy, then the military is frequently left as the only. complex national 
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organization capable of assuming temporarily the major decision-making 
Positions. However, varying types of instability have different ramific- 
ations for military involvement in the progression of instability. The 
types, which have the most immediate ramifications, are decision-making 
method failure, which frequently leads to military personnel becoming 
involved in civilian decision-making, and monitoring failure, which 
frequently leads to military control of riots or temporary control of 
parts of the administration or even full martial law. A further factor 
of interest is that the development of instability invariably leads to 
the development on the part of the military of politicizati6n - it follows 
that the greater the involvement, the more rapid and intense the develop- 
ment of politicization. 
The fifth conclusion is that given a professional military of non- 
or induced politiCization, the development of instability is the more 
important part of the relation between instability and predispositions- 
capabilities for predicting intervention. However, as prof essionalization 
decreases or alternative forms of politicization appear, then the more 
important the military side of the relation for predicting intervention. 
Overt politicization in a prof essional I 
military is unlikely to lead to 
total intervention except in the situation of the complete breakdown of 
the civilian regime, but it is. likely to, lead to coalition political 
role on the part of the military intermediate between the pressure group 
role of the non-politicized professional military and the total intervent- 
ion of the induced politicized. professional military. The most important 
'ý_ I -_ -ýi ý_ I-tI 
consequences of partisan and civilian sectional politicization are twofold. 
In the first placel partisan or. civilian sectional politicization can 
lead to the phenomenon_, of repetitive coups and are the most common 
precipitant of this phenomenon (although recurrent instability can also 
lead to repetitive coups. ) Military partisan politicization leads to a 
low level of external affective neutrality and as such predisposes the 
military to intervene more frequently. However, military partisan 
- 
v 
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Politicization is more usually the product of military rule and as such 
is more important in influencing performance than intervention. When 
partisan identification is found in military organizations prior to coupst 
it is usually associated with a very low level of military professionaliz- 
ation and with a very low level of nation state development, see for 
example the first coup in Togo. The more common precipitant of repetitive 
coups is civilian sectional politicization. Civilian sectional politiciz- 
ation leads not only to a low level of external neutrality but also a low 
level of internal neutrality and a low level of cohesion. The civilian 
sectional politicization can take place along a number of dimensionst such 
as identification with a civilian party (e. g. Syria during the 1950s and 
early 1960s) or an ethnic group (e. g. Nigeria) or an economic group (eoge 
numerous cases from Latin America). The coup can either take the form of 
a simple military operation or a combined operation with the appropriate 
civilian group. The phenomenon of a combined coup is very rare on the part 
of a politicized professional military. 'Civilian sectional politicization 
leads to repeated coups in that it tends to generate rival groupings 
within the military, and so as civilian 'politi cal fortunes fluctuate then 
so does the possibility for making coups increase. The most chronic 
examples are found in Latin America (see for example the post World War 
2 history of Argentina), although examples are also found less frequently 
outside Latin America as for instance in Syria., Furthermore, this 
phenomenon is likely to become more widespread outside Latin America in 
systemsj which have as yet experienced only'a small number of coups, as 
performance invariably leads to higher politicization and the higher the 
level of politicization then the greater the likelihood of variations and 
diversity in military political evaluations. The second consequence of 
Partisan and civilian sectional politicization is to lead to the occurrence 
of violence at or during the coup. Most coups by politicized professional 
militaries are bloodlessl though they may involve a limited number of 
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deaths and arrests, since such, coups usually take place in conditions of 
a high degree of perceived instability. Partisan or sectional coups are 
core likely to lead to overt violence -by'virtue of clearly defined rival 
groups existing in situations where there is no'consensus on the degree 
of instability or on the mechanism for the resolution of any such instability. 
The degree of violence associated with thisý. type of intervention may 
either be localized and short term., e. g. -Argentina, or more extensive 
and long term involving a civil war, e. g*-Nigeria or Spain. The extent of 
violence is a function of the capabilities, and degree, of polarization of 
the rival groups. 
The main conclusions concerning performance,. may be examined under 
the headings of the four main issue areas. -(Unless otherwise stated, the 
focus is on the prof essional military of non- - or . induced politicization 
in a nation state system. 
With reference to the first -issue area, ', several conclusions concerning 
k decision-making method may be made. First, with .. the exception of care- 
taker regimes, the military invariably dismisses the legislative body, 
the parties and the constitution. ýThe caretaker regime may also make 
some dissolutions, but these are'not usually as extensive. Second, following 
the intervention, two main variants of, executive --decision-making may be 
established. On the one hand, the, leader.: of. the military coup is established 
as the President/Prime Minister, with a cabinet '-in, which -there is a 
varying admixture of civilian and military ministers; or on the other hands 
a military junta is formed as the supreme executive council below which 
there is a civilian cabinet. The ýthird, point, ' which is closely related to 
the one above, conciagns the degree of civilianization'or civilian 
involvement. In this sphere -four main points may -be made. First I the 
Phenomenon of a total military -government is rather anomalous, since 
even the most clearly defined military -regime - (e. gý, Egypt after the 
Nasser vivtory over Neguib) is obligedto rely on the civilian adminis- 
tration. It. is interesting to note that the lower the level of nation 
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state development and hence the less-complex 
the major politicall economics 
social and cultural processes, then the lower the level of any such 
necessary reliance. Seconds military regimes, may vary in terms of the 
degree of militarization in two main ways:, the degree of monop6ly of 
main executive decision-making positions, and the number of military 
personnel employed outside the immediate central- executive decision- 
making positions. Third, the civilian personnel 9, 'employed by the military, 
tend to be technical experts rather than, politician-., Fourth, the process 
of civilianization may take two main forms., The one-involves the civil- 
ianization of the military itself,, i. e. -the, military, becomes a quasi- 
civilian regime through for example the formation of'aýpolitical party 
or the establishment of a strong central civilian assembly. The other 
involves the increasing employment-of civilian trappings by a nonetheless 
explicit military regime in the form of, the greater use, of civilians 
(and especially civilian politician )I ý the,, establishm'ent of a more 
-, or the permitted limited assemblys the promulgation; of a'constitutiong 
return of civilian political parties. The type'and, degree of civilian- 
ization is a function of two interrelated forces, namely the duration 
and the type of the military regime. -The -caretaker -regime generally 
involves the least degree of the first type of civilianization, but 
initially the most marked degree of civilian trappings-; the equilibrator 
reýime will tend to develop both-types of civilianization inýdirect 
relation to the length of its rule; Ahe innovator regime, will initially 
show the least amount of civilianization, but'over: time,. if it'does xMt 
become tran formed into an equilibrating, regime, it. will manifest the 
highest degree of civilianization., The 'fourth main -point, relates to the 
mechanisms of decision-making. 'When': civilianization -is low, the main means 
of decision-making is through, decrees and the -extensive 'use of commissions. 
As civilianization increases, then so, does the, propensity to develop a 
civilian cabinet or some type of civilian body, -either'ltp ppLrticipate in 
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or to monitor decision-making. The fifth point 
is,, that the higher the 
level of sectional politicization, the more likely is the occurrence of 
civil-military coalitions and a more extensive use. of civilian politicians 
(as opposed to technical experts. ) A sixth point concerns what may be 
termed the style of decision-making. Invariably, the military,, tends to 
emphasize simplicity, centralization, and efficiency.: Ln_decision-making. 
Thus military regimes tend to favour unitary,, organizations or decentral- 
ization under firm central control; the numbers involved in decision- 
making are curtailed; frequently the, administration is revamped and 
rationalized; and a very clear structure of decision-making is established. 
Furthermore even under the development, of civilianization, there continues 
to be an emphasis on a strong. central executive, a preference for 
indirect electionsl and a preference for'representation on. functional 
I. I-. ýýI 1- -1 1111ý 
and occupational rather than a party basis. Finally, _given 
the cohesion 
and technical expertise of the military, together with the usual affinity 
of the military with the civil admin. istration, it may be, noted that 
military regimes rarely experience any major, difficulties concerning 
the decision-making method. 
The scope of decision-making shows much greater-, diversity, than the 
method of decision-making, and is of. course, contingent on the type of 
military regime. The degree of 
-change, -induced 'by 
a., military regime is a 
function of three interrelated factors. -The, 
broader, the degree of 
instability, the lower the level of nation state d. evelopment, and the 
higher the military organizational capabilities and, predispositional 
dissatisfactions I then the greater. the propensity f or innovation. Thus 
unlike the case of decision-making, method, many, of the factors governing 
the scope of decision-making lie outside - 
the, control of, 
I 
the military. 
The success of the military with__ r, ef erence to. decision-making scope is 
again much more variable than the success of decision-making method, and 
is entirely contingent on the legacy of instability, for the'military 
regime and the skill level of the military., 
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With reference to the institutionalization process, a, number of 
points may be noted. Firstj although the military'can usually satisfy 
quite easily the clear establishment'of -the major political offices, 
the 
other processes of institutionalization are much more'problemmatic. 
Thus, 
given the abolition of the constitution and all'major civilia n 
bodies, 
the mechanisms and rules of procedure'for political interaction 
become 
very difficult to identify. Furthermorel theýmilitary is obliged to create 
legitimacy for the new offices and rules'of procedure. Threeýmain factors 
govern the success of the military with reference'to institutionalization. 
The longer the time period, the lower the degree of "military, cohesion, 
and the lower the degree of civilian 'involvement, then 'the, 'gr eater the 
problems of institutionalization for the military., 
(It is interesting 
to note that it is impossible f or a partisan or civilian's ec tional 
military regime to satisfy the institutionalization process. ') 
ý The 
caretaker regime experiences the least difficulty with reference to 
institutionalization 9 in that it is--committed 
to-a very .: short, time period 
(it is necessary to recall that institutionalization failure'has the 
slowest reaction for instability) and it is_' 
irýquently, invited to make 
the intervention and it involves -a high degree of, civilianizatiom. The 
shorter term equilibrator and innovative regimes may also'experience no 
major problem assuming there was a high'degree of'popular support for 
the intervention and assuming military Cohesion'was retained. However, as 
the time period for military regimes extends, then some 'degree of 
institutionalization, such- as the'use-of 'referendums orý'the' promulgation 
of a constitution must take place. If this'-proces-s does take placeý' then 
the military regime is likely to'become progressively transformed; I if it 
does not take place or if partisan or sectional 
. 
'pol. iticization'develops, 
then the military regime will progressively experiencethe-development 
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The mechanisms available to the military f or supTort mobilization are 
fourfold. The first is that of the referendum. Referendum -are most 
frequently employed in an institutionalization I 
capacity 
I 
in such circum- 
stances as the legitimation of a military man as 
head. of the-military 
Junta or the legitimation of a political policy- innovation, 'of which the 
most frequent is a new constitution. The primary limitation of this 
mechanism is that it Jr. impossible to use them. frequently, -they provide 
for a very retricted type of participation, and usually when employed by 
military regimes the range of choice inherent in the ref erendum is very 
restricted. A second mechanism is the use of a limited form of civilian 
participation thrjugh two main organizations. ý The one ispome form of 
civilian cabinet, but in this context it must be noted that the cabinet 
usually has only advisory status and usually consists Of - non-Party 
personnel. The other is the use of some form of civilian assembly. Such 
assemblies may be either functionally specific (the most common Veing 
that which is established to produce a new constitution) or more 
generalized. However, such assemblies usually 
`conýiain, a "large number of 
military-appointed members and representation, is usually along functional 
rather than party lines. Except in the-case, of, certain caretaker-regimes 
in which the pre-coup assembly is -retained, - such assemblies are usually 
associated with the later stages of a military, regime. A further mechanism 
is for the military tp develop, a more comprehensive structure for 
civilian participation, e. g. the BD, system inýPakistan, or the-adapted 
GD system in Indonesia. Again it is common to, find strong military- 
appointive powers, emphasis on functional-, rather than party representation, 
the use of indirect electionss, and a'close parallel- between -the particip- 
ation and administrative structures., Finally- the military may ýorganize 
its own political party, This may - take - three'main - forms. First the 
military may organize its own political party, or'join an existing party 
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working within the type of framework noted 
immediately above (examples 
are the Indonesian military organization Golkar or the joining by Ayub 
YJ= of the 11L. ) Second, the militarýy MY organize its own political 
party, which is the sole partyl eg. the ASU, 
in Egypt. In both these two 
basic cases, the party organization in terms of support mobilization is 
usually very limited in that it is governed by, a"number Of military 
constraints. The third form is the situaýi6n where the military constitutes 
the leadership of a political party$, which then, freely competes with 
other civilian political parties, e. g. S. Korea Thils 'type, of party 
f ormation is usually coterminous with a high if 'not total degree of 
transformation on the part of the military regime. In general, the 
caretaker regimes will employ either or both of the first two,. 'mechanisms; 
equilibrator regimes will employ either or both ot the second'and third 
mechanisms; innovative regimes will employ either or both'of the third 
and fourth mechanisms. 
The key variables covering the, success of, support mobilization are: 
length of rule, level of support at the time of the'coups. nature of the 
support mechanism employed by-the military, 'and. the degree of transformation 
on the part of the military. Caretaker regimes-. generally,, experience 
little problems with reference to support mobilization on account od the 
short period of rule; short term equilibrators may also experience little 
difficulty assuming a high degree of popular suPport-for the intervention. 
Howeverl since popular participation is one of'the''cardinal, features of 
the nation state system, the longer termýmilitarY-regimes are'obliged to 
come to terms with some form of support mobilization and hence are obliged 
to develop either the third or fourth mechanisms noted above* The degree 
of support for the military at the -time of 
the 
-coup is 
I very important 
in providing legitimation for the-military regime. The'tYpe of support 
for the military at the intervention may. -either take the form of a 
civilian invitation for intervention (e. g. -Burma'or,, the first Sudanese 
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coup), or spontaneous civilian demonstration of support at the time of 
the coup (e. g. Indonesia, Ghana, S. Korea. ) Usually all coups by profess- 
ional militaries of non- or induced politicization will be accompanied 
by popular demonstrations of support. However, it must be emphasized 
that this type f upport is both very volatile and of short duration 
and lies essentially outside the control of the military. The nature of 
civilian support mechanisms at the time of the coup is of vital import- 
ance. Where civilian support mechanisms are defunct, or where civilian 
parties are of a clique nature, then even the long term military regime 
may not experience any significant support failure assuming some form 
of support is mobilized. Thus Ghana or Egypt experienced no major difficulty. 
(In Ghana the CPP was defunct, the coup was popularly received, and 
the military regime was of short duration; in Egypt the civilian parties 
prior to the coup were of a clique nature. ) When all civilian support 
mechanisms are not defunct, then any long term military regime can expect 
to experience considerable difficulties. ( This would have been the case 
in Turkey had military rule been extended, and was also true to a degree 
in Pakistan. ) The importance of the type of support mechanism and the 
problems associated with each have already been reviewed. The major 
problem concerning the degree of transformation on the part of the 
military regime has reference primarily to the longer term regimes. The 
problem stems essentially from the fact that since support mobilization 
is one of the main processes of the nation state system, assuming the 
military regime is to perform in 'consonance with nation state developments 
then the military regime is obliged to use either the third or fourth 
mechanisms noted above. The main problems then are twofold. First, the 
military is ill-adapted to mobilize support successfully and further tends 
to favour a range of mechanisms, such as indirect elections, strong 
appointive powers, and subordination of party mechanisms to the 
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administrative structure, which over time tend to be inadequate for 
support mobilization. Second, military regimes experience the dilemma 
of total transformation, e. g. S. Korea, in which case where continued 
reliance on direct military support is maintained in situations where 
popular civilian support is waning, then partisan or sectional politiciz- 
ation is likely to develop, e. g. Brazil. In sum, long term military rule 
will lead either to total transformation, partisan or sectional politic- 
ization, or a high degree of support failure. 
The monitoring mechanisms avaliable to military regimes are generally 
extensive. Thus the military has control of the monopoly of force; it 
has control of a complex administrative machine; and with the occasional 
exc9tion of caretaker regimes, usually invokes martial law in the period 
immediately following intervention. The more marked the propensity for 
innovation or the greater the degree of partisan politicization, then 
the greater the salience and intensity of monitoring mechanisms. Military 
regimes rarely experience any monitoring failure on account of any default 
in their own monitoring capacities, but can experience monitoring failur, e 
on account of failure in other areas of performance. Invariably a high 
degree of salience of monitoring mechanisms on the part of a military 
regime over time is indicative of failure (usually institutionalization 
or support failure) in other areas of performance. 
With reference to the second performance issue area, the conclusions 
are rather limited. Three main ones may be noted. First, it is impossible 
to review briefly the success of military regimes in this area, since 
such a review would have to take account not only of a wide variety of 
dissynchronizations, involving a large number of idiosyncratic precipit- 
ating factors (since the abstract dissynchronizations tell us vvry little)l 
but also of a wide range of military organizational capabilities. The 
only possible general obsxvvation is that when the factors precipitating 
dissynchronizations are of a simple pragmatic nature, then, assuming a 
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high degree of military organizational capabilities, the military regime 
may be successful. When the factors precipitating dissynchronizations 
are associated with the major debilitation of a large number of civillan 
political organizations (inparticular civilian political parties), then 
the military regime is rarely successful., In sum, the military regime is 
generally more successful in halting an increase in instability than in 
alleviating the dissynchronizations. Second, when partisan or sectional 
politicization take place, then the military regime becomes a major force 
in fostering instability, and the stability in the political system 
cannot be restored until the partisan or sectional politicization is 
eradicated. The combination of an un table partisan or sectional military 
regime together with civilian instability can lead to total system 
breakdown, as is likely in Pakistan. Third, although it is impossible to 
identify a simple range of conditions governing the success of the military 
in alleviating the dissynchronizations of instabilityg it is easy to 
identify the situation in which successful alleviation takes place, namely 
the complete withdrawal of the military and the establishment of a stable 
civilian regime. 
The third issue area to be examined is that of the ramifications of 
military predispositions and capabilities for performance and vice versa. 
In general, it is the military predispositional dissatisfactionsg which 
dictate the scope of the regime. Simple incumbent dissatisfaction will 
lead to a guardian regime. A caretaker regime will usually involve specific 
incumbent, policy and low level structural dissatisfaction. An equilibrator 
regime will involve a more generalized incumbent and policy dissatisfaction 
and a higher level of structural dissatisfaction. An innovative regime 
will involve a high level of structural dissatisfaction, to which policy 
and incumbent dissatisfactions are subordinate in importance. The primary 
consequence of skill level for performance relates directly to the success 
of the military in decision-making and the consequent success of the 
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military in effecting any degree of change in the system. The composition 
and structure, the autonomy, and the cohesion of the military only have 
any significant consequence for performance when the level of profession- 
alization is low. For a military regime to maintain itself without 
experiencing any major breakdown, it is necessary that any sectional 
recruitment base loose its significance and that a high degree of 
cohesion be maintained. The generalized consequence of a low level of 
development of these factors is to le ad to the development of a high 
degree of partisan or sectional politiciziation. More specifically, when 
the recruitment base has not lost its significance, then the military 
regime will tend to perform in the interets of that base; when autonomy 
is low, military rule is likely to be prolonged; when cohesion is low, 
repetitive coups, with obvious consequences for performance, are the 
-likely consequence. In sum, performance, under the low level of 
development of these three factors, is likely to lead to an exacerbation 
of instability. 
The primary ramification of performance on military predispositions 
and capabilities is through the increase in politiicization. With the 
exception of skill levels, which may be assumed to increase, politicization 
becomes the major filter through which organizational capabilities and 
predispositions are effected. The military assumption of the major political 
decision-making positions inevitably leads to an enhancement of the degree 
of politicization. The consequences of such increased politicization for 
the military can be minimized as long as politicization is uniforml and 
does not undergo transformation from the induced-generalized type. The 
two major variables governing the transformation of politicization are 
the duration of the regime and the degree of change induced by theregime. 
The shorter th/e duration and the lower the level of change, the less 
likely any politicization transformation. Howeverl a number of factors 
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associated with performance tend to encourage either non uniform 
or a very high level of politicization. The former may lead to sectional 
and the latter to partisan politicization. Thus assumption of the main 
policy decision-making positions encourages debate over different 
perceptions of the role of the military regimd, the particular duration 
of the regimej the degree of change to be induced by the regime, and the 
type of regime to which transfer may be made. This type of debate, which 
takes place in all military regimes, becomes particularly acute when 
military cohesion is not high. The consequence of partisan politicization 
is to lead to a marked decline in military autonomy, which in turn affects 
performance by making the military regime impervious to facilitating a 
return to civilian government, which in turn leads to the development of 
institutionalization and support failure on the part of the military 
regime, (both Greece and Brazil at the present time are good examples. ) 
Civilian sectional politicization leads to a breakdown in cohesion, which 
may generalize in varying degree to all other military capabilities, and 
which will in turn lead to the possibility of the development of repetitive 
coups. It is very unusual for an intervention precipitated by partisan 
politicization to lead to a military regime in which there is a transform- 
ation to induced-generalized politicization, (although there are examples 
such as Vargas in Brazil. ) The most common consequences of interventions 
precipitated by sectional politicization are to lead either to partican 
politicization when military cohesion can be established, or to lead to 
a continuation of sectional politicization inducing repeated coups. 
The fourth and final performance issue area to be examined concerns 
the transfer of control. Basically three main types, with several aub- 
typesl may be noted. The first type provides the greatest problems for 
identification, and concerns the civilianization process. The identific- 
ation problems stem from the fact that the civilianization process is 
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generally very gradualg and hence it is difficult to establish clear cut- 
off points. It has already been noted that the conception of a total 
military regime is. rather anomalous and that any military regime must 
include a degree of civilian involvement. Of the two types of civilianiz- 
ation noted above, only the first is compatible with possible military 
transfer. Although the process of civilianization is likely to be 
gradual, transfer can only be said to have been achieved once the former 
military regime has permitted alternative civilian forms to emerge, and 
has transformed its support base from the military to a civilian group* 
This process can be relativbly clear cut, as for example when the military 
organizes a political party and subsequently competes with other parties 
in a general election (c. f. S. Korea), or it may be more complex and 
confusing (c. f. the establishment of Peron. ) This type of transfer is 
not very common and is most likely to take place when the military 
manifests a high degree of politicization and where alternative civilian 
ruling groups are weak. 
The second basic type of transfer is overthrow of the military regime 
and has three sub types. All these sub-types, by virtue of being overthrowe, 
are more easily identifiable than the above type. The first sub-type is 
overthrow of a military regime by popular civilian forces. This type of 
I transfer is always the product of the development of a high degree of 
instability within the military regime, usually of an institutionalization 
or support failure format and will always be accompanied by a high degree 
of monitoring failure. The consequences of this type of overthrow may be 
twofold. On the one hand, overthrow can lead to the establishment of a 
civilian regime (e. g. Sudan 1964); on the other hand, it may lead to the 
establishment of a new military regime (Pakistan 1969. ) The particular 
form of the consequence of the overthrow is contingent on whether there 
exists a sufficiently well-organized civilian political body, which is 
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capable of constituting an alternative regime. The second sub-type of 
overthrow is that accomplished by. an alternative military group manifesting 
civilian sectional politicization. Given the incidence of non professional 
politicization, this type of tran fer is not necessarily associated with 
instability on the part of the incumbent regime. The overthrow may lead 
either to a new military government (see numerous cases in Latin America, 
but also a number in Africa such as Nigeria, Togo, or Dahomey), or to 
a coalition civil-military government (this is particularly common when 
politicization is along party lines, e. g. Syria), or to a civilian 
government of which the military approves (e. g. Sierre Leone 1968). The 
third type of overthrow is that effected by a rising professional group 
in the military against an incumbent partisan or sectional military regime. 
This type of transfer usually leads to a short term rule on the part of 
the professional military group, during which time elections are otganized 
for a return to civilian governmentl (a good example is provided by the 
Venezuela coup of 1958. ) 
The third major type of transfer is the spontaneous withdrawal of the 
military. This type has two very different sub-types. The first concerns 
the situation where a civilian sectional politicized military will hand 
over control to a civilian regime of which it approves and to which it will 
lend tacit support. The second sub-type relates to the classic tran3fer 
by a professional military of non- or induced politicization, (e. g. Burma, 
Turkey). In variably the process by which this transfer takes place involvea 
the promulgation of a constitution, a period during which civilian political 
parties are allowed to form, the holing of a general election, and the 
final surrender to the victorious group' in the election. This type of 
transfer can only occur when three conditions are concurrent*. the existence 
of a professional military of induced politicizationt the perception by 
the incumbent military regime of the completion of its tasks, and the 
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availability of alternative civilian ruling groups. This type of transfer 
is invariably the most peaceful, and is not indicative of any marked 
degree of instability. Although the transfer is clear cut, it is interest- 
ing to note the types of post transfer control, which may be retained by 
the military. First, it is possible that no controls are retained, as in 
Burma. Second, the military may have some indirect control on the post 
transfer polity by virtue of having framed the constitution of the subsequent 
civilian polity, or of having banned or placed certain retrictions on 
parties, as in Ghana or Turkey. Thirdq the military may retain a number 
of limited direct controls, such as the'occupancy of the Presidency, or 
a delegated number of seats in the civilian assembly, as again in Ghana 
and Turkey. Fourth, the military may employ a more nebulous mechanism, 
namely the threat of a further coup. 
The Model and Paradigm: A Review 
In general terms, we argue that on the credit side we have provided 
an empirical paradigm for the comparative analysis of military inter- 
vention and performance and also, through the application of this 
paradigm, to a number of case studies, the beginnings of an empirical theory 
in the form of a number of interrelated, general, 'comparative findings, 
On the debit side, we have not provided a compr`-6n I sive empirical theory 
of military intervention and performance. Both these sides may be examined. 
With reference to the limitations of the study,, the most general 
observation is that a compXrehensive empiric , al theory'has not been 
produced. Such a theory would encompass a-body of statements with 
reference to interventionj which would define a single or several sets 
of conditions, on the basis of which probability #atements on the 
liýelihood of intervention could be made. A similar body of statements 
covering the main issue areas of performance would also be required. 
Given this major limitation of our research, three major areasl which 
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are seen as being responsible for this limitation, may be examined. The 
first area is that of the nature of the problem. It is something of a 
truism that different types of substantive problems generate different 
types of problems for research and empirical theory formatio#. Our problem 
area lies in the general field of macro comparative analysisq which in turn 
means that we are dealing with a very complex phenomenon. The specific 
ramifications of the complexity of our particular substantive macro 
comparative problem are several. First, it is necessary to deal with 
a large number of cases. (Thus even within the parameters defined above, 
military interventions have been prevalent in Latin America from the 
1930s onwards, in the Middle Fast and Asia from the 1950s, and in Sub- 
Saharan Africa from the 1960s. ) Second, it is necessary to mobilize a 
large number of variables, which must cover both, nation state organiz- 
ation and military organization. Third, given the complexity of the 
phenomena under examination, it is impossible to identify single syndromes. 
For example, in the case of the nation state,, it was necessary to identify 
a number of political, economic, socialq and cultural processes, which 
could be manifested in a number od different ways, and which could cohere 
in a variety of manners - the same holds true for military organization 
in that the definitional traits may constellate in a number of fashions. 
Furthermore the problem of permutation becomes eee morecomplex since 
we are interested not in a single phenomenon butin the interaction 
between two complex ones. The fourth problem is that of aftyx data. Again 
it is a truism to note that the broader, both the comparative and macro 
focus, the more difficult is the problemlof data collection. Although 
this problem is constantly declining, there are still-a'significant number 
of nation state systems on which there is very, little data, and a much 
larger number on which data is rather spgradic. 
The second problem area relates to the, 
-particular researchapproach, 
which is adopted for problem solving,, and which in this case was that of 
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empirical theory formation. As in the case of the type of research 
problem, the main difficulties stem from the complex-nature of empirical 
theory formation. Two general problem areas having ramidications for 
research may be noted. The first problem area relates to that constell- 
ation of problems concerning the application, of, the scientific paradigm. 
I 
Several important problems may be noted. First, the problems of data 
quantification are much more complex in'the social sciences by virtue of 
the nature of the data. Second, we are dealing with phenomena, which on 
a relatively short time scale (i. e. a number of, years) , are undergoing 
rapid transformation. Thirds since for most macro problems variable 
manipulation is very difficult, if not-impossible, itis very difficult 
to establish precise experimental designst' or to establish good control 
cases, or to repeat experiments. The'second problem area relates to the 
status of empirical theory within the general perspective of political 
science inquiry. Since empirical theory formation is-in many ways the 
final goal of political analysis and since empirical theory formation 
is certainly the most ambitious task within, political analysis I an 
additional number of problems are generated. Thus'we, are obliged to 
combine both abstract analysis and empirical reaearch; 'we, are obliged 
to devise heuristic mechanisms of classification and problem definition; 
or again we are obliged to move beyond description to Provide explanations. 
The third problem area relates to the difficulties and, limitations 
inherent in our particular model and the application of that model. A 
number of main problems may be noted., Although we have' extenzively employed 
scales for the identification of nation, state'processes, types of instability, 
and military predispositions and capabilities, and although the scalos 
have been rigorously employed on a'comparative basis, - the acalea have 
been non numerate. The distinction between quantative and non-quantativo 
scales and measures in terms of the distinction between numerate and 
non numerate scales is rejected, by us. Non-numerate scales may be 
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quantattive in so far as they are empirically defined and-are capable 
through empirical application of identification and differentiation of 
varying intensities of the phenomenon being scaled. Assuming quantative 
scales are being employed, then a distinctionýmay be made between numerate 
and non-numerate quantative scales. The former are more desirable in 
that as data collection becomes more preciset then so'too can data analysist 
and hence eppirical theory formation can become. more, sophisticated and 
more powerful. Thus, although we'have used, quantative scales, these scales 
have been non-numerate, and hence have lacked the: degree-- of power associated 
with numerate ones. A covTollory problem closely, related to, Ithat 
of 
scaling concerns change along these scales over time. Although by vittue 
of the scales being quantative, it has always been possible to identify 
changes over time, it is difficult to make precise statements on the 
importance of varying degrees of change_'., Such refinement can only be 
achieved through the use of regression-analysis, whereby the main 
regression line provides the reference line from which amounts of change 
may be assessed. Regression analysisq however, requires numerate scales. 
A further corrollQx-i is that, there is no method by which it in pos3ible 
to decide whether the various indices, which have been u3ed to identify 
the major scales, are unidimensional or. whether. they tap - several dimensions, 
Although the possibility of multi-dimensionality wi 
I 
thin a single scale 
has been tested crudely, itis only through correlation, analysis that a 
satisfactory test can be made I but. again our scales are not suf f iciontly 
refined to make this possible. A, second problem involvea the definition 
of the. parameters. Although the parameters are'. caýabl, e of - satinfying 
their primary role, namely boundary identification, they lack a final 
degree of precision. Thus without, clearly identifiable cut-off points, 
it is impossible to make rigorous. classifications-$ i. e. thero. jo thoroforo 
some degree of ambiguity in the inclusion. and exclusion of caze3. 
However, this is a perennial problem in, the, social sciences, which is 
attributable largely to the nature of, our'data. The second problem 
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concerning parameters is a more particular ones and relates 
to the 
parameters defining the types of military regimes. 
These parameters, 
though satisfying their primary role, are -rather' inadequate. 
A more 
satisfactory typology of military regimes would have 
to differentiate 
more precisely the change dimension, and would also have to 
include 
dimensions covering the direction of change and the intensity of the 
composition of the military regime* 
'ilýe` third'and final problem area 
relates to the case study aspect of the study. Simple case study analysis 
involves a number of major problems, many of which were reviewed in 
the 
critique of the individualizing studies in the first chapter. By using 
case study analysis within a comparative model, ý I manyýof'these problems 
are circumvented. Nonetheless, a number 'of 'specific additional problems 
remain. First, any comprehensive survey of intervention and performance 
using the case study method is impossibleas there are too many-cases. 
Second, there is no methodological rationale' for'the'selection of our 
cases. Although the number of cases is too large to cover them all, thin 
I 
number is too small and too diversified I to I employ satisfactorily 
standard sampling techniques. Third, since data' in, macro comparativo 
analysis is not uniform, some case studies have more limited and sporadio 
data than others. (For example data on Pakistan is much more extensive 
than on Burma. ) 
On the credit side, five main factors may be noted. In the firat 
place, we have developed a model or paradigm for research, which ic 
comparatively and empirically viable., Since' the' model 'is drawn in abstract 
processual terms, it is viable across'a wide number of hitherto divorgont 
cases. Thus, it is possible to identify and generate' a-. collection of 
uniformities across a large number "of --substantive cases of military 
intervention and performance. Second, since'the model has an explanatory 
basis and is drawn in heuristic terms', "which focus on change, it is 
capable not only of identifying 'comparative uniformities but'also of 
providing explanatory generalizations, governing these '. unif ormitieS 
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In the third place, although the initial focus. is on, comparative concepts 
(both in the analysis of instability and of the military), which are 
independent of individual cases, the utilization of the case study 
method within a broader model enables account to b. e taken of idiosyncratic 
variation, and thereby permits the detailed but still comparative 
analysis of individual cases. Fourth, the parameters, despite their 
limitations, have proved of considerable value in identifying and 
classifying, in a manner amenable to comparative and explanatory analysis, 
an area, which hitherto has remained rather amorphous. One of the main 
conclusions of this study is that as long as research regards military 
intervention and performance as a uniform and unitary subject area 
without defining varying types of intervention, -varying 
types of military, 
xxt varying types of system in which intervention, is made, and varying 
types of military regimes, then the body of generalizations, that will 
be produced, will be very trivial and hopelessly abstracted. Fifth, the 
attempt to identify various types of instability and varying factors 
precipitating such instability in the'nation state is seen as-making 
some inroad into a complex research areaq which has been widely ignored. 
There is very little work on instability and, change-in general, which ic 
both empirically applicable and which focuses beyond trivial indicatoral 
.' such as number of coups or number of deaths, in domestic riotat which aro 
both superficial and have no explanatory payoff. 
In sum, despite the limitations of the study, it its claimod that wo 
have provided a paradigm f or the comparative, empirical analyj3ij3 - Of 
military intervention and performance, which is - capable ý of application 
to a wide number of seemingly discrete cases. Further, to the extont 
that the model is not only comparatively viable, i* 'e. can produco 
comparative uniformities, but also, has an explanatory base, then it is 
possible in addition to provide explanatory generalizations covering ouch 
uniformities. Through the application'of the paradigm to, CMpirical 
analysis, it has been possible to analyzea number of complicated- 
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